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THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE

*and Other Essays in Social
Psychology*

BY

ELLSWORTH FARIS

Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago

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To

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

In Grateful Remembrance

PREFACE

The bringing together of the materials in this book into one volume is in answer to requests made from time to time by my former students who are teaching sociology and who wish to have their students read them. Some of these think that a somewhat wider public might also find them of interest. Nearly everything here presented has been published before, but the period of publication extends over several years and the journals and books in which many of these essays first saw the light are, in some libraries, inaccessible. All reluctance was ended by the publisher's willingness to accept the book "sight unseen."

The problem of selection and rejection was not an easy one, but doubtful cases were referred to my colleagues in the department at Chicago, who have counseled me with merciless affection. The effort has been made to include a representative list of discussions on some five leading interests with which, in my teaching and writing, I have been concerned. Much of it is polemic, which will surprise no one who is familiar with the history of social psychology in this generation. It must be confessed that there is a disturbing amount of repetition which will try the patience of some readers, with whose feelings I find myself in entire sympathy. The explanation is easier than the defense. The selections were published separately and for the most part reached different readers. Now that they have been brought together, it is somewhat embarrassing, but efforts at elision proved so difficult that I have taken more comfort than I am entitled to take from a remark made by one of my old teachers: "Saint Paul discovered the foolishness of preaching, but I have discovered the virtue of repetition."

Acknowledgments and thanks are due to the editors and publishers who have kindly consented to permit the reprinting of these essays. "Current Trends in Social Psychology" appeared in *Essays in Philosophy*, published by the Open Court Publishing Company as a commemorative volume in honor of

my former teachers of philosophy, Professors Tufts, Mead, Ames, and Moore. This will account for the personal nature of some of the references in the text. The same remark applies to "The Concept of Social Attitudes," first published in *Social Attitudes* by Henry Holt & Company in honor of my former colleague, W. I. Thomas. "Social Evolution" appeared in *Contributions of Science to Religion*, published by D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc. "The Origin of Punishment" appears in *Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions*, Little, Brown & Company, but was first published in the *International Journal of Ethics*. *Ebony and Topaz*, issued by the magazine *Opportunity*, published "The Natural History of Race Prejudice."

Acknowledgment is also due the editors and publishers of the *Southwestern Political Science Quarterly* for permission to use "Racial Attitudes and Sentiments"; to *The Journal of Religious Education* for similar courtesy in connection with "The Nature and Significance of the Mores" and the three essays that immediately follow: "The Fundamental Tendencies of Children," "Discipline in the Modern Family," and "Implications of Behaviorism." *Sociology and Social Research* published "Social Attitudes," *The Social Service Review* the essay on "Racial Superiority," and *The Journal of Educational Sociology* the one on "Two Educational Problems." In addition, the editors of the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society* have given permission to use four of the articles that first appeared in those volumes, and the University of Chicago Press has granted formal permission to reprint freely from the *American Journal of Sociology*, where several of the included essays appeared while I was editor of the *Journal*.

The discussion on "Standpoint and Method of Sociology" was presented before the Society for the Study of Child Development. It was prepared more as an outline than as a finished paper and there is still some doubt as to the appropriateness of its inclusion. This doubt concerns only the adequacy of the form; the importance of the problem is undeniable. The essay in question has not been published before. "The Subjective Aspect of Culture" has been rewritten.

My former secretary, Mrs. Katherine Niles Lind, copied out the chapters from the books and helped much to lighten the task. My present secretary, Mrs. Martha Gross, most generously

helped as the book was going through the press. Lyle M. Spencer, Fellow in Sociology, did most of the work on the index.

My debt to my colleagues at Chicago is too great ever to be paid and my obligation to other writers in these fields is so obvious that no reader can fail to see it.

ELLSWORTH FARIS.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
April, 1937.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE.	vii
I. INTRODUCTION.	1
PART I. GROUP AND PERSON	
II. THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE	7
III. THE SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF CULTURE	21
IV. THE PRIMARY GROUP: ESSENCE AND ACCIDENT	36
V. THE SECT AND THE SECTARIAN.	46
VI. ARE INSTINCTS DATA OR HYPOTHESES?	61
VII. THE CONCEPT OF IMITATION.	73
VIII. THE ORIGIN OF PUNISHMENT	84
IX. STANDPOINT AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY ILLUSTRATED BY THE STUDY OF PUNISHMENT.	96
PART II. CONDUCT AND ATTITUDES	
X. SOCIAL ATTITUDES.	127
XI. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES	132
XII. ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR	144
XIII. CURRENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.	155
XIV. BORDERLINE TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY	167
XV. OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS.	173
XVI. AN ESTIMATE OF PARETO.	190
PART III. SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION	
XVII. THE SOCIOLOGIST AND THE EDUCATOR	205
XVIII. TWO EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS.	210
XIX. THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MORES.	216
XX. THE FUNDAMENTAL TENDENCIES OF CHILDREN	226
XXI. DISCIPLINE IN THE MODERN FAMILY.	234
XXII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORISM FOR CHARACTER EDUCATION	241

PART IV. SOCIOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY

XXIII. PRELITERATE PEOPLES: PROPOSING A NEW TERM	251
XXIV. ETHNOLOGICAL LIGHT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS	254
XXV. THE MENTAL CAPACITY OF PRELITERATES	262
XXVI. CULTURE AND PERSONALITY AMONG THE FOREST BANTU	278
XXVII. SOCIAL EVOLUTION.	289

PART V. THE SOCIOLOGY OF RACIAL CONFLICT

XXVIII. RACIAL ATTITUDES AND SENTIMENTS	317
XXIX. RACIAL SUPERIORITY.	329
XXX. THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE	338
XXXI. IF I WERE A JEW	350
XXXII. THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE	354
INDEX.	367

I

INTRODUCTION

We are human because we can talk; civilized when we can write; and scientific when we have a sound method of isolating problems, seeking facts, inventing explanations and testing these objectively. And so we are scientific in some of our activities and not in others. In some fields we are semi-scientific, in others only proto-scientific. Social psychology is not a mature science nor a secure one; a scientific social psychology seems at times little more than a program and a hope. But the need for such a science is widely felt and the possibility of perfecting it is attractive. The words I have written in this book are intended to claim little more.

Although statements about society and personality occur in the oldest books and although even in the proverbs of the anthropophagi there is much of wisdom about life and its struggles, yet the systematic search for sound methods of investigation in this aspect of nature is of so recent a date that ours could almost be called the youngest daughter of Science. And it is this temporal immaturity that justifies the pride that we may take in the little we have done and makes unfair any reproach that we have not done more.

Sciences take time to grow. As early as 1543 Copernicus proved the revolution of the heavenly orbs, but it was not till 1687 that Newton discovered the formula that reduced the movements to law. And if it took 144 years for celestial mechanics to take that single step, sociology should neither feel nor incite impatience: perhaps by the year 2050 we shall have broken the record.

This book is, of course, not even an attempt to present a systematic statement of our achievements thus far. The articles, published separately over a period of years, are largely occasional in character and represent a variety of aspects of the general enterprise. The controversial chapters reflect the widespread interest in such problems as the existence of specific human instincts, the doctrines of behaviorism and psychoanalysis, and the book by Pareto, whose views were promoted by an enthusias-

tic group with almost the fervor of a cult. The conflicting doctrines of race have also occasioned spirited debate among us. It is hoped, however, that the reader will find in the negative statements on points of view that are rejected some affirmative and positive implications.

There are other chapters devoted to specific problems in theoretical social psychology in an effort to make a contribution to the problems that were and are still current. Several discussions are included which attempt to make a concrete application of the principles adopted to specific situations in education, religion, and race relations.

The ethnological chapters are based on a residence of seven years among the Forest Bantu in a village which is now a suburb of Coquilhatville, the capital of the Equatorial Province in the Belgian Congo. Thirty years afterward, opportunity was afforded for a brief field trip to the same region, and I have attempted to record some of the theoretical implications of the changes that have taken place.

Some of the most conspicuous inconsistencies have been altered, due to the changes in my own thinking that have taken place within the span of years during which the various portions of this work first saw publication. Others have been allowed to remain, and some have doubtless escaped attention. But it is hoped that a certain consistency may appear and that some contribution is made toward the achievement of a task which can be accomplished only over a period of many years and by the combined efforts of many men.

If an effort were made to present a systematic social psychology, it would be a difficult thing to do. Indeed, an attempt to do so now would, if honestly and intelligently made, acknowledge many gaps in our knowledge and many problems still unsolved. It is something, perhaps, to aid in presenting a point of view from which discussions can start and on which evidence can be sought. Even though we are not in the possession of an impressive body of laws in this field of scientific endeavor, yet we have a series of postulates whose utility is promising. It is hoped that these postulates will be found implicit in the text of this book, and some of them are overtly propounded. But in the interest of clarity it may be permitted to list here a few of the more representative.

The following are, therefore, presented as postulates—not as demonstrated conclusions but as postulates, assumptions, which should serve to guide investigation and to direct attention to the relevant facts so that the assumptions may be confirmed, disproved, or modified.

The reality of culture. The collective habits have produced uniformities of speech, thought, and conduct which form a body of phenomena with laws of its own.

The priority of culture. With respect to the members of a group, the cultural habits and forms are pre-existing, so that the most important aspects of a given person are to be traced back to influences existing in the culture into which he comes.

The inertia of culture. Slow unnoticed changes in a culture may be noted but these are relatively unimportant. Culture tends to produce itself indefinitely.

Culture is a phenomenon of nature. Language, manners, morals, and social organization grow up within the ongoing activity in the effort of a group to maintain itself, to secure food, and to rear children. The human animal differs from all other animals and has a different nature, but he is nevertheless an animal. He is a very wonderful animal—one who talks, thinks, aspires, and sacrifices, but still an animal.

The actions of men are prior to their thinking. Reasoning is an attempt to overcome the difficulties that impede action.

Imagination is, therefore, a phase of events, moving from possibilities to eventualities. The plot of a body of conspirators is an integral part of the assassination. A wish is the beginning of an act. Many acts that begin are never finished.

A human being is a being which has a self. No other animals have selves. A self is a subject which is its own object. The human being who stimulates others also stimulates himself, and this makes it possible to think of himself as he thinks of another. (Personality is relative to groups. Personality is a sort of dramatic role, a part that is played with reference to a social grouping. It can be understood only in social terms.)

An organized personality consists of tendencies to modes of action. Character is such an organization of these tendencies that others can depend on a man's future activity and count on his behavior. These tendencies are called attitudes, and attitudes are acquired within the process of social living.

The object of education is the production of approved and useful habits and attitudes. An adequate knowledge of the way in which attitudes come into existence would result in revolutionary changes in the methods of education.

The differing cultures of mankind can be understood, appreciated, and adequately dealt with when social psychology or some other science with the same objective can solve the problems regarding the origin and nature of cultural formulations and cultural changes.

Conflicts between nations, races, classes, and sects must be regarded as problems demanding solution which an adequate science of human nature should make it possible to understand. An adequate social psychology would furnish a program which would enable us to know what can be cured and how soon, and what must be endured and for how long.

And finally, values. Values are the objects of the most important of our wishes. Values are non-rational in origin, but so also are all the acts and wishes of man. But just as the minor desires of men are modified when reflective thought compares them with their competitors, so values, the objects of the highest of our desires, would seem to be susceptible to rational reformulation. Values unopposed present no problem. But values in conflict with other values present an occasion for that dramatic rehearsal of future consequences which we call reasoning. As our interests enlarge, we are able to take account of larger and larger wholes. The age of humanity may be still in the future, but we have been accustomed for many years to speak of a world community. Machine guns form the alternative to reason in determining which values shall prevail. An adequate science of human nature would enable us to find a better way.

The foregoing list of postulates could be greatly enlarged, but it is long enough, perhaps, to serve the present purpose. An objective science does not concern itself immediately with welfare. In order to be efficient it must be disinterested. But science, or knowledge, is always in the service of ends, and the ultimate justification of science, certainly the science of human nature, will be the service it can render to human welfare.

The business of man is to seek good ends; intelligence is the instrument for making the quests effective; and science is the effort to perfect the instrument and to make it adequate.

PART I
GROUP AND PERSON

II

THE NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE

Human nature is a very paradoxical term. On the one hand it is the culprit explaining, if not justifying, acts that are wicked and lapses that are weak. When our priests and pastors are disappointed in us, human nature is our alibi. It nullifies the work of pacifists and prohibitionists, and might almost be defined as that with which fanatical reformers fail to reckon. On the other hand, human nature is sometimes a beautiful discovery and a pleasant surprise. When queer, fierce, and savage folk act in a comprehensible fashion, we call them human as an honorific ascription. When human nature was discovered in the slaves, it led ineluctably to their emancipation. Seen in the untouchables of India, it is at this moment in process of raising their status. To find them human is good and leads men to praise and draw near.

In the attempt to sharpen the denotation of the term it is proposed to consider: how the experience of human nature arises; some obstacles to its realization; the relation of heredity to heritage; with a briefer mention of the mutability of human nature and the problem of individuality.

There is, then, first of all, this question: How did you and I get to be human, and how do others come to seem to be human? Every careful reader of Cooley and Mead has long been familiar with a clear answer to the first part of the question. One's consciousness of oneself arises within a social situation as a result of the way in which one's actions and gestures are defined by the actions and gestures of others. We not only judge ourselves by others, but we literally judge that we *are* selves as the result of what others do and say. We become human, to ourselves, when we are met and answered, opposed and blamed, praised and encouraged. The process is mediate, not immediate. It is the result of the activity of the constructive imagination, which is still the best term by which to denote the redintegrative

behavior in which there is a present symbol with a past reference and a future consequence.

The process results in a more or less consistent picture of how we appear, the specific content of which is found in the previously experienced social gestures. Not that all men treat us alike. It is trite to say that we have many selves but it is profoundly true, and these are as many as the persons with whom we have social relations. If Babbit be husband, father, vestryman, school trustee, rotarian, and clandestine lover he obviously plays several different roles. (These roles, or personalities, or phases of his personality, are built up into a more or less consistent picture of how one appears in the eyes of others.) We are conscious of ourselves if, when, and only when, we are conscious that we are acting like another. These roles are differently evaluated. Some have a high, others a low, rating, and one's comparative estimation of the worth of his membership in his several groups has a social explanation, in spite of the fact that many would seek a physiological explanation.

As banker or realtor Babbit may stand high, though as a golfer he may be a dub; his church status may be low and his club self high, and so through the list. The movements, vocabulary, habits, and emotions he employs in these different roles are all accessible to careful study and accurate record, but the point can hardly be obvious, since it is so widely neglected that the explanation of these habits and phrases and gestures that accompany the several roles is to be sought chiefly in the study of the group traditions and social expectations of the several institutions where he belongs. No accessible inventory of his infantile impulses would enable the prediction of the various behavior complexes concerned in the several personal roles. Moreover, whatever the list of personalities or roles may be, there is always room for one more and, indeed, for many more. When war comes Babbit will probably be a member of the committee of public defense. He may become executive officer of a law enforcement league yet to be formed. He may divorce his wife or elope with his stenographer or misuse the mails and become a federal prisoner in Leavenworth. Each experience will mean a new role with new personal attitudes and a new axiological conception of himself.

One's conception of oneself is, therefore, the result of an imagined construct of a role in a social group depending upon

the defining gestures of others and involving in the most diverse types of personality the same physiological mechanisms and organs. Both convict and pillar of society, churchman and patron of bootleggers, employ receptors such as eyes, ears, and nose, and effectors including arms, legs, and tongue. The way in which these are organized is, however, only to be investigated by studying the collective aspects of behavior. Your personality, as you conceive it, results from the defining movements of others.

And if this be true, it is a fortiori certain that our conception of other selves is likewise a social resultant. The meaning of the other's acts and gestures is put together into an imagined unity of organization which is our experience or conception of what the other one is. In Cooley's phrase, the solid facts of social life are the imaginations we construct of persons. It is not the blood and bones of my friend that I think of when I recall him as such. It is rather the imagined responses which I can summon as the result of my experience with him. Should misunderstandings arise and friendship be shattered, his nervous organization and blood count would probably remain unaltered, though to me he would be an utterly different person. Whether he be my friend or my enemy depends axiologically upon my imagination concerning him. In order to deal with this material we must imagine imaginations.

The ability to conceive of human nature thus always involves the ability to take the role of another in imagination and to discover in this manner qualities that we recognize in ourselves. We regard as inhuman or non-human all conduct which is so strange that we cannot readily imagine ourselves engaging in it. We speak of inhuman cruelty when atrocities are so hard-heartedly cruel that we cannot conceive of ourselves as inflicting them. We speak of inhuman stupidity if the action is so far remote from intelligent behavior that we feel entirely foreign to it. And conversely, in the behavior of non-human animals and, in extreme cases, with regard to plants and even inanimate objects, there is a tendency to attribute unreflectively human motives and feelings. This accounts for the voluminous literature of the "nature fakers." To sympathize with the appealing eyes of a pet dog, or the dying look of a sick cat, or to view the last gasps of a slain deer is to have just this experience. Wheeler, a fore-

most authority on the behavior of insects, writes of "awareness" of the difference between her eggs on the part of a mother wasp, and of the "interest" that other insects take in the welfare of their progeny. The fables and animal stories of primitive and of civilized peoples could not have been spoken but for this tendency of our imagination to attribute human qualities when some behavior gives a clue of similarity to our own inner life. Examples of this process could be indefinitely cited, from St. Francis preaching sermons to his "brother wolf" and to the birds, the romantic poets who speak to the dawn and get messages from the waves, the lover whose pathetic fallacy sees impatience in the drooping of the rose when Maud is late to her tryst, all the way to Opal, who loved the fir tree because he had an "understanding soul." The experience is entirely normal. The most unromantic mechanist may, in emotional moments, be carried unreflectively into an unwitting and immediate attribution of human impulses and motives to non-human objects.

Human nature is, therefore, that quality which we attribute to others as the result of introspective behavior. There is involved a certain revival of our own past, with its hopes, fears, loves, angers, and other subjective experiences which, in an immediate and unreflective way, we read into the behavior of another. The German concept *einführung*, while not exactly the same notion, includes the process here denoted. It is more than sympathy; it is "empathy."

Now the process wherein this takes place is primarily emotional. The mechanism is operative in all real art. In our modern life the drama and the novel are largely responsible for the broadening of our sympathies and the enlarging of our axiological fraternities. There is some plausibility to the disturbing remark of a colleague of the writer who declared that one can learn more about human nature today from literature than from science, so called. If federal regulation continues to increase, it might be well to pass a law forcing all parents of small children to read *The Way of All Flesh*. Books on criminology are valuable, but so is *The House of the Dead*. Culprits, offenders, and violators of our code are human, but in order that we may realize the fact it is necessary for us to see their behavior presented concretely so that we can understand and, understanding,

forgive. "There, but for the grace of God, goes John Wesley." Perhaps you and I might have been murderers.

There is a curious, and at first, puzzling, difference in the attitude of two groups of specialists concerning the nature and the mental capacity of preliterate, or so-called "primitive," peoples. The anthropologists and sociologists of the present day are almost unanimous in their opinion that so-called "savages" do not differ in their mental capacity or emotional possibility from modern civilized peoples, taken by and large and as a whole. Contemporary biologists, on the other hand, are in many cases very reluctant to admit this, and many of them categorically and insistently deny it. Now it cannot be the result of logical conclusions from research methods of scientific men in the case of the biologists, for their work is confined chiefly to anatomical structures and the physiology of segments. Their conclusions arise from other than focal interests.

On the face of it the situation is curious. The biologist has long ago demonstrated the surprisingly essential identity of the nervous system in all mammals. The rat or the dog is almost as useful for the vivisectional investigation of the human nervous system as a human subject would be. Element for element, the nervous system of the sheep is the same as in man, the differences being quantitative. A fortiori, the nervous systems of the Eskimo and the German are not significantly different. The biologist works with identical material but concludes by assuming great and significant differences between the different races. The anthropologist and sociologist works with strongly contrasted phenomena. He discusses and studies polyandry, witchcraft, and shamanism, socially approved infanticide, and cannibalism, and such divergent practices that one would expect him to posit much greater differences than even his biologist colleague would assert. An investigator from Mars (one may always invoke this disinterested witness) would probably expect the biologist who studies identical forms to be inclined to rate them all alike, and might infer that the anthropologist who studies such divergent customs would place them in a contrasting series.

The explanation seems fairly apparent. The biologist deals objectively, thinking in terms of dissections and physical structures. The anthropologist deals sympathetically and imagina-

tively. His work takes him into the field where he gets behind the divergencies and finds that the objects of his study have pride, love, fear, curiosity, and the other human qualities which he recognizes in himself, the differences being only in the form and expression. Thus, by an introspective sympathy, he comes to know them as human.

The limitations of introspective psychology need no elaboration in these days when extreme behaviorism has thrown out the infant with the bath. The uncontrolled exaggerations that arose out of the unverifiable imaginings of introspectionists brought about a violent reaction not wholly undeserved. It is not proposed here to make even a disguised plea for introspective methods. The essential point is not the desirability, but the inevitability, of just this type of imagination by which alone we recognize others as human, and which ultimately rests on our ability to identify in others what we know to be true in ourselves.

Imaginative sympathy enables us to recognize human nature when we see it and even to assume it where it is not. Conversely, when the behavior is so different that we lack the introspective clue, we find difficulty in calling it human. Such limitation is more true of our emotional moments than of calm and reflective periods. Recent questionings on race prejudice reveal the fact that, in the American group which was investigated, the most violent race prejudice, the greatest social distance, existed in respect of the Turks. It was further revealed that most of those who felt a strong aversion against Turks had never seen a Turk, but they had heard and read and believed stories of their behavior which account for the attitude. One story describes Turkish soldiers stripping a captured pregnant woman, betting on the sex of the foetus, and disembowelling her to see who should win the money. Such conduct we call inhuman, since we cannot imagine ourselves as engaging in it under any circumstances. If we are to regard all members of the genus homo as human, it is essential that the traditions of all races and their mores be sufficiently like our own to enable us to understand them sympathetically. It is easy to show that Americans who go to Turkey and understand the Turks not only find them human, but often praise and admire them. And all because the empathic imagination enables us to play their part and understand their motives.

The chief limitation to the imaginative sympathy enabling us to call others human is the phenomenon which Sumner calls ethnocentrism. By an extension of the term, which is here presented with a plea for indulgence, we may distinguish three types of ethnocentrism which are, in effect, three degrees of the phenomenon. Ethnocentrism, as ordinarily used, is the emotional attitude which places high value on one's own customs and traditions and belittles all others, rating as least valuable those that differ most. The universality of ethnocentrism is evidenced from the discovery that all preliterate peoples who have considered the question have worked out the answer in the same terms. It is obvious to a Nordic that the African and the Mongol are inferior to himself, and hardly less obvious that the Mediterranean is intermediate between his own highness and the low-browed tribes of the tropic forests. But for more than a generation it has been familiar to specialists that Eskimos, Zulus, and Pueblos have exactly the same feeling toward us. The customs with which we are familiar are best. Mores which differ most widely arise from the social life of an inferior people. We are supremely human; they are only partially so. To Herbert Spencer the high-headed and proud-hearted Kaffirs—who would in their turn have spoken contemptuously of his bald head and his helplessness in the forest—were intermediate between the chimpanzee and the English. They were only partly human. The writer of these lines once made what he felt to be a very good speech to an audience of naked savages, speaking in their own tongue with certain native proverbs and allusions to their folk-tales. The reward for this skill was the frank and surprised admission that at least one white man was intelligent and could make a decent argument like any other human being. The Texas farmers whose province had been invaded by an agricultural colony of Bohemians used to refer to them as hardly human since their women worked in the fields and often the whole family went barefooted. Ethnocentric narrowness envelops the group in a sympathy-proof tegument which blinds men to the human qualities of differing peoples.

The second form of ethnocentrism is harder to establish but must be asserted. It is seen in its quintessence in the writings of McDougall and his followers. Human nature consists of instincts and if a list of these be called for they are promptly produced.

The instinct of warfare is axiomatic and the proof is found in the military history of our people. But the list of instincts turns out to be merely a renaming and hypostatization of our own social customs. The instincts have been set down in a fixed list because men failed to distinguish between their immediate social heritage and the inborn tendencies of their infants. It is therefore a kind of scientific ethnocentrism, which conceives as native and human that which is acquired and social and leads to the conclusion that those with widely different customs must either have some instinct omitted from their repertory, as McDougall plainly says of some of the interior Borneo tribes, or else (and this comes to the same thing) they have these instincts in a different degree from those which we have received from our forebears; that is to say, the customs of other people, if they are sufficiently different, are due to the fact that their nature is not quite like ours. They are really not quite human, or, to say the least, differently human.

The third variety of ethnocentrism is somewhat more subtle. It is the limitation due to language. It is the penalty for having to speak in one language without knowledge of the others. The dreary list of sentiments, feelings, and emotions in some books is written as if all the words in the world were English words. We make sharp distinctions between fear, terror, and awe and, forgetting that these are limited to our vocabulary, expect to find the fundamental traits of human nature adequately described thereby. If we read German we may become interested in the distinction between *Mut* and *Tapferkeit*. Not knowing Japanese, we lose the precious insight which their idioms would give us in the inability of their language to make a neuter noun the subject of a transitive verb. A statement by a most eminent psychologist is concerned with a discussion of "what emotions do" and "what intelligence does," in the behavior of human beings. No Japanese would make such an egregious blunder—not necessarily because of different capacity for analysis, but because his mother-tongue is incapable of such erroneous metaphysical reification. Linguistic ethnocentrism, if we may so name this, would disappear if our minds were competent and our years enough to allow us to know all the languages of the earth; but until utopia comes, the handicap can be partly overcome by a conscious recognition of its existence and by an obstinate and repeated attempt to get

outside of the limitations of our own etymology into a sympathetic appreciation of the forms of speech of stranger men.

Ethnocentrism, then, is essentially narrowness. It is enthusiasm for our own, due to ignorance of others. It is an appreciation of what we have and a depreciation of what differs. It is essentially a lack of sympathetic dramatization of the point of view of another. It must be transcended if we are really to know what protean varieties human nature may assume.

From the question of how human nature is recognized there is a natural transition to the problem of how it is constituted. The current form of most interest is an old problem still exciting lively interest; the relation of inherited tendencies to social organization; the relation of instincts to institutions; heredity, to environment; nature, to nurture.

Current discussions of instinct reveal surprising initial agreements among authors who seem to be, and who imagine themselves to be, very different. Allport rejects instincts and McDougall has a fixed list (subject to periodical revision), yet both Allport and McDougall agree in making an uncriticized assumption that the customs and institutions of men are the outgrowth of the infantile and adolescent inherited impulses. Thus warfare is ascribed to the instinct of pugnacity, to which statement Allport objects and asserts that it is rather due to the conditioning of the prepotent reflex of struggling. It would be easy to make a long list of citations, but at random one may mention Parker, Trotter, and Bartlett. To such men the key to the understanding lies in an adequate genetic psychology. If we could only get at the infant and chart all his initial responses and impulses, they feel the problem of social organization would be solved.

This chapter is written under the conviction that sociology and social psychology must rely chiefly on facts from the collective life of societies for their material. Two fields of inquiry, among many others, can be cited as providing relevant material. One is the study of preliterate peoples and the other is the consideration of modern isolated religious groups. There is found among primitive people such a protean variety of social and cultural organization, including such various forms of religious, political, and family life, that it would seem impossible to account for them on the basis of definite instincts. When one society refuses entirely to produce children, another tribe kills all unbe-

trothed girls, still another practices cannibalism, eating their own infants, while yet others manifest tender solicitude for all their children, and when unto these are added accounts of bizarre marriage customs and religious conceptions and tendencies, it is hard to see how the conception can be carried through without assuming different instincts in each tribe.

The isolated religious sects of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are even more valuable to the theorist since the complete history of many of the customs is known, an advantage not possessed by the ethnologist as a rule. It is possible to describe in detail a time when there were no Quakers, Dunkers, Mormons, Shakers, or Perfectionists. The rise of polygamy can be traced in Mormonism, and the abandonment of the marriage relation among the Shakers can be dated and described.

McDougall has seen this difficulty and has met it with a certain naïveté. He has only to assume that strikingly different customs have been produced by peoples with differing instincts, or with instincts of different degrees of strength or intensity. The Shakers would, therefore, be adequately explained by assuming a selection of people who had no sex instincts, or very weak ones. The peaceful tribes would be those lacking the instinct of pugnacity, which leads him to the logical conclusion that the French have a different instinct from the English, and to the popular psychology which gives to the Anglo-Saxon the instinct for representative government, an instinct which the Italians and Orientals are assumed to lack.

Thus the assumption that instincts produce customs turns out to be a mere tautology, and the human race disappears as a biological species. A zoölogist who describes the migrating salmon or the breeding habits of seals or the incubating instincts of penguins is dealing with a single species whose members exhibit a universality of action. But if this formulation of instincts be followed out, every tribe or race must be assumed to have different instincts, and the basic error of the whole instinct psychology stands revealed. Then instinct merely becomes another name for custom.

Were all our knowledge of human nature limited to a single flash of information through a given moment of time, it might be impossible to criticize this serious error. Fortunately, there is history. The Mormons began without polygamy, lived through

a long period when plural marriage was customary, and then, through the stress of circumstances, abolished the practice. The English colonies have circled the earth, while the French remain at home drinking in the cafés of Paris, but there was a time when the French colonies occupied vast territories in the New World, and there is ample evidence of a considerable settlement of French both in Canada and Louisiana. The warlike Nordics dreamed of a heaven of warfare and slaughter, but when Norway seceded from Sweden something went wrong with their fighting instinct and, obstinately enough, they settled the matter by a peaceable arrangement. If customs change, and they do, and if instincts cause customs, then instincts change as often as the customs. But a changing instinct is no instinct, for instincts by hypothesis are constant.

The problem of social origins is not solved, but the history of many customs and institutions is in our possession and it is quite certain that the whole concatenation of unique and unrepeatable circumstances must be invoked to explain the creation of any one of them. And when once the organization appears, the new members of the group who grow up within it or who are initiated into it take on the group attitudes as *représentations collectives*, securing all their fundamental satisfactions in ways which the group prescribes. The true order, then, lies in exactly the reverse of the instinct-to-institution formulation. Instead of the instincts of individuals being the cause of our customs and institutions, it is far truer to say it is the customs and institutions which explain the individual behavior so long called instinctive. Instincts do not create customs. Customs create instincts, for the putative instincts of human beings are always learned and never native.

Exactly when human nature begins is a problem. But that it does, in each individual, have a definite beginning is an axiom. The newborn has not a developed personality. He has neither wishes, desires, nor ambitions. He does not dream of angels nor think the long thoughts of youth. He acquires a personality. He does not acquire his heredity. He acquires his personality. A quarter of a century ago this acquisition was shown by Cooley to happen in the first groups, the primary groups, into which he is received. He becomes a person when, and because, others are emotional toward him. He can become a person when he

reaches that period, not always exactly datable, when the power of imagination enables him to reconstruct the past and build an image of himself and others.

An inescapable corollary of the foregoing is the mutability of human nature. Despite the chauvinists, the cynics, and the absolutists of every sort, human nature can be changed. Indeed, if one speaks with rigorous exactness, human nature never ceases to be altered; for the crises in life and nature, the interaction and diffusion of exotic cultures, and the varying temperaments possessed by the troops of continuously appearing and gradually begotten children force the conclusion that human nature is in a continual state of flux. We cannot change it by passing a law, nor by a magical act of the will, nor by ordering and forbidding, nor by day-dreaming and revery, but human nature can be changed. To defend militarism on the ground that man is a fighter and the fighting instinct cannot be changed is merely to misinterpret and to rationalize an important fact; that the custom of warfare is very old and can be abolished only gradually and with great difficulty. To assume that the drinking habits of a people or their economic structure or even the family organization is immutably founded upon the fixed patterns of human nature is to confuse nature and custom. What we call the stable elements of human nature are in truth the social attitudes of individual persons, which in turn are the subjective aspects of long-established group attitudes whose inertia must be reckoned with but whose mutability cannot be denied. Having been established through a long period of time, and appearing to the youth as normal and natural, they seem to be a part of the ordered universe. In reality they are continually being slightly altered and may at any time be profoundly modified by a sufficiently serious crisis in the life of the group.

The history of social movements is but a record of changing human nature. The antislavery movement, the woman's movement, the temperance movement, the interestingly differing youth movements in Germany, China, and America—these are all natural phenomena in the field of sociology, and are perhaps most accurately described as the process of change which human nature undergoes in response to the pressure of unwelcome events giving rise to restlessness and vague discontent. Such movements, when they generate leaders and develop institutions

passing on to legal and political changes, create profound alterations of the mores and thoroughly transform not only the habits of a people and their nature as they live together but also the basic conception of what constitutes human nature. The present conception in the West of the nature of woman, including her mental capacity and ability to do independent creative work, is profoundly different from the conception which anybody entertained in the generations before the woman's movement began.

But for the limitations of space, the problem of individuality and character should receive extended treatment in this discussion. That being impossible, a brief word must suffice. There is so much of controversy concerning the question, and so much of confusion, that many seem to be hypnotized by mere phrases. It is much too simple to say that the individual and society are one, for it is difficult to know which one. The heretic, the rebel, the martyr, the criminal—these all stand out as individuals surely not at one with society. Nor does it seem adequate merely to say that the person is an individual who has status in a group. For it does not appear that before the acquisition of status the individual has any existence. Certainly if he has, he does not know it. The conception which it would be profitable to develop lies in the direction of the assumption that out of multiple social relations which clash and conflict in one's experience the phenomenon of individuality appears. The claims of the various social groups and relations and obligations made on a single person must be umpired and arbitrated, and here appears the phenomenon of conscience and that of will. The arbitrament results in a more or less complete organization and ordering of the differing roles, and this organization of the subjective social attitudes is perhaps the clearest conception of what we call character. When viewed from the outside, the struggles of the tempted and the strivings of courageous men appear to be the pull of inconsistent groups, and so indeed they are. But to you and me who fight and hold on, who struggle amid discouragement and difficulties, there is always a feeling that the decision is personal and individual. Someone has been the umpire. When the mother says, "Come into the house," and Romeo whispers, "Come out onto the balcony," it is Romeo who prevails, but it is Juliet who decides.

From one standpoint, then, individuality may be thought of as character, which is the subjective aspect of the world the individual lives in. The influences are social influences, but they differ in strength and importance. When completely ordered and organized with the conflicting claims of family, friends, clubs, business, patriotism, religion, art, and science all ordered, adjudicated, and unified, we have not passed out of the realm of social influence, but we have not remained where the social group, taken separately, can be invoked to explain the behavior. Individuality is a synthesis and ordering of these multitudinous forces.

Here human nature reaches its ultimate development. Henley, lying weak and sick, suffering great pain, called out that he was captain of his soul. To trace back the social antecedents of such a heroic attitude is profitable and germane, but it is never the whole story until we have contemplated this unique soul absolutely unduplicated anywhere in the universe—the result, if you like, of a thousand social influences, but still undubitably individual. It was Henley who uttered that cry. That you and I so recognize him and appreciate him only means that we also have striven. We know him and understand him because of our own constructive, sympathetic imagination. He who admires a masterpiece has a right to say, I also am an artist.

III

THE SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF CULTURE

The doctrine of evolution which dominated the latter part of the nineteenth century affected every field of scientific thought from ichthyology to folklore. It was inevitable that psychology should be profoundly influenced by it. This was seen first in the rise of physiological psychology, which, leaving to one side the notion of a substantial soul, considered man as an animal and set out to find what connection could be discovered between the body of this animal and the sensations, feelings, and thoughts experienced in the mind. Laboratories were first set up by physiologists, turned psychologists, and a series of brilliant researches rewarded the increasing company of workers in the field.

It was at length possible to state with confidence the "end-organ" responsible for each sensory experience, and to trace every nervous impulse to its terminus. The goal was to find the exact structure involved in each experienced sensation and feeling, to analyze both mental and physiological into ultimate elements, and thus to show in detail just how the body was essential to the operation of the mind.

Important as all this work was, it gave little light to those who sought an answer to the questions which most interest students of human nature. The need to direct the training of children, the counseling with the distressed and the anxious, the understanding of a youth in love or of a man suffering the pangs of remorse—these characteristically human problems received no illumination from the "pure science" which physiological psychology became. Aristotle believed that the brain was a gland which cooled the blood, but the discovery of the true function of the brain made little difference for the more vital problems.

Physiological psychology is still a pursuit of scientific dignity and has not ceased to engage the attention of careful and exact scholars. But the questions which it was hoped to answer came

to be investigated by other methods when it was thought necessary to try to pay the debt to society which every department of abstract science incurs. When America entered the World War, our greatest experimental psychologist refused to join his colleagues in their efforts to apply psychology to the military needs of the nation, declaring that there was nothing of practical value in what he had done.

The evolutionary view, meanwhile, led to another movement in psychology, first explicitly set forth in its full implications by William James. This was the emphasis on specific instincts which not only emphasized the animal nature of man but found the basic elements of human life in definite drives that were assumed to be inherited from sub-human sources. This approach was far more promising and offered a comprehension of the emotional drives and non-rational urges which the older formulation had been unable to give. The instincts were proposed as the explanation of the collective life and the institutions of men. They were not, indeed, conceived of as unalterable, for they could be sublimated; but they were both elemental and elementary and held high promise of affording the key which men had long sought. The vogue of this formulation spread rapidly and for a whole generation was unchallenged.

But just as individual differences rendered the earlier physiological statement unsatisfactory, so social facts in their variety made it difficult to carry out the conception of separate human instincts, inherited from the lower animals and uniform in the race. Ethnology revealed an amazing variety of customs and folkways that would require the denial of some instincts to some of the groups studied, while historical comparisons yielded similar inconsistencies in the case of civilized peoples. Many scholars came to the conclusion that the inherited tendencies were far greater in number than anyone had imagined but that the definite and specific character had been overstated, and especially that the complicated chains which some of the lower animals seem to inherit could not be found in man.

The studies of culture which anthropologists proceeded to make with admirable industry eventually led to a new view of the relation of man to his institutions. The primordial origin of human culture is a problem to the solution of which it is impossible to bring any facts. Sociology is in the same position on this

point as that in which biology finds itself with respect to the problem of the origin of life. And just as the biologist came at last to utter the dictum: all life comes from the living, so the student of culture declares: *Omnis cultura ex cultura*. And if all culture comes from antecedent culture, then no culture comes from the operation of the instinctive activities of individuals. There are, for example, no organs of speech. Lungs, vocal cords, teeth, tongue, and lips are not only present in animals without speech but in man each has its own function and speech is the result of their use for a purpose added. For speech is not an individual phenomenon. Language is communication and is the product of interaction in a society. Grammars are not contrived, vocabularies were not invented, and the semantic changes in language take place without the awareness of those in whose mouths the process is going on. This is a super-individual phenomenon and so also are other characteristic aspects of human life, such as changes in fashions or alterations of the mores.

Herbert Spencer called these collective phenomena super-organic; Durkheim referred to them as *faits sociaux*; Sumner spoke of them as folkways; while anthropologists usually employ the word "culture." These and the other terms reveal the need for the isolation of that aspect of human conduct and experience which is impersonal and which appears as an influence external to the individual person, attributable to no other individual, but determinative and formative with respect to the organization of his life.

That the concept is a fruitful one needs no argument, in view of the many existing studies of the culture of unlettered tribes and the enthusiastic work that is being carried on with increasing energy. It has been possible to mark out on the map the boundaries of the various cultures of the North American Indians, and Wissler has so delimited the "culture areas" of the whole Western continent. Thus culture is a *thing* in the logical sense. It can be defined, investigated, analyzed, and compared in its different manifestations. The culture is intimately related to the economic life so that those who hunted the buffalo had a different culture from the tribes who lived chiefly on salmon, and these in turn varied largely from the sedentary tribes whose chief reliance was on agriculture.

For a long time it was thought that the concept of evolution would offer great help in interpreting the cultured differences which characterized the hundreds of tribes of preliterates. The doctrine of distinct stages of savagery, followed by equally definite stages of barbarism and succeeded in turn by stages of civilization, was advocated and elaborated till it broke down of its own weight. The early assumption that each people pursued their upward way owing to some irresistible tendency to rise and progress was able to take care of the facts regarding stranded peoples who, for some reason, had halted on the march or even might have gone backward. It was not so easy, however, to account for the conflicting and contradictory elements or "complexes" of culture on the assumption of an evolutionary scheme. To cite one example: the mining and forging of iron meant a high rating in the scale, while a system of writing indicated a greater advance. Yet the North American Indians had the beginning of writing and the Mayas a highly developed system. And at the same time, they used stone tools, while the Bantu tribes of the rain forest lived in some instances without clothing, utterly lacking any acquaintance with picture writing, at the same time being highly skilled in the mining, smelting, and forging of iron tools and weapons. The use of stone tools located the Americans in the Stone Age, far lower in evolution than the age of metals, while the use of writing placed them very high in the scale. The naked Africans could claim a high rating on account of their knowledge of iron but were low in social organization and in many other achievements which they should have possessed according to any tenable theory of the evolution of culture.

There were many other difficulties that arose in the effort to make this scheme apply to the facts discovered in the field. The economic life was assumed to be determinative of the forms of social organization and the development of the religious rites and ideas. But when polyandry was described among the hunting tribes of the Eskimo, the pastoral Todas in India, and the agricultural peoples of Tibet, it was impossible to make the earlier assumptions fit the facts.

Explicit in the earlier formulations and implicit in the others was the premise that a gradual improvement in mental capacity must have taken place in order to account for the transition from the "lower" to the "higher" forms of cultural achievement.

And this seems necessary if we are to believe that the forms of collective life are the result of the efforts and achievements of individuals. The only logical alternative seems to be to deny the initial assertion and to attempt to account for culture as the result of the impersonal results of association.

The study of the introduction of inventions and discoveries from one tribe to another was the beginning of the end of the older evolutionary formulation. A tribe using the bow and arrow with skill and success, knowing how to make and use the weapon as well as any other people, has usually not contained within its membership the originator of the device, but possesses it because it was "diffused" from another and neighboring people who, in turn, have received it from another source, and so on through a long series of relays. It was not the lack of ability to make or use bows that had prevented their earlier appearance but the fact that no one had happened to hit upon such a contrivance. And why anyone ever did hit upon such a device is so difficult a question that no answer has ever been forthcoming. Alphabetical writing is a good illustration. Bantu children, learning to write and to read a language strictly phonetic, manage the task in a much shorter time than European children, who must continue the illogical spelling of the past. The ability of the Bantus to master writing and reading is unquestioned but because their opportunity to do so was lacking, they remained preliterate for thousands of years. Alphabetical writing was invented only once and from the small area where it started it has "diffused" to all peoples who know letters. It is not tenable to say that the Greeks were inferior to the Phoenicians from whom they received the alphabet or that the English were lower in the scale of mental development than the Roman missionaries who brought writing to the British Isles.

Considerations of this character lend importance to the concept of communication and contact between bearers of different cultures and suggest that the backwardness of primitives lies chiefly in their isolation. Homogeneous cultures into which no single element has been introduced or diffused are probably not to be found on the earth today, certainly they are extremely few. Borrowing is the rule, not the exception, and for nearly all it is true that only a very small proportion of any culture is autochthonous. The peoples of lower culture are those who

have been situated outside of the route along which the bearers of new things have traveled or who have fled to remote spots, where they remained cut off. In West Africa, in the watershed between the Nile and the Congo, in parts of California, and elsewhere, there are areas which are occupied by small, unrelated tribes speaking many different languages, each group having been driven into its particular area in former years by the advance of some militant tribe. These peoples are usually of a low, simple culture, easily explained by their linguistic and spatial isolation.

Acculturation, borrowing, diffusion, communication, contact—words like these seem to be much more appropriate and serve to designate the causal influences that are responsible for the great differences between one tribe and another. The assumption that the normal process is one of advance and improvement due to an evolutionary tendency upward is, therefore, seriously to be questioned. A population composed of gifted people with the ability to learn and to carry on the activities of a highly developed culture may, nevertheless, remain on a low level of development for an indefinite period.

Instead of the older view that every culture tends always to become higher and to develop more and more advanced forms, it would seem that we could more reasonably assume the principle of cultural inertia, which would view the culture as tending to reproduce itself by reason of its own momentum, once it has been definitely established and organized. This view would regard cultural change as everywhere a problem to be investigated. Contacts with other cultures are, no doubt, the most valuable as explanations, but any crisis which changes or interrupts collective habits will prove significant. Famine, drouth, pestilence, and other catastrophes in nature will be found important events to be considered in accounting for cultural change, though it may be doubted whether the result of these is an improvement or an advance. The usual effect is a loss, though the issue rests on facts to be revealed in concrete studies.

It is not easy to make this position convincing to the modern mind, which has been so long used to the idea of progress and which has, at least in the realm of material culture, become accustomed to a civilization that has acquired a "habit of changing habits" until the marvelous advance of the past two hundred

years, with its increasing tempo of change, seems to suggest that such inventiveness is an inseparable aspect of all human culture. But the idea of progress is not old. It was unknown to the ancients and quite foreign to the minds of the men of the middle age. The particular and unprecedented set of circumstances which brought about the industrial revolution, itself not uninfluenced by the great crises following the period of discovery and exploration, prepared men's minds for the prophesy of an indefinite improvement in life and its conditions. And when the notion of evolution was widely accepted, the doctrine of progress became a substitute for the earlier views of a divine providence. It was only a corollary of this main theorem to hold that all tribes and races had been engaged in a gradual and continuous development from a low state of mentality to a higher, producing, *pari passu*, a culture which corresponded to the mental ability of those who bore it.

But if we abandon the position which holds the capacity of the members of a society to be determinative of the richness of their culture and if we question the dictum that the temperament of the tribesmen determines whether the tribe be warlike or peaceful, we are led to quite another view of the relation of the personality and the culture. Leaving out the question of the reorganization following a critical breakup—in which case a new type of culture may be expected to appear—it is tenable to assume that the culture of a people is the determining factor and that the personalities who grow up within it are its subjective aspects.

There is a saying that each man has two lines of ancestors, the parents and forebears from whom by heredity the body comes, and the "spiritual" line from whom by social heritage we derive our souls. In a primitive isolated group the two would coincide, but in a complex and mixed society, and particularly in a world where books abound, they may be in essential conflict. It is by association and communication that the language, the habits of thought and of action, and the view of the world that is necessary to an organized life may be acquired.

It is possible, and for research purposes valuable, to consider culture objectively. The theology of a religious sect is collective, impersonal, traditional and can be stated in its origin and development in terms as objective as any description of a natural

phenomenon. But no theology exists without adherents who are its bearers, and there are subjective aspects of the beliefs that are not included in any objective formulation. And when the objective forms are subjected to strains that indicate a process of alteration, it is the subjective aspect which may first be seen to vary. The belief may still be accepted and the forms may still be observed, but the meaning may be altered and the inner experience, modified. The incipient changes in a culture may, therefore, be discovered earliest in the personalities which form its subjective aspect.

Unquestioned elements of a culture tend to assume the aspect of natural phenomena. Old forms of belief and action seem to be almost laws of nature and not products of human association. Thus Kant defended the expiatory theory of punishment by an appeal to the universal conscience. Let everyone examine himself, he said, and he will immediately realize that in his own heart is the conviction that suffering ought to be inflicted for guilt. This is the moral law within, equaled in majesty only by the starry heavens above. It is timeless and so has no history; it is axiomatic and a priori and therefore not the product of human experience or human contriving. No one could remember a time when the doctrine was questioned and, therefore, it was assumed that it had no beginning.

We now know that punishment does have a history and that to this day tribes do exist who have not developed the institution. The axiomatic character of the conviction only meant that the view was so old that no one questioned it. The common sense of one generation may be the new discoveries of a former age.

The irresistible cultural forms are called by writers of the Durkheim school *représentations collectives*, which we might translate "group ideas." It is the mark of these group or collective ideas that they are communicated in an emotional manner and become an almost ineradicable conviction, resisting logical or reasonable efforts to contradict or disprove them. In the phrase of Lévy-Bruhl the individual is impermeable to experience, that is, to his individual experience, if the collective idea is in question. These collective products are given to the children when they are plastic and uncritical, and they are powerless to resist. Argument and demonstration may be externally plausible and sound in logic, but the inner conviction remains as a sort of

"acquired instinct," to be dislodged, if at all, only by another collective representation belonging to another cultural formulation when the individual has, to some degree, left his own.

This phenomenon is not confined to magical and religious ideas and practices, though the greater part of the illustrations have been taken from these fields. The French sociologists were more interested in primitive people and have collected a great number of clearly illustrative cases and instances of the inability of the individual to surrender his conviction, when confronted by objective fact, because the *représentation collective* was infallibly true. But it is not alone among primitive people that examples of the operation of this principle may be found. Magical beliefs, surviving as superstitions among civilized men are far from obsolete among us and tend to live in every department of our life which has not been reduced to scientific formulation. The religious and theological beliefs follow the primitive formula in strict parallel. The beliefs are given to the very young in an atmosphere of impressive and emotional emphasis. They are accepted without question and, if well impressed, remain as permanent elements in the personality. Not only so, but they assume the character of axioms, of self-evident truths or the results of intuitive insights which were always "known," never taught, and belong to the realm of timeless truth the opposite of which is unthinkable. The reasoning of a Fundamentalist or a Catholic theologian rests on premises of this character. But the reasoning of a Confucian scholar starts in a different way, for Confucius was not concerned with rewards and punishments after death and advised his disciples first to learn about life and after that to try to understand death. He taught them not to give thought to heaven or spirits till they had first understood the earth and man. The Chinese scholar, therefore, fails to find within his own mind the theistic and supernatural ideas that to the Christian are so basic.

Just how the two cultures came to be so fundamentally different is the task of the historian of culture to discover, and attempts to make the statement are not lacking. But the point of the argument here is that the two sorts of personalities are to be understood as the products of two contrasting cultures. The value or lack of value in the thirst for God which the Christian feels is not in question here. The point is that the deepest

yearnings of the soul are yearnings that have been culturally inherited and are not to be considered as innate. In order that the experience may come to the individual he must have some influence transmitted to him from the culture.

There is a uniqueness in the character of much of our experience which obscures the truth of the statement just made. In those views which have been held from the earliest conscious years there is no recollection of the source from which they were received or of the time when they were adopted. They seem, therefore, to be self-initiated and autonomous, appearing as instinctive and intuitive. They are the moral axioms, the self-evident truths, the law written on the fleshly tablet of the heart. A social origin is difficult to trace and is therefore denied.

But the practice of training and instruction in religion and morals seems never to be consistent with the denial of the cultural priority. Even where the knowledge of God is held to be intuitive, there is careful thought for the religious instruction of the young. The intuitive knowledge may be asserted as a precept, but the very view that it is intuitive is carefully taught and fostered. Nor is direct and specific precept the only or the chief reliance, since the ceremonial government and the participation in rites and customs is, itself, an educative influence of great power. A child in a group will, in the very nature of childhood, tend to take on the ways of the group, and the only problem for the sociologist is found in the attempt to understand why and under what conditions there is resistance and non-conformity.

There are many means of communication besides speech which serve to transmit the cultural forms of a people. The impressive architecture of a church, with the richness of its decorated altar, is not only an esthetic object; it is a message and a lesson to be learned, all the more effective because inarticulate and therefore not of the nature of logic. The glorification of childhood and infancy, with corresponding sentiments of "pathos" about motherhood, which is so integral a part of our tradition is due in a great degree, difficult to measure but undeniable, to the paintings, statues, poetry, and music that have grown up around the theme. Such art is, of course, effect as well as cause, but its function in transmitting the tradition to the young is apparent. The war monuments and memorials, statues and portraits of the great men of a people, as well as the poems and songs that empha-

size or glorify some incident or period of the past—these are but silent voices speaking to young and old, but especially to the young, in emotional phrases that cannot be contradicted and that serve to fashion the personalities in accord with the dominant sentiment.

The members of a group are not identical. No two are alike, for the life of a group consists not in identity but in organization. Age differences and sex differences are the most striking, but differences in strength, in speed of movement, and in every analyzable aspect of human activity are to be assumed. The culture does not act like a mechanical mold on plastic material, for the member of a culture acquires its essence by action, appropriating and modifying what he sees and hears. But though no two voices are exactly alike and though each can be recognized by a hearer sufficiently familiar with it, yet the speech itself is a cultural form and the manner of speech is the subjective aspect of an objective whole.

The sociology of the leader enforces the truth that personality is the subjective aspect of culture. For the leader in any field of social life is both cause and effect. He is different from the others and so is trusted and followed, but his power lies in his ability to offer to lead in a direction in which men wish to go or to resolve a difficulty for which no other one has so good a solution. He must have confidence in the success of his plan and in this respect may differ greatly from those who are hesitant, doubtful, or despairing. No one can lead who does not contribute to the morale of his group, giving them a certain readiness for action and a measure of assurance of success. The leader differs from the others in several important respects and is the source of thought and action, necessary to take into account in the explanation of social change.

But the leader is also the product of the life of his people and may be considered as a sort of device for the sake of the life of a group. What the leader desires and does has come from the people who produced him or harbored him. If his program makes no appeal, his leadership is repudiated and his status is lost. The military ability of the Mongol leaders who invaded Europe, the remarkable phenomenon of the first crusade, and the influence of William Penn among the Quakers, not to speak of contemporary leaders of pacifism, fascism, and the rest—these

all reveal, on examination, the correspondence of the program of the leader with the will and desire of the people whose culture he expresses.

The leader shows how to obtain what his people want but do not know how to get. He knows how to envisage and describe a goal that others only dimly conceive. He gives expression to thoughts that others recognize as true, which they have vaguely felt but which they cannot ever quite formulate, and he is literally a product of the life and times that nourished him.

During the World War it was spoken as a taunt against the Germans that other nations were proud of their great men but that the Germans were proud of themselves for producing Luther. Excessive pride is always offensive but, sympathetically understood, there is appropriateness in both attitudes. We can be proud of our great men for to them we owe the programs and the formulations that enable us to carry on, but we may be allowed, also, to be proud of America for producing Washington and Lincoln for they, as shining examples of what was praised and valued, expressed the national life. It was only the Elizabethan age that could have produced Shakespeare, only Puritan England that could have given birth to Milton. Shelley spoke for men saddened after the political reaction, no less than Franklin expressed the thrifty common sense of a people growing prosperous in a new land.

For the culture may be said to have moods, so that the words heeded by one age will not stir the listeners who have changed the focus of attention. Many a time a leader has lost his power with startling suddenness. He no longer represents his people, and they cast him aside. The usual formula in speaking of this is a reference to the fickleness of the mob. But, since personality is the subjective aspect of culture and since every leader is the expression of the life and thought of his people, he is ever dependent on the masses and cannot hope to be followed when he presents that which they do not desire. If a people rear up one to lead them to the desired haven, they are not to be blamed for deserting when he seems to have lost his way. They turn from him and repudiate him and seek one who gives promise of success.

In order that a leader may succeed he must have a united following. This means that there is like-mindedness, which

enables the people to unite. In times of great disorganization the cultural unity is broken up and then leadership seems to be impossible. The older psychology, which began with individualism and thought of the leader as a sort of genius with a mystic power of prestige that compelled assent and loyalty, was at a loss to account for his appearance or his peculiarities. A confused people need a leader, but there is nothing they can do till he appears as a sort of gift of Heaven. If China is in disorder there is no hope till a leader appears, and eventually he will appear, so says the theory. But it is here suggested that this is reversing the order. A disordered and disorganized people cannot have a leader. Leadership is impossible in a faction-torn society. At most, there can be leaders of rival factions, and China had these in plenty. Lincoln was never the leader of the whole people, only of the stronger section. He is honored by all sections now, for the mind of the nation has become changed and united. The leader is a choice sample of the life of his people.

That personality is the subjective aspect of culture appears in the consideration of the man who partakes of more than one heritage. Members of this group, to which Park has given the designation of "marginal men," include those of mixed bloods, such as Mulattoes, Eurasians, Anglo-Indians, and other effects of miscegenation. Such a personality develops on the borderland of two traditions which compete within him and divide him. He belongs in a sense to both cultures and is unable to feel completely at home in either one. The mother tongue is not the same as the language of the father or, if there is no linguistic difficulty, the same division appears in other aspects of the culture. Such a person lives where two traditions meet and, because the personality is the subjective aspect of the culture, they meet in him and divide his soul.

The same is true of the immigrant who lives in an immigrant group in America, subjected at the same time to Americanizing influences in the public school and elsewhere. The sociology of the Jews also is similar for, with the religious tradition of endogamy, the in-group life is treasured while economic and other interests give a partial membership in the majority group. The result is a divided soul, with conflicts and personality strains reproducing in the individual the massive struggles which are taking place in the collectivity.

That the marginal man is a social and not a biological resultant is seen by reference to those individuals who, with no supporting group, are assimilated in isolation from their own people into a culture different from that of the parents. For the marginal man may not be of mixed blood at all. In Africa there are detribalized natives who have been educated according to Western standards and therefore do not feel at home in the old associations of their people, yet they are not fully accepted by the European group whose ways they have adopted. Negro graduates of Scottish medical schools who have returned to South Africa after some years of absence from home find themselves on the margin of two cultures and unable to be fully adjusted in either one. It is not the biological fact of heredity that is determinative of the sort of personality, but the taking over of the language and ways of thinking and doing. The subjective aspect of culture becomes disorganizing, or at least disturbing, when there are two cultures which are conflicting or confusing in their demands.

The question of the relation of the individual to society can be stated in a form which is meaningless and resembles the inquiry about the priority of the hen and the egg. But in the case of any individual person whom we may ever wish to understand it is a question with an obvious answer. For every human being is born into a society already organized and established. The cultural forms, the language, beliefs, and customs are far older than the child. There is a society into which we are born and the personality is the organization into a definite role, or part, to play within that organization. To understand a man from rural France and to know how he differs from a farmer in Szechwan, it is chiefly necessary to know the cultural forms within which the two lives developed.

Since every human culture is related to the land on which the members of each group live, it has been found highly useful to take account of the area in dealing with problems of personality. Inside the metropolitan limits of the great modern cities the "ecological areas," as they are sometimes called, are peopled by groups, often by immigrants, in which the customs and traditions differ so much from those of the older and more settled districts that there is at least a statistical presumption of a very different type of personality being found in that area. Sometimes a tradition of juvenile delinquency gets itself estab-

lished to such a degree that practically all the boys in the area are guilty, at some time or other, of infractions of the law—infractions which may even become traditional till the boys resemble in their attitude toward the law of property the criminal tribes in India, who devote their whole lives and energies to predatory activities. The criminal tribes in India perform religious rites before setting out on their major expeditions and have no more scruples against what the government calls crime than has a soldier who embarks for Somaliland to fight the Abyssinians. In the case of the city boy there is always a certain minimum of attention that must be paid to the dominant mores, but there are areas in Chicago where this attention is decidedly marginal. The tradition gets established, the small children look up to the older boys whose exciting adventures become a legend, and so they look forward to a career of approved delinquency.

Whether the different races have innately different temperaments is a question too difficult for our present information. That some are warlike and others peaceful, some very religious and others much less so, and that other striking differences exist—this is a statement impossible to doubt. But the changes which take place in the descendants of the same stock render tenable the view that even the temperamental aspects of the life of a people are culturally determined. Whether this is true or not, the tendency of the members of a group with little contact outside of the membership to take over and perpetuate even these qualities is, as we have tried to show in this discussion, a fact of primary importance.

We may think of personality as an acquisition. Human nature is not to be ascribed to the newborn. Language, religion, desires, and ambitions, and all the organization of the life are culturally transmitted, not to a passive absorber of the culture, but to an acting being whose perceptions are defined and whose role is determined by what is said and done to him and by the responses that are made to what he says and does. Thus, the whole is greater than the parts and precedes the parts. The whole even creates the parts, as the cultural unit encourages those aspects which are consistent with it and attempts to eliminate what seems to be undesirable.

IV

THE PRIMARY GROUP: ESSENCE AND ACCIDENT

The concept of primary group, while perhaps not the most important contribution of C. H. Cooley, may be the one for which he will be longest remembered. Others had spoken of the "we-group" and of the "in-group," but "primary group" is a happier phrase. In such groups, Cooley asserted, are to be found the very origins of human nature. The concept was coined at the right time and has been approved by the only effective authority, that of widespread quotation and continued use. The well-known passage reads:

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.¹

There appear to be three properties of the primary group expressed or implied in this statement: the face-to-face relation, the temporal priority in experience, and the feeling of the whole as expressed by "we." The importance of the primary group, as he later shows, is that human nature arises in it, and from it the human virtues of sympathy, kindness, justice, and fair play can be shown to originate.

The use of the conception raised certain difficulties. There was no terminology provided for the groups not primary; and many writers came to speak of "secondary groups," some authors actually putting these words into the mouth of Cooley though he

¹ *Social Organization*, 1909, p. 23.

nowhere uses the term.¹ The tendency has been to consider secondary groups as those which depend for communication on indirect media, such as newspapers.

A more serious question concerns the exact denotation of the concept. Attention was fixed on the face-to-face criterion to the neglect of the other differentia, and many now use the term as applying only to those who are physically present in the group relation. Implied has been the criterion of temporal priority which would limit primary groups to children, since adults have long ago lost connection with their first groups. The psychological criterion has received relatively little emphasis. There is value in a careful inquiry into the exact and definite qualities which mark off these groups from other groups.

The schoolmen made a distinction between the essence and the accident. The accident may define a concrete denoted object whose essence does not disappear when the accident is not present. Your table may be square and oaken, but being square and being made of oak are not essential to its being a table, and hence they are called accidents. It would be a table if round or oval or if made of maple or steel. The essential properties of a table can be stated in a careful definition, giving *genus* and *differentia*; but only error results from confusing accident and essence.

How essential to the definition of a primary group is the property face-to-face? Are all face-to-face groups primary groups? Are any groups primary groups where the relations are not face-to-face? Or is the face-to-face relation an accident? Similar questions arise concerning the temporal priority implied in the words, though in usage these have occasioned only minor difficulties.

There are groups to be described at the extreme of the series of which there appears to be no doubt. An American criminal court, with judge, jury, defendant, and counsel, are in a face-to-face nearness with none of the essential properties of the primary group as set forth in the quotation and the other passages in which Cooley uses his concept. For the court is externally controlled and governed by rules made by absent and ancient authorities. The actions are essentially institutional in character. A legislative body, even when small, or a board of directors with formal

¹ Even von Wiese and Becker do this as late as 1932. See *Systematic Sociology*, p. 225.

procedures, may be cited. A primary group may be as small as two, but an unwelcome bond salesman in your office does not necessarily mean that you and he form a primary group. Nor would a delinquent student summoned into the office of his dean form with that official such a group. Without multiplying instances it may, then, be assumed that not all face-to-face groups are in essence primary groups.

But do any groups not face-to-face have the properties of the primary group? There is reason to think so. A kinship group widely scattered in space, communicating only by letter, may be characterized by a common feeling of unity, exhibit "a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole," and be accurately classed as a primary group. A woman student has recorded an experience in which she "fell in love" with a woman author, wrote long letters to her, and was influenced by her profoundly and for many years, although the two had not ever seen each other at the time the account was written. Was not this a primary group? Historic friendships like that of Emerson and Carlyle did not rest on physical presence, nor indeed so originate. Comrades in a cause, if there is esprit de corps, often form primary groups independent of spatial separation. These seem to be genuine primary groups.

The problem, then, is whether primary group is a spatial concept or whether other criteria must be sought. This inquiry will lead us to a more fundamental question: the validity of the group concept itself. Is a group a mere aggregation of individuals and therefore a mere name, or does it denote specific sociological things to be defined, classified, and studied?

The differences of opinion on this issue are old and familiar, and no solution of the problem is attempted here. A clear statement of the point of view can be made and should be kept in mind by any who may wish to profit by this discussion. The word "group" is used by some writers to indicate merely the aggregate of the individuals which make it up. This is the proper usage which statistics employs. The ages of divorced persons can be grouped into classes, averages figured, and relations with other aspects calculated. Such a group is a mere collection of units, and the averages are abstract symbols denoting the generalized character of these units. But the *sociological* group involves

consensus, concert, communication. The statistical group exists for the statistician; the sociological group exists for its members. In the former the individuals constitute the group; in the latter the group makes its members. The vigorous attack on the group concept which Allport and others have made seems to neglect this distinction. The reader will find a discussion of those opposing views easy of access.¹

I should like to raise the further question of the degree to which a sociological group can be defined in strictly objective terms. To what extent is a group to be called objective, and to what degree must subjective attitudes and images be assumed as essential? Is the sociological group an experience, an organization of experiences? A primary group may, indeed, be described by an onlooker after observing movements and sounds; but he may be only interpreting the symptoms, leaving the very essence of the group life unnoticed, or else misinterpreting what he has seen and heard. Strictly behavioristic accounts of group life cannot take account of what the members of the group feel or think.

"The sort of mutual identification and sympathy for which 'we' is the natural expression," suggests that Cooley did not mean to make the face-to-face relation the essence and sine qua non of the primary group. And if the primary group is characterized by the "we-feeling," we must look to subjective criteria and cannot depend wholly on mere observation, externally attempted. The appeal must be to experience and not confined to behavior.

Behaviorism is professed by many who do not accept the extreme forms of the statement. There are left-wing behaviorists, right-wing behaviorists, and those who occupy the center. But it would be accurate to characterize all forms of behaviorism as motivated by a desire to be objective. There is a tendency to minimize and sometimes to deny the importance of the inner subjective aspects of experience. Left-wing behaviorists deny the very existence of consciousness, but even right-wing members of this school seek to phrase their facts in terms of movements that can be observed. Only thus, do they feel, can we have an objective science.

¹ See "Group and Institution," in BURGESS, *Personality and the Social Group*, Chicago, 1929, pp. 162-180.

Cooley saw things differently. Since the movements of our muscles, when we glow with pride or long for friends, offer no set pattern, he insisted on the importance of the imagination and the feelings. When a man falls in love or "gets religion," the nervous currents are so inaccessible compared with the images and feelings and resultant attitudes that he considered these latter facts as basic and central. Those who know their Cooley will recall his bold statement that the solid facts of social life are the facts of the imagination. My friend is best defined as what I imagine he will do and say to me on occasion. Cooley taught that to understand human nature we must imagine imaginations. In his last book he quotes Holmes as saying that when John and Tom meet there are six persons present. There is John's real self (known only to his Maker), John's idea of himself, and John's idea of Tom, and, of course, three corresponding Toms. Cooley goes on to say that there are really twelve or more, including John's idea of Tom's idea of John's idea of Tom. And if this be thought a fanciful refinement, he insists that a misconception of this last type, when Germany made a fateful decision, was possibly the reason she lost the war. In these "echoes of echoes of echoes" of personality we have an a fortiori consideration of the importance of the subjective aspect of conduct.

Whether Cooley be correctly interpreted as meaning that the primary group is defined in essence as characterized by a certain kind of feeling is a matter of literary exegesis. The considerations advanced indicate this to be the logical conclusion. If there is group consciousness, *esprit de corps*—a feeling of "we"—then we have a primary group which will manifest attitudes and behavior appropriate and recognizable. The face-to-face position is a mere accident. Groups of friends and neighbors form primary groups, but the essential quality may be present in groups where spatial contiguity is lacking. The Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom has some hundreds of idealistic pacifists scattered over the world, most of whom have never seen each other. But they are comrades in the cause, are conscious of an enveloping sense of the whole group, think and speak and feel in terms of "we," and answer the definition of a primary group. We have shown, on the other hand, that many face-to-face groups lack this quality.

If our reasoning is sound, it follows that not every family is a primary group and that a school group may or may not be so defined. A domestic tyrant with commands, threats, and punishments may conceivably assemble his subjects around a table thrice daily in a group that lacks the essential qualities of the primary group. Likewise, a teacher may sometimes be the leader of a primary group; but one who has alienated the children may be hated or may be treated abstractly as a mere outsider and functionary in a company where there is no feeling of "we" and thus no primary group.

The correlative of the primary group is not a group whose members are separated or one where the communication is by indirect media. Rather is the primary group to be contrasted with the formal, the impersonal, the institutional. Its importance consists in the fact that primary relations give rise to the essentially human experiences, so that human nature may be said to be created in primary group relations. The more completely the relations are mechanized, the more fractional the contacts become and the less effective in generating the sentiments which are distinctly human. If children in home and school are to be made to participate in the culture of their people, it is necessary that the home and school be primary groups, and the mere fact that they meet face-to-face with the members of the family or the school system is not sufficient to give it the essential character.

This is not to say that the primary group is a value concept and therefore superior to other types of groups. Human institutions are erected to meet human needs, and these needs may sometimes be better satisfied by institutions than by primary group relations. Indeed, primary group relations may intrude in a disorganizing manner, as when a police officer refuses to arrest a man because he is a friend. Here belong much of the corruption, bribery, nepotism, and "graft" of our modern life. Formal and institutional groups cannot perform their function unless the distinction between them and the primary group be kept with scrupulous clarity. Moreover, there is no sharp dividing line between the two clear types. There are marginal cases and transitional forms, and critical experiences can alter either or both of them; but there need be no vagueness if the essential qualities of each be accurately stated.

If the argument so far is sound, we now see that the primary group can be destroyed, utterly destroyed, even though face-to-face relations continue. This is more frequently observed in family disruptions but can be observed in other types of primary groups. Former intimate relations may become purely formal, even legal, relying on fixed forms or external regulations. In the primary group one does more or less what he pleases; in institutions one follows the rules. In congenial, intimate friendship there can be no set regulations, no set formulas; for in this relation life is free-flowing, spontaneous, and interpenetrating. Friendship has never built an institution, nor can it, for the primary group withers and dies in an atmosphere of legality. Formal and external relations are different. Men stand on their rights, appeal to authorities, declare the motion out of order, insist on the sum nominated in the bond, sue for the terms of the contract.

Thus a primary group is at once more and less than an assemblage of people. An assembly may become united in an exalted moment till every member is aglow with the consciousness of the whole, but such a consciousness is also possible, as we have shown, when distance intervenes. It may be unilateral, just as unrequited love may be. But the experience is real, describable, and very important. Moody, in "Gloucester Moors," wrote of drinking in the beauty while he thought of his brethren in the city, oppressed in body, mind, and purse; and he said:

Who has given me this sweet
And given my brother dust to eat?

And it would seem untenable to deny the reality and importance of this momentary expression of a lifelong identification with a whole class which characterized the life of this poet.

So-called "secondary contacts" have nothing to do with the case. Contacts by letter, printed journal, book, telegraph, telephone, radio, may have any quality from an abstract promulgation of a harsh law to a throbbing message which unites and intensifies a bond between comrades. Even in large and scattered groups—particularly those we call "social movements"—the struggle for liberty, freedom, justice, or any great cause may call into existence the very experiences and relations which we are able to find in the primary group.

That Cooley so held is clear in his statement that democracy and Christianity are the outgrowth of the primary group and are its ultimate expression and flower. It is clear from his discussion that he did not mean the institutions, for the church is not Christianity, nor is democracy the same as the state. But, if conceived ideally, Christianity is expressed in love, sympathy, and loyalty by those who consider themselves members of an encompassing whole of which they are part and in which "we" is the golden word. The attitude and feeling are the essence; the space and position are but accidents.

Human life is essentially dramatic. Personality arises as, and because, we play roles in our social intercourse. The process of reflection in which we define for ourselves the meaning of what we have said and what others have said and done to us is also a dramatic event. We become conscious of ourselves when we realize that we are acting like another. Our personality is shaped by the definition of our acts which we receive from others. We respond to them in our imagination and build up not only our virtues and vices but the awareness of them. And here arises the transcendent importance of the primary group. Only in the primary-group relation is this type of influence directly effective and positively formative. Strictly mechanical relations approximate absent-mindedness, hostile relations tend to generate opposing attitudes, but in the primary group the seeds of a culture live and bear fruit. And the group is a relation between members, not an aggregation of units. The sociological group can be described only by references to the experiences of its members.

The considerations advanced have been essentially theoretical; but there are practical applications of the theory, as, indeed, there are of all theories. For the primary group, with its looseness of organization and its free-flowing influence, being the matrix in which human nature takes form, the type of control that characterizes the primary group is uniquely its own. The family has always been considered the essential type of a primary group, and yet it has been shown that the family belongs in this category only when there is a certain type of organization present. It is possible to trace the political and governmental patterns of control within the historical period as they have come into the family relationship. The patriarchal family, with a benevolent despot or a malevolent one, who is at the same time lawgiver,

judge, jury, and executioner, is not the original form of the family; and indeed contemporaneous families all over the pre-literate world can be found where this particular type of control and relationship is absent. When the pseudo-political forms have been imported into the family, it no longer retains its essential character as a primary group. The control is to some degree transferred from this particular locus to other groups into which the children can find their way. The family has lasting influence over its members in the degree in which it retains its character as a primary group. It loses its essential type of control when, through ignorance of this particular principle, another type of control is substituted.

Entirely analogous phenomena may be observed in our American schools. The kindergarten as it is now conducted is essentially a primary group, with the types of control and of relationships such as have been described. The same thing can be said of the very earliest grades, but tradition has decreed that, as the child matures, the essentially informal type of control shall be superseded by one more definitely institutional, with the result that the attitudes and ideals which the teacher is set to transmit often fail more or less completely to be derived from that particular source. Any objective examinations of the high schools in America at the present day will bear out this statement and illustrate this principle. The opinions, the standards, and the ideals of the teachers are transmitted to the students of the high schools only to a fractional degree, and it is the contention here that the explanation lies in the loss of the essential nature of the primary-group relation in the traditional type of control which the high school has adopted. What happens is a matter of common observation and universal knowledge. The adolescents seek and form primary groups of their own which have a definite isolation from their elders. Primary groups ranging from little circles of friends to definitely predatory boys' gangs illustrate again the principle we have here set forth. From the point of view of the mental hygiene of children and adolescents, what parents and teachers need to do is to "go to school to the gang" and learn what their methods are; and when this instruction has been well profited by, it will be found that the control of the gang is essentially the control of the primary group and that the school and home have lost the essential character of it.

We cannot fully describe the primary group by concentrating all our attention upon harmony and intimate personal relations, for these have their most intense manifestations when they are contrasted with the hostility and conflict of other similar groups which give esprit de corps and unity and are the occasion of morale in the primary group. The hostile group is not the opposite of the primary group; it is, to a certain extent, the condition of its existence. If there were only one primary group, there would not be any at all, because group consciousness only occurs over against the consciousness of another contrasting or opposing group. Hostility and loyalty, then, are two aspects of a definite relation, and the essential character of the primary group must be sought in its free-flowing, unrestricted character.

It is, as we have shown, in the institution that we find the essential opposite of the primary group, where the forms are fixed, the rules prescribed, the offices laid down, and the duties set forth with definite clarity and relative inflexibility. The person is no longer acting freely but is acting in an office, performing a definite institutional function. When an institution operates in its typical character, the functionary manifests a minimum of personal relations. An institution might almost be defined as a social device to make emotion unnecessary. But the primary group has as an essential element in it the emotional character which binds its members into a relation.

The nature of the primary group, then, lies not in its parts but in its organization. It depends not upon its spatial contiguity but upon its functional interrelation. It can be described neither by statistical enumeration nor by spatial measurement. More is involved than separate elements. In addition to space there is also time. The primary group cannot exist without memories; it cannot endure without purposes. No mechanical or spatial description is adequate. It is a changing organization of functional activities tending toward an end, influenced by its past and guided by its purposes and its future. It is not a mechanism; it is a part of life.

THE SECT AND THE SECTARIAN

Social origins have rested so far chiefly on a foundation of ethnology. Primitive peoples were assumed to represent earlier stages of the life which we are living, and from Comte and Spencer till now men have sought to answer fundamental questions about our own religion, morals, art, and economy by collecting facts regarding savages. But the results have been disappointingly meager. The ultimate origin of any of our basic activities is lost in the unrecorded past. The answer to the question of origins which seemed at first to be promised by ethnography has actually been sought by an appeal to psychology, and since the psychology of primitive man is a matter of inference, the net result of nearly a hundred years of writing is little more than a collection of theories of the origin of institutions, not one of which can be disproved, but each one of which is unproved and indeed unprovable. The curtain rises in the middle of the drama—sometimes, indeed, toward the end of the last act—and the process by means of which the past has been reconstructed differs in no essential respect from the most primitive of mythologies.

There exists a contemporary phenomenon, relatively neglected, which offers brighter promise of success. The religious sect, and particularly the modern isolated sect, has advantages for the student which ethnography does not afford. In many cases the whole history is accessible, since the date can be found when the sect was not dreamed of and the whole evolution can be traced. If sociologists cared to give the same careful and detailed study to the foot-washing of the Dunkers or the dancing of the Shakers as they do to the totem dances of the Australians or the taboos of the Bantus, the material would be found to be not only equally interesting but in all probability more fruitful.

The religious sect is a valuable field for the study of sociology as distinguished from social psychology, since it furnishes a body of facts concerning the rise of institutions. The current notions

of the origin of institutions include the theory that they developed from a fixed set of instincts, the theory that they are determined by the geographic environment, and the theory that the whole phenomenon arises out of the conditioning of the infantile reflexes. Now, psychology is very important and there are many problems which are essentially psychological, but the sociology of institutions can be studied without positing any foundation of psychology, and it needs no more depend on psychology than on astronomy or geology. There are questions to be answered, facts that can be gathered, hypotheses that can be tested, and conclusions that can be arrived at when institutions are studied with the essential abstraction which all scientific inquiry demands.

Nevertheless, the religious sect is also a valuable field for the study of social psychology. The sect is composed of sectarians and the sectarian is a personality. Moreover, his personality issues from the life of the sect and can be understood only if we take into account the social matrix in which it took form. The relation of the individual to the group and of institutions to the instinctive equipment, as well as the problem of the relation of inherited temperament to institutional organization—all these and other psychological questions can be profitably studied in considering the sectarian and his sect. If we assume that human nature is not a fixed or constant or hereditary thing, but on the contrary results from the presence of, and contact with, one's fellows, the sect affords a field for the study of personality in its development which, in cases where the group is cut off with relative completeness from outside influences, gives a situation analogous to a laboratory setup where the conditions are controlled and the variables studied.

The relation of individual personalities to institutions is apparently reciprocal. The members of a religious sect are shaped and fashioned in accordance with the traditions and world-view which prevail within the group. To ask why a man who has lived from infancy in a Mormon community looks at life from the standpoint of Mormonism is to ask a very easy question. His life has been defined within the given social whole. But if we become curious and inquire how the institution of Mormonism was constituted, the question is more complex. For the sect has its roots in the far-distant past, besides having differentia that mark it off from any other institution. If it be true that the

sectarian has been too often studied in isolation from the sect, it is even more apparent that the sect has been studied with too little regard for the other groups with which it was in contrast and conflict. The telescopes have had too small a field of vision. The conventional accounts include a certain description of the times and conditions, but the sect is usually set off rather too sharply against a definitely opposing group. Indeed, one may think of the sect in a figure. Arising at a time when the fixed order is breaking up, or tending to break up, the sect is the effort of the whole community to integrate itself anew. It is the order arising from social chaos, though the order may not be overstable nor the chaos a condition of utter disruption. If we examine the organization of a large number of sects such as Quakers, Shakers, Mennonites, Dunkers, Perfectionists, and Amanas, what appears upon close scrutiny is that at a crucial moment in the history of a society a situation occurs which is literally unique, never having been present before in any group of people anywhere in the world at any period of time. And since the situation is unique and since the personalities of the members form a unique assemblage of forces, interests, and ideals, the solution of the difficulty has also a certain uniqueness about it.

The student of the literature becomes familiar with a priori assumptions and the explanation by general principles, but these do not stand the test of a comparative study. One writer remarks that it was quite natural than Ann Lee should found a celibate community since she had such a disastrous married life. But many women have had disastrous married lives who did not found celibate communities, and many celibate communities have been founded by those who did not have disastrous married lives. Indeed, Ann Lee did not begin her sect with celibacy. That feature was a later addition. One writer has explained a colony of communistic celibates as response to their environment. They were in the wilderness in Pennsylvania shut off from associations and in a physical milieu very much like an ancient Egyptian sect that was celibate and communistic. The proof offered of this causal statement is that when civilization conquered the wilderness their distinguishing doctrines were given up, which forces the remark that there are many settlements in the isolated wilderness that were neither communistic nor celi-

bate, and, moreover, that some communistic sects persisted, and some still persist long after the whole surrounding community has been conquered by civilization.

It is, therefore, impossible to say of any given region that it will produce a definite type of religion. The set forms of the constitution of a sect vary so much that the details must be regarded as chance or accidental. The problem here is very similar to the problem of an invention, differing chiefly in that the sect is a collective affair while an invention is individual. Of course the various members of a group are not equal in influence, and usually the fate of a whole religious movement will be modified by the biographical details of some important early leader. As is well known, polygamy was not the original program of the Mormons but came in in response to an attempt to meet a particular emergency. The Amana community has practiced communism for nearly a century, but they had many years of continuous existence before communism came into their mores. The custom was adopted when, after one of their migrations, it developed that the poorer members who owed the more wealthy ones large sums of money for their lands seemed to be hopelessly in debt. Whereupon, after some divine inspirations and much conference and objection, it was at last agreed that they should hold all things in common. But, after the matter was so decided, this feature became an integral part of their society and has remained unquestioned for generations.

There are many instances where the traditions of a group have been affected for long periods by the experience and influence of a single man. The Disciples, who form one of the larger denominations, have a peculiar inconsistency in their treatment of non-members. Baptism by immersion is a *sine qua non* for membership, but those who are not baptized are freely admitted to the intimacies of the communion table. The problem is completely explained by the experience of their leader, Campbell, who began as a Presbyterian and practiced open communion, later affiliated with the Baptists, and finally organized an independent sect. This variety of religious experience caused him to advocate the inconsistency which, being adopted by the small group and retained when it began to grow, has endured for a hundred years and been the occasion of much friction and at least one division.

The sect is originally constituted, not by non-religious persons, but by those who have split off from existing organizations. Christian Science grows largely by accretion from former adherents of organizations which are older, and this is typical. The condition of unrest and confusion loosens the bonds of union, and sometimes a few kindred spirits find each other and a nucleus is formed. It is very rare that the original motive is separation, but when the divergent nucleus excites opposition and achieves group consciousness the time is ripe for a new sect. The first stage is then typically a stage of conflict, though the methods of warfare vary according to the standards of the times. Many of the organizations are short-lived, and it would be highly instructive to have an exhaustive study of the small sects that did not survive. When group consciousness and morale characterize the original company or cadre of the sect, there is often a more or less rapid growth by accretion or attraction by others. Just why they are attracted is a very interesting problem. It is often assumed that the chief appeal is to men of like temperament. Perhaps this is what Giddings means by consciousness of kind. Men outside the sect join themselves to it because they feel a consciousness of kind, that is, they are similar in temperament and regard themselves as being like-minded. The question is not easy to decide, but there are facts which make this a doubtful explanation. Thomas Edwards, writing in 1646 about this very problem, gives a long list of motives which in his opinion were leading men to join the hated sects about him, among which are the following: some were needy, broken, decayed men who hoped to get something in the way of financial help from the new sect; some were guilty, suspected, and obnoxious men who were in the lurch and feared arrest or indictment, and to these the sect was a sanctuary; some, he claimed, had lawsuits and hoped to find friends to help them in their litigation; others, he thought, were ambitious, proud, covetous men with a mind to offices; still others, he insists, were libertines and loose persons seeking less restraint than the older communities insisted on; another class he calls wanton-willed, unstable persons who pretend to be convinced, while others he calls quarrelsome people who like to stir up trouble; and still others include those who have quarreled with their ministers or have had some trouble about their church dues and thus have gone off, disaffected.

Even if we make a liberal allowance for the bitterness of the controversies of the seventeenth century, it seems necessary to conclude that the new converts were men of many types. To join a group it is not necessary that you regard yourself as like them; it might be more accurate to say that you have an ambition to be like them and therefore want to change. In the histories of most sects it is possible to describe a period of relatively intense conflict, and here the necessities of comparative study are the greater. For the conflict is modified by the opponents. Men learn the art of war from their enemies, and when they start out they are rarely as extreme as they come to be under the stress of the fighting. The Amanas attacked the clergy for immorality and laxity; they refused all military services and did not send their children to the public schools; while in their turn they were beaten, harassed, and imprisoned. William Penn's plea for religious freedom he justified on scriptural grounds, calling it natural, prudent, and Christian, finding in the Bible justification for loving one's enemies and refusing to employ human force. Tolerance he regarded as prudent because the Scripture says "no kingdom divided against itself can stand." But the opponents of Penn are necessary if one is to understand the position he takes, a position which at that time was new and revolutionary. In Edwards' *Gangraena* there is a seventeenth-century expression of the view of the dominant group; toleration was wrong since "a kingdom divided against itself could not stand." Edwards regarded tolerance as a great evil, as the following quotation will show:

Toleration is the grand designe of the Devil, his Masterpeece and chiefe Engine he works by at this time to uphold his tottering Kingdome; it is the most compendious, ready, sure way to destroy all Religion, lay all waste, and bring in all evill; it is a most transcendent, catholique, and fundamentall evill for this Kingdom of any that can be imagined: As originall sin is the most fundamentall sin, all sin; having the seed and spawn of all in it: so a Toleration hath all errors in it, and all evils, it is against the whole streame and current of Scripture both in the Old and New Testament, both in matters of Faith and manners, both generall and particular commands; it overthrowes all relations, both Politicall, Ecclesiasticall, and Oeconomicall; and whereas other evils, whether errors of judgment or practise, be but against some one or few places of Scripture or relation, this is against all, this is the Abaddon, Apollyon,

the destroyer of all religion, the Abomination of Desolation and Astonishment, the Libertie of Perdition (as Augustine calls it) and therefore the Devil follows it night and day, working mightily in many by writing Books for it, and other wayes, all the Devils in Hell and their Instruments being at work to promote a Toleration (Thomas Edwards, *Gangraena* [London, 1646], pp. 121-22).

The conflict unites the sect, creates esprit de corps, and heightens morale. Usually, but not always, if the conflict be too severe so that confidence is lessened, dissensions may arise and factions appear. Conflict united the German people for four years, but when they began to feel that the cause was lost, the conflict broke up the unity of the nation. In the sect, however, a conflict can be with the "world," which is a subjective image, and it is possible for a sect to survive great disasters since its members are so certain of ultimate success. The sect therefore has always some degree of isolation and is more apt to have a high morale when there has been success in securing a location shut off from the rest of the world. There are, however, devices of cultural isolation which overcome lack of physical separation, as can be observed in the present state of the Christian Science church. In this case isolation depends upon a separate vocabulary and particularly upon the admonition not to argue or discuss the matter with outsiders. The Masons, and to some extent the Mormons, achieve isolation by secrecy.

In this conflict period of the life of the sect the tendency is toward exclusiveness wherever feasible. Certain economic relations with the "world" are necessary, but the cultural life is protected. There is always a tendency to be an endogenous tribe. Sometimes to marry an outsider is to forfeit membership in the group. Yet the time always comes when this is difficult to enforce, for from the beginning of time the sons of God have looked upon the daughters of men and found them fair and desirable. Intermarriage never becomes general until disintegration has set in, and it is always a destructive influence, for queens make good foreign missionaries and no child can easily despise the religion of his mother.

A highly interesting aspect of the development of a sect is found in the tendency to divide and become two sects, typically more bitter toward each other than toward the "world" which they formerly united in opposing. There appear to be two types

of division. Sometimes it merely represents a stage in the process of reabsorption into the larger society from which they came out. In this case the progressives or innovators want to change the old customs to conform with what is being done outside. The Disciples split on the question of whether an organ should be used in church, the organ party wishing to imitate the outsiders while their opponents wanted to maintain the older tradition. Another type of division seems to give no such clue. It is apparently a differential interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional phrase. The Dunkers had an issue concerning multiple foot washing; one party insisted that each person should wash the feet of only one other, while their opponents contended that each should wash the feet of several. The text to which both parties appealed was: "Ye ought to wash one another's feet." There are other examples of ambiguity in the initial statement or doctrine, and unless there is an adequate machinery, or supreme court, which can settle the matter, divisions may result.

But whether the group divides or not, a period arrives when the isolation begins to disappear and the customs of the outside world with its beliefs and practices, even its ideals and doctrines, begin gradually to penetrate the group. When two people live side by side they always influence each other. The Boers in Angola smear their floors with fresh cow dung, which picturesque custom they acquired from the savages around them. Such tendencies are slow in coming and are often very strenuously resisted. In 1905 the annual meeting of the Old Order Brethren solemnly decided that it was unscriptural for any of their members to have a telephone. The Dunker authorities have solemnly ruled on erring brethren who attended animal shows, played authors, bought county bonds, served on juries, bought pianos, used sleigh bells, wore neckties, used fiddles, wore standing coat collars, erected tombstones, and joined the Y. M. C. A. All this was many years ago and the process starting then has gone on until many of the progressive Dunkers smile at what they now call old-fashioned objections.

If we turn now to the question of personality and the light which a study of sects can give us on this problem, it is clear that the sect in its collective life produces the sectarian. The sectarian is therefore a type, and types of personality turn out to be the

end-products which issue from the activities of a group. Types can be studied with reference to the morphology of the human body. Thus, men can be divided into the fat and round, the lean and slim, and any other discoverable groupings. They may be divided into introverts and extroverts, though nearly all the people you meet are neither one nor the other, but rather mixed. These and many other classifications are of value and should be encouraged; but they fail to meet all the needs, and it becomes apparent that the social life men live is more relevant than the physical constitution they inherit. There is a typical Mormon and his personality can be described. He is in favor of the highly centralized institutional organization; he is ruled by a characteristic system of theology; he believes in private property controlled to a certain extent by a theocracy. Likewise, there is a typical Shaker; but the Shaker holds private property to be undesirable and even against the will of God. Moreover, to the Shaker all sexual intercourse is immoral, and there is a long list of definite statements that could be applied to this typical individual. There is also a typical Dunker, neither communistic, like the Shaker, nor ruled by a central hierarchy, like the Mormon. He belongs to the one true church, as most sectarians do, but each sectarian belongs to a different one true church than the other sectarians. The Dunker regards it as obligatory to be immersed in water three times, facing forward each time. He must ceremonially wash his brother's feet and give him a holy kiss of love, keeping himself unspotted from the world.

Each of these sects, like all closely organized religious groups, has a peculiar vocabulary, a fixed tradition, and a specific and peculiar way of regarding God and man, the world and the hereafter. The sect, then, is analogous to a primitive tribe, and the primitive tribe has long been recognized as productive of specific types of personality. There is more difference between a Shaker and a Dunker than between the equatorial Bantus and the South African Zulus. And this difference exists in spite of essential similarities in race, language, and geographical similarities in environment.

These types are the result of social heritage and breed true socially for long periods of time. They cannot be explained by geographical environment, for the Dunkers and the Amanas and

many others live in the same kind of environment, cultivating the same soil and surrounded by neighbors who are alien. Nor can appeal be made to physical heredity, for the sects are constantly acquiring members from outside the line of descent. The Mormon missionaries traveled all over America and Europe seeking and finding new recruits for the community in Utah. The cultural life produces the mores, and the mores are irresistible when skillfully inculcated into the young and into the new recruits.

Moreover, as time goes on new and often important variations in the mores arise. Neither for the group nor for the individual are all moments equally important. Life does not consist of unaccented rhythms, but rather of periods of uniformity followed by important moments of decision, and from these latter issue changes which may determine the course of the group for generations to come.

In this connection it becomes necessary to refer again to the assumption frequently made that there is a temperamental uniformity which explains the group. They are all assumed to be like-minded; new converts come in because of a consciousness of kind. The group is assumed to select those of a certain temperament. This interpretation fails to meet just criticism. An examination of the membership of the sect and the phenomenon of division and dissension forces the assumption that many varieties of temperament are included in the membership of the sect. The hypothesis here advanced is that the new convert does not come in because he was of like mind, but that he comes in because he changes his mind. He makes it up in a different way. The sect attracts him because he wants to be different and it takes him and makes him into a different type as he comes to enter into the cultural life.

In support of this notion several types of facts seem relevant. First, the sect arises in a time of disorganization, which is always a period of unsettling. Men are thus ready for a new stable or organizing influence. They do not join because they are like anybody; they join because some solution is offered to their unrest. Second, the descendants of the members of the sect can be assumed to be of different temperaments, and this assumption is borne out on investigation. In spite of the difference in temperament the typical sectarian in each case can be accurately

described and is held to loyal membership until the sect begins to disintegrate.

Facts of the third group are more important and more conclusive. It has been pointed out that the history of the sect shows a typical progression. The period of extreme isolation, conflict, and high morale is followed by a more irenic era, when conformity with the outside world gets increasing approval. The end result is the disappearance of the sect as a separate conflict group and the lessening importance of their differences when considering the influence of these on the personality of the sectarian. The typical sectarian is, therefore, a different person in the different stages of the life of the group. The assumption of the temperamental uniformity is difficult to hold in the light of the progressive alterations which are demonstrable. A combative, exclusive non-conformist who dresses differently from those in the society in which he lives is a very different personality from him who joins with others in their associations and enterprises and who comes to be a patriotic and regular member of an American political unit. Since the sectarian is the individual aspect of his sect, he changes when his group changes and his group changes with a changing set of relations. The changes in the sect are not dependent on the temperament of the members, and the changes in the sectarian reflect the collective life. Therefore, the temperament of the sectarian is a varying element and the theory of the temperamental selection seems inadequately founded.

Those who appeal to temperament as a causative factor do not always keep in mind that temperament is an inference and not a fact. Temperamental qualities are abstractions. A definition of temperament would include those factors in the personality which determine the mode of behavior and which are innate. Since, however, temperament does not become important until the personality is formed, it is always a matter of inferential abstraction. The temperament can be shown to change, and arguments about inherited temperament ought to be made with the greatest care.

Experience is, then, creative. The sect is not a safe refuge where the temperament and desires of an outsider can be comfortably expressed and realized; it is rather a formative force or set of forces; and the motives which lead a man to join a sect may be

quite different from those which assure his continuance in it. No one on the outside can fully know what the experience on the inside is. Being a sectarian may be more satisfying than was at first imagined, or it may be less so, but it is certainly never exactly anticipated. The motives which lead a woman to the altar in marriage may be quite different from those which make her decide to endure to the end. The reason a man takes up smoking is rarely the motive which makes him continue the habit. The sectarian is, therefore, in some sense a new creature. He may regard himself, and quite accurately, as entirely made over. Very commonly he refers to the new existence as a rebirth.

If we attempt to analyze the personality of the sect in terms of attitudes, we have available the theoretical discussion of W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki. An attitude is stated to be a process of individual consciousness set over against a corresponding value. R. E. Park in discussing attitudes is concerned with the relation of attitudes and the wishes and opinions. The attitude is said to be the mobilization of the will. Psychologists, among whom Allport and Thurstone may be mentioned, have attempted to investigate attitudes by questionnaires and inquiries regarding verbal assent or dissent. The assumption is that the attitude corresponds to the verbal expression of it.

In the work of V. Pareto there are distinguished three elements which we may roughly force into some kind of relation with the preceding points of view. There are C, the customs, convictions, and principles which the members share; these he calls the *dérivées*. The second element, B, is the verbal expression when the first is questioned or challenged and represents the need to be logical or the desire to appear reasonable. These he calls the *dérivations*. There is a third element, A, relatively invariable, arising from the sentiments and interests which may be admitted, but which are often concealed. These are spoken of as the *résidues*.

The social attitude seems to correspond to the *résidues*, but there is also an attitude of a more general sort corresponding to the *dérivées*. The *résidues*, or attitudes, are never the object of direct perception. They must be inferred, but the inference is a necessity. Thus Mormon polygamy was at one time an accepted practice; it was a *dérivée*, in class C. The reasons assigned for the practice in debate, argument, and propaganda belong to the

class B. They are highly variable and a premium is placed on ingenuity and originality in the inevitable forensics. But the inner motives and deep-lying attitudes arising out of their instinctive cravings and sentiments, class A, may be very different from what would be admitted. Without going into detail here it is apparent that sexuality is involved to a degree to be determined by whatever methods are at hand.

Now, the origin of social forms, the creation of new mores, need be uniform in a given group only in class C. The elements B tend to have more uniformity, but are still quite various, while the element A admits a far wider variety. Some people join the Dunkers for economic security; others, to avoid military service; others, out of disgust for the state religion; and so on through a great variety. The *dérivations*, or class B, among religious sects are often taken from Bible texts, and it sometimes happens that the same *dérivation* will be used by opposing sects to justify contradictory practices. "Suffer little children to come unto me for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven" is quoted by Baptists to show that infants do not need to be baptized; it is quoted by Paedo-Baptists to justify the baptism of children.

"Every kingdom divided against itself cannot stand." This *dérivation* is quoted by Quakers to prove that sects should be tolerated, and by Edwards to prove that they should be suppressed.

"In Heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage." This is a favorite proof text for the Shakers, to show that there should be no sexual intercourse, and was the central text quoted by the Perfectionists to justify the form of free love which they called "complex marriage."

The number and nature of the attitudes, the *résidues*, is large and bears upon the question of like-mindedness and similarity of temperament. As already pointed out, there may be a score of varying motives which bring people into a common organization.

But now comes the most important consideration. The attitudes in class A, the *résidues*, are continually being reformed. They are created as emotional experiences multiply and result from later *dérivations* and new objects and new loyalties. The common experience in the sect tends to make widely varying *résidues* more nearly common and identical.

Pareto points out the necessity for caution in assuming, as Allport and Thurstone do, the correspondence of *dérivation* and

résidue. The literature of the Shakers abounds in ascetic sentences and repeated assertions that sex is an unnecessary evil, but sometimes the Shakers worked all day and danced all night, and in the early period the men and women were nude and danced together. It seems necessary to assume a far greater interest in sex than their opinions and principles express. One cannot understand a sect by merely studying its creed.

The study of the sects which survived needs supplementing by a knowledge of those which died. In certain periods of disorganization there were many small aberrant attempts at organization which did not live and many doctrines which did not take on. One John Boggis, who became a preacher of note in seventeenth-century England, is quoted by Edwards as refusing to say grace at dinner where the meat was a shoulder of roast veal, scornfully asking "to whom shall I give thanks, whether to the butcher, the bull, or the cow?" Such extreme divergence failed to take on.

In every time of disorganization there is always a certain disorder in the sex mores. This happens in political revolutions and also in a time of religious unrest. The new sects are very often accused of sex practices contrary to the mores. Some of these accusations are probably exaggerated, because the enemies are rarely restrained in their statements, but it is easy to point out a certain trend toward sex liberty among many of the sects. Edwards quotes a certain scriptural argument. One of the sects insisted that since death dissolved the marriage bond, and since the Scripture teaches that sleep is a form of temporary death, it is no sin to engage in sex intercourse if one's husband or wife is asleep. In such an instance there is a clear indication of a strong attitude and an example of the ingenuity of the *dérivation*, or, in this case, the rationalization.

We conclude, then, that the sect is the result of collective forces that surround it and to which its own life is in part a reaction. The sect produces a type which comes to take on certain attitudes, to be devoted to certain objects and values, and to define life and the world in the way that is approved. The most fruitful field for study would seem to lie in the securing of complete and adequate life histories of sectarians, including new converts to the sect, members who have always been in it, and dissidents and deserters who have gone out from it. For the

intimate life histories will give light on the actual product that the sect is responsible for and afford material for the accurate answering of some of the problems at present unresolved.

The purpose of this chapter has been to call attention to a field of study which has not been wholly neglected but which has not yielded the results that it might yield if the material were studied with diligence. It seems not too much to say that the sect and the sectarian, if adequately investigated, could throw a flood of needed light upon one of our oldest and most perennial problems: the relation of society to the individual, the leader to his group, the relation of institutions to instincts, which is the same problem that interested Plato when he discussed the relation of the one and the many.

VI

ARE INSTINCTS DATA OR HYPOTHESES?

The doctrine of human instincts is, in this country, hardly more than a generation old. It was as late as 1890 that James wrote: "Nothing is commoner than the remark that man differs from the lower creatures by the almost total lack of instincts and the assumption of their work by reason." So well did he argue for the existence of instincts in man that men came to say: Nothing is commoner than the belief that we are endowed with instincts inherited from the lower creatures. Whole systems of psychology have been founded on this assumption. And yet the agreement among psychologists has very definite limits. As each came to define and list the instincts, it became increasingly apparent that the subject was very difficult, there being little agreement either as to the nature of the instincts or their number. At the present time there is the widest diversity of opinion as to what an instinct is; there is the utmost confusion as to how many instincts there are. What are the implications of this diversity and this confusion? Perhaps the explanation is that human instincts are explanatory assumptions and not observable phenomena. Let us examine how they are defined and listed.

The definitions vary widely. (Says James: "An instinct is the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without foresight of the ends and without previous education in their performance."¹) This definition is criticized by several of his successors, including Thorndike.² The succeeding attempts agree, for the most part, in being different from that of James, but their similarity goes little farther. Hunter expresses his view in five words, calling an instinct ("an inherited coordination of reflexes," adding that "it refers not to a state of consciousness but to a mode of behavior,"³) against which notion McDougall

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, II, 383.

² *Educational Psychology*, I, 22.

³ *General Psychology*, p. 163.

asserts that ("instincts are an outcome of a distinctly mental process as well as an innate tendency.") McDougall represents a tendency which culminates in this curious formulation from Drever:

Now we are proposing to call the conscious impulse instinct, when and in so far as it is not itself determined by previous experience, but only determined in experience, while itself determining experience in conjunction with the natural objects or situations determining experience as sensation.¹

One is tempted to discuss this gem of verbosity, but I pass to the statement of Münsterberg that the term "instinct" is not a psychological category at all, but is strictly biological, "the instincts do not introduce any new type of psychological experience,"² which opinion can be set over against the contradictory assertion of Wundt: "The assumption that instincts belong only to the animal and not to human consciousness is of course entirely unpsychological and contrary to experience."³ Watson calls it a chain of reflexes, while Pillsbury⁴ relates it to openness of synaptic connection. It is perhaps unnecessary to cite further instances, for every student of the literature is aware of the wide variations in the formulations of the definitions—not merely verbal differences, for these would not be important, but fundamental differences in conception. But why do they differ so widely? May it not be due to the very nature of the problem itself?

Certain of the psychologists have, indeed, written very frankly concerning the difficulties here insisted upon, but the momentum of current opinion, the idols of the theater, have prevented their carrying out the impulse to reject the category as a factual datum. Thus Thorndike admits:

Lack of observations of human behavior and the difficulty in interpreting the facts that have been observed which is the consequence of a civilized environment, the transitoriness of instincts and the early incessant and intimate interaction of nature and nurture, thus baffle the cataloguer of original tendencies.⁵

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 26.

² *Instinct in Man*, p. 88.

³ *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 186.

⁴ *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 317.

⁵ *Essentials of Psychology*, p. 240.

⁶ *Educational Psychology*, I, 40.

Unfortunately, the baffled feeling did not endure, for on page 52 of the same volume the very same author thus describes the instinct of hunting—an instinct which Angell declares not to exist.

To a small escaping object, man, especially if hungry, responds, apart from training, by pursuit, being satisfied when he draws nearer to it. When within pouncing distance, he pounces upon it, grasping at it. If it is not seized he is annoyed. If it is seized, he examines, manipulates and dismembers it, unless some contrary tendency is brought into action by its sliminess, sting or the like. To an object of moderate size and not offensive mien moving away from or past him man originally responds much as noted above, save that in seizing the object chased, he is likely to throw himself upon it, bear it to the ground, choke and maul it until it is completely subdued, giving then a cry of triumph.

This description lacks nothing in vividness, but one would hardly have expected such a statement from the scholar who wrote the masterly critique of the doctrine of imitation. The description is hardly convincing—it smacks of the armchair. How many children in the city parks may be observed pouncing on the small animals and dismembering them? The chickens, cats, and small dogs are “of moderate size and not offensive mien” and often may be seen “moving away from or past” the children, but the number of times the children can be observed “choking and mauling them till completely subdued, giving then a cry of triumph” is perhaps decidedly limited. Certainly, if the above is the hunting-instinct, then very few observers have seen it manifested and no one appears to have recorded any supporting facts. Perhaps this happens only when the human being is “apart from training,” but the trouble is that the hypothetical baby who, on a desert island, had no training at all, died at the tender age of two days and only the writers of the books have ever seen a man “apart from training.”

Watson also makes a frank admission.

No fair-minded scientific observer of instincts in man would claim that the *genus homo* possesses anything like the picturesque instinctive repertoire of the animal. Yet even James maintains the contrary. . . . Instinct and the capacity to form habits, while related functions, are present in any animal in inverse ratio. Man excels in his habit-forming capacities.¹

¹ *Psychology*, p. 254.

Yet even Watson gives an extended list of instincts, accompanied, at the same time, with many expressed misgivings.¹

Cooley may be taken as a representative of those who reject the term "instinct" as characteristic of human nature, the distinguishing marks of which being the plastic and variable nature of the responses.² (Münsterberg, already quoted, also rejects instincts)

It is clear, then, that the definition of the term is in doubt. It will be even easier to show that (The number and classification of the instincts is in a state of direst confusion.) (James leads off with some thirty-two (including the instinct of licking sugar!), but Angell³ is content with half that number, rejecting the alleged instinct of cleanliness (perhaps he had a small boy of his own) and refusing to include hunting and modesty.) He did, however, make certain additions not on James's list. (Warren⁴ has twenty-six, including "clothing," "resenting," and "domineering" while Thorndike in his *Original Nature* enumerates some forty or more) besides certain "multiple tendencies" both of thought and action. (Nor is this all. Pillsbury, Watson, Hunter, and the rest, among the psychologists, as well as Graham Wallas, Carleton Parker, Ellwood, and Hayes, and many others, all follow with their own lists, no two quite agreeing and each with his own opinion as to what should be included and what rejected. McDougall) in the work already referred to, has proposed a criterion which requires the instinct to be found among the animals, not in all the animals but in some of them, and also to be found in an exaggerated form among abnormal people. This leads him to (posit some fifteen or more, the number varying in different editions of his work.) The zoölogical garden on the one side and the insane asylum on the other would thus have a veto on the candidates for the list, but the criteria have found favor with but few.

(Trotter in a war-time book insists on four instincts and no more; Ames in his *Psychology of Religion* reduces them to two instincts which he finds quite sufficient to explain the complexities of human life, while Freud, Jung, LeBon, and Kropatkin each

¹ In later writings Watson abandoned the instinct doctrine.

² *Social Process*, p. 199.

³ *Psychology*, p. 349.

⁴ *Human Psychology*, p. 106.

reduces human nature to one single instinctive principle, though they do not agree on what it is.)

How does it happen that gifted men are so unable to agree on what they consider the basic facts of human nature? Some slight differences might be understood, but surely the range is distressingly wide. One, or two, or four, or eleven, or sixteen, or thirty, or forty—this looks suspicious. Facts are the given, accepted, apparent data of a problem. Perhaps instincts are the hypotheses.

There is (one distinction) that has received increasing emphasis since the time of James, that (between reflexes and instincts.) This distinction seems too valuable to be surrendered, for there is a class of (reflexes, like sneezing and coughing,) that do not vary noticeably, and there is a list of them in constant use for diagnostic purposes. The patellar reflex is a well-known example. But the case of the instincts is very different. No such specificity exists here, no such invariability, no approximation of anything approaching the uniformity with which different authorities set forth the list of reflexes.

(The difficulty in formulating a doctrine of instincts is that habit and social interaction enter in so early that it is difficult to disentangle the original from the acquired.) For example, Watson investigated the causes of fear in children. A statement by James has been repeated and reaffirmed by many subsequent writers.

Strange animals, either large or small, excite fear, but especially men or animals advancing toward us in a threatening way. This is entirely instinctive and antecedent to experience. Some children will cry with terror at their very first sight of a cat or dog, and it will often be impossible for weeks to make them touch it.

Watson tested this, by introducing into the presence of children who had no previous experience with animals, all sorts of strange stimuli, a pigeon, a rabbit, a white rat, or a dog, but he was unable to find any visual experience that caused fear. He did find, however, that if a sudden noise frightened a child at the same time that a hairy animal or a fur coat was shown him, the presence of the coat or the animal alone would subsequently arouse fear.¹ And the moral of that is that the conditioned reflex, or as the older

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. 6.

writers called it, simultaneous association, begins to modify inherited reactions from the very first, and continues so to modify them. (Instincts are therefore impossible to make out in their purity, for they are constantly being modified by habit and social experience.)

(The most usual explanation of instinct has relied upon the so-called genetic method and assumes that these social customs, which are observed among civilized people, are the result of the stamping in, through age-long experience, of some reaction which is inherited by each succeeding generation. Thus Patrick derives the love of baseball from the activities of prehistoric savages: "Man in the primitive world had to run, throw, and strike." And baseball actually reproduces the very attitude of the cave man with his club. The question arises, however, as to why Russian boys or the French or the Chinese do not play baseball. It is to be presumed that American boys are not alone in having descended from primitive man.)

(The ridiculous length to which this author carries the "genetic" method is illustrated by his statement that "the former dependence of man upon the horse is shown in the instinct of the child of today to play horse, to ride a rocking-horse, or a stick, or anything.")

The corrective of this type of error lies in a wider knowledge of ethnology. Consider, for example, the enormous variation in food preferences. The Eskimo eats only meat, often raw. The Hindu eats only vegetables and is unwilling to kill even an insect. Most of us eat both animals and vegetables. Millions of people still occasionally eat human flesh. Whole nations have fish as a prominent part of their diet, but the Plains Indians never eat fish, regarding it as poison. A colleague of mine objects to Negroes' living next door to him and defends it as an inherited instinct, while Texans on the Rio Grande speak of a "native instinct" of hostility to the Mexicans, not to speak of the feeling of Californians toward the Japanese. None of these feelings are instinctive.

The power of a social custom to modify original nature may be well illustrated by comparing the attitudes of two African tribes concerning twins. The women of the Ibibio tribe in Nigeria live in constant dread of the misfortune of bearing twins. They

¹ *Psychology of Relaxation*, p. 56.

never eat of a double yam or a double plantain lest its magic power cause the birth of twin children, one of whom at least is no merely mortal offspring but the child of some wandering demon. When twins are born, they are flung into the bush for the leopards to eat, while the mother goes apart for twelve months, purifying herself in strict seclusion, food being taken to her once a week. Even this is a mitigation, due to the humanizing effect of an approaching civilization, for formerly both mother and children were invariably killed.

In the Congo valley live the Bankundo people, less than a thousand miles from those in Nigeria, among whom the mother of twins is the object of honor and veneration throughout her life. She is entitled to wear a special badge around her neck, and her name is changed to "Mother-of-Twins," a title which is quite permanent, like the title "Judge" among us, or "Colonel" in Kentucky. She is always saluted in a special manner, being given a double greeting, one for each twin.

The natives of the Ibibio tribe are thus afraid of twins and always kill them. The Bankundo fondly love twins and highly honor their mother. If either of these customs was alone known, we might easily assume an instinct toward twins. To account for the former, the law might be formulated: In the parental instinct two affirmatives are equal to a negative, canceling each other. If the latter custom were to be reduced to law, it might read: Parental love varies directly as the square of the number of children born simultaneously. The customs being contradictory, we are compelled to assign the phenomena to nurture and not to nature.

Many discussions of instinct refer to the imagined experiences of our primitive ancestors, experiences which are not learned by a direct observation of facts, but which are described by those who possess a luxuriant imagination. In discussing the instinct of pugnacity, McDougall quotes with approval Lang's account of the origin of prohibition and punishment. It is too delicious to omit:

The primitive society was a polygamous family, consisting of a patriarch, his wives and children. The young males, as they became full-grown, were driven out of the community by the patriarch, who was jealous of all possible rivals to his marital privileges. They formed semi-independent bands hanging, perhaps, on the skirts of the family

circle, from which they were jealously excluded. From time to time the young males would be brought by their sex impulse into deadly strife with the patriarch, and, when one of them succeeded in overcoming him, this one would take his place and rule in his stead.¹

Since there are absolutely no data on the foregoing question, as no one ever observed such a society, the luxuriance of imagery is remarkable. But the scientific (?) process involved is identical in every way with primitive mythmaking and differs in no respect from the explanation which Eskimos give in Greenland to account for the existence of white men, who are said to be the children of an Eskimo girl who got lost and married a dog.

Stimulated by these illustrious examples, I have been emboldened to explain an interesting "instinct" which, though widely known, seems to have escaped the attention of our professional mythologists. In observing my six-month-old infant, his tendency to put his toes into his mouth is the occasion of much interest on the part of the family. Now this "instinct" is quite common among human infants, and is not due to imitation, for, alas, my joints are so stiff that he did not learn it from me. It is a native, inherited propensity. As a "genetic" psychologist I might explain it as inherited from cave-dwelling ancestors who, shut up all winter in their caves, would necessarily let fall much food upon the floor of the cave, some of which would inevitably be collected in considerable masses on the bottoms of the feet and between the toes of the inhabitants of the cave. In times of famine, those who could eat the accumulated food from their feet and toes would be enabled to survive, and thus the tendency, now no longer useful, would be inherited by their descendants.

Still retorting in kind, I would insist that by the criteria of McDougall it would be entirely possible to make an irrefragable argument for the existence of infanticide as a human instinct. It complies with all the requirements; it is specific, it occurs frequently among the lower animals, and it exists among abnormal people as a pathological disturbance. While infanticide is not universal, yet no instinct is without exception, and the "instinct" of infanticide may be thought of as moderated by the "parental instinct," just as shyness and sociability modify each other or as curiosity and secretiveness are held to alternate in their activity. The instinct is confined to girl babies among

¹ W. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 282.

some tribes, and was widely practiced in some form among the Greeks and Romans. It is undoubtedly very widespread among civilized people, but is now usually concealed. It could also be argued that infanticide had, originally, a survival value. It not only has eugenic possibilities, as when called out by the perception of weak or sickly or deformed children, but in times of famine it would reduce the number of mouths to be fed. Moreover, the children themselves could be cooked and eaten. Readers of the Bible will recall the passage in Deuteronomy, chapter 28, where the eating of children by parents is specifically referred to. Surely, the *reductio ad absurdum* is justified.

One who goes over the literature carefully is impressed by the fact that whenever it is proposed to discuss a human instinct there is a tendency to give examples of the behavior of the lower animals. Drever has written a book on *Instinct in Man*, for the most part a discussion of the opinions of philosophers. There is very little citation of facts, and when one comes, finally, to a chapter on specific instinct tendencies and proposes to read about gregariousness, he is presented with an account of the behavior of the wild ox of Damaraland. Descriptions of human behavior usually concern observations of children, and if these are (infants, no instincts occur, only reflexes.) The explanation of adult behavior usually goes back to the adaptive behavior of primitive man, who never acquired any bad habits because he lived in the golden age when nature was right.

It is perfectly clear that such naïve inventions based on a theory of evolution form no part of a valid scientific method and only obscure the whole issue. This much at least is plain: (An instinct in developed human beings can never be the result of direct observation. At best, it can be a hypothetical inference, an assumed elementary component in a complex human situation.) (It was formerly assumed that human mothers were in possession of a maternal instinct which enabled them to perform their duties adequately. But if untaught human mothers be carefully observed, very little evidence appears in support of this notion. One of the most awkward sights to be seen, says Watson, is an uninstructed young mother trying to bathe her baby. It is safe to say that the doctrine of a maternal instinct so eloquently preached by psychologists is not only untrue, but has been the occasion of much suffering and even of the death

of many children. A mother robin knows without teaching how to prepare a place for her young, what sort of food they need, and where to find it. There is much evidence that human mothers are far less competent in this respect.) The common opinion is that uncivilized people are more fortunate and that our maladjustments are due, not to our human nature, but to the artificialities of civilization. But the more primitive people are understood, the less support appears for this view. Present-day uncivilized people have an enormous death rate, endure much pain and suffering, and, moreover, have their lives hedged about at every turn with artificial convention, rigid and harmful taboos, social prohibitions, and threatening fears.

There is probably sufficient warrant for assuming instincts among the lower animals, and there is certainly no justification for going back to the older view that man has reason which marks him off as acting from considered motives; but it is a question whether the human animal does inherit specific instinctive patterns. There seems to be a fundamental difference between man and the lower creatures.

What I am insisting on is that the human instincts, except in the case of very young children performing various simple acts, are never the result of direct observation. (These infantile acts are moreover of the reflex type.) If human instincts were assumed as hypothetical concepts to be arrived at at the end of the discussion, the psychologist would not commit the sin against the Holy Ghost. (What this type of "genetic" psychologist does is to make his hypotheses into a fact and put it at the first of his discussion; but to make into fact that which is not fact is to deserve censure.) If we are ever to get ahead, we must know a fact when we see it.

The social psychologist should fasten his attention on the facts of human nature which lie all around us in the form of attitudes, desires, and wishes, which can be recorded, studied, collected, classified, and explained, and which are open to no such objection as the instincts, which in the nature of the case are always hypothetical components of a complex form of behavior.

Genetic psychology would not only be defensible, but would be in the highest degree valuable if it abandoned its attempt to explain human nature as a whole and confined itself to the study of particular groups. It is very profitable to try to understand the different stages through which an American boy will probably

pass on the way from childhood to maturity. It is also a reasonable possibility that such a statement can be made. But no statement can be true of all men everywhere, so long as cultural inheritances differ so profoundly. The American boy during adolescence often passes through a period of individualism and rebellion. So also perhaps do boys of other groups, but certainly it is not true that the boys in isolated primitive groups have just this tendency. Girls play with dolls and boys with marbles, but this is not original nature nor instinctive nor to be explained by racial history. I have often seen in equatorial Africa a naked child of five drawing along the path a realistic model of a five-hundred-ton steamer with a stern wheel that turned. The toys of children always point forward, never backward. The explanation is to be found in social recognition and not in prehistoric activities.

The Polish Peasant, by Thomas and Znaniecki, is a model of the type of investigation referred to. For a Polish peasant is not like a Russian peasant, and is very different from a Chinese coolie. And the difference is to be accounted for, to an extent as yet undetermined, in terms of social interaction. (Nothing but confusion and disappointment will result from regarding instincts as factual data which can be observed, classified, and explained.) Students of social psychology should study social values, social attitudes, desires, wishes, and organization. We should build on a foundation of facts. We need to elaborate better ways to get at the facts. The emphasis should be placed on methods of investigation. We should leave to others their mythological constructions and build our science on surer foundations.

(But if it be contended that conscious desires and wishes are too varied and complex to be adequately dealt with and that the assumption of instincts is a necessary simplification of the multi-form material, the answer is that the simplification is unreal and the satisfactions are illusory.) The schoolrooms of the land too often present the spectacle of straight rows of identical desks at which sit children of the same age, supposedly endowed with the same instincts and therefore to be treated all alike. And when the method fails, democracy is blamed instead of the mistaken science. In his last book McDougall has actually formulated separate degrees of instincts for separate races, and we of the

Nordic race are asserted to be deficient in the "gregarious instinct," being a race in love with our separate homes, from which we emerge only at the call of duty, or war, or ambition. And he has seen New York!

There is, however, a concept of a hypothetical character which is a necessary assumption, the study of which is most important and which has been strangely neglected. I refer to temperament. Had the energy that has been devoted to describing and listing hypothetical instincts been devoted to an attempt to analyze and isolate the temperamental factor in the complex social attitudes, we should be much farther ahead. Instinct tends to describe us en masse; temperament emphasizes the differences. And in the solution of the problems of personality that confront the social psychologist, the differences are the more significant.

The analysis and isolation of temperamental attitudes is a very difficult task, for temperament, too, is a hypothesis. For more than two thousand years the term has been used and the results are still very meager. But with the impetus given the subject by the interesting work of Downey¹ and with current interest in the study of human wishes, there is ground for hoping that patience and hard thinking may yet be rewarded. If temperaments could be adequately classified and a method of determining them could be devised, there would be made available an invaluable supplement to the intelligence tests. Indeed, until something of this nature is discovered, the intelligence tests will not only fail to come into their full usefulness, but will continue to be used to buttress fallacious arguments. There will be the initial advantage in this new attack on temperament that the same mistake need not be made that was made in studying instincts, namely, the mistake of thinking that hypotheses are data.

¹ "Some Volitional Patterns Revealed by the Will-Profile," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, III, 281.

VII

THE CONCEPT OF IMITATION

The problem connected with those similarities of behavior called imitation has occupied the attention of most men who have written in the field of social psychology. Emphasized and slightly enlarged, the concept has given its name to whole schools of psychological and philosophical speculation. Formerly imitation was widely held to be a primary instinct, taking its place alongside the old standbys, pugnacity and fear. Recent writing on this subject has tended to introduce certain modifications. McDougall, for example, is unwilling to write it down as an instinct, but has worked out a sort of imaginary switching arrangement by means of which the witnessing of the "expression" of an instinct may cause the same instinct to function in the beholder of the expression. Thus, while fear has its adequate and normal stimulus, the sight of a frightened person has a tendency on its own behalf to arouse the instinct of flight, which is the motor side of fear.

It is the purpose of this article to give an exposition of a point of view differing somewhat from those preceding. Imitation is a fact or, better, it is a name given to many types of fact. It is observed in many varieties of social experience, and must be dealt with in any thoroughgoing statement of human nature. But the thesis here presented is that imitation is not only a result of other causal or predisposing conditions, but that so-called imitation arises as a result from several widely different types of mechanism. *Moreover, the same causes or mechanisms or processes which result in imitative behavior can be shown to result also in behavior that is in no sense imitative.*

Imitation must clearly involve similarity in behavior to some copy or stimulus. To imitate is to behave like another, though all such likeness may not be imitation. There may be imitation of the activities of another, as when we copy another's dress, reproduce his movements, think thoughts like his, or have

feelings and emotions which resemble those of another. Such, at least, is the usual and uncritical assumption.

The functional treatment of imitation, most fully presented in the writing of the French sociologists and engagingly stated by Professor Ross, assigns all these types of imitation to a single cause or mechanism. It is assumed that there is a tendency to imitate that is normal to human nature. Professor Ross goes further and assumes that suggestion is indissolubly linked up with the phenomenon. Man is a suggestible animal, and ideas, feelings, and movements are all thought of as suggestions, and produce in turn imitation. The behavior of crowds and mobs, the spread of fashions and conventions, the social heritage of customs, the conscious copying of new forms, and the unconscious imitation of gestures, dialects, and language elements—all these are assigned to the single and simple impulse of imitation, which comes to us through the avenue of suggestion.

Upon critical examination of the facts it seems necessary to make certain distinctions between different types of imitative behavior. There are at least three distinct and divergent sorts of reaction, which may be illustrated by three different types of phenomena.

First, the behavior of crowds and mobs. A panic in a theater is picturesquely described as a sort of mental or emotional contagion. At first only a few are frightened, but their screams and frantic efforts to escape may be quickly taken over by others until the whole company is seized with uncontrollable fear. The anger of an excited mob is another instance of the same mechanism. Men find themselves in a mob by accident or join it from curiosity, but later they describe their experience as being "carried away" by the emotion of anger. The voluminous literature on the behavior of crowds includes many descriptions of religious revivals, where those who come to scoff remain to pray, sucked into the vortex of religious emotion owing to the tendency to imitate the behavior of those who are observed. Into this class will also fall the panics and examples of collective enthusiasm which do not depend on the actual physical presence of the members of a group. Later in this discussion it will appear why this class should also include cases of hypnotism, in which one person responds to the suggestion of another when the inhibitions are removed by previously established rapport.

These examples, which could be multiplied, are clearly cases of imitation, and the interpretation of them seems to be in general quite identical, but as will presently appear, the central explanation lies in the previously acquired habitual attitudes which receive a characteristic release.

Another quite distinct type of imitative behavior is the imitation of dialects and tricks of speech, which is a widespread if not universal phenomenon, and in the same category belong even more important imitative changes, which account for the acquisition of opinions, ideals, and social and political views, when one lives among other people and is in communication with them. Evil communications corrupt good manners, and this is true imitation. Tarde's theory of criminality included this type of experience as well as the next or third category.

There remains a type of behavior differing from both the others. It is typified in fashion and exhibited in all forms of conscious functional activity. Women who follow the new styles are hardly swept off their feet in an unconscious way, as the members of a mob are, nor do they gradually realize that they have bobbed their hair or shortened their skirts without knowing it. Much of our imitative life is of this character. It is a conscious copying. The model presented appeals to us first or last, and we go and do likewise. The interpretation of this type of behavior seems to be quite different from that of either of the other two.

If now we compare and contrast these three sorts of activity, it appears that the first kind, typified by panics and mob behavior, is characterized by two adjectives, that is, it is *immediate* and *unwitting*. Sometimes it is spoken of as unconscious, but it is straining the word "unconscious" to say that an angry mob is not conscious. In typical mob behavior, however, it is not a deliberate purpose, but rather a partially realized activity which is most characteristic. Moreover, it is immediate or quick. Under excitement of a panic, there is not time to think and deliberate, for if one does stop and think and deliberate, he often finds himself acting differently from the others.

The second kind, typified by the acquisition of a dialect, when it is not planned, differs fundamentally from the first. It is unintentional. It is often spoken of as unconscious; it is certainly unwitting. But, unlike the first type, it is slow. It takes

weeks or months sometimes, and certainly does not occur with the picturesque suddenness of the mob-activity type of imitation, though in cases of religious conversion, which are marginal to this, the climax may occur with a certain dramatic suddenness. In such cases we assume precedent processes.

The third type differs from both of the others in that it is conscious, planned, intended, purposed. To buy a motor car because a neighbor has one or to acquire a more expensive car like that of our social model, is to be under the influence of a distinct process, quite easily marked off from immediate, unwitting imitation and also from the slow, unwitting type.

We have, then, the problem of interpretation which will reveal how these three distinct sorts of behavior come into existence. They appear not to be the result of the same motives or the same processes. Moreover, they are all complex and ought to yield to an attempt to analyze them.

When we examine carefully the first type it appears that mob activity involves a certain release of existing, that is of pre-existing, attitudes, habits, tendencies. The members of a theater party who are seized with fright are assumed to have already existing a fear of death and fire. Sudden alarm calls out, making it kinetic and overpowering, the tendency to save oneself from this danger. In the angry mob the situation does not differ. The fury of the members of the mob likewise rests upon already existing hostility, however latent or inactive this feeling may have been previously to the excitement. It is both picturesque and accurate to speak of the contagion of fury, but this contagion is the arousal of hostility and not the inculcation of it. The hostile attitudes are evoked, made active and kinetic. White men have been aroused to extremes of emotion quite surprising to themselves when in a mob attacking Negroes, and in the Chicago riots the Negroes found themselves in a mob on more than one occasion, but it was a mob of Negroes. I can find no record of a Negro being swept into the contagion of a mob of white people attacking a member of his own race.

Consider the case of hypnotism. Under the abnormally suggestive condition of complete hypnotic control the subject responds immediately to what he is told to do. The subject will masticate a piece of paper and call it good, if he is told that it is candy or beefsteak, but if a person without musical training be

sent to the piano, when hypnotized, and told to play a sonata, he will not, for he cannot. The abnormal condition makes it easy to release existing attitudes, but it does not create new ones. A Trilby, when hypnotized, will sing and sing better than ever, for suggestion may intensify a potential activity.

We have then this formulation of the "law" of immediate, unwitting imitation exemplified in the crowd behavior: *Imitation in crowd behavior is limited to the release of attitudes or tendencies already existing and which are not new.*

The immediate responses to suggestion, which are most striking in hypnotized subjects, depend upon extreme dissociation, and are, therefore, the same type of behavior as crowd activity. Immediate response to a stimulus without inhibiting tendencies is almost a definition of suggestibility. The important point here is that the behavior of an excited member of a mob is precisely like the behavior of a hypnotized person. It is, therefore, not limited to crowd behavior, but crowd behavior is a special case in the whole general class of suggestion responses, and it is important to observe that the hypnotized person rarely imitates; he usually obeys. It looks like imitation when the stimulus and response are identical or similar, but if the operator says, "Jump," and the subject jumps, no one whose mind is really alert would call it imitation.

There is another type of behavior which requires mention. Cases of the sudden imitation of social models by little children are frequent in the literature, and, while by no means wholly authenticated, probably do occur. Whether they be entirely new or the result of the process set forth in our second type, is at present an open question.

If the above "law" be true, there is no justification for the older formulation that the ideas and feelings come into the mind from without. If we inquire into the explanation of crowd behavior, it is apparent that we will need to know the past history or previous experience of the members of a mob, so that we may understand what attitudes are present that can be released. The one point here is that crowd behavior produces nothing new but is limited to the intensification and activation of the habitual. There is a further point of the highest importance, namely, the failure of one emotional expression to produce its like in another, but this will be discussed later.

The first, or mob, type of imitation, being limited to previously existing habits, differs fundamentally from the second type, which consists essentially in new acquisitions. As stated above, this is typified by the widely observed and familiar phenomenon of acquiring a dialect, speech habits, tricks of manner, and gestures, as well as opinions, ideals, and beliefs. We have called this the slow, unwitting type. The writer, after some weeks in France, discovered with surprise that he was shrugging his shoulders like those he talked to. It was a new gesture and had been acquired without intention or knowledge. An even more striking experience was to have adopted, while living with an uncivilized tribe where the practice was general, a rather inelegant gesture, which consisted of pointing with the lips instead of the hand. The lips were protruded in an exaggerated fashion toward the object indicated. One could hardly imagine oneself wishing to acquire this gesture, and when a friend one day told me I was doing it, I denied the statement, but a little later, when caught in the act, had to confess. It is very easy to see how different this type of imitation is from the one just discussed. Here is no sudden release of an old attitude but a slow acquisition of a new one. There is a story in the Bible of a debtor who owed a great sum, which was forgiven him after he had made a plea. Instead of being merciful, he went out and treated cruelly a man who owed him a much smaller amount. This seems to fall into the second category. The servants of cruel masters should be merciful, but they tend to become cruel. In Kingsley's *Water Babies* the little chimney sweep, after being beaten and kicked by the master sweep, sobbed himself to sleep on a pile of straw and dreamed of the time when he should be a master sweep and be able to kick little boys around. The point receives hyperbolic emphasis in a ridiculous story by Mark Twain. An infidel and a priest on board ship fell into an argument about religion, during which both men became very angry. They separated in a bad humor. Next morning they met on deck and walked straight up to each other. The infidel held out his hand, which the priest cordially grasped. Said the infidel to the priest, "Father, I wish to apologize for my hasty words. I have been thinking all night about what you said, and I have decided that you are right. I am going to join the church." The priest replied, "I have

thought all night about what you said, and have decided to quit the ministry."

It is clear that we must seek for some other process than the evoking of an existing attitude if we are to understand such behavior. The key seems to lie in the normal human tendency to converse with oneself, that is, to stimulate oneself and to answer one's own stimulation, in which process one takes the role of the other, and new attitudes from the other enter one's own repertory.

This analysis of the process of conversing with oneself has been most elaborately set forth by George H. Mead.¹ Social experience consists in gestures and sentences directed to others, and in answering gestures and sentences addressed to us from others. We are stimulated and we respond. Others are stimulated by us and respond to us, the social action consisting in the peculiarity that the response to a stimulus is also ipso facto a stimulus to a response. Each gesture, therefore, is both answer and query, both stimulus and response. When, however, the person is alone this same type of activity tends to go on, following the pattern of associated behavior. The individual then comes to stimulate himself and to answer his own stimulation, and to proceed to respond to that answer, after which he goes on to answer that response. As far back as Plato is found the recognition of the fact that thinking is a conversation with oneself.

It should require little argument to show that the individual person can stimulate himself, though the statement is regarded by one popular writer as an obvious impossibility. It would be agreed that a man can shave himself, scratch himself, or pinch himself. He cannot, save metaphorically, kick himself, but Lewis Carroll says that Alice slapped herself for cheating herself when she was playing croquet against herself. Talking to oneself is not an unusual but a normal phenomenon, and in the reflection which goes on following an emotional social contact, it is normal to live over again the whole scene. I think of what I said, then I think of what he said in reply to me, after which I recall my reply and his answer, and then perhaps I think of the very clever remark I could have made if I had had time to work it out. And

¹ Mead's discussion is at last available in a posthumous volume: *Mind, Self, and Society*, Chicago, 1934.

so the conversation with oneself goes on including the responses of the other, which are lived over again.

Here we have an approach to the solution of the slow, unwitting imitation. To live over again the conversation or conflict is to say the words of the other in something resembling the same tone and with the same attitude. It is literally to take the role of the other, to play the other's part, to assume the other's character. This would make it clear how the infidel might come to think like his clerical antagonist. It is utterly unlike mob activity, having little in it of the release of stored-up latent attitudes, but it is the gradual taking over of new ones, which, indeed, may be organizations of old elements. It is the normal human tendency of playing the role of the other when we reflect on past social experiences and relive the past.

A "law" of this slow, unwitting type of so-called imitation we may then attempt to formulate as follows: *When in rehearsing the past, emotional situations are re-enacted, taking the role of another sometimes gives rise to a new attitude which is so like the attitude of the other person that it is often called imitation.*

It is evident that we still require further analysis and observation to reveal just how this process can operate. In extreme cases, such as pointing with the lips and learning to shrug the shoulders, there is involved a form of attention to minimal stimulations which should be the object of research.

This process has been fully treated by Mead and others under the head of redintegration. The incomplete present act tends to be filled out when tension exists, and this filling out is an integrating anew, that is, a redintegration. It is often called imagination, and includes everything within that category and perhaps a great deal more.

The third type of imitation differs from both the others in that it is conscious, volitional, and planned. Many young people go to college because their friends go. Some go to the opera for the same reason. Others buy listerine. The explanatory principle here must involve an underlying purpose or ambition which is furthered or achieved by the imitated activity. To go to college gives one a standing, a promise of success, or four years of pleasant loafing, and this ambition or desire takes its particular form because of the models that are presented. It is not the imitated act that is the center of interest, but rather the act is the instru-

mental activity which forwards or realizes the already existing purpose.

The attempt to write out a "law" for the third type of imitation would result in a statement somewhat as follows: *When a purpose or an ambition appears to be achieved or furthered by acting like another, the result is the phenomenon known as conscious imitation.*

The three types of imitation, then, rest upon three different pre-conditions. To understand the first we must know what are the habitual attitudes that are ready to be suddenly released. To explain the second we must take account of the gestures and opinions or convictions of others which, by rehearsing, we come to approximate, while to interpret the third we must know the ambitions or unfulfilled desires which the mental and muscular activities are assumed to consummate.

All three types of activity are referred to as imitation, and it is confusing to deny the applicability of the word. Yet the imitation is a mere accident, in the old scholastic meaning of accident, a non-essential result of the three distinct processes already described. For it seems clear upon reflection that the same type of experience which gives rise to the three sorts of so-called imitation—that is to say, the same mechanisms—may produce, and more often than not do produce, types of behavior to which no one could assign this term.

Let us return to the first type of activity—the quick, unwitting imitation, so-called. It is a sudden release of movements. It produces the phenomena of emotional and muscular uniformity. Fear sweeps over a crowd, or anger, or generosity, but all that happens is a sudden release, and more often than not, the sudden release is of the opposite sort. In the Cleveland Convention of 1924 all the delegations were drawn into a kind of mob uniformity, with the one stubborn exception of the delegation from Wisconsin. These were not for Coolidge, and neither bands nor banners could make them march. There were stampedes of many kinds at the New York Democratic Convention of the same year, but the waves of McAdoo enthusiasm left the Smith delegates unmoved, and vice versa. It is a bit superficial to say, as is often said, that there is a tendency when one emotion is expressed to feel within ourselves the same emotion. Ask the disappointed and forlorn lover whether devotion always inspires the same. A courtship would be very easy if this were true, perhaps too easy

to be exciting. Professor McDougall should witness a dignified and corpulent gentleman fall down suddenly on the sidewalk. Such a person often has emotions, but the spectators' emotions are probably quite different, and may generate in turn a third type of emotion in the unfortunate man. The case of the girl who, when the theater fire was started, did not run but began to play on the piano, shows that sudden release in an emergency is not necessarily always of the same sort as the copy. Persons in a mob or crowd will act alike if previously existing latent attitudes are similar and can be simultaneously released, but the members will act very differently if they possess different attitudes, and this happens quite as often as not.

Likewise with the second type. To argue with another person means to think it over and take his role, but whether we come to think like him or not depends on too many factors to make the outcome sure. Not every argument between a Catholic and a Protestant results in both parties changing their faith. Some eastern people, but by no means all, go to California and come to take on the native race prejudice toward Orientals. It is, therefore, of the highest importance to observe that the same process that results in so-called imitative behavior, results equally often in utterly unlike action.

The case of conscious copying is even easier to state. Someone starts a fashion of bobbing hair, rouging cheeks, penciling the brows, and painting the lips. At least the fashion gets started, whether it can ever be traced to any one source or not. Now these fashions come to be imitated, but not by everybody, nor all at once. Painted lips have their charm if not overdone, and would doubtless be more attractive if some women had better illumination at their dressing tables. Many imitate the painted lips, but many do not. And why not? One said to me, "I'm not that kind of a girl." And this is the real underlying explanation of all conscious copying. If she is that kind of girl, she will imitate what seems to her to advance her status in the desired direction. The law student will let his hair grow long like the famous advocate, the young medical student will grow a pathetic beard in imitation of some famous surgeon. It is the ambition or ideal lying behind the whole which explains the activity, and this produces imitative behavior only when it finds the pattern instrumentally attractive. When I see a well-set-up man

walking very erectly, I find myself squaring my shoulders in imitation, but when I see a person with an unattractive stoop, I find that, instead of stooping, I am reminded of my defect, and I square my shoulders. When Queen Victoria heard a joke at which people laughed, but of which she disapproved, she used to say with a severe look, "We are not amused." The conscious copying, then, is a mere irrelevant detail. To see a girl using her make-up in public hardly incites any man to want to shave.

It is, then, the conclusion of this discussion that imitation is hardly a justifiable psychological category. We have seen that habitual attitudes produce crowd imitation, that talking to one's self produces another type, and conscious choice a third. On the other hand, the releasing of old attitudes, talking to oneself, and conscious choice, all three result in behavior that no one would call imitation. Imitation is, then, a mere accident of these three quite distinct types of mechanism. There is no instinct to imitate. There is no tendency to take over immediately a like thought or feeling, and all the uniformities which have received loosely the name of imitation are to be interpreted in quite the same way as the non-uniformities growing out of the same processes.

Imitation, then, is a result, but an irrelevant result. It is an apparent but not a real result in a causal sequence. It cannot be brought inside of any general statement or psychological law. The contrary opinion seems to result from that type of error which has given us so many wrong conclusions in the past, namely, defective analysis.

VIII

THE ORIGIN OF PUNISHMENT

This discussion of the origin of punishment is undertaken with a view of obtaining some light on a difficult subject by means of the genetic method of approach. Our institutions are so complex and our tendency to idealize the existent is so inveterate that we are driven from one theory of punishment to another in the effort to justify what may, perhaps, have no real justification.

It is believed that a clear statement of the origin of punishment could throw some light on the nature of the punishing attitude and in another chapter the effort will be made to state the psychological corollary of the view here advanced.

Punishment is nowhere regarded as a specific instinct. It is not a part of the "original nature of man." Its manifestations are sometimes said to grow out of the instinct of pugnacity and its accompaniment, the emotion of anger. However, even these instinctive reactions are not themselves simple and direct but are, in their turn, dependent on the thwarting of other instincts and impulses. Fighting and anger are social in their nature, requiring for their arousal the presence of another animal of the same or related species which enters into some sort of competition or opposition and attempts to check the carrying out of any one of the stronger impulses. Hunger, thirst, the desire for the possession of any object, or the sex instinct, can, most obviously, be the occasion of the arousal of the fighting reaction if a sufficiently serious check is encountered.

But the fighting reaction is not punishment. There is a popular use of the word in which one prize fighter is said to receive "punishment" from the other, and the "natural punishments" are referred to by Herbert Spencer, but for such uses of the term there is only a metaphorical justification. Neither combat nor calamity is sufficiently social in character to deserve the designation of punishment.

The common statement is that punishment is derived from this feeling of anger and reaction of fighting in a direct fashion.

MacDougall,¹ for example, follows Laing in deriving the whole punitive situation from the "primal law" which is thought of as arising out of a situation within a small tribe of kinsmen in which the patriarch, who wished to have control of the females of the group, drove off the younger males of the tribe as they grew up and forced those who remained to submit to his direction and control. The result of disregarding these directions was, in every case, punishment by the patriarch, who might go to any length until submission was reached. In short, punishment is held to follow directly upon the opposition, by any one, to the operations of the sex instinct.

The same general notion appears in Pollock and Maitland,² in which the original situation is described as one in which each member of the group was his own avenger and the position defended that punishment follows directly upon the opposition of any member of the group to the serious purposes and plans of another. Naturally, the place for the origin of the institution of punishment will, accordingly, be found in the tribe. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth is held to be the natural and normal way in which a member of the group answers the action of another in opposing his acts.

The analogy which suggested this theory is, as will be readily seen, the phenomenon of struggle for leadership that occurs occasionally among gregarious animals. Rival candidates for the leadership of a herd of elephants have been observed to fight desperately. The defeated one wanders off to lead a life of comparative solitude as a "rogue." But it is not difficult to see that such an effort to banish one member of the group is a very different sort of undertaking from the normal punitive situation. In fact, there is very little resemblance between a duel to the death and any normal procedure of punishment. In punishment there is an endeavor to be fair and just which the old account does not fully recognize. There is, even in extreme punishments, a mental measurement of the offense with the penalty, and some rough equation results. But in the "primal law" situation there is only the deadly struggle between infuriated and excited rivals.

There is abundant reason for questioning whether anyone inside the primitive group was ever punished, at least by those

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 282.

² *History of the English Law*.

within his own tribe. In an instinctive way the members of the group are bound together and in the most homogeneous groups they do not punish each other. Present-day people of some uncivilized tribes do not punish their children. The writer, during a residence of several years among the Bantus of the Upper Congo River, in which time the people were under constant observation, failed to observe a single case of the punishment of a child. This is not a deliberate or reflective process but, rather, traditional and uncritical. The child, in a small community that is homogeneous and in a situation where outside influences do not penetrate, will find himself fitting into the social situation where he grows up and is without the stimulus to commit acts of an antisocial character.

And when, by any chance, such an act is committed, it is highly improbable that it will arouse any resentment whatever; in the event that it does, there is no remedy, and the tribe simply does nothing save where the offense is so serious as to break all bonds. The situation is analogous to that in which one breaks or damages his own property by accident; it is regrettable, but there is no remedy save an imprecation. It is impossible for some people to thrust a knife into their own flesh. Somehow the weapon refuses to enter. The primitive tribe is a unit in a comparable sense. Every member is to be credited with the good deeds of the whole and to be blamed for the faults of any one. In extreme cases expulsion from the tribe might take place.

The Congo State government in the old days was never at a loss in the effort to apprehend criminals, for while the direct pursuit of a native in the forest would be like trying to overtake an antelope, such a chase is quite unnecessary. The tribe is a unit to such an extent that it is only necessary to send to the village for the chief, whose dignity will not permit him to flee in any ordinary emergency, and to cause the arrest and detention of this chief, if necessary, after which the man who is wanted always comes in voluntarily and surrenders. The only alternative to doing so would be to leave the country entirely; for existence would be unbearable with the head of the tribe in bondage on account of the offending member's failure to give himself up.

The point in this connection is that physical force is not the means of securing this supreme degree of sociality which will lead a man to give himself up to a fate that is desperate in the

extreme. The earlier theories on this point are probably erroneous. The typical group control did not depend on force. The fact that the military leader of a warlike people was often, perhaps usually, a man of great strength, has led to the totally unwarranted inference that the rule was to the one who was physically the strongest. The savage is very ready to admire physical strength, but the leadership of one who is physically strong will not depend on this fact entirely or chiefly. He who rules must do so on account of some measure of wisdom in ruling and on account of the support he has from the loyalty of the rest of the group. Achilles is the greatest warrior among the besiegers, but the leadership lies not with him who sulks in his tent or who is indifferent to the death of his own people in unequal strife. Those who have assigned the dominant part in early group control to force, physically understood, have failed to understand that the sneer and scorn of those within our own group are infinitely more powerful forces.

An incident personally observed on the Upper Congo River illustrates quite adequately the part played by public opinion in group control. A gigantic young warrior, under the influence of foreign and alien ideas, which were beginning to appear in the community following the European occupation, violated some minor point in the native system of taboos and was quite unrepentant when attention was called to it. The matter came to the attention of the oldest woman of the tribe, who set out at once in indignation to find him. He hurried off to his hut, but she followed him to the very door, uttering all the while a stream of indignant protest to which the man vainly attempted to respond but without opportunity of interrupting the unbroken course of her invective. He went into his hut and she crouched at the door; he retreated into the inner room, but she only raised her voice. The end of the unequal contest was reached when he came to the door, hesitated a moment, and then ran off into the forest, leaving the field to the victor. But the victor was a woman nearly a hundred years old, gray-haired, toothless, shrunk, and lean, so frail that a blow from the fist of the warrior could have crushed her skull. She was the incarnation of public opinion and there was more power in her voice than in his muscle. Nor would it be just to say that it was his fear of the consequences which restrained him from resorting to force to rid himself of

the troublesome adversary. The fact is that the force of the expressed common will is so strong that it does not occur to the individual to contest it. Obedience is unreflective and almost instinctive. For just as the parental impulse urges the mother to care for her child, so the child's tendencies impel him to respond to the mother. And there is no need to explain why the child obeys the mother, the phenomenon requiring explanation being the failure on the part of the child to respond, when this does occur.

It seems clear to the writer that the explanation of the tension and friction in modern groups, including family groups, is most easily found in the complexity of the groups in which modern children grow up. An analogy to the primitive simplicity of conduct is to be found in the absence of errors in the speech of primitive children. If a language is pure and has no foreign idioms and if the children are not in the company of those who speak other languages or dialects, then it is probable that they will make no errors in grammar. My own observations confirm this conclusion. During my residence among the Congo tribes no child was ever heard by me to make a mistake in grammar. The influences are all homogeneous, the stimuli are all consistent, and there is no occasion for an erroneous reaction in the matter of the vocal gestures called language. The language is almost perfect in its regularity. The real phenomenon that demands explanation is that a mistake should be made at all, for the normal method of response will be to adopt the conventional words if these are received from a consistent source.

It is confidently believed that a careful report of the facts and conditions among present-day savages would establish the non-existence of the punishment of children among many of them. V. Stefansson says: "We count it as one of the chief triumphs of the four-year expedition of the American Museum of Natural History to the Eskimo that we discovered why it is that children are not punished; for such immaterial things is the money of scientific institutions expended!"¹ He then gives the two previous explanations that have been assigned, namely, that the children are so good that they do not need it, and secondly, that the Eskimos are so fond of their children that they cannot bear to punish them. Both of these explanations are rejected in

¹ STEFANSSON, V., *My Life with the Eskimo*, p. 395.

favor of the theory that the belief of the natives that every child is the reincarnation of the spirit of an honored ancestor is the real explanation of the forbearance of the parents under circumstances which the white man often found very trying. Whether this explanation points out the real cause of the phenomenon or whether it was a theoretical formulation which grew up to account for the practice and to justify it, is not important for this discussion. The main thing to observe is that there is no punishment of children among these people. With the coming of the white man, the group will be more and more subject to outside influences and there will be increasing opportunities for tension; but during the ages when they were living their own life, there was no thought of punishing the children.

Stefansson also deals at length with the subject of the immense power of public opinion in the Eskimo society. Resort to force is so rare as to be almost negligible. They are a unit. Rule is not by force, though there is always a leader. The authority of the leader depends, not on his strength, but on the extent of his influence with the larger group.¹

Absence of punishment is also the characteristic of the Japanese system of governing children. President Sato of Sapporo College in a conversation with the writer says that the Japanese do not punish their children even yet, although the foreign influences are very pronounced at the present time in Japan. But for a long time the system was homogeneous and unified, and the momentum of it endures until the present. It is true that President Sato considers that the Japanese are too indulgent with their children and that they should exercise more careful control over them, but the fact of the absence of a system of physical punishments for children is highly significant.

The solidarity of the truly primitive group in this respect can, therefore, hardly be overstated. There is no remedy for an infraction of custom by a member of a group. No physical force is used or can be used. The whole of the remedy is vocal disapproval, reproach, and scorn. But for reasons that will later appear in this discussion, it is contended that scorn and ridicule are the most powerful weapons that are available in the service of conformity.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 365.

² The Roman Assembly of the Tribes could not inflict death, only a fine,

This much is, therefore, clear from the discussion so far. Punishment could not have arisen within the early group, owing to the absolutely social character of their early organization and the absence of physical force from their methods of dealing with one another. It is recognized that offenses might occur, and did sometimes occur, which would be so serious as to dissolve the bonds entirely; but as will be seen, such a situation was met by a mode of reaction that is not properly called punishment.

How, then, did punishment arise? If it did not begin inside the group in some sort of formal infliction of penalty or violence or force, did it originate in the reactions against the enemies of the tribe? This question will now be considered.

The really primitive group, we have seen, was probably bound together by ties which made it impossible to proceed in any way against one of the number for an offense that should work injury to the offender. The opposing theory finds the origin of punishment in the wars with the enemies of the tribes. Westermarck thinks that the instinct of resentment, in most cases "sympathetic resentment," but always some strong emotional state of mind, is the key to the understanding of the punishing reactions. Hobhouse finds a cognitive basis for the origin of punishment in the concepts that are formed when the evil effect of the offense is observed. Steimmetz traces it to the expansion of personality that follows the retaliation against an affront.

But it seems quite unnecessary to go beyond the simple, inherited reaction of all gregarious animals of the carnivorous type, all females with young, and even insects of the social kind, as bees and wasps. There is a natural, inherited reaction of defense against the attack of a stranger or an enemy. The savage fights anyone from the outside who has attacked his child or his brother or his father or any of his kindred or clan, and does so just as a hive of bees or a nest of hornets responds to a disturbance of a hostile nature. The reaction is not due to reflection, does not arise out of concepts of justice or right or property, and is not due to any antecedent feeling. The beginning of the whole process is this reaction of a protective character absolutely essential to the preservation of the group, which

for the life of a Roman was sacred inside the walls. (MAINE, *Ancient Law*, p. 375). *But the military court could inflict the death penalty.*

takes into account only the dangerous character of the enemy and the need of securing his annihilation.

The fixed character of the primitive group is one of its most striking characteristics. In general, it is almost true that the only way to become a member of the group is to arrange to be born into it. There is, to be sure, a natural tendency toward the enlargement of the social group, but for the primitive man, even the nature peoples of the present day, it is often true that the whole world is divided into just two classes, namely: kin who cannot become enemies and enemies who can never become kin. The former are never liable to punishment for reasons shown, and the latter are equally exempt from *punishment* because they are the object of *attack in war*.

The attack on an enemy or a stranger who offends is often made when the dictates of prudence or self-interest would make another course of action desirable, but the tribe is without any other alternative. Just as a rattlesnake exhausts his venom in futile strikes and is captured with impunity, so many a native tribe would have been able to maintain itself and get ahead if it had been able to take a cool and rational attitude toward attacks, but this is not possible. The attack is made because there is nothing else to do.

Just what punishment is will presently appear, but it is evident that an attack which ceases only with the annihilation of the enemy, which is without any relation to the nature or gravity of the offense committed, and which is directed toward those who are thought of in the most abstract way as enemies, is not yet the sort of reaction that we call punishment. It may be called a war, a feud, a vendetta, or a foray, but the disregard of consequences, the lack of measure or restraint, the wholly impersonal relation that is assumed, marks the phenomenon off from true punishment.

The literature of feuds and of the vicarious infliction of suffering on the innocent members of the group is voluminous, but the following personally observed circumstance will bring out the facts that it is desired to emphasize in this connection. A native woman of the Upper Congo secured the remission of the payment of dowry and returned in a perfectly regular and legal manner to her father, but passed with unseemly haste to the home of the co-respondent. The deserted husband, in a fit of

jealousy, came from his distant village with a party and proceeded in the darkness to fire the hut in which the couple were sleeping, but, as it was afterwards explained, included some near-by huts because the huts of the enemy were not very well built. The next morning saw a counter foray into the villages of the house burners, but this attack was directed against a remote portion of the enemy's village in order that they might be taken by surprise, as the news of the affair had not spread. Accordingly, an approach was made and a volley fired at close range, killing a man and a woman who did not know that there was any trouble between the two communities. After this, slaughter went on merrily for several months.

Now, it is significant for this discussion to note that the group has no censure for those who are the occasion for trouble of this kind. The woman whose action caused the death of several of her tribe was not reproached, even by those who were the heaviest losers in the fighting. The actions of the quarrelsome members of the tribe, in so far as they affect outsiders, are accepted unquestionably and the whole tribe joins in the natural, normal, and often joyously exciting reaction called out by pugnacity. Nor is there any blame for the enemy. He is conceived as doing his part. He is not supposed to take into account the interest of a group other than his own; he is thought of in the most abstract fashion as a target and source of danger, game and hunter in one, and with nothing even resembling a fellow feeling.

There was a little Congo lad who owned a chicken, which one day appeared with only one leg because the boy felt obliged to practice economy by eating one leg and letting the rest of the fowl wait! This killing on the installment plan is hardly to be thought of as cruelty, but is due to the fact that the fowl is viewed from the point of view of food alone. The lad would as soon have thought of showing mercy to a potato or a mango as to a chicken, for mercy and consideration belong to the members of your own family and are unthinkable in any other situation. The cannibal tribes, which are not the lowest but represent the highest development among the peoples of the Congo valley, often stick the living victim full of bamboo skewers to preempt portions of the meat before the slaughter!

A social attitude toward a member of another group is, therefore, unthinkable. A snake, a leopard, a slaughtered sheep, or

a crushed worm is not more abstractly treated. It is felt that an attitude of this sort cannot by any stretch of meaning be taken to include punishment.

The conclusion is, therefore, that there was no punishment of anyone in a thoroughly primitive society. The whole universe was divided into two classes for the theoretically primitive savage, and these are the members of his own group whom he does not ever think of striking or punishing in any way, and the rest of the world who are to be watched carefully at all times but who are to be destroyed if they are found in an attitude of attack. The theoretical primitive man is not observable. Present-day savages are not primitive.

A closely analogous situation is found in the attitude of civilized nations in their international relationships. The citizens of a foreign country, so long as they remain on their own territory, are not subject to punishment by any other nation whose citizens may have suffered injury. If an expedition is made across the border and damage is done to the goods and persons of another nation, there is no punishment by the nation that receives the injury. Any attempt at redress by a foreign nation inside our territory is war. There are only two courses open to an offended people in such a case. They can send an attacking force across the border to avenge the wrong, but this is not punishment; it is war. The only other course open to the injured government is to appeal in a friendly way for the government of the offenders to take cognizance of the offense and do justice. But clearly here the injured nation is not punishing anyone. They may appeal to another to punish, but this appeal is a friendly and social act. Punishment must, therefore, be administered by the group to which the offender belongs. But we have seen that when the group is homogeneous it is impossible for the category of punishment to have any place. There are groups organized within civilized society which are so thoroughly social that there is no thought of punishment within the circle, as for example, a college faculty or a social club.

For a situation which would make the attitude of formal punishment possible, we must have a society that has grown so complex that there are varying degrees of relationship and of fellow feeling. This is, to be sure, the natural result of a prosperous community for, as populations multiply and it

becomes necessary for part of the company to migrate in order to find more room, it is inevitable that some distant tribes should also be distant kin and the reaction of enmity would tend to become modified. In case an offense should be committed, indignation would be present, but it would be tempered by other feelings. The presence of slavery as an institution is also one of the early manifestations of complexity. Exogamous marriages, likewise, imply alliances with otherwise hostile tribes and these alliances are often of the most serious and binding nature. Also there are numerous temporary alliances for barter and for protection.

In such a complex situation it would be a rare case in which an offender would not have some friends within the very group that is concerned. Should two slaves, for example, have a serious quarrel, there might be nothing in the way of a battle to the death if they were of different tribes. But the owner of the two would naturally wish to save his property. In case of a federation of villages, the leaders would naturally be in favor of an amicable settlement of feuds between constituent members of the larger organization. There will be those in such a complex group who would wish to see the offender destroyed, that is, they would take the part of an enemy. There would also be those who would wish to have him escape entirely and who would, therefore, defend his cause. And there is necessary in any real punitive situation an impartial umpire who has interests on both sides.

Here, then, we offer a suggested solution to the problem of the origin of punishment. So long as there are just two groups in the social world of the savage, no punishment can take place; but when there are three or more groups in his world, the attitude of formal punishment becomes possible. There is the group to which the offender belongs, the group which he has attacked, and a third which is relatively neutral and has interests in both.

Our institutions of punitive justice exhibit this phenomenon quite accurately. The criminal is the expression of a group and is normally quite loyal to the group ideals and the code of his clan. This group is represented before the bar by counsel, appointed, if necessary, by the state itself, and the counsel for the defense is interested in making such a showing in the trial of the cause that the rights of the defendant will be fully protected.

There is also the group which the prisoner has attacked, represented by the prosecuting attorney, whose sole task it is to paint the offense in the blackest colors, or, in other words, to represent the culprit's enemies and to destroy him, if necessary or possible. The fact that the prosecuting attorney is said in our legal procedure to represent the "people" should not blind us to the fact that there is also a third group necessary in the situation, represented by the judge and the jury. These stand for the great body of those who are not directly concerned and who are, in reality, attempting to arrange the conflicting claims. The jury is supposed to have no interest in the case and preferably to have no knowledge of the matter—to be, therefore, wholly disinterested and of another social group entirely.

According to this discussion, punishment is a practice that has arisen out of group activity and owes none of its origin to private vengeance or the rule of force within the group. Punishment is the expression of the clashing of groups; with a "buffer-group" to lessen the shock. It is a phenomenon of social psychology and can be approached intelligently only from the social point of view.

IX

STANDPOINT AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY ILLUSTRATED BY THE STUDY OF PUNISHMENT

The position presented in this chapter, a point of view shared by many of my colleagues, although not a unanimous position as yet, is that the sociological approach presents neither a new doctrine of elements nor an adoption of any of the former lists. The problem of what the elements are seems not to be solved but to be outgrown or at least transferred. It is assumed that personality appears in the give and take of group activity, but there result habits so firmly entrenched as to seem instinctive, and there result desires felt to be basic and fundamental; but habits, attitudes, and desires are not elements appearing in the individual waiting to be made explicit in the personality but are rather the partial or developmental aspects of the personality which develops as a whole in the conception of oneself and of others and for which the term "person" is an adequate word. The elements of the individual personality, therefore, are not found in the individual person, but are to be sought in the mores of the group as these are appropriated, accepted, rejected, or modified in the interaction. The "traits" of personality are important to study and significant when found, but they prove to be descriptive terms denoting the developmental aspect which describes the behavior of the person in respect to the expectations, purposes, and prohibitions of the group in which he lives.

By the present trend of opinion and practice in social science the sociologist is encouraged to make use of the methods of his confreres in other fields, from psychology to anthropology; but if he has any distinctive contribution to make it is perhaps in the emphasis of the importance of the group which can always be found to antedate the personality itself. This emphasis on the importance of the group has, we shall see, important corollaries for research and suggests methods of investigation which have already proved fruitful and which offer increasing attractiveness.

The group is not a mere name for separate individuals but is thought of as a reality, an aggregation united in a set of relations which can be defined and studied.

The sociologist begins with the assumption of the reality of the Group. This is the point on which there is to be found, within the field of sociology itself, no dissenting voice worthy to be heard. But in this emphasis and assumption sociologists find themselves in so sharp a contrast, even conflict, with so many other competent workers in other fields that it is fitting to begin this discussion with a defense of this basic starting point and an attempt to make clear just what is meant—and what is not meant—by it. This means that all the facts in our social life are not individual facts.

Let us begin with an illustration and take language for an example. Our English speech exists, not in the cross-referenced list of its abstractions in the dictionary, but in the living voices of our people and in the growing body of our literature. Every sentence spoken or written is written by an individual person, but language is not an individual thing. Much has been brought to light in the last hundred years concerning its history and changes, its losses and gains, its development in semantics and in structure. We know that *bruder* changed to *brother*, that *thur* became *door*, that *acht* became *eight*. The inflections disappeared and the word order became more rigid. But these changes had no advocates. The differences had no inventors, they were not only not planned, they were unknown. The language is a vast, impersonal thing, and those who spoke it and from whom in turn we learned it were passive, though acting; were coerced, though willing; and we know of the alterations only after the event. Language is, therefore, a collective phenomenon. The English language developed according to a series of evolutionary changes that could never have been discovered by the study of individuals.

Familiar also to sociologists and to their critics are the facts regarding our manners, our customs, our moral codes, the folkways, the mores, the fashions, the religious conceptions and practices, and the sweep of public opinion. Society is not the arithmetical sum of its members, and public opinion cannot be understood as the average of the opinions of the individuals who constitute a public. The group exists and its influence

on individuals is glacierlike in its irresistibility and sometimes in its speed of movement, though crises always increase the speed of change. There are individual facts and there are social facts, but social facts are not obtained by mere addition, nor is the group to be regarded as only a name for an aggregation.

The group is not only a reality, it is a *prior* reality. Those with whom we deal, whether children, delinquents, or criminals, did not grow up as individuals and then for the first time form groups. They were born into groups and were the recipients from the beginning of group influences. Families and schools, governments and churches take the raw material and begin their work on it. How those groups get started is an inquiry apart, not without much interest. But once assumed to exist, they take the children and make them into members. The institutions and groups in our modern life are not alone altering personality; they are creating personality. The ideals, the ambitions, the purposes, the habits, the very objects of attention are the result of group influence. So far from the groups' being the result of the instinctive equipment of separate organisms, they can, as Dewey remarks, be thought of in the opposite relation. "It is the institution that produces the instincts and not the instincts the institution."

The above statements are not intended to be dogmatic, and they are presented in the full realization that others do not agree. The present purpose is served if an adequate statement is made of the primary assumption of the sociologist.

The question is, however, so controversial that it is necessary to attempt a clarification of its connotation. For if we consider crowds, families, circles of friends, or formal organizations like banks, joint stock companies, universities, it is pertinent to inquire when a given number of persons form a group and when they do not. And if a group is assumed to exist, what it is that makes it a group and what is gained by calling it a group instead of regarding the separate people who make it up as still separate, even though they may be influenced by other separate individuals.

In the first place our language has reflected the intellectual needs of our people by giving us terms for collectivities which act as a whole and whose effects are not to be understood by analyzing the units. It may be said that a great wave that smites a

ship in mid-ocean as a "green sea" is made up of separate drops of water (though a drop of water is a spherical-shaped thing not easily seen in a wave), yet we find it conveniently necessary to refer to the wave as a whole and the navigator would never deal with it adequately by any habits he has learned from separate drops of water. A glacier may be analyzed into an infinity of minute ice crystals, but mountain climbers must learn how glaciers as such behave and, if he values his life, know how to deal with the crevasses. It is not necessary nor even defensible to assume an over-soul, or an over-drop, or an over-crystal. But it is necessary to recognize that new qualities appear in the whole when it acts as a whole.

We assume, then, that groups exist. Individuals exist but groups also exist. And to the persistent objector the sociologist would reply by saying that a group exists in exactly the same sense that anything else exists. Malaria is a reality and exists because a complex of symptoms is conveniently so called, and vast programs of public health proceed on the result of this assumption. The present writer owes his life to the work of men who so believed and so wrought. Not to be betrayed into any excursion into the metaphysics of reality but remaining firmly planted on the rock of empirical thinking, we can say that things exist because they are experienced. If Buddha exists for the Buddhist, and if the horned devil existed for the medieval Christian we can only say that cultural reality must be dealt with and we can only discuss the world we live in and not the world that we might have lived in. And in a world where men recognize groups, where they love groups, fight groups, give money to groups, lay down their lives for groups—in such a world it is not possible to deny their existence. And no people, civilized or primitive, has been found where the love of groups was absent or the claims of groups were neglected. And so, though the sociologist cannot claim that all agree with him, he takes as his starting point the groups which have their names, their traditions, their collective habits, and their coercive power. Groups can be classified, studied, described, and analyzed. And in the important genetic studies which concern the developing personalities of children it is the sociologist who must insist, early and late, that families, schools, play groups, gangs, cliques, and sets are of prime importance and that much valuable material can come from a study of

these which will throw light upon development in a way that is uniquely important and informing. The group does not, of course, create the personality or even "mold" it, for the member is also acting and interacting with his group. Communication within the group makes personality possible.

For the term "group" there are two very different meanings which are quite distinguishable and, since sociologists employ the two, it is necessary to clarify the difference. There is the statistical group and there is the social group. The statistical group is an abstraction made by the investigator who assumes units which he can count. Thus, divorced persons can be enumerated and these can be divided according to age, occupation, place of residence, or any other interesting relations including importantly the various divisions of time, different years, or even the seasons of the year. Studies made in this way of crime, delinquency, suicide, insanity, and any other sociological phenomenon have yielded valuable data, the nature of which will be discussed as we proceed. At present we are interested to point out that the "groups" so studied are only brought together in the mind of the student, a detail which marks them off sharply from the "social groups." These latter have an added quality of interrelation and some degree of integration. The statistical group has units, the social group has members. The units in a statistical group may have no relation to the other units and are not necessarily affected by the other units; while the members of a social group are not only affected by the relation, they are constituted by the relation. In a social group which includes several classes, it is the group which constitutes its members. The family and the school are within their limits determinative of personality. It is almost a definition of personality to say that it is the role which is assumed within the activities of the group.

It follows, therefore, that the study of the group is often a necessary preliminary to the study of the personality, and an understanding of the group will mean the understanding of the personalities of those within it, if the investigation is sufficiently thorough, it being kept in mind that group membership is never unitary but always mobile and that the most isolated of persons moves in a plurality of groups.

The sociologist finds it necessary to classify social groups, since the forms of control over members thereof differ in impor-

tant ways. One of the simplest and most useful classifications is into the informal and the formal. Those falling under the first of these have been called the primary groups, since they have the quality which the earliest, or primary, relations tend to take, such as the family and the play groups of children, where the relations are relatively free and the fixed regulations are absent. The formal groups have a different constitution. They are more rigid and official in character, and there is a smaller degree of interpenetration. Institutions like banks or corporations are typical of formal groups, and while important for the study of personality, tend to have different methods of control.

In the study of groups the sociologist is interested in the morale, the esprit de corps, and the collective representations in the group.

An aspect of social relations already mentioned needs a further word: The multiple membership that characterizes the least experienced of persons and the most simple societies and is particularly important as life becomes more complex and social relations more extensive in modern civilized existence. The groups to which a person may belong are sometimes widely different and sometimes sharply conflicting in their demands, and a given personality trait that may be assumed to be social may be traced to group experience in another or in a prior group wholly foreign to the association in which the personality is at a given moment found. And it must be remembered that social relations include not only what is said and done to the person and what he answers and does in return but must include that larger series of social relations represented in the literature he reads, the pictures he sees, and in the various artistic products with which he has had experience. For it is more than a figure to say that art is a form of communication.

These preliminary statements of standpoint are of importance only in so far as they guide research and facilitate investigation. The test of their value is the degree to which they serve to facilitate the collection of data relevant to problems of personality and to an interpretation of these data which will give rise to the discovery of general laws which will increase our knowledge.

Those students of personality who call themselves sociologists have relied on several methods of procedure, among which we may list the following:

1. The life history, or the more or less completely guided autobiographical document. This is sometimes a record of the entire life, sometimes a suggested filling out of an outline stressing the particular problem under investigation. When the record sought deals with a very limited area of experience, it may consist of brief answers of a specific sort and then it approaches the questionnaire.

There are admitted defects in the life-history technique. In the first place it is usually impossible to know whether the statements are exact and there is often no way to verify the statements. Moreover, the entire record of a life would be an unmanageably voluminous document and, therefore, only a fragment can ever be obtained. Also, the record of the past is not the same experience as the living-through the experiences recorded and so the result is not the exact account of how the experience was registered by the person writing but rather the memory and interpretation as it can be recalled at a time often long subsequent.

In spite of these admitted limitations, the sociologist finds this a very valuable method. The lack of verifiable truth is compensated for by the accuracy of the picture of the personality as it is conceived by the subject at the time of writing. It may not be true that the Jackroller was subjected to unbearably harsh treatment by his stepmother, but it is significant that he thinks so or, at the very least, that he wishes to make the reader believe it. The record of memories may be far from accurate, but it is significant for the personality that the memories are present and the interpretation and defense or accusation or objectivity is of significance quite independent of the other considerations. In this respect the life history has the advantages and defects of the interview, with the added advantage that the document is a permanent record and collections and comparisons of these can be made and studied at leisure.

2. The interview. The social worker and the psychiatrist depend so largely on this method of obtaining data that it is not necessary to enlarge on this point. The values and limitations of the interview are similar in many ways to those of the life-history document, though rarely is the client asked to give an oral account of his whole life.

3. Community studies. An understanding, as complete as possible, of the population, economic activities, institutions, customs, and social life of a given community makes it possible to interpret more adequately the personality of one who lives in the area. In the effort to achieve this understanding, the sociologist takes for a model the ethnologist who attempts a description of the culture of a tribe, seeking to make an objective description of those aspects of their total life which he regards as significant.

4. Statistical ecological studies. Assuming that the different parts of the city were different in their population in racial composition, economic condition, occupational status, and in other aspects, the attempt has been made to mark off these limits with definiteness and accuracy. The result of a series of continuous and related studies has been the division of the city into fairly definitely marked areas, each with a geographical center (where the land values tend to be highest) and with boundaries sufficiently definite to be capable of being plotted on a map. Within these areas it was then possible to study the particular phenomenon of interest. Among such phenomena we may mention juvenile delinquency, crime, divorce and family disorganization, poverty and dependency, suicide, and insanity. Studies have shown that certain areas are characteristically high in many or all of these indices of disorganization and that statistically the rate shows a gradual decrease from an assumed center toward the periphery. The quantitative results show, or seem to indicate, that the different forms of disorganization occur together and they raise the presumption that phenomena so different as juvenile delinquency and suicide are either related to each other or are to be referred to a common cause or series of causal antecedents.

Just how far we are justified in concluding that the causes are disclosed by the statistical results is uncertain and it is perhaps safer to say that such statistical ecological studies in which the phenomena are related to an area yield rather a clarified statement of the problem than its final solution. The cases included in a statistical aggregate can most advantageously suggest hypotheses which can then be tested by other ways of procedure, such as case studies. It is true that sufficiently laborious and

complete statistics with sufficient refinement might be able to carry the problems far toward solution, but in practice this is very rarely attained. In general we have the conclusion: These phenomena are related; I wonder why and how.

This is not an exhaustive list of the methods and procedures of sociological investigation. Each problem has its characteristic features and the data will be found, now in the facts in the biography of the leader of a group, now in the effort to discover the typical personalities in the group, again in the study of the conditions that produced the group, or in the records of its traditions and activities. The study of institutions and, most profitably, the study of particular institutions, the study of social movements and the stages from the initial unrest to the triumph of the movement in getting itself institutionalized and recognized in changes in legislation or to its disintegration and death owing to conditions that brought failure—all these have important results for the study of the genesis and nature of personality. The origin of the religious sect, for example, may be due to a unique constellation of events, while its development is often very different from any purpose which was ever formulated. Once the sect has become integrated, it takes its place as an important cultural fact and proceeds to influence the personality of its new converts and of the children who are born into its heritage. The Mormon, the Menonite, or the Christian Scientist can only be completely known and explained as the results of facts which transcend specific inquiries into individual experience. If such an institution as the religious sect be followed through, there is discovered a cycle of collective isolation which reaches an extreme point, after which the curve returns and the process of integration begins, the sect returning once more into the world which it had left, accepting much of what was formerly rejected, and producing its modicum of alteration in the mores of the larger society. This appears clearly in the case of the Friends, or Quakers, but is also true of the Methodists and, presumably, of all sects.

It is by a study of the various types of groups and institutions that the sociologist hopes to transcend history. Historical facts, in their very nature, are unique. Each one has a date and a place. Being uniquely located in space, time, and circumstance, it cannot be repeated, and no scientific laws can come

from that appreciative description and interpretation which we call history. But if the various historical accounts of specific situations with a similarity sufficient to warrant a common classification be assembled and classified and their common elements abstracted and brought under unifying formula, there results a sort of natural history which can lead to the discovery of relations, causes, and general laws which enable us to pass over into sociology. The history of the French Revolution is history and can be written only with some interpretation and appreciation. Accounts before us have bias, prejudice, and partiality, depending on the point of view of the historian. But if the various accounts of the French Revolution be assembled and the accounts of the other revolutions be compared with each other, there is the possibility that something may be learned about revolution in general and the adventitious aspects can be separated from the important and the essential. In this way lies the possibility of a sociology of revolution. Actual studies of this problem have been produced in recent years by American sociologists.

It is characteristic of social science in our day that the problems studied are defined very narrowly in order that a defensible method of attack may be found and defended. Older writers depended less on investigation than reflection and a sort of arm-chair philosophizing. The result of their work was liable to be a series of theories or systems and the argument largely conceptual. We are at present in a period of reaction against this procedure, and there is much to be hoped from the current prestige of fact finding, even when the facts found are of little value. There is a conviction that facts are self-justifying and are their own reward. It is even contended that the facts will speak for themselves when accurately set forth and persistently accumulated. An adequate statement of scientific method would, it seems to me, mean an insistence on the relativity of fact to problem and would lay stress on the necessity of a constructive activity which builds facts into a systematic statement confirming a hypothesis or helping to dislodge one which has become a matter of doubt.

When a problem of sufficient dimensions engages the attention of the social scientist, there is hardly any field of knowledge which may not offer him data. And it is his privilege to call upon the

specialists in remote fields if their facts or their results seem of value to him.

With a view to making this point clear, it is my purpose to present here some reports on an unfinished investigation, hoping that it will illustrate the methods mentioned and that, if the matter or manner seem of importance to others, discussion will be provoked that will forward the search for truth in this small corner of the field.

As a result of my experience including my reading, reflection, gathering of information, not excluding my interpretation of my own personal experience as child, parent, teacher, experimenter, and as field worker in a number of primitive tribes, I have come to entertain the following hypothetical views concerning the phenomenon of punishment. *Punishment did not always exist in human society. The origin of punishment was relatively late in racial experience, being, perhaps, contemporaneous with civilization. The practice of punishing children arose long after the punishment of adults came into society. The effect of punishment on children has a disruptive tendency on the group to which children belong. The resulting isolation results in an increase of "social distance" which tends to lessen the control of the adults over the attitudes of the children in the group.*

The above statements are given not as demonstrated conclusions but as hypotheses to be tested. Relevant to their investigation are facts and materials to be found in the fields of ethnology, mythology, legal theory, social history, studies of groups including schools, families, and other collectivities. The experiences of individuals who have inflicted punishment and observed its effects, the testimony of those who have been punished and of those who have witnessed or who have even contemplated it can have a certain relevancy.

The limits of space prevent an adequate exhibit of the data, but enough will be included to enable the reader to form an estimate of the values and shortcomings of the method pursued. The ethnological facts alone, as already collected, occupy some hundreds of pages. Here we content ourselves with a few paragraphs.

Twenty years ago attention was attracted to various statements pointing to the lack of punishment in the control of children among primitive or preliterate people. Stefansson,

who spent three years among the Eskimos, was so struck by this difference from our own culture that he devoted considerable time to trying to discover what the explanation was. Knud Rasmussen, who has visited every Eskimo tribe, records the same observation. While the Eskimo children are very well disciplined and are extraordinarily obedient, they do not suffer any punishment or penalties from their parents. Authorities on the American Indian began to report the same condition in widely scattered primitive tribes on this continent. The same report began to be very common among observers of African children.

As time went on, these statements became more and more frequent, until now it is a matter well known that the punishment of children among preliterate people is the exception and not the rule. Where the influence of civilization has been felt, and a consequent disorganization of the tribal control has occurred, the phenomenon of the punishment of children can be observed, but the general rule still holds, and the rather striking fact that children are well controlled and adequately disciplined without formal penalties or the assertion of formal parental authority is a phenomenon capable of exciting lively theoretical interest.

But, in addition to these facts about the differential treatment of children in primitive and civilized communities, other very interesting reports began to accumulate about the treatment of adult offenders. It was reported by Radcliffe-Brown that in the Andaman Islands there was no punishment of adults for any crime which they committed, which of course means that there were no offenses described as crime, since crime and punishment are correlative terms. The same statements are made by competent observers of the pariah tribes in Africa, of the Bushman tribes in the southern part of the continent, of certain of the Pueblo tribes, and all in all there are about forty small groups of isolated, primitive people scattered in various parts of the world where punishment is practically unknown, essentially non-existent. This is true of most of the Eskimo tribes, who have already been mentioned as being without the punishment of children. Those who became interested in this phenomenon devoted their energies at first to the framing of some hypothesis to account for the lack of punishment among the few peoples who did not have it or for the lack of punishment among the much larger number who do not apply it to their children. It

would be entirely defensible to pursue this inquiry and to see if an answer could be found to the question of why this particular element is lacking in certain parts of the world.

This, however, is not the only way in which the question could be approached. It would be possible to inquire, also, just as legitimately, as to how the punishment of children entered into later society, assuming ours to be later, or how the punishment of adults is to be accounted for in the much larger community where it is almost universal. Students of social origins have, for a long time, been in agreement that it is a pertinent inquiry to raise the question of the origin of any of the elements in our civilization. It is proper to inquire into how religion began, how art began, or the state, or the moral life, and it is also profitable to inquire how we may account for the origins of punishment. It is quite true that the facts we most need are forever inaccessible, and yet so long as there is a lively interest among physicists and astronomers in the origin of the earth or the origin of the solar system, it does not seem inappropriate that students of society should entertain the question of how the institution of punishment came into existence in our world. The facts so far, then, are clear. Over most of the world children are punished; over a much larger part adults are punished; but over some considerable areas neither children nor adults are ever punished.

The problem that concerns us is the place of punishment in home and school as directed toward children, and the next appeal is to the field of folklore and mythology. The conviction that punishment is appropriate to children rests in no small degree upon the testimony of the sacred books and the beliefs about the character of the deity and his treatment of those who offend his laws. The eternal lake of fire and brimstone where the souls of the damned were punished by a malignant demon throughout eternity is a familiar picture which was very real to our medieval Christian ancestors. But to the historian of religion it is very clear that such pictures are the projection of a certain aspect of the past experience of the people who accept the doctrines thus stated. The purgatory and the hell of Dante had their counterpart in the torture chamber and punishing devices of the generation preceding the time when Dante wrote.

While there are elaborations and picturesque enlargements in the account of the after life, yet it is quite possible to show that the next world is dependent for its imagery upon the experience of the generations preceding those who formulated the picture.

The conception of retributive punishment by an angry deity who is just and all-powerful, very clear in the New Testament writings, was elaborated in Persia, from which source much of it came into Palestime in the early Christian centuries and those just preceding. It also flourished in Egypt and in other parts of the civilized world of ancient times. There are, however, many parts of the world from which it is absent. The early Hebrew Scriptures have no hint of punishment in the next world for deeds done in this world, and if a careful survey of the mythology of all races is made with this question in mind it is interesting to record that over most of the world there was no belief in punishment after death. Among the North American Indians, where there was punishment of offenders, there was no belief that the next world had any such activity. Indeed, punishment in the after-life is practically absent from the beliefs of all preliterate peoples. There is often a belief in a difference in the fate of those who die, so far as the after-life is concerned, but this is more liable to be on the basis of how death was met, whether on the field of battle or by violence, and there seems to be a rather complete absence of the idea of retributive justice in the after-life of those who have offended on this earth.

But more interesting than this fact for our problem is the further consideration that the mythologies of many who are not to be classed as savage peoples have this same interesting feature. This is true of the pre-Christian Celtic mythology; it is true of the Scandinavians; it characterizes also the Finnish, the early German, the early Greek and Roman, and most of the others.

What significance has this collection of facts? If our first assumption is correct regarding the relation of social factors to sociological deposits, are we not justified in concluding that the absence of an idea of future punishment reflects a time when there was an absence of punishment of the living? Even if this be true, it does not follow that the life of the people was necessarily idyllic or totally harmonious; it would only mean that there had not appeared any authority sufficiently powerful to make the offender subject to a definite penalty. Taken alone,

it would appear that the evidence of mythology would not be very conclusive, but taken in relation to the other facts already presented and to be immediately set forth, it does seem that we are justified in attaching to it some importance.

An inquiry into why offenses are punished will lead the inquirer to a reading of a succession of abandoned theories. Oppenheimer lists more than a dozen of these, but they can be grouped and classified in ways that would make a smaller list or, with refinements of distinction, a longer one. For the purpose of this discussion we can speak of them briefly.

There is the doctrine of expiation which defends punishment as a moral necessity, modified by Hegel into a logical necessity, stated by Herbart as an aesthetic necessity; but these and other refinements of statement have a common assumption. It is to the effect that suffering abolishes the guilt, wipes it out, or washes it away, various metaphors from the laundry or the housekeeper being employed. This theory will not stand criticism. There is, first of all, the quantitative difficulty. The amount of guilt is different in different offenses, and the amount of suffering in different punitive activities also varies. In order to apply the theory, the suffering must be made equal to the guilt, but it is impossible to find either units of guilt or units of suffering, and so the attempt to equate them proves to be an impossible task. An equation can be made between the amount of suffering and the satisfaction of those who have been damaged or those who are inflicting the penalty, but this departs from the theory and would be rejected as unethical.

But in addition to this factual objection to the theory of expiation there is the more important basic assumption that in the very nature of man is involved an attitude of resentment to wrong which requires the punishing act to even it up. This is held to be primary and original, but facts innumerable can be cited in support of the statement that the resentment toward a wrongdoer is always a function of the group relations which obtain. It is not possible to resent the act of a comrade in a group who offends a member of a hostile group in the same way or to the same degree that we resent the acts of a member of the hostile group toward one of our own. This is so obvious that it hardly needs elaboration. A large-scale example is the treatment of the Jews in Germany, and the differential attitude

toward this taken by Jews or by impartial observers or by members of the governmental party in Germany would illustrate what can be paralleled by similar differences in definition throughout very wide realms of experience. It is, therefore, necessary to abandon the theory of expiation and to assert that it rests upon inadequate psychological foundations.

The theory of deterrence assumes that the contemplation of an offense will arouse in the person involved a picture of the penalty which others have suffered and thus inhibit him from the act. The reason that A is punished is to deter B, C, and D from committing the same offense when they recall the consequences which A has suffered. This has been refuted by changing psychological insight which presents the contemplated act as being essentially different from a calmly reasoned process. If reasoning were cold and objective and devoid of any instinctive urge or emotional drive, the outcome might be different, but with the present view of the psychology of action, the theory of deterrence breaks down. Moreover, in practice, no support has been found for the theory which would lead us to believe that severity of punishment is an adequate deterrence of offenses.

The theory of reformation fastens the attention upon the effect of the suffering upon the individual patient. It can be abundantly shown that this effect is by no means constant and indeed is relatively rare. The reformatory effects of punishment are illusory and when the reformation does take place it can more reasonably be attributed to other types of social influence, and so the theory of reformation breaks down. It should be said further that if punishment is entirely educative and reformative it tends to take the form of therapeutics and loses its essential punitive character, that is to say, resentment disappears.

Not to enter too deeply into this aspect of the subject, it is asserted here without adequate proof of the assertion, that all the theories of punishment turn out to be untenable, and if this be assumed we may offer the following interpretation: A theory of punishment is a sort of rationalization. All of these theories are of relatively recent origin. All of them can be characterized as defenses for a proposed change or reform on the one hand, or as reasons for resisting change on the other. Many of them are in the nature of rear-guard actions of the conservative members of society, while others are arguments for a new and better way of

treating criminals and children. But in either case the important sociological principle is that theories of punishment are far subsequent to the non-rational custom which grew up as other culture traits in the mores grew, not as a rational solution to a problem, but as a collective representative having its origin, like other collective phenomena, in the more massive social facts that gave rise to the custom.

The relevance of this argument to the problem in hand may be stated, then, in this fashion: The punishment of criminals and children is a non-rational custom which is defended by theories acceptable to the generation that produced them and fallacious when analyzed by those who do not share the assumptions of the theorists.

A further relevant consideration in the study of punishment, with the purpose of getting an adequate conception of it, comes from the consideration that in the primary groups, such as a circle of friends or a child group of equals, there is no possibility of formal punishment. A teacher may punish the children in her school for disorder in the room, but disorder in her absence cannot be punished by any member of the group; it can be objected to, and there can be quarreling and fighting, but the act of punishment must be performed by one who has some formal authority; and groups without number can be found where such formal authority does not exist, because in the primary group the essence of its being is a mutuality and non-authoritative equality. The point is that the surprising discovery of the absence of punishment in a small number of primitive groups can be paralleled by a very large number of modern primary groups whose methods of control have none of the elements of formal penalties.

The origin of the individual attitude toward punishment of offenses and the necessity of suffering for wrong-doing, including the feeling, of which much is made by many influential writers of the present day, that self-punishment is appropriate and that we must reckon with a native urge for it, is not to be found in the individual as such. This feeling or sentiment must be sought in the mores of the group and cannot be ascribed to an innate tendency or unconscious urge. Punishment is, therefore, a social custom, very old but arising in specific, concrete situations and perpetuated by conditions which may be found by persistent analyses.

Whatever the origin of the punishment of children, it arose subsequently to the punishment of adults. This statement contradicts the traditional opinion but seems to be justified in the light of the available facts. The despotic patriarch ruling with an iron hand is a myth. Neither the Homeric Greeks nor the ancient Hebrews were primitive people.

The punishment of children in the family, which is an integral part of our contemporary culture, can be investigated by observing family discipline, by questions asked of adults, by questions directed to children, and by the securing of connected accounts of children or of adults with reference to their experiences in administering or suffering or observing punishment. The present writer has collected a large amount of material of this character which can be treated in a variety of ways. It is proposed here to consider the results with the methods of case material as against the quantitative methods of statistical enumeration. In a questionnaire addressed to the mothers in parent-teacher associations in the cities of Chicago and New York, some two hundred replies were received bearing on various aspects of observed punishment, both administered and experienced. This included an inquiry into the attitude of the respondents toward the practice of punishment, but the interest at this point is on the observed effects as characterized by those who reported. The following sample of twenty-six answers is representative:

1. My child always tore her hair.
2. I was usually in a mood to say and do anything in revenge.
3. Became prejudiced against everybody.
4. The effect was that the child became sullen and bad tempered.
5. Felt as if the entire world was against me.
6. Felt sore at the entire universe.
7. Felt like a wronged and trapped creature.
8. Ran away from home.
9. Felt angry.
10. Was made to feel ridiculous and resolved to do better next time.
11. Felt contrite and resolved to be good afterward.
12. Felt embarrassed and repentant but sometimes defiant.
13. I decided to behave afterward.
14. Wished harm to the punisher.
15. I knew a child who tried to kill his parents.
16. The girl cursed and wished her parents had never been born.
17. I felt as if the punishing person should never have existed.
18. The boy cursed his parents and said he hated them and did not want ever to see them again.
19. Felt terrible.

20. Felt morbid and sulked.
21. Hurt my pride very much.
22. Felt very much ashamed.
23. Wished I was dead or lame.
24. Wished I was crippled.
25. Wished I would get sick and die.
26. One child I knew committed suicide because he had been punished by the teacher.

At first it seemed that there was no common effect of punishment, for the above material taken as samples reveals that in the opinion of those reporting, punishment sometimes produces resentment, sometimes contrition, sometimes defiance, and even leads to murder or desertion.

But when further inquiry was made it seemed definite that one result always followed, namely, a certain degree of isolation.¹

¹ The above phrases were abstracted from the complete answers to a questionnaire sent to the 200 mothers. The following is a copy of the questions. The answers provide material for problems not discussed in this chapter:

"This questionnaire is being distributed by students in the University of Chicago who are collecting material on the subject 'punishment of children.' The child's viewpoint is necessary for a complete survey of the problem, and it is earnestly requested that thoughtful and uncolored replies be given to the questions herein contained. Do not sign your name to the questionnaire; but give it your deepest personal consideration, as you will thus assist in providing a considerable mass of important psychological material even though its source is not identified.

"The word *punishment* is here used in the sense of 'a voluntary and equative act performed by one in control upon a more helpless person after the committing of the offense.'

- "1. For what kinds of offenses should children be punished?
2. What kinds of punishment are most effective for children?
3. a. Does punishment always benefit the child?
b. What punishments have most benefitted you?
4. Do children ever resent punishment?
5. How do you think a child normally feels under punishment?
6. Should punishment be different in the home from in the school?
7. Did you ever know a child who was harmed by punishment? How?
8. Could a home be run without punishment?
9. Could a school be run without punishment?
10. Could you have been raised without punishment?
11. If so, what method of control do you think would have been preferable for you?
12. Do you know of any cases where children have wished harm to themselves or the persons who punished them because of punish-

A series of life histories was collected from 500 students in various colleges in the Middle West. The papers were written by upper classmen and covered various aspects of their past life as they could recall it and cared to communicate it. One section was written about the discipline in the family with no more direction than the simple direction to write on this topic. Most of the students wrote two or more pages on this topic. One out of six failed to discuss the topic. It is not proposed to treat the material statistically. For the purposes of this paper the first 150 papers were read and the key phrases on punishment and the effect of it were noted. The papers, taken at random, were examined and the phrases were recorded till they began to repeat themselves, that is, no new types of effects seemed to appear, and then the work was stopped. The object in presenting the material is to show the reason for concluding that there are a certain number of typical attitudes produced in the child by parental punishment. No effort is made here to decide why one result rather than another was produced. This is an important question but would require special attack. The classification of the material of this nature is relative to the purpose of the student, but it is believed that the main conclusion will be accepted.

Desertion from Home.

1. Step-father would take the buggy whip to me . . . when I was thirteen I ran away.
2. Only system of discipline, the rod . . . was not told right from wrong. Learned to tell falsehoods to save hide . . . rebelled . . . left home and never returned . . . never got homesick.

Death-wishes, Etc.

3. After I had been punished . . . wished I were dead. This was so I could make my parents feel sorry.
4. Father used to believe in good old spanking . . . oh, how it hurt my feelings. Thought I was adopted child and they did not love me. Wanted to get sick and die so they would feel sorry for me. Now I know that both parents were always just.
5. Caused me to wish that I had not been born . . . that I could go away never again to return.
6. Mother scolded me . . . prayed I might die so mother would be sorry

ment? Elaborate in much detail.

13. Any opinions about punishment or interesting cases known to you."

7. Father whipped so hard I prayed I might die. There was bitter hatred for my father. I rebelled and practiced deceits and did not regret it. I would remain sullen and not talk for days. He never allowed us to explain.

Deception, Etc.

8. Father dominated . . . father used whole basket of shingles on me . . . I think he was fair for that situation . . . seldom rebelled until I was sixteen . . . used the back window for entrance.
9. Small switch . . . did not rebel against the system but used small deceits to avoid it.
10. Punishment . . . whipping by mother. Severe scolding by father which hurt worse and lasted longer . . . rebelled against the punishments and practiced deceits to keep from getting caught. Never lied except on a few occasions.
11. System of discipline not very strict . . . was just . . . deceived in order to avoid it.
12. Never whipped very hard . . . lectures main diet of punishment . . . was fair . . . small deceits in things I couldn't see were wrong.
13. Discipline . . . consisted of both fear and reward . . . whipping or talking to . . . if did something well was rewarded . . . discipline not unfair . . . at time of whipping was bitter and rebelled . . . bitterness did not last long . . . small deceits to get out of licking.
14. Discipline sensible and fair . . . rebelled when my wishes were thwarted . . . small deceits to avoid punishment.
15. Whipping . . . used every scheme that was possible to avoid whipping . . . I suppose it was fair . . . told many falsehoods.
16. Discipline . . . corporal punishment rarely . . . usual deceits on occasion.
17. Received only one whipping that I can recall . . . felt it was unjust . . . practiced small deceits.
18. System of thrashing with whips . . . some slapping . . . not altogether fair . . . practiced deceptions to avoid punishment.

Resentment, Rebellion, Etc.

19. Feared father . . . resolved to get even with him when I grew up . . . in moments of peace he was kind to me and I could not help from weeping when he got tender.
20. Lied to avoid spanking . . . punished some by sending them tramping . . . making them leave home with a small bundle on the back . . . "you cannot live at home unless you will improve your conduct" . . . To see a person striking another arouses in me a dislike for the person striking . . . I cringe now when I think of my brothers being strapped . . . respected and feared my mother . . . father never punished.
21. No special system of discipline . . . not very mischievous or naughty . . . were screamed at and one of parents had nervous spells and fits of anger . . . this was hard on us.

22. Whipped with small switch . . . at that time thought it was cruel for parents to whip their children.
23. Old type ironclad rule . . . father usually on the job . . . not altogether fair.
24. Always spanked and scolded . . . I certainly did rebel . . . often practiced deceits.
25. Family rather strict with me . . . always punished when I needed it . . . sometimes too strict with me . . . rebelled in spirit but not outwardly.
26. Discipline by depriving me of thing I liked . . . spankings not common . . . rebelled sometimes but usually only inwardly . . . Almost never lied to get out of things.
27. Father was head of the house . . . on no occasion were we permitted to contradict him or disobey . . . frequently rebelled . . . practiced some petty deceits . . . do not remember having expressed myself openly . . . usually sulked about . . . daydreamed of a time when I would get even.
28. Father always strict . . . if orders not carried out I was duly punished . . . usually sent to bed . . . spanked in early years . . . later on punished by withdrawal of privileges . . . rebelled now and then without any good resulting.
29. Mother tells not to do a thing . . . finally gives in after we begged a while . . . discipline left to mother . . . mother fussed at us . . . punishment always switching . . . quite fair . . . rebelled, small deceits to avoid it.
30. Discipline by mother scolding and whipping . . . evaded punishment till father came home . . . he never spanked . . . scolding made me resentful and sulky . . . father talked until we were shamed. Father expected obedience and got it . . . no fear of him . . . respected and adored him . . . never resented father, rebelled against mother . . . deceitful to mother to evade punishment . . . never with father.
31. Discipline strong . . . not confide in mother . . . father and I practiced deceits in order to avoid conflict situations (later father and mother were divorced).
32. At that time considered punishment unjust . . . often tried to lie out of it.
33. Never severely disciplined . . . father never disciplined us . . . "left it to mother" . . . discipline was unfair.
34. Very rigid . . . cat-o-nine-tails . . . razor strop . . . piece of kindling . . . mother most merciless creature . . . beat us while stark naked on the bed . . . kneeling bare-kneed on hard kitchen floor . . . never fair . . . no thought behind it . . . felt she used it to make us afraid of her . . . to avoid it slept in barn with dog for warmth . . . missed meals to avoid it . . . one day I jerked the whip from her hand and told her I had a mind of my own (writer is 31 years old, undergraduate).

35. Did the right thing because I feared what my mother would do or say or "what other people will say" . . . Heaven forbid that I should ever use that method.

Isolation, Shame, Etc.

36. Punished by not speaking to me for a long time.
37. Discipline of home was silence . . . when we did anything contrary to parents they would not speak to us until we apologized . . . hurt dreadfully . . . I was stubborn . . . not speak for three days . . . sometimes father gave long lecture . . . no whippings . . . never deceive father . . . he hated that.
38. Never would talk to me . . . hurt more than a whipping.
39. Spanking for lying . . . told before all the family . . . greatly ashamed.
40. Mother used slipper when emotionally disturbed . . . never felt fairness or justice in way rewards and punishments were meted . . . they were cruel and lacked sympathy . . . mother slapped my face in front of company . . . mother at heart sacrificing . . . mother taught prayer . . . I doubted the sincerity of her belief.

Destruction of Initiative, Etc.

41. Father required strict obedience . . . no open rebellion . . . made expressions in the back yard alone . . . mother not as strict . . . no disputes about expediency of obedience to parents . . . this regime failed to develop my self-confidence.
42. Very rigid discipline . . . severe corporal punishment . . . bachelor brother of 35 has his spirit broken . . . he has forgotten how to think for himself.
43. Bodily punishments I cannot remember . . . mental punishments . . . inclined to believe that my feeling of inadequacy may be attributed to these punishments inflicted upon a sensitive mind and conscience.

Generally Accepted.

44. Punishment reasonable and thorough, but I believe I would be lighter with the strop.
45. No rebelling . . . only one way to go . . . never did an added piece of work or favor to avoid a penalty.
46. Spanking by mother only . . . always fair . . . never rebelled . . . knew I was wrong or would not be spanked . . . parents gave me good talks . . . deceitful only one or two times.
47. Firm but never cruel . . . fair and never obvious . . . tantrums cut off by cold water . . . sulking rewarded by being sent to bedroom alone.
48. Parents sometimes severe . . . felt I could confide in them . . . father angry over foolish things and paddled me . . . I told truth.
49. Discipline strict . . . honesty stressed . . . never rebelled . . . no deceits practiced, they would have been unearthed immediately.

50. Very fair . . . usually resented it for the time until I had time to think it over . . . reasoning first, then spanking as a last resort . . . whipped with the open hand . . . did not practice deceit . . . meant much to receive a spanking, parents never punished when angry . . . punishments never made us think less of our parents . . . never questioned the rights of the parents.
51. When young was punished for some misdemeanors . . . the wonder whether I was an adopted child left me later . . . misdemeanors meant punishment . . . never unjust . . . never rebelled against it . . . never practiced deceptions . . . never lied to my parents.
52. Discipline in every way fair . . . parents rulers but not tyrants . . . no need to rebel . . . all punished alike . . . punished only when wrong doing was discovered . . . of course we told lies to keep from getting a whipping . . . would hide all evidence.
53. Dad's word was law . . . no particular system of discipline.
54. We knew that if we disobeyed punishment was sure to follow . . . father needed to speak but once.
55. Mother was strict . . . took her word as law . . . never whipped.
56. Mother's chief form of discipline was: "you cannot go out to play," or "you must be home by seven" . . . Dad told me and it was done.
57. Razor strop . . . always stressed importance of honesty.
58. Discipline chiefly verbal . . . fear was not used as an instrument of punishment.
59. Fair . . . whipped or talked to . . . either of the parents could do this because they had the best of strength.
60. Punished by double work . . . tried to get out by promises.
61. Father final authority . . . father exacting . . . seldom whipped . . . father talked to us . . . mother whipped more but could be talked out of it . . . father fair . . . never rebelled to any extent . . . no deceit to father but deceit to mother.
62. Never rebelled against my mother.
63. Discipline too lenient for my own good . . . only whipped four times . . . resented them for a time . . . sent to sit on a chair . . . I often brooded on it for a time . . . I rarely deceived my parents for was taught to hate a cheater.
64. Whippings not severe and very reasonable . . . little or no resistance.
65. Not spanked after fourth grade . . . usually mother told me wherein I had erred . . . father once or twice punished me by removing my privileges . . . I am quite obedient . . . punishment seldom more than a reprimand.
66. Back of hair-brush afforded punishment . . . many lickings . . . needed all I got.
67. Good talks . . . severe whippings . . . usually fair . . . never rebelled.
68. Taken for granted . . . never severe . . . denying play . . . whipping by either father or mother . . . felt it was for our good.
69. Mother usually . . . father spanking when he came home at night . . . denied privileges and pleasures, not rebellious.

70. Only one whipping from father . . . never forgot it . . . deserved it.
71. Discipline strict . . . hand applied frequently . . . was fair . . . deserved all we got . . . only once lied to avoid a spanking.
72. Never whipped . . . father always tried to reason it out with me . . . when younger was sent to room or bed . . . little crying caused me to forget . . . punishment was always fair.
73. Punished whenever I needed it . . . once in a while spanked . . . most of the time sent to bed without a meal, this worked wonders . . . never punished except when necessary.
74. Parents had quite a rigorous discipline . . . requirements explained as for our own good.
75. Discipline fair . . . father very severe when angry . . . mother punished more frequently but less severely.
76. Few whippings . . . doing without something we wanted.
77. Discipline severe . . . strapped for every misdemeanor . . . I did not like that method but since strap was laid aside I wish it was back for I hate tongue lashing or silence of parents . . . present method more effective . . . rebelled against strappings . . . tried to get out of them.
78. I can appreciate it now . . . without punishment I should probably have been a black sheep.
79. Remember a great many whippings . . . do not hold it against my parents . . . reasonings would not have been as effective as whippings.
80. Count number of whippings from mother on fingers of hand . . . never received whippings from father . . . confidential talk of mother hurt more than beating . . . entirely fair . . . rebelled when young . . . later realized that parents were right.
81. Father never touched me . . . mother switched us with peach tree switches . . . sometimes talked to us in quiet peaceful way . . . this had much effect.
82. Was fair . . . rebelled against it sometimes . . . sometimes deceitful.
83. Never rebelled . . . never practiced deceit.
84. Whipped by mother . . . do not recall practicing deceit but am sure I did.
85. Whipped us . . . discipline was that used by uneducated parents.
86. Father had a violent temper . . . would punish his children too severely . . . mother would interfere to keep him from injuring us . . . after these, father was always repentant.
87. Did what was expected through necessity and fear of father . . . remember only one spanking.
88. Usually sure of punishment . . . disobeyed my parents plenty.
89. Never unfair . . . did not always obey . . . don't remember being spanked . . . never small deceptions.
90. Mother instilled what she wanted me to do . . . if I did not do it she got me to feel that it would hurt her feelings . . . I realized two years ago that she was practicing a trick on me and rebelled against this method.

91. Parents always confided in me . . . rarely punished me except after thoughtless piece of mischief.
92. Not often punished . . . felt we deserved it . . . fullest confidence in parents.
93. Sometimes thought it was not fair . . . never rebelled except a few times . . . practiced no deceit.
94. Fairness of their decisions prevented any feeling of rebellion . . . greatest respect for my parents . . . I was often in the path of the switch.
95. Good bawling out . . . never rebelled or practiced small deceptions to avoid it . . . have respect for parents now.

Relative Absence of Punishment.

96. Never whipped . . . seldom scolded . . . I just seemed to know what mother and dad wanted me to do or not do.
97. Discipline excellent . . . obeyed every rule . . . I worshipped my father.
98. Guess I instinctively knew certain things I could do or not do.
99. Obeyed mother . . . certain of her love and sincerity . . . never practiced deceptions.
100. Mother never gave any corporal punishments . . . always highest respect and love for her.
101. Positive but kind . . . no rebellion.
102. The possibility of losing the confidence of our father was our only punishment . . . the tone of his voice was sufficient.

Investigations not reported in detail here and mentioned without the supporting data have been made but are omitted, owing to limits of space. Among others they include the following:

1. A series of short accounts of experiences of punishment by 43 Negro children in Chicago public school with interviews of the mothers of the children.

2. A study of the informal controls operating in high school groups in which the controlling influences are apparently to be found in the primary groups of friends and fellow students with the officials and teachers regarded as more or less formal and institutional authorities.

3. A study of a group of sixteen boys from 9 to 12 years, organized for a period of two years and met for two half-days every week, where the control was very complete and where the principle was explicitly enunciated and carefully observed that there should be no penalties of any kind inflicted and no punishment of any nature exacted. The details of this experience are to be published but the results seem to be in line with the hypothesis already formed.

4. A series of life histories numbering about 200 in which the intimate or primary groups are uniformly represented as those in which authority is absent and punishment impossible.

The considerations advanced lead to the hypothesis that the variations in the relationships of family groups determine the type of control. With formality and externality there is punishment after the manner of the political state. Where the control is informal, punishment tends to be absent. Punishment in the family is an importation into a primary group of practices that could only arise in the political state. The effect of the importation is always to destroy the primary character of the group.

It is more than an accident in our English speech to refer to certain relations as impersonal. Impersonal relations are fractional in character. They can be accurately characterized as segmental. The importation into the family or the school of the methods of control which obtain in the strictly formal institutions like courts and government offices may and does produce a variety of effects, as the material has shown. But one effect is always present: there is a barrier of segmentation, a psychic partition, a division between the punisher and the punished. To say the same thing in other language: the primary group, family or school or any other, which uses formal methods of punishment loses its character as a primary group and tends to become, so far as these methods are used, something other than a primary group. For the primary group can be defined only by the nature of its methods and by the forms of control there obtaining.

And it is in these relations of an intimate and personal character that personality is formed according to the standards and preferences of the group. The meaning of the acts and gestures of the child is derived, so far as his own realization of them is concerned, not from what he does but from the responses he obtains in those primary groups of which he is a member either temporarily or permanently.

We end where we began, in the assertion of the reality of the group. But the group is difficult, if not impossible, to identify in strictly and purely behavioristic terms. More than the external movements and bodily behavior is involved. The personality is a role as conceived. My friend is my imagination or conception of expected action and response. The sociologist feels impelled to imagine imaginations. The primary group is

one where the relations are unimpeded by formal and fractional segmentation. It consists in the relations.

Harshness, antagonism, and conflict are just as important for the understanding of personality as are harmony, concord, and cooperation. But it is important to know what type of relations gives rise to those effects and what type produces these. And if the thought of the writer is at all clearly expressed, it would appear that the study of group relations in their differential aspects should throw much light on the way in which personality growth takes place in the children of a given society.

There is reason to hope that sociological investigations will yet yield results comparable in significance to those obtained in the other natural sciences. Neither the complex character of the material nor the emotional tone of some of the conclusions would appear to be insuperable difficulties. If the problem of punishment were to be completely solved, it would be a triumph of the human intellect comparable in importance to any of the notable triumphs of science in the past.

PART II
CONDUCT AND ATTITUDES

X

SOCIAL ATTITUDES

Within recent years the concept "Social Attitude" has been used by a number of writers with a content sufficiently consistent to warrant the serious consideration of this term. Thomas,¹ Dewey,² Park and Burgess,³ Williams,⁴ Koffka,⁵ Allport,⁶ and Bogardus,⁷ among others, have employed the concept, though not with identical meanings. For an even longer period the writer has had a graduate course with this title, originally offered by W. I. Thomas.

One would not need to be hypercritical to find inconsistencies and incompatibilities in the various definitions (Thomas, for example, defines attitude as a conscious process) yet the emphasis on behavior and the ultimate expression in movement runs through them all. Important nuances of behavior are distinguished in the use of marginal conceptions such as Disposition, Impulse, Habit, Instinct, Reflex, and even Wish and Desire, but it is possible to use the term "attitude" as a general notion to describe the tendency to perform actions of a describable and identifiable sort.

The logical significance of the concept lies in the change of emphasis from sensation to behavior, from receptivity to spontaneity and innate or acquired motor tendencies. This distinguishes the approach from that of traditional psychology and from some aspects of behaviorism where the problem is to describe the "reaction" to a "stimulus" and where the sense organs are described as "receptors." But there is another logical difference which is essentially a shift of emphasis from a timeless principle

¹ *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.*

² *Human Nature and Conduct.*

³ *Introduction to Sociology.*

⁴ *Foundations of Social Science.*

⁵ "Gestalt Psychology," *Psychology Bulletin*, 1922.

⁶ *Social Psychology.*

⁷ *Fundamentals of Social Psychology.*

or force to a concrete event. This marks off the "Attitude" psychologists from the "Instinctivists." An attitude has been variously designated as a gesture, an incomplete act, or a tendency to act. Some attitudes are overtly motor and muscular, though we also speak of "mental attitudes," where the behavior is delayed or only expected, yet always possible.

Approached in this general way, one may speak of attitudes under certain broad dichotomies. Thus we may divide attitudes into the hereditary and the acquired. Some tendencies are inherited, as the tendency of the duckling in respect to water, or the grasping and sucking reflexes of children. Thomas speaks of these as "temperamental attitudes." Other attitudes are acquired under social pressure and definition, as the vegetarianism of Hindus or Polynesian cannibalism. These are social attitudes, though they are individual phenomena.

Another dichotomy is that of conscious and unconscious attitudes. For there are unconscious attitudes. Williams in the work cited discusses judicial attitudes as seen in the five-to-four decisions of the Supreme Court, made consistently over a long period, and explicable only on the assumption of an unconscious bias or attitude. Other attitudes are conscious, such as one's attitude toward carrots or the Ku Klux or Hoover.

A third division may not be quite so obvious but is valuable and even essential to make, namely, the distinction between group attitudes and individual attitudes. Both are "social attitudes" in the sense above indicated, but the group attitudes also exist. This is probably what the French writers mean by *représentations collectives*. Perhaps the two other invaluable French notions, *morale* and *esprit de corps*, also refer to certain phenomena which we may call group attitudes, that is, to collective phenomena which are not mere summations. By individual attitude we may designate not merely the subjective aspect of any group tendency or cultural element but, more particularly and more usefully, the divergent and differentiated tendencies. The individual manifestation of race prejudice cannot be understood apart from a consideration of group attitudes. In collecting data it often happens that the investigator finds cases of the acquisition of a prejudice with astonishing suddenness and as the result of a single experience. But this could happen only in a milieu where there was a pre-existing group attitude. One who

has no Negro prejudice may acquire it from a single unpleasant encounter, but it is the group attitude that makes it possible for him to acquire it. An exactly similar experience with a red-headed person would not result in the same sort of red-head prejudice in the absence of any defining group attitude. Moreover, in the United States, prejudice against mulattoes means always prejudice against black people. In South Africa and in Brazil, where mulattoes are not classed with black people, the outcome would be very different owing to the different group attitude.

With regard to any attitude it is helpful to observe that it may be either *latent* or *kinetic*. These familiar words from physics are perhaps self-explanatory. All attitudes are not always active. We may call a girl's liking for ice cream an attitude, but it is not active or kinetic most of the time. An attitude is kinetic if there is actual motion or tension, for the test or criterion is to be found in motor behavior. An attitude may be kinetic without any observable or objective motion. Consider the difference between the two types of habit represented, respectively, by the ability to write and the tendency to excessive drinking of liquors, which we may call a "bad habit." Both these habits are attitudes, but the first is (in Dewey's words) a tool to be used when needed and active only then, while the second is not so. A bad habit intrudes and breaks in. It is like a compressed spring or a pneumatic pressure-cylinder. The tendency arises and determines the attention but may be the occasion of much disturbance even when unrecognized. The unconscious kinetic attitudes are the chief concern of the psychoanalysts.

A central problem in this field is the relation of attitudes to objective phenomena. Thomas states this as reciprocally causal, and sequential. "The cause of an attitude is always a value and a pre-existing attitude." This is stated to be equivalent to saying that every individual phenomenon has both individual and social causes. This may be true, but there is another relation which the statement leaves out of account. It is the relation between the subjective individual tendency and the external value ("object" is a better term). Now this relation is not causal or sequential but denotes rather the double aspect of one phenomenon. The attitude is *toward* an object and the object is, in some sense, the externalization of the attitude. *Neither causes*

the other, either with or without help. They appear together in experience.

It follows that attitudes are just as social as objects and that objects are just as individual as attitudes. Both objects and attitudes have both individual and social antecedents and both are aspects and results of organization. This relation is assumed in the investigation of attitudes which takes the form of questionnaires, concerning not attitudes but objects, and yet which reveal attitudes as counterparts. To ask a man whether he is a reactionary, conservative, progressive, radical, or revolutionary is to demand information which may be difficult, even if the subject is willing. But to ask such a one to give his estimate of Coolidge, Wilson, Davis, Gompers, Foster, and Debs is to ask not for his attitudes but for his objects and to get information on both. A man's world is the external aspect of his character; his personality is the subjective aspect of the culture of a group.

The problem of the genesis of attitudes is one aspect of the general problem of emotional disorganization and rational reorganization concerning which there is a very large literature. New objects do not arise merely as effects of social values and preceding attitudes but as a result of conflict, crisis, and reintegration, wherein social and individual forces and antecedents are in some form of opposition. The present need here for investigation is the study of types of crises and the collecting of new attitudes in their genesis. But the new phenomenon is always an attitude-object or object-attitude. When the draft law made the declaration of war mean something, millions of people redefined the United States. The results were a new country (new object) and a new patriotism (new attitude).

Defined in this way, social attitudes are sometimes spoken of as the elements of personality. Personality consists of attitudes organized with reference to a group into a system more or less complete. A social attitude is not the mobilization of the will of the person but the residual tendency that has resulted from such a "mobilization" and the subsequent campaign.

This brings up the relation of attitudes to wishes and particularly to The Wishes. Here there is at present some confusion. It is a good field for research and analysis. Some writers speak of attitudes composed of smaller or simpler elements called wishes (Park), while others use the words in a way difficult to

distinguish. The most obvious and to me the most useful distinction seems not to have been clearly stated. A wish is obviously an incomplete act, a forward-looking movement with a future satisfaction as an essential characteristic. An attitude is, on the other hand, the result of organization, the residuum of activity, coming at the end of the satisfaction of some wishes and remaining to initiate other wishes but not related to wishes as whole to parts. Those who write of "The Four Wishes" apparently mean types of attitudes, or perhaps classes of satisfactions.

Space forbids the discussion of appreciative and descriptive attitudes (following Royce) and of the value of such classifications as are inherent in complex group organization and the division of labor. The concrete and factual nature of the concept has already resulted in valuable researches. This is in marked contrast with the paralyzing sterility of the instinct concept which dominated this field for so long but which is, fortunately, being very rapidly discarded.

XI

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES

It may well be that the future historian of social psychology in America will record that the concept of social attitudes came into general acceptance in response to an unwitting search for some release from a sterile absolutism. The quest for the innate and universal tendencies went on for thirty years as an attempt to discover the exact list of the human instincts. The major premise of that search was the assumption that, just as the ant, the bee, and the beaver showed fixed and ineradicable behavior patterns that could be described in picturesque words, so also with man.

But by 1920 the earnest attempt to secure some fruitful list had become so discouraging that doubt was cast on the theory itself. A short-lived tendency to name these invariable units by some other noun was far less successful. The reflexes, potent, prepotent, and impotent, were too thinly disguised and failed to secure any enthusiasm. In vain was it contended that those reflexes could be modified by social experience; for the instinct-psychologist had long since retreated from his criterion of "specificity."

That the effort to find the unalterable list of elements was still continued by writers on social psychology only reveals the difficulty with which men part with the predilections of their early years. The presidential address of the American Psychological Association one year was delivered by a social psychologist¹ who had given up the older instinct doctrine but substituted an equally neat list of "desires." It was so difficult to break away from individualistic conceptions and become truly social in the initial assumptions that few men saw the issue. The sociologists had been emphasizing the group, and the growth of a sociological consciousness had already affected ethics, economics, political

¹ Knight Dunlap. The same position was taken in his *Social Psychology*, 1925.

science, and religion, but to psychology the sociologist seemed to go with his hat in his hand, not presuming to carry out the logic of his own premises.

Even when Thomas first introduced in an impressive way his concept of attitudes and values, the full significance of the change had not penetrated. For at first the attitude represented chiefly an insistence on the dynamic and moving aspect of all experience, in contrast to the "states of consciousness" of traditional psychology. There still remained the instinctive equipment and an arresting quartet of wishes which set the young graduate students in sociology by the ears.

One of the men who saw the issue plain and clear was J. M. Williams. His books appeared in rapid succession, though they were written with becoming leisure and with careful and painstaking method. To Williams social psychology was the science of attitudes and in his excellent work, *Our Rural Heritage*, he gives an account of the attitudes of the New York farmers, deriving them from the social experiences and showing how changing conditions in the second period of farm life brought about new attitudes.

When Znaniecki published his *Laws of Social Psychology*, he preferred a different terminology but revealed plainly his insight that the acts and experiences are the determining antecedents beyond which it was not profitable or even possible to seek any stable elements or absolutes.¹

But the first thoroughgoing and unequivocal statement of the logical outcome of the new movement was made by John Dewey in his *Human Nature and Conduct*. It was a conscious break with the older view and a clear statement of the relation between institutions and cultural forms and the attitudes (habits) of individual persons, the attitudes which are the self, the habits which are the will. "The instincts do not make the institutions: it is the institutions that make the instincts." The old units are thoroughly repudiated and the new ones are shown to be formed afresh in every concrete readjustment of a man and his fellows.

It is well for changes to come slowly, but it would seem that sociologists have been over-slow to grasp the liberating significance of this concept of social attitudes which has so much of value for

¹ See also ATKINS, W. E. and H. D. LASSWELL, *Labor Attitudes and Problems*, 1924.

their work. The concept of the mores with the emphasis on their mutability and their power has influenced other fields. But the stubborn individual yet remained, and the fluid character of social life congealed against the absolutes of his inborn equipment. Yet social attitudes, once they are grasped in their full significance, become the counterpart in individual equipment of the richly varied customs of the peoples of the world—differing as customs differ, from land to land, and changing as the mores change, from age to age. For the social attitudes of individuals are but the specific instances in individuals of the collective phenomena which the sociologists have labored for a century to bring to the consciousness of their colleagues in social science.

Now the nature and growth of the mores has been made known to a satisfactory degree by the work of Germans like Wundt and Ratzenhofer, by Frenchmen like Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, by Englishmen like Marett and Frazer, and by Americans like Sumner and Small, and much has been learned that the present generation can use.

No longer are we compelled to puzzle and confuse ourselves with a set and fixed scheme of social evolution with fixed stages and inevitable sequences. We are free from the dogma of economic determinism or any determinism. We know that culture is neither in the blood nor in the germ-plasm and that race means nothing as compared with the experience and activities of the group we are to study. Gone is the ancient doctrine of child-races, the infantile picture of primitive man is obsolete, and the mind patterns of a people are known to result from what they do and say, from what is said and done to them by man and nature.

Institutions are not produced by the instincts. Warfare makes men warlike and churches make men religious. It is clear that culture precedes particular individuals, that cultural patterns were ancient when you and I were young, and that the key to the varying attitudes is to be sought in culture history, culture contact, and social change.

The logic of this compels attention to the dilemmas that older men of another day encountered. It was assumed that man has, universally, a fighting instinct. It was discovered that some peoples are peaceful—war being unknown among them. What can be said, then? Only one thing—such peoples are defective. Just as a monster might be born with one eye, or with no arms,

so some defective peoples appeared as sports, without the fighting instinct. The weakness of the argument is on the surface. The instincts were not discovered or even formed in the antecedent equipment at all—they were but psychological pilferings from the sociological treasure-house.

And the refutation of all this follows quickly upon that comparison in time and place which results in a study of social origins. We find art to be universal in human societies but it is not difficult to show that artistic activities, practices, and products arose from activities that were not artistic. Religion is ubiquitous (if we are careful to define religion in broad enough terms) but none of the differentia of religion were religious when they began. Likewise morals are everywhere, but the mores can make anything right, and can prevent condemnation of anything and the private individual consciousness is the still small voice of one's people giving its warning in words and precepts that are never at variance with the highest ideals of the time and the area.

It is to the group, then, that we turn for the genesis of social attitudes which are profitably studied in the separate members of these groups. The social psychologist is interested in personality, and personality might almost be defined as the organization and ordering of one's attitudes. The group attitudes are selected in the individual person; public opinion is represented in individual opinion; and personality is the subjective aspect of culture.

It will be very unfortunate if the discussion of social attitudes degenerates into a quarrel over terminology, for there is no more certain symptom of the immature state of a science than a persistent and bitter logomachy. Thomas, in collaboration with Znaniecki, secured the adoption of the term *attitude*, but when the latter wrote "on his own" he gave careful reasons why this term is not a good one. "Attitudes" seemed to Znaniecki too static a term. He preferred to call them *tendencies*. And this, in spite of the fact that the chief argument for the new view by Thomas was that the older states of consciousness of traditional psychology seemed too objectionable on account of their static implications. Graham Wallas suggested that we compromise on the term *dispositions* as a sort of neutral word, since what we are talking about represents a disposition to act or think in a certain way. Dewey likes to call them *habits*, with the caution that some habits which have become automatic and mechanical are mere inert tools

to be used in the service of some more dynamic urge. "Habit" is thus a trifle ambiguous, but it is easier to see clearly what is indicated if we think of the analogy of bad habits, which do not rest quiescent till we want to use them but intrude upon our consciousness and insist on initiating their type of action. (This is a figurative statement but the figure is a good one.) But whether we speak of attitudes, of habits, of tendencies, or of dispositions is no great matter. In fact it is utterly irrelevant if so be that we are careful to know just what we are talking about. The world would be impatient with a physicist who should arise to remark that the X rays are not really X rays at all. They are Roentgen rays. If the physicists were as much obsessed with logomachies as are some social psychologists, we might even have some scholar write a whole chapter insisting that they are not X rays but that really and in truth they are A rays, since they came at the beginning of the knowledge of radioactivity, and that it would be well to suspend work on them till we could agree on the matter of terminology.

It is, then, of small moment—indeed, it is utterly unimportant whether we refer to these as one thing or another if only we are clear as to the phenomena in human experience and behavior that we are indicating. It is the denotative aspect of a word that is important. The necessity of concepts is not minimized by the insistent demand that we should think of what the term stands for and not lose time in arguing about the symbol. The true sciences never dispute about words. We shall have arrived where we long to be when we can just as conveniently substitute numbers or letters of the alphabet for the concept and feel that we have lost nothing in the shift. For it is a disadvantage when the concept itself carries an emotional aura in its word-association and we should free ourselves from this easily transcended limitation.

If, then, thinking denotatively, we inquire into the nature of an attitude, it appears that it is "*an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving.*"¹

An attitude of devotion to one's mother is something which can be investigated and concerning which confident and demonstrable assertions can be made in particular cases. But we cannot

¹ DEWEY, JOHN, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, p. 42.

know what particular act will be performed toward one's mother on account of the existence of this attitude. The attitude is a way of conceiving an object; it is the mental counterpart of an object. There is no confusion in calling it mental in the light of our knowledge that mental processes are integrally related to actions, are the result of delayed completion of actions, and are the preconditions of subsequent actions.

To illustrate further: we can investigate and learn to make confident assertions as to the existence of attitudes of individuals and groups of individuals on war, the church, and prohibition. Thurstone has produced laborious but effective devices for the determination of these three classes of attitudes in a group of chosen individuals. In these cases, as in most attitudes, there is a positive or a negative affective tone. The attitude is "for" or "against" the church, war, or prohibition. But the exact and specific act which any individual will perform is not known by knowing his attitude. All we can say is that when the time comes to act the attitude will enter in as an essential factor in the outcome. But in a crisis the attitude may change and the action be different.

There is one type of situation that has received much attention from social psychologists in which the attitude and the act bear a closer relation. I refer to the picturesque phenomena of crowd psychology and mob psychology. Once we had discovered the fallacy of the older imitation psychology, we were prepared for the insight that made it clear that in the psychological crowd which acts under the excitement of a leader the unity of the crowd depends on the possession of a common attitude which is brought into the focus of consciousness and made kinetic. Hatred of race, in an angry mob, is evoked and intensified; other attitudes are thrust into the background, and the suggested acts are in harmony with the attitudes to which the appeal is made. The psychology of persuasion and of salesmanship is due to a similar mechanism. The extreme form of this same condition is found in hypnotism.

Attitudes are, then, causally related to action, but many acts are strangely at variance with attitudes which the actor can be shown to possess. This is due, of course, to the simultaneous possession of many and even conflicting attitudes and to the varying way in which situations are defined so as to bring one

attitude or another into the focus of attention and thus into kinetic operation.

The exact relation of attitudes to actions is of such importance that we may well inquire somewhat more carefully into the matter. This leads us to inquire into the genesis of attitudes. Thomas's formulation has influenced all writers on the subject. To him the cause of an attitude was never another attitude but always depended on another attitude and a "value," which was the term he preferred for the objective existences in the world. The series is typically, for him: attitude—value—attitude, or, value—attitude—value.

Thus, if we have as a starting-point an attitude a and as a result an attitude m , the evolution may have gone on in such a way that out of a , under the influence of a value B , is evolved the attitude d ; out of d , under the influence of J , the attitude k and k , under the influence of a value N , was changed into the attitude m . But it might have happened also that a was influenced not by B , but by C , and the result was a different attitude e , which again under the influence not of F , but of G , gave i , and i , when influenced by L , also produced m . And the same can be said of values.¹

The utility of this scheme, depending as it does on the separation of attitudes and values, or objects, and linking them together in a causal series seems to prove disappointing in experience when an effort is made to discover the genesis of any particular attitude in any particular person or group. In the first place, the sequence is not convincingly apparent. The attitude and the value, or object, seem to exist always as two aspects of a single unity of organization. Thus, if a man confesses to a prejudice against the Negro race, there is to be distinguished an attitude (of prejudice, hostility, withdrawal) toward an object which is the Negro race. The object, or value, is as much a part of the individual experience as is the attitude. It is, in effect, the externalization of the attitude, just as the attitude is the subjective counterpart of the object. For there seems to be the necessity of recognizing that objects, or values, are not the same to two people who have different attitudes. The church is not the same object to one who hates it as to one who loves it. The flag is not the same to the devoted patriot as to

¹ *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (2d ed.), 1927, pp. 1839–1840.

the conspiring traitor. The value and the attitude are two aspects of the same experience.

It follows from this that one cannot experience a new object without experiencing at the same time a new attitude. The object is that toward which the attitude is directed. The attitude is the tendency toward a mode of response, toward the object in question.

If, now, we inquire as to the changes in attitudes and the formation of new ones we are assisted when we recall that attitudes, like habits, represent the stable and organized aspects of a personality and that these tend to persist so long as they work well and allow our conduct to proceed in a satisfactory way. The key to our problem lies, it seems to me, in the concept of *crisis*, which Thomas himself has made so prominent in his earlier writings. A crisis is to be found just in those situations where existing attitudes fail to apply and where existing objects fail to satisfy our expectations.

A student once wrote an account of the relatively sudden acquisition of a new racial prejudice, due to two unpleasant experiences with the members of the race in question. He had approached the experience with a favorable attitude toward an object which he defined in a certain favorable way. When the critical events occurred which changed his attitude, what happened was a brief period of confusion, surprise, and mental uncertainty. After he had reflected on the unpleasant and disturbing events, the result in this case was the *simultaneous acquisition of a new and unfavorable attitude toward an object which he had never had before*. That object was now repulsive where it had formerly been attractive. The experience is then always attitude-object or object-attitude. It is sometimes possible to get information about the attitudes of a person by merely asking him what his attitude is. But experience has proved that sometimes it is more exact and fruitful to inquire how a man defines particular objects; for the definition of the object may be a better revelation of the attitude than any attempt to describe it directly would be. One example of this is furnished by an attempt to discover the relative liberalism or conservatism of a series of informants. Subjects were asked to define a list of men as to whether they were liberal or conservative or radical. And it is clear that, when one man insisted that the late Samuel

Gompers was a radical and another put him down as a conservative, much relevant information was received about the attitudes, even more than if another type of approach had been attempted. Such judgment gives little information about the "real" Gompers but it does reveal that he is a different person to a conservative businessman on the one hand, and to a communist agitator on the other. The value does not "cause" the attitude. Both value and attitude arise when a former value-attitude proves impossible of adequate functioning.

Every attitude is, then, the resolution of a crisis, the solution of a difficulty, the end of a period of chaos, the termination of a moment of disorganization. The marvel is not that attitudes differ, but that they are so often alike or at least so similar that common action is possible, and the reason for this seems to be that a man who is puzzled and uncertain is usually humble enough to receive help where he can find it and that in the absence of a solution which he vainly seeks he is ready to accept the help of others. For thinking is a hard task, the outcome is uncertain, and the human mind at its best barely works.

Thus the new convert to a sect is often one who, puzzled and confused at the diversities of the world, accepts the solution that is given to him with convincing assurance, and he is ready to define his world as he is taught, even if this means taking on new attitudes that earlier he would have regarded as absurd or impossible. When medical science fails or blunders, and no relief is in sight, the doctrine that sickness and pain do not exist is better than no doctrine at all. Uncertainty and suspense are hard to endure, and any organization is better than none.

This is why the knowledge of an attitude will never enable us to predict what a man will do in a crisis. For a crisis is just that situation in which the man is so confused that he does not know what to do. If there is an impending emergency and a man has a complete plan to meet it, there is no crisis, for the emergency has really been foreseen. A crisis defined in advance and adequately prepared for is not a crisis.

The subjective or hidden nature of an attitude has given much concern to those writers who have a leaning toward behaviorism and who hesitate to admit the relevance of any data which are not immediately accessible to sense. Attitudes are not acts, they are predispositions. If they were predispositions to specific

and definite acts the difficulty would be less, but attitudes are *tendencies toward modes of action and do not have any one-to-one correspondence to specific responses to stimulations*. And thus a difficulty arises since, in strict phrase, an attitude, however real, must always be inferential.

The early reaction to the doctrine of attitudes obscured this fact by assuming that attitudes are immediately revealed in the opinions and statements which are easily obtained by direct approach. And this inaugurated a questionnaire era of research on attitudes. Subjects checked off prepared statements, or filled in dotted lines, or responded to interviewers, the statement recorded being assumed to have an immediate and unequivocal relation to the attitudes. Because the results were very disappointing there was a reaction against the concept, but the error was due not to the mistaken notion of the existence of attitudes, but rather to an inadequate position concerning the psychology of opinion. We must turn briefly to this point.

An expression of opinion is clearly an act. The act is, just as clearly, the result of the play of attitudes. But it is not true that the particular attitude that is sought has been involved. For there are other aspects in the total situation which may, and often do, call out attitudes quite different from the object of the investigation. A person's response to a question may be indicative of his real attitude toward the object involved, or it may be determined, not by that attitude at all, but by the attitude toward the questioner or by still other objects which are important and determinative.

A question about one's attitude toward sex may be answered entirely with reference to the attitude toward the questioner. A question about religion may be answered under the operation of an attitude toward the group in which the man questioned lives. It is only in those relatively infrequent moments when we are caught "off our guard" that attitudes and statements of opinion correspond. We get a perfect correspondence in those situations where a man "gives himself away."

Expressed opinions are actions, since they require us to write or to speak; and to ask a man to express his opinion on a given issue is to introduce into his experience at the moment an indefinite number of potentially active attitudes. When a given expression of opinion is found to be inconsistent with the "real"

attitude, it only means that the psychologist has been guilty of a misinterpretation. For every act is the expression of existing attitudes and these sometimes occur in simultaneous multiplicity.

Nor is it any serious objection to the concept of attitudes to insist that they are subjective and hidden, for much of human life is inner, and unless we can formulate some scientific account of the processes that are inaccessible to the eye of the observer, we shall fail to have a science of human nature. Cooley's insight was never more profound than when he wrote that the solid facts of our human life exist in the imagination. A jury may be called upon to decide the question of whether a given act was suicide or accidental death or whether a defendant is guilty of first degree murder or of accidental homicide. The data on which their decision is based are objective but the decision concerns the presence or absence of motives, the existence or non-existence of attitudes. Social psychology might conceivably limit its field to the overt and observable, but in that event we should need another science that would investigate just these facts that are so important and so difficult.

The importance of the insight that attitudes are the acquired modes of response lies in the reality that it lends to the problems of personality and to the liberation that comes when the mutability of social life finds its counterpart in individual change. The old absolutisms are seen to be *ex post facto* devices, reversing the causal relation between the individual tendencies and the cultural facts. We are free to investigate the attitudes of Bolsheviks and of Fascists, of labor leaders and of capitalists, of newspaper reporters and of farmers, of judges and of businessmen, with none of the misleading impediments that formerly blinded men to the facts of human life and experience.

And the research in this field has already been important and promising. Thomas and Znaniecki found the attitudes of Polish peasants possible of statement and made them convincing when presented.¹ Williams² has set forth the attitudes of judges, ministers, and other professional men and followed this work with a monograph on the farmers of northern New York.³ Atkins and

¹ *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (2d ed.), 2 vols., 1927.

² *The Foundations of Social Science*, 1920.

³ *Our Rural Heritage*, 1925.

Lasswell made a convincing study of the attitudes of laborers,¹ and in the University of Chicago studies in the making of citizens, edited by C. E. Merriam, a whole series of volumes is presented on the subject of the systematic attempts of governments to produce desired attitudes in the children. Specific researches have been carried on to discover the existence of attitudes, and scales of measurement have been produced, notably by Thurstone.

The controversial literature on attitudes is extensive and leads gradually to a consideration of types, traits, and opinion, with abundant promise of more accurate methods than have been hitherto available. The problems studied are sometimes unimportant and perhaps often irrelevant but the gain in an objective attitude toward human nature is real, and the promise for a science of personality is enough to encourage those whose lives are devoted to the quest.

It seems to have been inevitable that the Greek injunction to know thyself should be the last of scientific achievements to be realized. We are yet far from a complete realization of it. But we are confidently at work and, when the story is at last told, it will be recorded that the insight provided by the concept of social attitudes, for which we are indebted to W. I. Thomas, came when it was needed and furnished an interesting and usable tool of analysis.

When we shall be able to state completely how and why our attitudes occur, and how and why they are modified, we shall be in a better position to understand human life, and social psychology will begin to pay back its debt to society.

¹ *Labor Attitudes and Problems*, 1924.

XII

ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

It is several years since psychology was first defined as the science of behavior. The significance of this formulation lies in the recognition of the importance of action and movement and the necessity of including more than the description and explanation of mental states. The beneficial results of the new conception were destined to be delayed by the rise, a few years later, of a vigorous and aggressive group who took up the word "behavior," added an "ism," and insisted that psychology was obsolete and that movement and action could alone be made the subject of scientific investigation. Thought, feeling, and imagination were found difficult to study; so, in order to save labor, their very existence was denied. The behaviorist boasts of the fact that he has no mind, and glories in his inability to think.

While it is too early to evaluate the effect of this last chapter in our current history, it is very clear that, along with the gain that has resulted in emphasizing objective observation, there has been a loss in more than one direction. We have witnessed, in the first place, a terrifying creation of neologisms which appear to be mere translations of our familiar terms into awkward and inferior phrases. Instead of "imagination" we read of "neuro-psychic behavior reaction patterns," and instead of "thought" we are forced to hear of "implicit laryngeal behavior," as if suppressed speech did not include scores of other structures and muscles. It may provoke a laugh for a behaviorist to refer to his indecision by saying: "On that point I have not yet made up my larynx," but a phenomenon is neither explained nor explained away by the mere coining of a new phrase.

Another effect of the behavioristic mutiny has been more serious for science. I refer to the tendency to limit the concept of action to the overt and visible. Just when the American psychologists were in a position to profit by the discoveries of Angell, Dewey, Mead, and their colleagues which enabled us to

regard thought and reflection as phases of action, and to continue our researches with the insight into the nature of imagination as a constructive process made necessary because existing habits were inadequate and in order that new ways of action might be discovered—just when we had reached this point, the young men began to be informed that “the whole traditional clutter of conscious states and subjective concepts must be thrown overboard.” Of course anyone who owns the ship and its contents can throw overboard any or all of the cargo, however valuable, but intelligent men will salvage it if possible. The psychologist can throw overboard tendencies to act, emotions, sentiments, wishes, and desires, but men who live and work will not throw them overboard. Courts of law will not throw them overboard, nor employers of men, nor lovers, nor parents, nor teachers. Psychologists can neglect the important aspects of human nature whenever they feel incompetent to deal with them, but then some other workers will arise who will try to make us understand what men live by, and how, and why. There is a lesson for psychologists in that other outlaw movement known as psychoanalysis, which built so formidable a structure on nothing but desires and wishes, conscious and unconscious. For it is inevitable that one extreme should beget another.

One particular phase of the current denial of the importance of the subjective aspect of experience has arisen as a criticism of the concept of attitude initiated by Symonds¹ and elaborated by Bain.² The spirited attack of the latter writer seems to make timely the attempt to state anew some of the more elementary aspects of the act and the relation to action of attitudes, desires, wishes, opinions, and objects. It is not proposed to make any original contribution at this time. The purpose of this discussion is to set forth a constructive statement of what some of us found to our surprise was not the common property of social psychologists. Let us begin with “actions.”

Human life consists of actions, but between one act and another we sometimes rest. There are valleys of calm between the mountains of endeavor. Raup's excellent and suggestive volume on complacency states this calm or rest as, in some sense, the end

¹ See *Psychological Bulletin*, March, 1927, p. 200.

² See *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (May, 1928), pp. 940-957.

or purpose of the striving or action. The *gestalt* psychologists refer to the same phenomenon under the term "equilibrium." If I read Woodworth and Hollingsworth aright, the same notion is set forth in their words. From this it follows that action in general is divided into separate acts in particular. Moreover, these separate acts can be shown to have a beginning and an ending. Some of them also have a middle, which is the main reason why there must be psychologists as well as behaviorists. For it is in the middle or mediating phase of certain of our acts that subjective experiences occur and become all-important.

The actions of men are not only separate and distinct events; they have also a structure or form. There is a temporal *gestalt*, a configuration, an organization. When an act is ended it is possible to describe its consummation in terms of experience. In our major collective activities this consummation is usually marked by a formal ceremony, hence the "dedication" of public buildings, the formal ritual of degrees in colleges, the solemn signing of peace treaties and articles of agreement. But the separate actions of individuals have the same character, and it is possible to describe accurately the feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction when the act, enterprise, or project is done, finished, consummated. For the act is not merely a series of movements, but rather a series of movements plus some goal of endeavor, some end in view. Movements are integrated into acts by the fact that there is an imagined end and a felt unity. Even the most overt behavior receives its essential character from subjective experience. The mistress may insist that the task is not done, while the maid may contend that all is finished. There is no question of the movements performed; it is a matter of differing subjective pictures of what was intended.

But if actions have an ending they also have a beginning, and the beginning is an integral part of the act just as truly as the beginning of a race is part of a race or the beginning of a lecture is part of the lecture. And here appears another chapter of disaster in the ruthless unloading of the cargo by the behaviorists in throwing overboard desires, purposes, and subjective states. For, while there are mechanical movements, such as absent-minded acts, which have no purpose, our significant behavior has its beginning in a type of experience for which we use such words

as "intent," "purpose," "motive." The effort which we have so often witnessed, of late, to treat the movements only and leave to some other pseudo-science the study of the subjective has the ludicrous result of identifying actions which are utterly different. There *is* a difference between murder and accidental homicide, though the movements may be identical. There *is* a difference between suicide and accidental death. Dr. Cavan found, in her study of suicide, that it was highly profitable to study the "death wishes" of men, for the wish to die is incipient suicide. To give money sacrificially to aid a good cause is not the same as to give a like amount to curry favor with the public. To say that the act is the same but the motive is different is to miss the essential nature of both. The two acts are quite different, for the outer without the inner is no more the whole act than the inner apart from the outer. Behavior without purpose is accident; purpose without behavior is reverie. The planned act has both imagination and movement.

There are some acts that approach the automatic and the mechanical. Some of the reflexes would be included in this class, and certain learned activities which are evoked by an appropriate stimulus. The operation of the brakes on a motor car or even the quick turning of the wheel in view of a sudden obstruction are typical of such automatisms. We may speak of these as "immediate" acts. The word "instinctively" is often used to describe the behavior, though the coordination is, of course, an acquisition. More important for this discussion is the class of acts which we call "reflective," actions which require deliberation, planning, reasoning, thinking out a means of meeting the exigency. These acts occur when the situation is contingent and there is no immediate means at hand to enable the action to go on to completion or consummation. There is uncertainty both within and without, both externally and internally. The *situation* is imperfectly defined since and because there is no *response* ready to be made. In the full sense of the word there is neither stimulus nor response; instead of a stimulus there is an ambiguity or vagueness toward which we would like to act, while instead of a response there is an urge or tension which we do not know how to release. "I cannot understand this letter; I do not know what to make of him; I wonder what I ought to do." It is in the attempt to solve problems by means of reflection that the phe-

nomena of imagination, meaning, desires, and wishes force themselves on the attention of the psychologist.

In order to show that attitudes considered as tendencies to action are essential to the adequate interpretation of behavior, it is mainly necessary to emphasize the temporal character of the action. Even the quickest act requires a measurable time-span, while some acts consume minutes, others take hours, and some plans require years of endeavor. No discussion of acts can be adequate which takes no account of the past and the future as well as the present. Moreover, when an act has been consummated the condition or state of the actor is altered ineluctably. To have "lived through" a great experience is to be forever changed, and every reflective act leaves some permanent effect. Some deposit remains, not only in experience, but also in behavior. There results an attitude. An unpleasant experience may leave a man with a bias, or prejudice, which he never had before. An unexpectedly happy experience may completely alter his leaning or proclivity toward the object of his action.

An action, therefore, has a duration, and when it has run its course and has been completed there are subsequent effects which are important to reckon with. But there are two ends to a line, two limits to the duration of an act. In addition to the residual effects succeeding the act there is an important consideration with respect to the antecedent conditions of the action. For, concerned as we are with the effect a given act has had, we are equally interested in what the future action is to be. Behavior is important, and what men do is vital; but we are also interested in what they are about to do, in what they can be induced to do. Hence the necessity, the vital necessity, of considering attitudes as tendencies of action.

One writer expresses surprise that some regard attitudes as "desirable outcomes of education." It would seem incredible that anyone could know, even superficially, our public schools and doubt that attitudes are considered the desirable outcomes of education. Of course in the schools some attitudes are deliberately discouraged, but others are produced by long and patient effort. The teaching of history and of literature are primarily undertaken for the purpose of producing attitudes toward this nation and other nations, toward social and moral objects which the community approves.

We are not only vitally interested in what men are going to do, but we are interested in producing predispositions and proclivities that will lead them to do what we desire. Hence we have schools, evangelists, newspapers, and organizations for the purpose of altering conditions and producing tendencies to certain types of behavior.

Now there is no reason why a behaviorist should be interested in this subject, nor any reason why he should try to discover or understand attitudes. But the psychologist has always been interested in the whole of experience, and even if both behaviorist and psychologist should alike cease to be interested in the subject, it would only mean that others would arise to try to answer the pressing questions. The needs of men are imperative; it is only a question which science or sciences will arise to meet the needs, to state the problems, analyze them, devise methods of investigation, and produce valuable and serviceable generalizations and laws.

As used in this article, an attitude is a tendency to act. The term designates a certain proclivity, or bent, a bias or predisposition, an aptitude or inclination to a certain type of activity. As so used, an attitude cannot be an act, though it may be the beginning of an act. The word is sometimes used to designate the muscular set when the act is immanent, but it cannot be so limited. For as men use the word and as we deal with men there is need to speak of a man's attitude when there is no behavior immanent. Even in moments of "complacency" or calm or equilibrium referred to before we must be allowed to assume the existence of attitudes as tendencies, latent but real. One man I know well has very decided attitudes, and many of these attitudes I know so well that I could state them with every assurance of accuracy. He has decided attitudes toward prohibition, the tariff, the League of Nations, and Herbert Hoover. He has these attitudes and many more. He has them all now, though at the moment of this writing he is busily engaged in an activity remote from any of the objects named. Yet he does have these attitudes now, and they are tendencies of a very definite sort, and his future actions will result from these tendencies.¹

¹ The question of definition and the inconsistency in the use of the word "attitude" is a matter of concern to some scholars. This is more a question

The nature of attitudes will be clearer if we consider them in relation to the objects and the emotionally toned objects which are appropriately called values. Here also there is evident some confusion, but the question is not really difficult. For the attitude is toward something to which the attitude is related. When equilibrium has been disturbed and a conscious and deliberate act results, one effect is the formation in experience of a new object, and the attitude or residue is the correlate of the object. At the party Romeo meets Juliet, and very shortly the girl becomes to him a beloved object, a value. We can speak of the attitude of Romeo toward the object, Juliet. They are correlative terms, arising simultaneously in experience. When the object changes, the attitude changes, *pari passu*. But it should not be difficult to distinguish my hatred from my enemy who is the object of the hatred. Until men become hopelessly unable to distinguish hunger from beefsteak there should be no difficulty in telling the difference between a value, or object, and an attitude.

It must be observed, however, that objects belong to experience. Psychology is not concerned with what the object is, but with what it is experienced as. For we live in a world of "cultural reality," and the whole furniture of earth and choir of heaven are to be described and discussed as they are conceived by men. Caviar is not a delicacy to the general. Cows are not food to the Hindu. Mohammed is not the prophet of God to me. To an atheist God is not God at all. Objects are not passively received or automatically reacted to; rather is it true that objects are the result of a successful attempt to organize experience, and the externalized aspect of the organization is the object, or value; the internal or subjective tendency toward it is the atti-

of lexicography than of science. A word means what men mean by it, and most dictionaries patiently record all the uses of the words in the language. If one author is inconsistent, and most of them do slip, he should be held accountable for the fault, but scientific progress will not be made by mere voting about words. It is also a matter of common knowledge that other words are used instead of the word "attitude" to denote the same thing, *e.g.*, tendency, predisposition, disposition, and habit. To the tyro this is confusing; but if we think denotatively, we cannot go far wrong. Even the word "attitude" could be abandoned and a meaningless symbol substituted without loss. We could speak of the element *X* which is left as a residue of a former action and predisposes to a future act or type of acts.

tude. Let it be said again, the name by which this aspect of human nature is referred to is absolutely irrelevant. The essential point is that tendency, predisposition, organized inclination is centrally important, and that corresponding to this aspect of the experience of the person there is an externalized object of the tendency to which men give the name "object," or "value."

Two other notions have been recently made the subject of debate, namely, wish and opinion. These are also important aspects of action, and each shall receive here a brief consideration.

A desire is not characteristic of complacency. Some desires or wishes are so weak and unimportant that this fact may be obscured, but it is easy to show that when we wish we are in a certain condition of tension. We are incomplete. The hungry man wishes for his dinner. When he has dined his wish is gone. His impulse is "satisfied"; it disappears. If one might risk a phrase, the wish could be defined as an impulse together with an image of the object of satisfaction. A wish is, therefore, one aspect or phase of an incomplete act. One convenient distinction between wishes and attitudes lies here. An attitude exists as a tendency, even when latent; a wish is always more or less dynamic or kinetic. A man may be said to have an attitude toward coffee. If he be very fond of coffee he may come to wish for coffee on occasion. Having had three cups and enjoyed them all, he still has an attitude, the same attitude, toward the object, coffee; but he does not, let us hope, wish for any more. He may wish later. He has an attitude, but no wish.

If the foregoing considerations be convincing, it follows that a wish is not the predisposition to an act but the actual part of an act. Some acts never get completed, but if wishes are sufficiently strong and do not mean action of too difficult a nature, it should be easy to regard wishes as essential phases of actions which go on to the end. If the wish is abandoned, then the act is left incomplete. Alas, many of our castles are only air!

As to the relation of opinions and responses to questionnaires asking about attitudes, there is little that now needs to be said. We can, for the most part, rely on the verdict of the many students who hastily endeavored to investigate attitudes by this short and easy and futile method. It would seem evident that a response to a questionnaire is itself an act. If the statement concerns some object, the attitude toward the object can be

assumed to exist. But when one talks or writes he usually talks or writes to someone, and the object of the action in that case is often the questioner, and not the subject which the questioner wishes to be informed about. The sad experience of Bain and others with questions and answers about attitudes might be interpreted as due to the failure to take into account the fact that in a questionnaire there are four factors instead of only three. The fourth factor being so important and being wholly neglected in the calculations, the results proved relatively valueless. But even if the fourth factor, the questioner, be eliminated, there is no warrant that the three factors remaining would be in a one-to-one correspondence. There is every reason to say that they would not so correspond. The attitude exists, and the object of the attitude is its correlate; but the reason, the opinion, the rationalization, this is much more variable, and it is necessary to devise more careful methods if we are to learn what attitudes are and how they are to be discovered.¹

The method of studying attitudes cannot be discussed within the limits of this chapter. Thurstone has made a suggestive attempt to apply a refined statistical method to the problem.² It is clearly more difficult than was at first assumed to construct a scale which will measure the attitudes of either a group or an individual, though the former seems the easier task. The general principle adopted by Thurstone appears to be the consistency of the responses to a series of questions in comparison with the expressions of groups whose attitudes are known from sources other than their replies.

The specialist in this field will recall the work of such men as Williams³ who have revealed the usefulness and even the necessity of asserting the existence of unconscious attitudes. John Dewey, in a brilliant discussion, has shown the necessity for assuming attitudes of which the actor need not be conscious in order to interpret behavior that is inconsistent.⁴ Thus it appears that

¹ See PARETO, *Traité de Sociologie* (Paris, 1919), for an extended discussion of the three elements, *résidues*, *dérivations*, and *dérivées*.

² See THURSTONE, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII (January, 1928), 529-554.

³ See WILLIAMS, J. M., *Foundations of Social Science*, New York, 1920. chap. xiv.

⁴ *New Republic*, November, 1927.

the notion of attitudes as tendencies to act is forced upon the investigator, not only in predicting what will be done, but in interpreting the behavior of the actor in the past.

The insistence on the importance of the subjective aspect of personality need not be the occasion of any lessened interest in the central importance of action and behavior. It only means that behavior is not always patent and overt. Sometimes the river runs underground and its waters flow along a channel never seen by human eye and in a bed never sounded by any plummet. But it is there, and whatever methods can be devised to learn of it must be employed. The only unpardonable scientific sin would be to deny that there is any stream underground.

Thus qualified in meaning, the term "behavior" might be of the highest worth. For a man's personality and his character mean actions, since what my friend means to me is what he will do to me and for me, including what he has done. But the inner life of my friend is an integral part of his action, and it is necessary to assert the reality of the subjective experience, not as contrasted with movement, but as a connected phase of it.

What is needed is, not the denial of the difficult, but hard thinking and hard labor in the effort to devise means to wrest the secrets of nature from her in the realm of personality as men in natural science have done in their field. We need to investigate the genetic history of individual attitudes and to learn how they acquire their quality and their strength. We need to know the difference between the individual attitudes and collective, or mass, attitudes, for there does seem to be some essential difference. How attitudes are modified and how broken up is a problem, or rather a general class of problems on which much effort is at present being expended; but more workers are needed in this vineyard. There is also the problem of measurement and prediction. Again, there is the problem of the relation between the native and unmodifiable and the social and acquired. On this last rest such important political issues as, for example, a national immigration policy.

But this is not the place to present a list of research projects in the study of attitudes. The attempt has been to show that the notion of attitude is not only important, but essential. Some other word may prove more convenient in later usage, and

some more desirable uniformities may and should be observed in the effort to communicate our thoughts to each other. But the important consideration is that the invisible and subjective experiences of men are integral and inseparable parts of their objective movements. To neglect the study of attitudes will be to fail to understand personality.

XIII

CURRENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

When the men of my generation began the study of psychology they did not know how lucky they were. For, in the years immediately following publication of James's *Principles*,¹ psychology was psychology, and it was possible not only to learn it but to refer to the "teachings of psychology" on this and that. There were, indeed, two schools in the early part of this century but they differed little and their proponents not only got along well, but spoke practically the same language. They were known as the structuralists, likened to anatomists, and the functionalists, likened to physiologists. It was easy in those irenic days to interpret each one as really supplementing the other. There was no trouble on the horizon when Angell's *Psychology*² appeared, and in the laboratory in Chicago and elsewhere Titchener's manual³ and Angell's text were carried in the same brief case and accepted by the same students.

Just when the trouble all began it is not possible to say, nor important to date. Ross⁴ wrote a book on social psychology in which he translated some of the engaging ideas from the French sociologists. McDougall's *Social Psychology*⁵ represented little more than an attempt to be consistent in giving instincts the first place in the explanatory scheme of human nature. But it was around 1911 and 1912 that things really began to happen. The second decade of the century witnessed all kinds of ferment. Not only did it see the rise of the mental tests, the whole concept of mental measurement, but it was the period in which were brought to our attention the two major rebellions in the psychological field: psychoanalysis, the creation of European

¹ JAMES, WILLIAM, *Principles of Psychology*, New York, 1890.

² ANGELL, JAMES R., *Psychology*, New York, 1904.

³ TITCHENER, E. B., *A Text-book of Psychology*, New York, 1909.

⁴ ROSS, E. A., *Social Psychology*, New York, 1908.

⁵ MCDUGALL, WILLIAM, *Social Psychology*, Boston, 1912.

physicians, and behaviorism, under the leadership of the *enfant terrible*.

It was in this decade also that the *gestalt* psychology came into existence in Germany, though it did not become known in America so promptly as the others. The *gestalt* people had a poor press agent though they later became more active. While most of these systems do not claim to be social psychology, and while some of them distinctly repudiate any such implication, yet they are all influencing social psychology and must be taken into account if we are to understand the present condition. If we were to try to catalogue the different forms of statements or schools at present existing in America, we could distinguish easily several more or less distinct points of view.

First and oldest in America is the imitation school, originating in France and widely popularized by Ross. This is by no means so influential as it used to be, since the authors themselves have come to modify their position. Most influential of all probably is the instinct school of social psychology, represented by McDougall, whose coming to America helped to strengthen the popularity of his point of view. At one period this school was almost predominant, but within the last seven years it has been somewhat on the defensive. The psychoanalytic movement has had much to do with social psychology, and Adler would be quite willing to call his individual psychology "social psychology," paradoxical as it sounds. It is really not paradoxical, for social psychology, as most men use it, is a study of the social influences on the personality: in the words of the *Psychological Index*, the "Social Functions of the Individual."

The most aggressive and militant group is, of course, the behaviorist. The founders of the behaviorist school repudiate the notion of social, but writers like Allport¹ and Bernard² have attempted to make a behavioristic integration and harmony in applying the concept to the problems of social psychology.

There remains to be noted the general point of view, less militantly fought for and promoted with less of partisanship and therefore perhaps less sharply defined, which is the result of the work of the Chicago group and their allies in New York, Michigan, and points west. It is an interesting fact that the social psy-

¹ ALLPORT, F. H., *Social Psychology*, Cambridge, 1924.

² BERNARD, L. L., *Introduction to Social Psychology*, New York, 1926.

chology of Wundt¹ has had very little influence in America and at present receives scarcely any mention.

If we inquire more specifically into the course of development of the various "schools," it should be pointed out that orthodox imitationism produced a fiery controversy in France, Durkheim² objecting strenuously to Tarde's³ formulation, and arriving at the notion of *représentations collectives*, or group ideas, social concepts, which members of a group receive from the collectivity. The effect of this process, the resultant social phenomenon, is often indistinguishable from imitation, but the mechanism by means of which it is brought about proves to be more complicated than was assumed in the earlier formulation. The importation of imitationism into America by Ross, already referred to, was even more vulnerable. Ross unfortunately identified imitation with the process of suggestion and it became increasingly difficult to accept this. Suggestion occurs in many places in our social life, but the result of the operation of suggestion is more often than not a response which no refinement of interpretation can identify with imitation. Moreover, the phenomenon of conscious choice or deliberate copying, which also results in imitation, is frequently the terminal member of a series of activities and experiences for which the only acceptable term would be deliberation or reasoning, and this means that suggestion is even more remotely in evidence. In addition to these two objections it became necessary to discuss a third difficulty. The slow, unconscious influence due to the histrionic self-stimulation or dramatic rehearsal of emotional experiences produces a gradual and unwitting type of modification, sometimes identified with imitation, and again utterly unlike any known form of suggestion. In America, Baldwin⁴ made the concept of imitation prominent, but the work of Cooley in his observations on children and in his analysis of the process gradually deflected attention from the over-simplified conclusions of the imitation school. Imitation did not produce a large controversial literature; attention gradually shifted, and social psychologists found themselves concerned with other issues.

¹ WUNDT, WILHELM, *Völker Psychologie*.

² DURKHEIM, EMILE, *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique*, Paris, Alcan, 1895.

³ TARDE, GABRIEL, *Les Lois d'Imitation*.

⁴ BALDWIN, JAMES MARK, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*.

I do not remember to have read any account of the thoroughgoing abandoning of the doctrine of associationism which has taken place in the last twenty years. It is really a very interesting phenomenon. In the system of William James, in Angell's *Psychology*, and in all the orthodox texts and handbooks of twenty years ago there were presented to the reader two utterly incompatible notions. The first was the doctrine of sensations and perceptions received through the sense organs and developing into concepts, judgments, and reasoned propositions, with little essential difference from the formulations of Locke himself. The second was the theory of instincts, utterly different in origin, since they were assumed to arise from within and were related to ideas and reasoning not as disturbing factors, but as the ultimate mainspring of conduct and of reasoning itself. The situation was logically impossible. It was inevitable that the inconsistency should be discovered, for one cannot, indeed, logically hold that ideas enter the mind from without through the reception of sensations and at the same time insist that reasoning occurs in the service of an instinct. Sooner or later one of these had to go; and, as everyone knows, it was associationism which was crowded out of the picture.

Here we have the significance of McDougallism. The instincts had been listed and discussed long before he wrote, but the wide popularity and influence of McDougall's formulation seems to be accounted for in large measure by the fact that he clearly relegated rationality to a subordinate relation. The drives of human life were no longer rational ideas but non-rational instincts inherited from the prehistoric animal world and bred in by a thousand generations of primitive men.

It is interesting to note that this transition was made with surprising ease. One looks in vain for controversial literature defending associationism. As late as 1921, Warren¹ wrote a history of associationism but it amounts almost to an obituary notice. The pragmatic or instrumentalist philosophy had prepared the way.

Quite a different story is to be told regarding instinctivism. As a generally accepted doctrine it occupied the stage for a relatively brief period, being uncritically accepted for little more

¹ WARREN, H. C., *History of Association Psychology*, New York, 1921.

than thirty years. The controversy arose as a result of the dissatisfaction of those who were trying to make use of it. There was first of all the difficulty in describing the list of instincts, which led inevitably to an increased recognition that many supposed instincts were really due to social customs which had in the individual become "second nature." Later on there emerged the conviction that instincts could never be a matter of observation since, whatever their original nature might have been, they were always overlaid with acquired and customary influences. This gradually caused the critics of McDougall to defend the position that the inherited tendencies of the human being are, though very numerous, fractional and minute in character.

Professor McDougall has defended his doctrine with characteristic vigor but has not always understood his critics. To him the alternative of instinctivism is a return to intellectualism and Lockean associationism. It is difficult to see how he could so misinterpret those who oppose him. There has been no tendency to deny the importance of inherited movements. On the contrary, it is everywhere assumed that the original tendencies are non-rational and motor. The real issue is as to whether the actions which are organized into instinctive patterns are in any sense inherited. Fighting, flight, maternal care, and display of oneself, all arise from vague tendencies, but their specific form, even their very appearance, is the result of an organization which takes place within a given cultural medium.

The instinct controversy is a matter of the last seven or eight years and the subject is at present under discussion, with a number of foremost authors still defending the conception as having value, but with an increasing tendency on the part of most writers to be apologetic and tentative in their use of the term. The traditional psychologists seem to favor it, and the notion finds place in the writings of the *gestalt* group, with a certain deference paid to it by the psychoanalytic school. On the other hand, the behaviorists tend to discard the notion, many sociologists have given it up, and John Dewey¹ in his social psychology wrote a chapter which he headed "No Separate Instincts." A recon-

¹ DEWEY, JOHN, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part II, Sec. 6, New York, 1922.

cing formula is still in the future, but it seems accurate to say that the concept of instinct plays little or no part in any present researches. It belongs to the realm of "explanation."

The behavioristic movement has strongly influenced American writers in social psychology. Allport and Bernard are quite explicit in their allegiance to the general point of view, and even those who have reacted unfavorably have been compelled to reckon with it. The history of the rise of behaviorism roots in two movements, the brilliant work in animal psychology and the controversy regarding imageless thought which began some eighteen or twenty years ago. The first of these showed the possibility of a method of purely objective observation and record of observable movements under controlled conditions, and the second led to widespread skepticism concerning the reliability of the hitherto unchallenged method of introspection. To these two we may add the Russian discoveries of the conditioned reflex which led to the publication of a psychology by Bechterew¹ which he preferred to call in a subtitle "Reflexology." The controversies arising as a result of the vigorous advocacy of behaviorism are still current, and there is a tendency on the part of many American authors to treat as "behavioristic" the whole problem of personality. As a result there are several kinds of "behaviorism," the extreme type and a series of more or less well-organized systems in which imagination, ideas, and subjective phenomena are recognized and studied, but with reference to their function in behavior.

The relation of J. B. Watson's² system to the instinct psychology, out of which it in part arose, is roughly analogous to the relation between Lockean associationism and the preceding system of innate ideas which we connect with the name of Descartes. Behaviorism, with its central doctrine of a reflex which can be "conditioned," is a sort of physiological associationism, and it is interesting to note that Watson has actually asserted the same possibility of absolute control over the individual children in almost the same language that was used in the mid-nineteenth century by the disciples of Bentham and Mill.

¹ BECHTEREW, W., *Objektive Psychologie*, German Translation, Leipzig and Berlin, 1913.

² WATSON, J. B., *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Philadelphia, 1919.

These latter were quite sure that on the blank tablet of the mind, ideas could be written which would make of the material at hand any types of personality desired. Watson is equally certain that with the uniform and identical stock of inherited reflexes a "wise conditioning" would produce any desired personality type. He agrees to take a hundred children and make them into musicians, artists, or what you will, as a result of properly conditioning their behavior.

The exigencies of controversy have forced an interesting extension of the conditioned reflex, which has amounted almost to repudiation of it. Curiously enough, this has received little attention, yet it seems to be a very vulnerable point. A conditioned reflex is a movement which remains unmodified, the "conditioning" consists in producing this movement by simultaneous association with the stimulus of another and irrelevant one. If the reflex is modified or changed the problem of the modification should receive attention. In a "behavioristic" system this is passed over. A "reflex" or "response" is often said to be "conditioned" when it is really modified or changed, that is, when it disappears. A child who learns to repeat what his nurse says to him is said to be conditioned. It is as if Pavlov, in reporting his experiments, would have recorded that the dog secreted saliva in response to a musical note associated with the original stimulus, and then had proceeded to record that in course of time the dog would come to play the violin.

The psychoanalytic school of psychology is interesting for several reasons. It is in the first place extra-academic. At present there are very few of these men in academic positions, here or in Europe, and no recognition was given them in the programs of the Psychological Association until a few years ago. Nevertheless, they have attracted world-wide attention.

One of the most interesting aspects of this movement is its utter independence of physiology. That such a system, so founded, should have influenced academic psychologists may perhaps be partly due to the gradual dissatisfaction with the earlier alliance with physiology. At any rate, the psychoanalysts have no physiological assumption. There is not a neuron in Freud. The whole system is built upon the *experiences* of the person and is concerned with wishes, images, anxieties, fears, and dreams. It is a sort of antithesis and counterpart to

behaviorism. No more striking symptom of the confusion and ferment of our time is to be found than the simultaneous allegiance which some writers actually profess to Watson and Freud. Perhaps some Elijah will appear before the multitude ere long with the cry, "Choose this day whom ye will serve." But a consistent system and a resolution of contradictions require time and perhaps until now the time has been insufficient.

The *gestalt* psychology slowly matured from about 1912 for a period of ten years before it attracted very much attention in America. This was due in part to the isolation caused by the World War. It may be that the relative lack of influence so far results from the difficulty of taking over so thoroughgoing a system and incorporating it into existing systems which are older. It seems too early to predict how much of the insight of this school will be found useful—at least, I find it difficult to speak with confidence.

The general point of view represented by Cooley, Dewey, Mead, Thomas, Park, and their colleagues differs essentially from the preceding formulations in the emphasis on the social group, or matrix, in which the personality takes shape, and in the emphasis on the social nature of individual personality. When Thomas speaks of "social attitudes," he refers to the attitudes of individuals which are the result of social influencing. Dewey wrote: "Institutions cause the instincts." Cooley¹ has written convincingly concerning society and the individual as different aspects or phases of the seamless fabric of human life. Personality appears from this point of view as the subjective aspect of culture. Social psychology so considered draws heavily on anthropology and finds itself closely related to sociology. This explains why so many sociologists have been interested in the subject of social psychology.

The foregoing systems or "schools" do not exhaust the list, but sufficient has been said to justify the statement made earlier in this chapter that we are at present in a state of relative disorganization. At least the student coming into the subject of social psychology must listen to conflicting and contradictory views to an extent unparalleled in our earlier history. If the past can teach us anything of the future, it will be safe to prophesy that a few years from now either we or our successors will be

¹ COOLEY, C. H., *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, 1922.

able to formulate an integrated statement with the hope that insights will be clearer and generalizations more valuable.

The distinguishing characteristic of the present situation in social psychology is at once the result of the present confusion and rivalry of systems and at the same time the promise of betterment. I refer to the enthusiasm for research and the widespread attempts to carry on first-hand factual investigations. Much that passes under the name of research is, of course, hardly worthy of the dignity, but when liberal discount is made there is much gold in the dross. And just as warring theologians find themselves able to cooperate in enterprises of practical religion and service, so the partisans of the various systems and schools have very little temptation to object to actual investigations made by their rivals. And, of course, as time goes on the accumulation of data will require new attempts at synthesis and integration, for the new wine is best poured into the new wineskins.

The complete catalogue of investigations now in progress in what may accurately be called the field of social psychology runs into hundreds of titles, obviously of varying importance. Many of these are studies of individual persons. From the behavior clinics is coming a wealth of carefully gathered material concerning boys and girls whose conduct has deviated slightly from accepted norms, while studies of actual delinquents, of criminals, of the mentally abnormal, and of the insane are piling up data which will ultimately be assayed and will inevitably add to what we know. There are also being accumulated guided autobiographies, "life histories," of normal people, most of them having to do with specific crucial moments and all potentially valuable as confirmatory or contradictory evidence. We shall shortly be in a position to state with much more confidence than ever before the results of attempts to analyze human nature into the elements, wishes, desires, and attitudes, which seem to point to the necessity of abandoning permanently the older atomistic individualism. No individual wish nor any individual attitude seems to have arisen without relation to the environing culture in which the life was lived.

On the other end of the logical series lies the problem of types of personality, the end results of the life organization of the individual. The morphologist, the physiologist, and the psy-

chiatrist are all being called upon to contribute to this, while every organized and dynamic group is also assumed to be capable of contributing to the answer to this central problem in social psychology. And here again the trend seems to be in the direction of an increasing emphasis upon the function of the whole in determining the type of the one.

Not only in the study of individuals are research workers busily engaged in collecting facts, but collectivities are yielding their due share of data. Groups, gangs, families, communities, and institutions are being studied with reference to particular concrete problems. Social pathology, including chiefly crime and delinquency, but not confined to these phenomena, occasion studies often looking to the solution of concrete problems but pregnant with the possibility of theoretical generalizations of major importance. Besides these, specific group problems, such as the attitudes of a group, studies in public opinion, and related inquiries, give promise of yielding a wealth of needed information.

It was remarked in the beginning that the present chorus of competing and conflicting voices which confront the student who attempts to master current social psychology is unprecedented in its variety and in its contradictory nature. It was further shown that this condition is comparatively recent and the opinion is here repeated that it will probably not endure for long. One reason for saying this has just been presented. The new facts will, of necessity, compel new formulations, but there is another consideration. The leader of a school very rarely has been known to yield to his opponents or rivals. Their concepts and phrases assume the character of slogans and shibboleths. If these leaders were immortal, perhaps the condition we now are in would be permanent; but their tenure is finite and, though few die and none resign, yet eventually all are retired. Students and successors will inherit their tasks and, in the nature of things, they will be more syncretic, more objective, and their formulations will prove more useful, which is perhaps what we mean by saying, more true.

This discussion has been concerned with the direction in which current scholarship has been trending. The part played in this development by the members of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago has been entire worthy of the traditions of our group. Professor Tufts has emphasized throughout

his teaching career the social influences in the development of personality. The chapters which he wrote in the Dewey and Tufts *Ethics*¹ not only revealed a thorough mastery of sociological and economic writings, but served to define for the younger men of that day the problem of the relation of the mores to the moral life of the individual.

In the lectures and writings of Professor Moore the stress has been placed (at least this was true when the writer was a student) on the analysis of the thought process, and later students of social psychology have derived much inspiration and received much clarification from his formulation of instrumentalism. The relation of conflict to reasoning makes essential the discussion or association with others and leads inevitably to a repudiation of the older atomistic individualism. Indeed, the accusation of solipsism which was heard in the early days of the pragmatic controversy was utterly unfounded, chiefly for the reason that individual mind is essentially social in its constitution.

Professor Ames repeatedly acknowledged his obligation to the social point of view and made a notable contribution in his *Psychology of Religious Experience*.² The analysis set forth of the essentially social character of the individual's religious experience added a strong tower to the structure of the temple. When religion is defined as the consciousness of the highest social values there is made possible a method of study of religious experience through social psychology which was previously not available.

In the case of the present writer, the greatest obligation is felt to Professor Mead,³ to whom American scholars are indebted for some invaluable and wholly unique contributions. Nowhere can be found a comparable analysis of the psychology of meaning, the nature of symbolism, and the distinction between the significant symbol which makes human experience possible and the inferior development which accounts for the limitations of the lower animals. Mead's doctrine of the histrionic tendency which

¹ New York, 1908.

² Boston, 1909. See also by same author, *Religion*, New York, 1928.

³ MEAD, G. H., "The Social Self," *Journal of Philosophy*, X (1913), 374-380. "The Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX (1922), 157-163; "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV (1925), 251-277. *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago, 1934; *Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, Chicago, 1936.

runs through all normal human imaginative experiences, very happily designated as the tendency to "take the role of the other," has, in the opinion of the writer, been one of the major contributions in this generation to our knowledge of how the personality develops and the consciousness of self arises. Mead has set forth the process by means of which the spontaneous and meaningless gesture is defined by the responses of the other, so that, while our ideas are our own and the symbol is private, yet the soul of the symbol is its meaning, and the meaning is the contribution of others.

XIV

BORDERLINE TRENDS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social psychology has mainly borderline trends because social psychology is itself a borderline area. As in a good doughnut, there is more in the circumference than in the center. Indeed, it is doubtful whether there would ever have been any social psychology at all or any courses in this field or any researches in this area, had there not existed a borderline field in which traditional psychology was not interested and yet which was believed to contain resources that sociologists needed in their work. Not that experimental psychology is or was barren or unfruitful. An admirable technique was developed, rigorously scientific in method, unequivocally mathematical in procedure, but concerned with problems that were increasingly small in extent and more and more remote from the needs and interests of those who were forced to consider the motives of men and to whom the adjustments and the harmonious development of human life seemed all-important.

Only on similar grounds can the rise of psychoanalysis be explained. Since traditional psychology had neither interests nor methods that were available to the study of personality disturbance, the physicians who were treating hysteria and kindred disorders developed a system which broke completely with the physiological psychology of the day. Just as Christian Science rose and still thrives on the mistakes of medical science, so psychoanalysis found its opportunity in the confessed incompetence in respect of problems for which there was no place in the program of the psychologists of twenty-five years ago.

And in the same way, the sociologist, in seeking a foundation in theory for the study of the family, crime, delinquency, suicide, public opinion, and related problems, began his work, not in rebellion or in impatience, but from necessity. However, it was a borderline field from the beginning. The sociologist in building

his structure needed certain basic foundations, and just as a manufacturer who cannot get his order filled sets to work to make his accessories in his own factory, so the social psychologist arose to try to meet a need which might conceivably have been supplied by existing disciplines.

Social psychology was a borderline concept even before this, when in Germany the formulation of a German folk soul led to the earlier efforts to state the psychic trends underlying the origin and development of art, morals, religion, and the political forms of European society. We in America know this best from the work of Wundt, whose folk psychology is the effort to fill the gap left by the obsolescence of the philosophy of history. But of all the borderline influences, this one is, at the present time, least influential.

Another European conception deserves a prominent place in the briefest sort of historic report. It rose in the reactionary period in France when opposition to democracy, never lacking under any organization of the state, developed a pseudo-scientific rationalization. It is from this humble, if not ignoble, ancestry that our collective psychology has largely been derived, with its mob psychology, its study of crowds and related phenomena. Here, too, is a borderline, and the work of the past generation has not been unsuccessful in clarifying the problems and in formulating generalizations.

In France and in England social psychology was at first considered as collective psychology, a study of the mental planes and currents, in the language of our Professor Ross whose vigorous and lively metaphors have delighted our students for twenty years and more. So conceived, social psychology is still investigated and cultivated, but the present trend is to make that chapter of the statement and outgrowth and corollary of the earlier work, which sets forth the psychology of the individual person considered as the resultant of social forces. Social psychology is individual psychology if the individual be conceived as the center of multipersonal influences.

As an attempt to understand how the immature member of a society becomes a developed person with his own individuality and his own character, the social psychology of the past twenty-five years has remained on the borderline, an interstitial area, marching with sociology, with psychology, learning from psychia-

try, and importing heavily from the output of ethnology. Perhaps a more accurate figure would be this: each of these needed or seemed to need a social psychology and each of them proceeded to make his own, though, fortunately, they did have diplomatic relations, and ideas and even methods flowed freely across the frontiers.

It may have been inevitable that the investigation of personality which we call social psychology should start with a disastrous inheritance from the earlier individualism. At any rate, history must record that it was so. Perhaps it was the analogy of chemistry, with its marvelous success in discovering the ineradicable elements of matter, that had most to do with leading us into the long and fruitless effort to find the irreducible elements of personality. At first these were thought to be ideas, and at the very first these seemed to be innate ideas, latent and concealed, but, under the developing influence of contacts, ready to develop into the accepted axioms of mathematics and the precious articles of the theological creeds. These went the way of all flesh but only when succeeded by another list, contributed by the tiger and the ape, those most recently acknowledged kindred of the children of Adam. Only for about thirty years did the instinct doctrine remain unchallenged. Just as it had become universally accepted, the inadequacy of its formulation began to dawn upon many, and the last ten years have changed the whole conception of the stability of the inherited motor habits and the value of attempting to form a list of them.

The instinct controversy has been our most interesting little internecine strife within the period under review, which, indeed, is the whole short life of social psychology as a definite field. There was a small list of gilt-edged instincts with an unquestioned reputation for solvency, and for a time it seemed that their prestige was unshakable. Some of the young men began to utter heretical words, but it was not till Professor Bernard entered the market that disaster overtook the issue. There is a rumor that he gathered them through a number of graduate student brokers, but at any rate when he unloaded 5,684 separate instincts upon a nervous market, the slump began in earnest, and present quotations make one think of German marks. Those who still retain them use them as token money, for they have lost their intrinsic value.

Nor was the earlier effort to accomplish the same result by surcharge or overprinting any more successful. To call them something else and have them perform the same function was a natural recourse in a field where disputes about words are endemic and science is so largely the opinions of professors. But to say that warfare is due to the instinct of pugnacity differs in no essential way from assigning it to the prepotent reflex of struggling. Not the connotation of a term was at stake but the denotation of a fact. There are some troubles that do not yield to etymology. Sleeping sickness is as serious as *encephalitis lethargica*. Epsom salts has the same effect as sulphate of magnesia. The real question was not the name of the inherited behavior but the question of its existence.

Equally short-lived and equally unsuccessful were the suggestions which substituted wishes or desires in a definite list. The discussion has not reached an end and there is no warrant for asserting unanimity, but the trend seems clearly in the direction of complete emancipation from the necessity of discovering or even the possibility of admitting any essential and definite elementary constituents in the developing individual. And this would have consequences of importance for sociology, for social psychology, and for practice. For it would place the social group in a new perspective and enable us to find in the mores and institutions of a time and area those elements which were formerly asserted to exist in the psychophysical organism.

This trend is not only in accord with, but is in no small degree the result of, the fact that social psychology is also marginal to ethnology, from which field have come conceptions that have been invaluable clarifying influences. For the ethnologist in this period has come to regard culture as a datum and has, if I interpret him aright, written his declaration of independence from any a priori individualistic psychology. Like little dog Dingo, he had to. For there was no way of accounting for the strikingly different cultures save by some impossibly absurd hypothesis of a differential instinctive equipment of different tribes which, indeed, McDougall in a moment of consistency was moved to do. But as this would destroy the unity of the human race, it did not commend itself to the students of preliterate culture.

If institutions create the instincts, and not vice versa, whence the institutions? And ethnology is at present answering it in

a phrase suggested by that of the biologists after Pasteur: *Omnis cultura ex cultura*. And if this phrase be understood and its meaning and implications fully grasped the result is not only a new Magna Carta for social psychology, but a newer and more intimate dependence at the same time on sociology. For we are at home in studying groups, the folk and the mores are household words with us, and it is not difficult to assimilate to our language the notion that culture precedes and produces the individual. Aristotle again says to us: The whole comes before the parts.

Social psychology as the science of personality has another marginal connection—that with child study. And in the nursery schools and institutes that have been set up at Iowa City, at Minneapolis, at Detroit, New Haven, and elsewhere there have come not only a new impulse and a set of conceptions, but the promise of a new method comparable to the influence of animal psychology in its earlier effects. For the study of nursery-school children, especially in groups, can be and is increasingly becoming more objective, with engaging possibilities. It is inevitable that the study of such children shall be made with a constant emphasis on the group in which the child moves and the interaction of the members.

As to psychiatry, there is scarcely any distinction in the methods and point of view of some of the investigators in this field and those who class themselves as social psychologists. The differentiation is, of course, in the pathological conditions which the psychiatrist, of necessity, makes central in his work. Yet even this is less true than formerly, owing to the increasing treatment of near-normals in clinics. Alfred Adler after a lecture on individual psychology once remarked to this writer that his own interest was obviously in social psychology. The indebtedness of social psychology to psychiatry is evidenced by the fact that many of the concepts which we use have been frankly and openly borrowed from our colleagues in that field.

I might mention, finally, the recent contribution in method which may be said to come from the almost obsolete field of psychophysics. Thurstone, taking the familiar notion of least perceptual differences, has stimulated much interest by producing measuring scales of attitudes by means of an elaborate and careful graduation of statements which, when arranged in a series,

give an indication of the attitudes of the members of a group on any given subject.

If this list were to be made inclusive, it would be necessary to speak at some length of economics and to mention work on economic motives and on labor attitudes and similar studies which have appeared in a satisfying quantity and make the relation of marginality quite clear.

Nor may we fail to mention political science, where studies of public opinion, the interest in leadership, and the necessity of accounting for the peculiar idiosyncrasies of prominent men, from mayors to presidents and kings, have led to studies which impinge very definitely on this field and indicate the value and necessity of extensive and hearty cooperation.

There is, indeed, no department of social science, from history and human geography to education and religion, that cannot draw inspiration and assistance from social psychology and in return make a valued contribution of fact and method and fruitful theory.

He who has personality for his central interest will not lack for stimulating academic and other scientific contacts. So numerous are the contacts that there is required much circumspection for the accurate delimitation of the field. Concentration on an unappropriated problem is not as easy as it was. Whether a special field of social psychology will be increasingly independent or whether the workers outside will become so fruitful that sociologist, economist, political scientist, and psychiatrist, among others, will be doing all the work is a question on which it would be unwise to make a dogmatic pronouncement. Since most of these problems are marginal, it is not unthinkable that the various frontiers will be gradually annexed. Should that day come, the social psychologist would be a victim of technological unemployment. But should it so happen, it will not be soon. Such a day is surely remote. And meanwhile, we cultivate our garden.

XV

OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS

The history of reflective thinking on the subject of personality records a series of unsuccessful efforts to designate the elements into which it can be resolved. That mind and personality are complex is obvious, and that the ultimate and simple constituents may be discovered has long been assumed. A survey of some of the most influential of them should prove profitable to the student of social psychology and should aid in placing our current views in a certain perspective.

Two observations seem justified from an examination of the story. One is that formulations have been repeatedly rejected, not by those who found them unacceptable at the outset, but by those who accepted them and later found them wanting. It seems impossible for the author of a theory ever to give it up, for the idols of the cave will not be denied their worship. Bacon exhorts us to be suspicious of any conclusion concerning which we find ourselves enthusiastic, but as in the case of Ephraim joined to his idols, the only ear turned is the deaf ear.

It is not rare, however, for the disciples of a master to revise his teaching. If the product is overadvertised and fails to do what has been claimed for it, some young man will begin to tinker. Then he, in turn, presents a new finality to the world.

For our academic forefathers down to our own generation did aim high. Each one knew that his predecessors erred, but he fondly hoped to say the really final word. Yet each "final" word, once new and shining like a coin from the mint, becomes tarnished and of little worth. Antique thoughts do not rise in value like period furniture; at the most they are like fossils in a museum, revealing the past experiments of nature.

Is it admissible to boast that we live in a generation of scholars who make no pretention to finality? There are surely some who rejoice at the thought that our successors will change our doctrines, and some are pleased with the prospect that our work will

be made out of date by those who shall carry on the task of discovery. It was not so in former days. Hegel and Spencer thought they builded for the ages, but the successors of both Hegel and Herbert Spencer could hardly wait for the architect to move out before they began remodeling and wrecking.

But although the authors of theories felt confident of final and absolute truth, it is easy to see how relative they were, not only because they neglected essential facts but also because social, political, and economic conditions always affect the abstractions of psychological theory. There is a compulsive nature of social thought, or at least social conditions always influence views about human nature.

It is sobering to our egotism to realize that we are the children of our time, even as psychologists. The theoretical psychology of a convinced slave-holder could hardly have been the same as that of a confirmed abolitionist. This need not make us cynical, but it does enable us to understand why men in the past advocated views that we find it impossible to take seriously.

If we begin with the era called modern we may first briefly mention the theory of innate ideas. It was in the period of the Thirty Years' War, when the foundations of certainty were threatened. Since men could no longer safely rely on authority and the conflicting sentences of the monks, and since the church, the state, and the vigorous new science were firmly established on something, men considered the ideas, beliefs, and axioms, both moral and scientific, to be as much an innate part of them as the color of their eyes. Ideas were the elements. Innate ideas, instinctive ideas, they were, never having been taught or learned. With this equipment it was possible to account for the activities and organization of the world.

Neglecting everything else but the elements, we may note that ideas were the possession of an existing soul. Ideas were not the soul—the soul had ideas. Ideas were innate. This was proved because they were certain, self-evident, and had no origin in remembered experience. The advocates were unable to overcome the handicap of cultural isolation. Everyone, everywhere, admitted a belief in God; therefore, such a belief was born in everyone. It was centuries before the notion of the mores was advanced and the tendency to assume as universally human that which is culturally old and still current was to reappear

many times, surviving in the belated reasoning of McDougall and Pareto.

Ideas caused motion and action. It is easy to see the favorable soil for such a notion. Institutions were challenged and defended, and it was the hope of men that by opposing reason to tradition and to passion it would be possible to think a way out of the difficulties.

Innate ideas were accepted, but they did not endure. The English scholars of the Enlightenment had no doubt of the value of reasoning, and if right ideas could only be spread, it seemed possible to reform and reconstruct a troubled world. It would be difficult for a revolutionist in an age when men were challenging the divine right of kings to accept the doctrine of innate ideas, and Locke and his followers were revolutionists. Ideas were still the "elements," but not innate. It was a blank tablet on which the ideas were imprinted and whereon they were marvelously combined according to the fixed laws of association. This view prevailed for a long time, ending within the memory of men now living, though greatly modified in detail as successive expounders tried to patch it up. It is today only a museum piece.

This theory was a valuable tool for the defense of the democracy of that day. Reason produces action and consists of combinations of ideas which can be associated in obedience to fixed laws. At the hands of the Herbartians the ideas were endowed with force and power, struggling and surging to get over the threshold of consciousness, lending a hand to a friend, or pushing off from the narrow standing room all unwelcome companions. Elaborate mathematical formulas were developed to describe what would happen in the seething company.

Two things happened to lead to the revision and ultimate rejection of this formulation. One was the difficulty of accounting for the connection of ideas, defined as immaterial, with the brawn and sinews of the body, through the brain, which were admittedly material and grossly so. The keenest minds of the age were racked as they strove to find a plausible answer. And many answers were given, of which none has survived. Like so many other problems, it was not solved; it was simply outgrown. How a spiritual force coming from outside could touch a ponderable nerve-mass was insoluble because it didn't happen. At least so later thinkers concluded. William James exercised his

genius wrestling with this puzzle, but his views have only a historical interest. If, on the other hand, ideas are assumed to occur *within* the course of experience and not as its cause and source, a more satisfactory statement of the relation is possible.

Another influence affecting the associationist psychology was the waning enthusiasm for the equalitarian theory. It is paradox of democracy that in breaking up hereditary inequalities and privileges it stimulates competition and struggle and thus encourages individual differences. The modern vocational guidance advisers, with their "batteries" of tests aiming to reveal the important I.Q.'s were anticipated in aim nearly a century and a half ago by a "faculty psychology" that sought to describe our elements as specific capacities, varying in individuals, governed by separate organs of the brain, and discoverable by observing the external contours of the skull.

Phrenology is gone, surviving only as a form of charlatan sooth-saying, and its list of faculties has disappeared with it, but the keen-eyed student may at times see it thinly disguised in current notions about abilities or capacities or even instincts. There is, however, no attempt at present to formulate a list of elemental faculties. The failure of the phrenological system of elements was due in part to the top-heavy growth of the list of faculties and the growing list of inconsistencies and exceptions. Its death-blow was received when brain physiologists succeeded in localizing the functions of various parts of the brain. The organ of the faculty of reverence, which every good preacher needs to have well developed, turned out to be the motor center controlling the muscles that move the toes. Rarely has a widely accepted theory received such a conclusive refutation.

But faculty psychology survived in various ways, and the division into intellect, feeling, and will has in it the same basic logic. Books have been written not so long since on the training of the will, as though it were a race horse to be trotted around a track.

The great experimental movement in psychology moved a step closer in the relating of mind and body. This work, begun in Germany, soon spread abroad and led to the founding of laboratories and to the present independence and isolation of psychology from philosophy. The tragedy of King Lear foretold the ingratitude of this lusty daughter and her distress when her orphaned

state was realized. Physiological psychology owes its existence to physiologists who wished to know what correlations could be discovered between eye and color, tongue and taste, and all the rest of our equipment. Its most brilliant achievements were obtained in the effort to follow the model of chemistry, where the elements have yielded to patient inquiry following a sound method.

The element of physiology is the cell. Perfected microscopic technique had made it possible to see cells in their isolation. To what extent was it possible to find conscious experiences as simple and unitary as the neuron? Reasoning had already been broken up into judgments, judgments into terms, terms traced back to perceptions, and these in turn broken up into "sensations." To find the elementary sensations gifted men labored for many years and with brilliant results. They had started with five senses but they ended with dozens of specific ones, and hundreds of degrees. It was proved in the laboratory that the human consciousness can distinguish hundreds of shades of gray. Touch is not one sense but five; taste is four; and smell is many more. Sense organs were even discovered in ambush in unsuspected places in muscles, tendons, and joints, else we could not know when we move.

The analysis of sensation into the hundreds of elements and the correlating of these elements with the cells of the sense organs, and the successful blazing of the trail along the sensory nerves to the outer bark (cortex) of the brain along an association fiber to a motor center, then down to the muscle cell till the baby grasps the ball—all this was accomplished with gratifying unanimity. Another class of elements was also discovered—the feelings of pleasure and pain—though there was not quite the same unanimity, some authorities wishing to add other feelings. But the work of thirty years of patient seeking resulted in the agreement that only two classes of elements exist in human experience, sensations and feelings, the feelings resulting from the way in which the sensation is mediated. Any sensation can be either pleasant or unpleasant; thus a too-bright light will be unpleasant, as will one too dim.

Having taken the machine apart, it was not so easy to put it together again. Just how the self is constituted was not easy to state, and the mechanism of desire and aversion was capable of a

statement only approximately satisfactory. This was of little concern to many of the workers who were so interested in the analysis of experience into elements and the correlation with physiology that the larger problems were put aside against a day of reckoning. And the day of reckoning came. By the second decade of the century, Gestaltists, Behaviorists, and Freudians were advancing to the attack against different sectors of the position.

In relating sensation and movement the experimentalists had gone a step beyond the early associationists. It was no longer a mystery how a sensory impulse could get into connection with a motor mechanism. The connection can actually be seen with the eye on a well-stained slide. In the twentieth century it was not necessary to interpolate an idea or a conscious process between sensory receptor and motor effector, for the sensation is defined as a stimulus and generates a current, and when this current runs over the path the movement is complete. But what of consciousness? Various answers were given to this question, one of which was that consciousness indeed takes place, an "epiphenomenon" and not essential to behavior. Consciousness was compared to the sound of a gun, an invariable accompaniment under certain circumstances of certain connections but not necessary to the accurate work of the gun. The behaviorists simply put a silencer on the gun and claimed that it worked just as well. If behavior is the organization of the nervous system and is accomplished by synaptic connections, why appeal to consciousness?

American Behaviorism may be thought of as an outgrowth of the physiological psychology, with its gadgets for the study of the body and its methods of introspection for explaining the mind; but in the meantime, another formulation of elemental constituents claimed attention and received wide approval. This was the doctrine of instincts.

Two weaknesses in classic associationism help to make intelligible the rise of the instinct psychology. The first is the extreme rationalism of the older view against which instinctivism is a reaction. It does not require a study of mob psychology to cast doubt on the doctrine that reasoned ideas are the cause of human conduct. Rationalism was the effective polemic weapon for bringing to book the claims of ancient and outworn institutions.

The associationists are not to be blamed for asserting the right to reason about such matters, nor is it strange that they should come to believe that rational thought was the prime mover in conduct. Whatever the steps by which it came about, there grew up a new recognition of impulse and emotional urge for which reasons are, indeed, sometimes given but which seem to have other sources than cold, passionless thought.

But the most important influence in the new formulation was, of course, the new biology and the widespread attempt to apply its conclusions to every department of scientific inquiry, from astronomy to child psychology. In medieval thought man was created with a dual nature, body and soul joined in a somewhat inharmonious union, with the task of making the best of it till the soul could be released from its dangerous partner. The teaching that man is, without reservation, animal, was new, exciting, and for good reason unwelcome. At length it came to be accepted, and William James in 1890 presented man with a greater number of instincts than any other animal. Most of them, however, he found in the animals also, and the tendency became general to assign their origin to a prehuman period, or at latest, to a mythical age when "primitive man" was acquiring habits, useful enough for him, but of doubtful value, some of them, to us who were doomed to inherit them.

For some thirty years instincts were unquestioned as the serviceable and adequately known elements of personality. For a time psychologists retained the machinery of associated ideas, but these were later abandoned and the picturesque repertoire was the chief reliance of all social scientists. It is true that the instincts were most useful for retrospective explanations. They served chiefly to "explain" the past acts of men by appealing to the more remote acts of beasts. The alibi it offered to man was a bit unheroic. The acts and thoughts of a man were, it is true, due to experience, but never to his own experience. One writer traced the satisfaction of baseball to the savages whose clubs were necessary to survival, as was their skill in running and throwing.

The decline of instinctivism was rapid, once it began. Several difficulties began to appear in the thought of those who had accepted the doctrine with enthusiasm and had proceeded to try to carry it out as a method. One of the difficulties was the impossibility of determining the number of these elements or

feeling any certainty as to their nature. Various lists were proposed, many lists eventually appearing, but hardly any two lists agreed, nor was it possible to bring the problem to a crucial test or to any test. It presently appeared that there was no method. The "primitive man" appealed to was placed so far back in time that no facts were available and resort was had to imaginary accounts, interesting little stories of fanciful events which might explain had they been true but of which there was no evidence. Once psychologists became critical of the notion, it was easy to see, by a comparison of peoples and epochs, that what had been assumed to be a universal human instinct was in fact only the acquired attitude taken over from a social custom.

The instincts failed to meet the needs of students of human nature because evidence was lacking that the complicated inherited habits which are so characteristic of birds, beasts, and insects have their counterpart in the human organism. The number of instincts appears to be in inverse ratio to educability and of all animals man is the most educable and plastic of living creatures. If we seek elements we shall look for them in vain in the instincts.

When the Behaviorists appeared on the scene, physiological psychology had finished the inventory of sensations and feelings and was occupied in attacking other problems by the method of introspection under controlled laboratory conditions. Eventually Behaviorism offered, as the elements we are seeking, a list of inherited reflexes, which by conditioning permit the development of a personality.

We may note circumstances that led to the appearance of this formulation: the controversy about imageless thought, the rise of reflexology in Russia, the experimental work on animals, and the collapse of the instinct doctrine, already mentioned.

The controversy about imageless thought began in Germany but was taken up in the learned journals in America and elsewhere. A very brief account will suffice. The orthodox theory of mental elements required sensations, which were bundled up into perceptions and could be revived as images. When some experiments were published declaring that in reasoning out certain problems some of the subjects reported that no imagery was present, violent disputes arose, Wundt claiming that the introspection could not have been accurate. His opponents

insisted that they were correct and that they had introspected correctly since they were "trained" introspectionists.

Sides were taken freely on the issue, but one unexpected position was that of the Behaviorists, who felt that if the high priests of introspection could not agree it was justifiable to pronounce a plague on both their houses. Accordingly this was done, and since introspection involves conscious memory and since the introspectionist method was to be discarded, the concept of consciousness was discarded as unnecessary and even redundant.

The brilliant experiments on animals had shown what surprisingly interesting results can be obtained by setting a problem for an animal, observing him carefully, varying the conditions, and recording the results. Here, of course, there was no introspection, and if there was consciousness it was irrelevant.

The familiar Russian experiments on animals showed how animals and even man can, by simultaneous presentation of stimuli, acquire an automatic response to what was originally wholly ineffective. This gave hope of stating the complicated behavior of adults as the effect of such simultaneous association of cues.

Finally, the decline of the vogue of instinctivism resulted in the formulation of a list of inherited movements that could be observed and recorded in careful observations on children so controlled as to admit of verification by other investigators. Thus the specious appeal to a fictitious archeology of human behavior was made unnecessary.

The experiments were carefully done and the enthusiasm with which the results were received by many of the younger men resulted in the announcement of a whole system instead of a valuable contribution to the old. The reflex was regarded as the key to the interpretation of human life and the conditioning of the reflexes was presented in a manner analogous to the doctrine of association of ideas a hundred years older. Since the reflexes are simple and universal in children, it was thought to be possible, by skillful conditioning, to produce any desired type of behavior and thus offer to education a new and sovereign method.

But difficulties appeared. The reflexes are indeed present and exist in large number. On the other hand, they are relatively invariable and can be modified or suppressed with the utmost difficulty. Conditioning, as revealed by the experiments and

the observations, did not alter the course of the reflex; it only changed the occasion of the reflex response. That the salivating dog should come to react to a musical note was interesting and significant, but it did not allow for the teaching of the old dog any new tricks. The Behaviorists in discussing the acquisition of language by a child could make a plausible statement about how a child comes to understand the meaning of words said to him, or, in their terminology, how he comes to respond to words which are used to condition the original unconditioned reflex. But when it is desired to tell about the child's talking, the only contribution is: "In course of time the child comes to say: 'open box,' etc." But the drooling dog did not come, in the course of time, to play the violin. The conditioning of a reflex is the arousal of an inherited movement by a stimulus not originally capable of such an effect; conditioning offers no interpretation of the growth and development of new and complicated habits and attitudes. The reflexes and other less definite movements must enter into combinations for which conditioning is an inadequate explanation.

About the same time that the Behaviorists began to publish in America, there arose another revolt against the traditional psychology with its elements of sensation and feeling. They began with some brilliant work in the psychology of perception and might have had more influence had they not yielded to the temptation, so common in a commercial age, to build up a whole rival system. The details of their criticisms cannot be given here, but mention may be made of their insistence that the sensations that were investigated in the laboratory were not the experiences that are constituents of normal experience. In distinguishing the many shades of gray, the observer is not only abstracting what is usually a marginal constituent of experience: he is placing himself in a comparing attitude, according to instructions, and this attitude is necessary for the judgment to be made. The connection of attitude and perception compels a revision of the notion that sensations result from the mere excitation of an end-organ by external energy. Indeed, the criticism goes farther and insists that the reception of a sensation, far from being a primary or elementary experience, is the result of abstraction and sophistication, and these points are defended by means of ingenious experiments and careful logic. A perception is held to be always an organization with a form, or *gestalt*, and the group

has adopted the name of the *gestalt* school. The "bundle hypothesis" is successfully refuted, since the exact stimulus may be made to produce a variety of effects.

Some of the conditioning experiments which were accepted as conclusive consisted in training an animal to go to a food-box that was the lighter of two. It was assumed that the sense organs were associated as to the tract used. The *gestalt* psychologists repeated the experiment, then substituted a still lighter one and took the darker one away. The animal went to the new one which had not been "conditioned" at all. This was held to show that the animal was responding to a figure and was, in reality, choosing the "lighter of two." Confirmatory results were obtained with children.

The *gestalt* seemed at first to be about ready to give up the concept of elements altogether and to derive their categories from the phenomena of interaction, but they were prevented from doing so by the difficulty encountered in accounting for the particular form or configuration. The assumption is made, therefore, that some of the *Gestalten* exist in the soul to correspond with those found in nature. While this doctrine is not prominent, it seems to be clearly held. But any accurate or experimentally determined number of these forms awaits demonstration.

It is in the voluminous writings of the psychoanalysts that the sharpest break with psychology is made, for the nervous system is completely ignored and attention is largely confined to conflicts in the "soul," whose incestuous and selfish desires are assumed to be primary and elemental and therefore in tragic and perpetual conflict with social requirements. How the "movement" split promptly into a number of rival schools, each with a leader claiming to be the only true prophet, how it was skillfully commercialized, how its proponents entered unhesitatingly into every specialized field of social science, pontifically pronouncing conclusions in anthropology, sociology, history, biography, mythology, and religion, reaching at a bound the solution of problems for which patient scholars are still industriously laboring—all these are familiar to every reader.

It has all the elements of a cult, for men "believe in" psychoanalysis as they believe in the gospel, or rather instead of believing in the gospel, not from scientific evidence but from emotional conviction or from some personal emotional experience, as men

adopt Christian Science because they have been healed of their worries.

To account for the rapid rise and popularity of these views will be easier for our successors than for us. Psychoanalysis came on the scene when orthodox psychology was facing confusion. It emphasized sex at a time of world-wide postwar disorganization and subtly insinuated, if it did not openly advocate, a form of indulgence which every period of disorganization has witnessed but which had never before claimed a "scientific" justification. Its proponents are masters of publicity and have characterized as "rationalization" all arguments and reasons that do not agree with their own. Dealing with mental abnormality, they have been of little assistance to legitimate psychiatry, since they cannot reveal, as physicians do, the details of their treatment to their medical colleagues. Their patients consist chiefly of the more affluent unfortunates who gladly pay for the comforting assurance that their disorders are not serious since they have been present from earliest infancy. The doctrine is at present decidedly popular with a certain class of social workers who should know, if anyone does, what sex repression means.

The central doctrine of the Unconscious (impressively capitalized) appears to be a hypostatization of the notion of the subliminal which is at least three hundred years old and has received recognition ever since. But the Unconscious is presented in the books of these men as the most important aspect of human life, a rather repulsive dungeon where evil spirits are confined, to be exorcised by letting the cat out of the bag. If proof of the existence of this limbo is demanded, reference is made to the maturation of problems, a phenomenon long familiar. Men have awakened from sleep to find a difficult solution all clearly apprehended, but it can also be said that a skater has suddenly found his performance improved, though this would not mean that the Unconscious had been exercising on the ice.

Wishes or desires appear to be the limit of analysis here, and, under the influence of this formulation, certain sociologists and psychologists have attempted to erect a structure on the same foundations. But all the desires of men on which data can be gathered turn out to be strivings or tendencies toward more or less specific goals, and to erect desires as units involves serious logical difficulties. A desire is transitory, a stage in activity, an

impulse seeking a more or less definite satisfaction, a craving which disappears and dies when the goal is reached. Desires are phases of action but are not involved in all acts. There is also impulsive behavior and there are stabilized "sets" which are related to past satisfactions and may be the occasion of future desires but are hardly to be identified with desires as such.

Moreover, there are vague cravings which are capable of numerous alternative directions. Social experience, moral norms, and collective aims cannot be neglected in understanding the origin of desires and their complex nature. The attempt to make wishes the atoms or elements of personality results either in a rough classification of them or in a list of instinctive wishes which present all the logical difficulties of any instinct doctrine. Activity, movement, behavior, conduct, striving—these are all indubitably to be asserted of human nature, but to isolate one form of the activity as elemental would seem to be inadequate and indefensible.

For wishes or desires include a striving for a definite goal or satisfaction, and this goal appears in experience as an image of what would satisfy the desire. The image, in turn, is derived from social experience and cannot, as far as we know, be unrelated to remembered or promised satisfactions. Desires, then, come from the culture and not from the solitary soul.

The list of elements could have been longer. We have seen that innate ideas have been proposed as fundamental elements; later on, acquired ideas, imprinted by sensations. The account has included the faculties variously enumerated, the sensations and feelings of the experimentalists, the instincts of the evolutionists, the reflexes of the Behaviorists, the forms of the Gestaltists, and the desires of various groups. What are the elements into which it is possible to analyze this unity? Or may it not be possible that the long and incongruous list reveals a search for the elements of something which is a unity of such a sort that it cannot be divided into elements?

The question is not without importance, but the problem of personality is not only in a very unsatisfactory state; we still are without a sound and agreed method by means of which it may be studied. It is surely not beyond the power of the human intellect. Personality is complex, but so is every object of study in every field or science. We need time, and patient men, able to search

diligently and weigh their evidence impartially, not hugging doctrines as darling possessions, and concerned chiefly with sound procedures of testing their results.

It would appear that the human personality always grows up in association and communication. The very word comes from the language of the stage and is a sort of metaphor signifying that we play a part or assume a role in the drama of life when we achieve a personality. For personality is an achievement and man is not born human, since to be a self is to be a subject which is its own object. It may be that, since personality is the sequel to a series of events, the elements are to be found, if we must have them, in the surrounding milieu.

This is obviously true of the language one speaks. The vocabulary, the syntax, and the meaning of phrases, are incorporated into experience with whatever increment of distortion or of enrichment. One might attempt to analyze a language, and, if it be reduced to writing, it would appear that all our vast literature can be inscribed by using just over a couple of dozen characters. But are they elements? Do they have existence and meaning and function, considered separately? Here is the letter *s*. Let us write the words "nail," "now," "pear," "care," "peak," "pill." If to each of these words we incorporate the *s* we have "snail," "snow," "spear," "scare," "speak," "spill." Is it possible to speak of the function of the *s*? No analysis of meanings will reveal any elementary quality in the *s*. Each word is a whole, a picture, a form, a *gestalt*. It is not made up of elements. Each letter taken alone may be the object of attention, but in combination there is formed that which resists analysis. This analogy is not, of course, exact but may help to clarify the point.

The attitudes are sometimes spoken of as elemental. But in what sense may we say so? The word "attitude" is here used to denote a tendency toward a mode of action, usually highly generalized, and resulting from the actions that have left their effect on the whole. The prejudices, biases, interests, preferences, loves, hates, and such like are words we use to denote attitudes. Now if a man has a violent prejudice toward Mussolini, is an ardent admirer of Ghandi, is very much opposed to the tariff, is interested in the Boy Scout movement, prefers beef rather than pork, loves his child, and hates Fascism, we may speak of all of

these as attitudes. We may think of these tendencies present in him continually, ready to be evoked, perhaps even seeking to find some expression, though clearly they would have to take their turn. In one sense, perhaps, we may call them elements.

But if attitudes be considered elements, they perform no such logical function as the elements of chemistry or of physiology. For attitudes are demonstrably the result of action and may be most helpfully conceived as residual propensities or predispositions left over from social experience. The attitudes that are significant from the standpoint of a theory of personality are those incorporations into the individual self of habits and beliefs in the mores of a society.

Neither ideas, faculties, instincts, nor attitudes exist as elements out of which personality is constituted. Rather do all of these, or what were supposed to be these, result from the particular selection and variation made by each individual person on the folkways and mores that he encounters.

Perhaps the disagreements of the past three hundred years may be explained by assuming that the differences were due to the impossibility of the problem. Men could not agree on the elements because they do not exist. The assumption in all of them was that individuals constitute society. But if we assume that society produces personalities, then the elements of personality will be found, not in the individual self at all, but in the collective life of his people.

The history of the thought of the last three hundred years could almost be written as the passage in one realm of life and another from fixity and absoluteness to change and relativity. An immovable world gave place to a revolving sphere; a fixed peasantry cruelly repressed in the fourteenth century in England and in France, and in the seventeenth in Germany and who had long remained bound to the soil, found freedom of movement and began to people the new world. Religious faith, once delivered as unchangeable, has become a developing experience, a matter permitting choice and freedom to individual men. Momentous changes came when the divine right of kings received its challenge with the execution of Charles I and its deathblow with the condemnation of Louis XVI. And if the American Declaration of Independence, which asserted that the consent of the governed was the source of the just power of the ruler,

was disturbing to the later eighteenth century, it was blasphemous to the medieval mind and to all who held unrevised the medieval view of man. It was Woodrow Wilson in the twentieth century who, voicing what was in the minds of his people, expressed the ultimate consequence of this long movement when he declared that the reign of law, based on the consent of the governed, was to be sustained by the "organized opinion of mankind." In this statement opinion, with its tides and currents, was changed from an object of scorn to the final court of appeal in political life.

It was not alone in ecclesiastical and political life that change and the relative replaced the fixed and absolute. The biology of the nineteenth century transformed the unchanging types, created by a thought of God, into slowly developing species still growing from form to form. Wide knowledge of a vaster world led to a study of comparative moral codes, and folkways were seen to evolve into mores and into crecive institutions, each with its life and history. In logic, reasoning, which had begun with a major premise and proceeded up syllogistic stairs to a fixed conclusion, became an activity which begins with a difficulty and a problem and ends with a hypothesis whose life is uncertain, destined, like the ox-cart, to be discarded for something better when that shall be discovered.

The theory of human nature which we call "psychology" did not assimilate this conception readily. Although political and social reforms, as well as theological movements, were based on psychological arguments, yet these are seen in retrospect as consequences and corollaries of programs of action. Rousseau and Hobbes did not differ in their political views on account of their views of the original nature of man; their theories of human nature were arguments in support of their programs of action. And in the later controversies between rationalists and empiricists, no less than the more recent disputes between instinctivists and Behaviorists, both sides of the controversy agree in a common premise that there is a list of stable elements that can be discovered. The rebellious youth who defiantly appeals to his right to express his instinctive urges is a brother under the skin to the aged conservative who insists that the institutions of society are authoritative because they are founded on the immutable instincts of the race. It is only since the rise of recent

social psychology that the conception of human nature as the result of action has been formulated. This view might be termed histrionic or dramatic, for it conceives the personality as a role, a part to be played, and the role of an actor depends on the play that is being enacted. Institutions and customs precede individuals, and personality results from participation in these ongoing social processes.

Human personality, arising in communication, is the result of conduct which takes place in the presence of others and in contacts with friends and enemies, allies and opponents. Personality is mobile, self-developing, self-organizing. Groups precede babies and children are born into communities with customs. To assume fixed points of origin or stable elements which are combined into a personality is to reverse the order of development. Ideas, sensations, and wishes occur, but they are events and consequences, not elements. They must be defined in terms of the social process, not the process in terms of them.

XVI

AN ESTIMATE OF PARETO

Graduate students in sociology have included in their reading the treatise of Pareto¹ for the past ten years, indeed, since the appearance of the French translation. The American translation now makes the material available to the undergraduate body of students, and offers an appropriate occasion for appraisal and evaluation. Since the present version has been preceded and accompanied by a very effective advertising campaign and by a number of very extravagant eulogies written by literary men and others not competent in this field, it is fitting to inquire concerning the book, whether it is of value to students of sociology. The initial sale was large, and therefore the conclusions of any reviewer can be appraised by a large number of purchasers who are already in possession of the twenty-dollar set. In preparation, the reviewer has read the whole of the new translation, being already familiar with the French edition.

Although teachers of sociology will not choose to remain wholly ignorant of a work that has so much publicity, yet there seems no reason whatever why anyone else should be asked to spend time in reading these bulky volumes. Whatever in them is sound is not only not new, but is much better stated by authors long familiar to American scholars. The announced attempt to build an entirely new system of sociology can hardly be deemed successful. Many people have asked, like Pareto, what is the matter with sociology. Deficiencies in our science are evident, heaven knows, but one thing the matter with sociology is that its literature has been hidden from the eyes of those who imagine that they can build up a complete and adequate system while ignoring the work of other men. He who builds on nothing

¹ PARETO, VILFREDO, *The Mind and Society (Trattato di sociologia generale)*. Edited by Arthur Livingston. Translated by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston with the advice and active cooperation of James Harvey Rogers. Harcourt, Brace & Company, New York, 1935, 4 vols.

builds nothing. The author who acknowledges no debt to anybody is one whose contribution is probably no greater than his debt. Science is funded knowledge; and a science of sociology, still in the making, will be the work of many patient scholars, each adding a little to the store. In no other way does a science grow.

An interesting contrast and comparison can be made between the American Sumner and the Italian Pareto. Both of them became known as economists; and both found the abstractions of economic theory disappointing to them in their efforts to understand human society. All those conceptions which cluster around the notion of the "economic man" appeared to leave out so much that was vital, that both of these men turned to sociology. Sumner had long been familiar with the non-rational aspects of human life. To Pareto, whose reading in sociology appears to have been almost negligible, this came as a startling new discovery. Those of us who have had thrills of originality can understand the enthusiasm which he must have felt when this old truth became new to him.

Sumner proceeded to gather examples of non-rational behavior and finally produced a measure of order out of chaos when he divided the folkways from the mores and showed their relation to the later developing institutions. It is a great misfortune that the isolation of Pareto precluded any acquaintance with Sumner's work, which appeared some years before his own. He struggled with the problem of the non-rational customs, but gave it up and turned from a study of the customs of men to a consideration of the mere words they used in defending these customs and to the innate causes of them. Sumner attempted a small task and in a measure succeeded. Pareto tried a larger enterprise with but lamentably meager results.

One of the differences between Sumner and Pareto appears in their attitude toward morals. Sumner is scientific and objective. Moral conduct, he found, is approved conduct and grows up in every society. It is relative to the life of that society. The sociologist does not, indeed, interest himself in what "ought to be," but he finds it profitable and even necessary to study carefully the duties which men perform because they believe they ought to do them. Sumner found the mores to be always true and right. "The mores can make anything right and prevent

condemnation of anything." The most curious customs thus become valuable data to be interpreted. Pareto failed to achieve this objectivity. To him right and truth had no correspondence with reality. His theory of knowledge was the naïve position that there must be a correspondence between the idea and some visible or tangible object. He could not find any such reality corresponding to, say, a "state of law." His patience is quickly exhausted and the use of such words is the occasion for contemptuous irony. Seizing on a reference to the "true" meaning of a word, used by a writer, he fairly snorts: "Twenty-one guns for our old friend *True*" (2160¹). (The parentheses refer to the numbered sections of the book.)

The announced purpose is to construct a system of sociology on the model of celestial mechanics or physics or chemistry (20). "We move in a narrow field, the field of experience and observation" (71). By "experience" he means "direct experience," a definition hardly enlightening (580). "I intend to take my stand strictly within the field of experimental science" (79). "Proof of our propositions we seek strictly in experience and observation" (69:7). "I intend to remain absolutely in the logico-experimental field and refuse to depart from it under any circumstances whatever" (17). Similar statements are iterated over and over again. Had he been able to live up to the expectations aroused by these promises, the book would have been a very different book.

Not only are we promised that conclusions will be everywhere verified by facts; we are also assured that there will be the most meticulous attention paid to a rigorous and exact definition of terms. "In the logico-experimental sciences the aim is to make language as exact as possible" (p. 1927). "If things are designated beyond the possibility of doubt or misunderstanding, the names that are given to them matter hardly at all" (p. 1927). "Let us keep to our quest for relationships between facts, and people may give them any name they please" (2). "Words are of no importance whatever to us, they are labels for keeping track of things" (119). "We use words strictly to designate things" (108). "We shall use terms of ordinary parlance, explaining exactly what they represent" (119). Never was a promise more clearly made, more often reiterated, or more flagrantly violated.

But before examining the undefined terms with which the book abounds, note another feature of science that receives much attention. Experimental science is not only declared to limit itself to observed and experienced facts and to require exact definition of terms; there is another requirement: it must be mathematical. If only quantitative and mathematical methods could be applied in sociology! "In order to grasp the form of a society, it would be necessary to know what the elements are and how they function in quantitative terms." If indices were assigned to the various elements we could state them in the form of mathematical equations. The number of these equations would equal the number of unknowns. But such equations are at present impossible (2062). In a footnote the possibility of imitating celestial mechanics is declared to be doubly unattainable for there "still would be the difficulty of solving the equations, a difficulty so great that it may well be called insuperable" (2062¹).

No single aspect of his failure is quite so hard for the author to endure as this disappointment about mathematics. "Pure economics" has its equations but leaves out of consideration necessary elements of society. Sociology would be possible if we could only have equations; but they are impossible of formulation, and they could not be solved if they were written. To this subject we are brought back again and again. Time after time the author writes that if this were only pure economics it would be a good place to write some equations and then a long series of such equations in economics is given, just to show that it can be done. The discussion finally reverts to the subject in hand with the plaintive remark that, unfortunately, sociology must use "ordinary language" and that mathematical treatment is not possible. The brilliant statistical work of modern sociologists is not mentioned and was presumably not known to the author. He makes no use whatever of mathematics.

The decision to use "ordinary language" is, after all, reluctantly taken. Letters of the alphabet are employed to denote the important concepts for the first 500 pages and there are constant relapses into the same habit. The acts of men are, at first, denoted by *c*, the "very variable" ways in which these acts are explained are represented by *b*, while the "relatively invariable," the "virtually constant," part of the whole is symbolized by *a*. Toward the first part of the second volume the author finds this

algebraic practice getting tiresome and gives names to the symbols. The acts, *c*, he calls *dérivées* (translated "derivatives"); the reasons or proofs, *b*, are named *dérivations*; while the invariable portions, *a*, are given the name "residues." The acts are thus conceived as having three parts: the deeds, the reasons assigned, and the motives behind them. No sociologist could withhold his gratitude from an author whose work brought new light to this set of problems. But Pareto is disappointing and contributes nothing.

One-third of the above program is given up and completely abandoned without even a start. The derivatives are frequently mentioned in the preliminary discussions of the relations of *a*, *b*, and *c*, but they nowhere are studied. By derivatives, Professor Pareto meant the acts of men which are the object of study of Sumner in *Folkways*. The non-rational character of all customs is there brought to a demonstration, and Sumner shows how it is even impossible for men to plan successfully any new mores. Had Pareto not been ignorant of Sumner he might have done something with this area of life, but, unassisted, he found the subject too difficult and gave it up without a struggle. His only attitude toward the strange customs of other times and other lands is that of the untutored ethnocentric: a mingling of surprise, incredulity, and scorn. How could Newton "have harbored such childish idiocies?" (652); "Poor Strabo must have been out of his mind" (594¹).

The folkways and the mores, in which non-rationality is most obviously apparent, proved too difficult. The word "derivative" does occur once in the fourth volume and is such a surprise to the translator that he adds a footnote to the effect that the use of the word is so exceptional as to be unique and must be regarded as a slip of the pen (2270¹). The word is used repeatedly in the beginning of the first volume, where the plan is set forth. But the acts of men are not expounded; they are abandoned and forgotten.

Nearly three-fourths of the material is concerned with residues and *dérivations*: much of Volume I and all of Volumes II and III. The latter two volumes require nearly a thousand pages, more than 1,200 numbered sections, and about 976 footnotes, some of which are very long. The whole work, even after the translator has deleted many repetitions, has a total of 2,033 pages, 2,613

numbered sections, to which must be added some 1,845 footnotes, very copious, many of which are several thousand words in length. The whole is said to contain about a million words.

What the author has to say could have been presented in a scant tithe of the present length. The repetitions account for much of the prolixity, and the many "asides" account for much more; for the author constantly allows himself to be diverted, like Juliet's nurse, into garrulous and irrelevant discussions, or into diatribes against men who have excited his animosity. But a careful reading of the text forces the conclusion that the lack of clearness is due to the incompetence of Pareto for the task which he assigned to himself. One of his admirers has written that the treatise is a veritable pandemonium, as badly written as can be imagined, and that the reading of it is almost incomprehensible. This author, Bousquet, goes on to say that "the absence of methodological plan is pushed to an almost pathological degree." Over and over again a return is made to a problem that refuses to come out right, and that, in the end, still refuses. Pareto was unable either to confess his obvious failure or to cease his futile efforts.

Mention has been made of the determination, often repeated, to make the meaning of words as exact as possible. Yet even his most enthusiastic eulogists cannot agree on what is meant by residues, and some of them confess that they do not understand. Homan and Curtis wrote on this point: "We have struggled hard to make clear what we mean by a residue, and we are afraid that our struggles have only involved us more deeply in the mire of words."¹ And yet these two men had spent two years in a seminar on Pareto, conducted, it is true, by an enthusiastic professor of physiology. What puzzled them will puzzle any reader, for the author returns in vain again and again to the task of making clear his meaning, repudiating in one passage what he has written in another. It would seem to be impossible to write with clarity if the mind is in confusion.

A few examples from the text will substantiate this statement. Very many more could be cited. The residues are those parts of the whole such that if the residues are known, the acts will also be known (1690). And yet the residues are unknowable, for only the *dérivations* can be known (2083). The residues are

¹ *The American Journal of Sociology*, XL (March, 1935), 667.

modified by the *dérivations* (1735), but the residues are repeatedly declared to be invariable, virtually constant, etc. (850, p. 1916, and many other passages). In no place is the concept defined.

It is the same with sentiments (865). The residues are manifestations of sentiments but the concept is not made as exact as possible, for Pareto's admirers are continually puzzling their brains over the meaning of the word "sentiment."

The residues also manifest instincts (870). But these manifested instincts are not defined as exactly as possible. They are not defined at all but remain in the limbo of the vague. Scornful words abound when an author uses a word which is left undefined. "I hope I shall be excused if I do not define this sweet entity" (2182). But instincts are assumed to be made known by the residues, which are, themselves, unknowable: "We know only the derivations" (2083). In one passage it is asserted that behind residues and derivations alike are parts, or elements, or factors that are quite unknown and inaccessible (1690²).

The use by Pareto of the concept of instincts reminds one of McDougall, who presented his picturesque repertoire of innate elements in a volume that appeared as early as 1908. Had McDougall's work been known to Pareto he might, at least, have made much larger use of animals. They are mentioned only casually, and with none of the zoological insistence¹ of McDougall. Pareto says that because the hen defends her chicks she does have a sentiment (1690). But he might have learned from McDougall to bring in the stallion and the peacock, the horse and the squirrel, and especially the monkey, who has the parental instinct, which, McDougall says, is lacking in "philosophers as a class." Perhaps the difference in terminology will tend to obscure the identity of procedure. Both attempt to explain the sweep of history by appeal to inborn elements. McDougall accounts for the difference between the colonial empire of Britain and that of France by asserting that in the British the instinct of curiosity is strong and the instinct of gregariousness is weak, while the strength of these two instincts is reversed in the case of the French. Negroes, McDougall asserts, are strong in the instinct of submissiveness, which accounts for their having been slaves. McDougall paints with a larger brush than Pareto, tending to assign the same instincts in the same proportions to whole races, while Pareto is more concerned with the differential heredity of

the different social classes; but, in his Lowell Institute lectures, McDougall¹ agrees with Pareto's essential position, sounding the alarm against the dysgenic effect of the social ladder. It is to be expected that Professor McDougall will find himself in sharp disagreement with Pareto, which is often the case with two writers who have assumed a common erroneous premise.

It is with an equipment of undefined terms and unproved propositions that Pareto comes at last to the task of classifying the residues which, "if known, will allow us to know the acts." The procedure is similar to that of McDougall or Allport or any other writer who "explains" a social fact by applying a biological label. Just as Allport² assigns the conditioning of the prepotent reflex of struggling as the explanation of the "espousal by the German people of the Kaiser's policy of invasion and devastation," and just as McDougall accounts for the Protestant Reformation by asserting that the Nordic Protestants had different instincts from those of the racial groups that remained true to the Catholic Church,³ so Pareto finds the institutions of Athens and Sparta to be due to differential residues, manifesting differential inherited instincts (2419). Acts, customs, and even national character are assumed to be due to the operation of specific forces, biological constants, which are obtained by first describing the conduct that is to be explained and then inventing a residue that would account for the conduct.

Some of the confusion of Pareto would have been mitigated if he had realized that he was inverting the problem. The cultural life of man is, of course, to a large degree non-rational. This is not new but it is true. The customs of men do grow up without rational thought. Moreover, as Durkheim and his colleagues have so abundantly shown, the cultural products exercise a coercive influence on the individual members of a society whom they affect from their infancy. Thus the attitudes of men are the result of their social experience. The sentiments, the emotional aspect of the attitudes, are powerful and non-logical but they are the effects of social participation, not of innate constants. Pareto cannot understand how Newton could accept the religious ideas of his time. He is amazed that a man should adopt the

¹ *Is America Safe for Democracy?* 1921.

² *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 59.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

mores of his people. But where the mores exist they are always true and always right. It is not silly to accept them; it is human. The failure of Pareto is due to the same error into which McDougall fell: the error of mistaking that which is collectively originated and socially transmitted for a unitary and inherited individual tendency.

The treatment of the residues and their classes is labored and long drawn out but singularly sterile. The residues are set forth according to genera, species, and subspecies, but most of them are illustrated only to be forgotten. In the final attempt to interpret the "general form of society" which depends on the residues, only two of them receive any but the most casual mention. The net result of all the labor in some five hundred pages is the conclusion that some people in every society are born innovators and rebels and others are natural-born conservatives, and when they do not breed true to type the social equilibrium is disturbed owing to "class circulation." The innovating residues, Class I, are christened "instinct of combinations," a confusing phrase, since residues are never instincts but manifestations of instincts. What is meant is that some men are born with a tendency to combine one thing with another. In other words, there are some classes of men who are born with a tendency that causes association of ideas. Very much could be said about this formulation. Let us only recall that since every act of thought involves associations and therefore combinations, we may safely assume that even the most immovable reactionaries always have their plans and their schemes.

The other residue, the only other one of which any use is made, is Class II, and is called the "persistence of aggregates." We are not told what instinct this represents. It would appear to be a clumsy and perverse way of referring to the tendency to habit formation, which, again, might well be asserted of the whole human race and not be allowed to be the possession of any one class of society. It is to this class of residues that the disciples appeal when they wish to understand why a man desires to own his property. Habit is a phenomenon concerning which much is known and to which Pareto's discussion adds nothing save the masquerade of a confused terminology.

In the third volume *dérivations* are likewise presented in a similar classification, but here the results are even more meager.

Classes and subclasses are set down, to the number of eighteen. But they are really all about the same. Four-fifths of the discussion of them is occupied with the "verbal proofs" and the admission is made that, if defined a bit broadly, all the *dérivations* could be put into this class. Nor is such a statement very striking when we recall that *dérivations* are the "verbal manifestations" which men use to "prove" that what they do, or believe, is reasonable. The statement that verbal proofs should be called "verbal proofs" is hardly open to question, but one wonders why it should take a volume of five hundred pages to say it.

The author is often irritated, sometimes infuriated, and always puzzled and baffled to account for the content of the *dérivations* he records. He simply cannot understand why men write such silly things and utter such incomprehensible absurdities. It would be difficult for anyone to understand if he started with the untenable assumption that the rationalizations are the manifestations of innate tendencies, uninfluenced by social experience. Pareto insists that the *dérivations* are manifestations of residues. They do not proceed from the actions of men but from the inherited instincts and sentiments and are due to the "hunger for thought." Men want to be logical and reasonable, and in their effort to be logical and reasonable they speak nonsense and write idiocies. They hunger for logic but satisfy their hunger with foolishness.

It would have been easier for him had he realized that he was dealing with a sociological and not a psychological problem. The *dérivations* are arguments, reasons, explanations, rationalizations. Now, reasons are given to opponents and are uttered in conversation or written to persuade or confute. Reasons that are advanced can always be assumed to have some relation to what the reasoner considers will influence his audience. Had Pareto seen this, he would not have berated Newton or St. Augustine or anyone. But the social escaped him. By examining words he came to predicate innate causes of the words, which were conceived as invariable biological elements. Divorced from the time and place in which they were uttered, many of the arguments cited are incomprehensible. Referred to the social situation, they are easily understood.

There has been some discussion concerning the relation of Pareto's views to Italian Fascism. A reading of the fourth

volume reveals an extraordinary correspondence, whether or not there is any causal influence. Pareto is bitterly scornful of the very word "morality" and equally contemptuous of truth, right, justice, and democracy. He is concerned with the "élite."

The élite are not the best; they are the strong and successful. A sneak thief is a member of the élite if he is a successful sneak thief and can avoid the police and accumulate a quantity of loot (2027). If he gets caught, he is not of the élite. Those who govern belong to the governing élite if they are strong and are willing to use force to kill their enemies. If the governing élite breed too many children who have an overabundance of the "persistence of aggregates," then some people who have strong "instincts of combinations" will drive them out and become the élite. This he calls "circulation of the élite." It is recognized that all this may involve murder and rapine but he does not hesitate to say that murder and rapine only mean that the strong and worthy have succeeded the weak and cowardly (2191). What to him is despicable is not to kill the weak but to defend ruthlessness by voicing appeals to right and justice, for these have no "correspondence with reality." The very word "justice" infuriates Pareto.

There is not sufficient space for a detailed account of the fourth volume to which the first three are preparatory. From the standpoint of sociology this is no loss. The volume is largely devoted to muck-raking and reminds one of Lincoln Steffens, but it lacks the objectivity and balance of Steffens and is devoid of Steffen's rich experience, rare insight, and high moral purpose. There is exposure of the corruption and rascality in government, with much attention to France and Italy and with very copious footnotes, many of them clipped from the newspapers of the day. The speculators, the "foxes," were on top, but Mussolini and the other "lions" were destined to reach them with a well-aimed cuff, "and that will be the end of the argument" (2480¹).

And thus the animals, rejected as sources of instincts, are presented as ideals of conduct. The lion takes what he wants because he has the strength. Pareto goes one step beyond the doctrine that the end justifies the means; he scorns to give any justification at all. His ethics are the ethics of the beasts, the wild beasts, who never utter non-logical "verbal manifestations." "Since the world has been the world, the strong and courageous

have been the ones to command, and the weak and cowardly the ones to obey, and it is, in general, a good thing for a country that it should be so" (2480⁴).

Although the book has no value for sociology, the student of personality should find it a serviceable document. The unintentional revelation of Pareto's coarseness, his scorn for moral principles (2316¹⁰), his unfairness to opponents, his utter lack of a sense of humor, his towering egotism—all these and much more are obtrusively manifest. Some competent student should work through the material with a view to understanding the development of the personality of an old man who aspired to be the Machiavelli of the middle classes. One result of such investigation might be the explanation of why he thought he could teach the world sociology without ever having learned it, even if he must use a million words.

PART III
SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

XVII

THE SOCIOLOGIST AND THE EDUCATOR

If the task of education may be said to consist in transmitting the culture of a group to the immature members of it, it is obvious that "education" is a far wider term than would be necessary to describe what the institution of the school is trying to do. Pre-literate peoples have a very effective way of training the children in the arts and skills which they value and also in indoctrinating their young people with the approved moral and social principles and points of view. That this task is too heavy for a modern family or the unorganized members of the community is assumed in the very existence of schools with officials, trustees, administrators, and instructors. Civilized people have always valued the relatively artificial and necessarily formal organization which constitutes the institutionalized educational process. The task of the teacher has never been easy, but the universal assumption that it is becoming more difficult all the time is perhaps quite defensible. Perhaps, also, it is more difficult in America than elsewhere, for here exists an ideal by no means unquestioned in our day, but still dominant, that makes us want to give to all our people all the educational advantages which anyone can hope to acquire. This would be difficult anywhere, but when the population is so mixed culturally it becomes increasingly a heavy task.

Two important questions have always concerned educators who became reflective about their work: the content to be passed on or inculcated, and the method of doing it. The first of these is the problem of the curriculum; the second concerns methods of education and classroom management. In answering the questions which necessarily arise, educators have for a long time appealed to psychology, and from psychologists they have received most valuable assistance. There has been growing, however, a feeling that the sociologist may have some help to give, and that perhaps some of the questions which psychology

was assumed to have the answer for might be at least illuminated if the sociologists were appealed to.

This has seemed to some to be particularly true of the question of content of teaching, that is, the curriculum. For a long time it was almost wholly traditional. In a static society it is likely that it would always be, and always remain, completely traditional. The education of a child in Central Australia or in a Winnebago tribe would consist—and one might even say should consist—in the skillful transmission of an unvarying system of acts of skill and points of view.

It is commonplace to say that modern life is changing so rapidly that this formula no longer applies. We do not teach Greek in our high schools, but there is a demand for typewriting and instruction about internal-combustion engines. Now it seems quite clear that psychology can furnish, as such, little assistance in providing the answer to the question of what should be taught, since the necessary social demands get such explicit and compelling recognition. The formula that education should "bring out" all the powers of an individual is obviously unworkable, for there are too many powers to be brought out and too little time to bring them out, and some powers which we hope nobody will ever bring out. If there is a demand for stenographers, which means that there are good positions to be filled, there remains the task of finding out whether some of the children are incapable of doing the work; and as psychology is now practiced, this is a psychological question. But whether there should be stenographers and whether stenography belongs in the curriculum is perhaps a subject which psychology would not attempt to answer.

Professor Snedden has written at length and very clearly on this aspect of educational sociology, and there is now a clear recognition that the group demands must be considered in deciding what shall go into the course of study. A caution has repeatedly been expressed, and most properly, that the groups are not necessarily fixed, in either membership or their traditions. The word "group" must be defined with reasonable elasticity; but if the concept be sufficiently protected from misapprehension, it seems fairly clear that the first place to look for an answer to this question is in the customs and traditions, the activities and the cultural attitudes, of the group, or community, or society.

Here we seem to be on sociological ground, but appearances after all may be a bit deceptive. If the culture be homogenous and consistent, the sociologist is entirely redundant. He does not need to make an inventory of the mores because everybody knows them sufficiently anyhow. If the culture be highly complex, with divergent and conflicting mores and institutional interests, the sociologist would seem to be more in place. But is he? Consider the problem of military training. One group is thoroughly committed to it and another group violently opposed. Who can decide? The sociologist might attempt to state the effect of military training on the national psychology, but so far the struggles and debates on this question have taken the form of rather violent emotional controversies between specific interest groups, with the usual number of interested neutrals which form the "public," and an even larger number of indifferent people who are not aware of the issue. Such a question then becomes either a philosophical and ethical controversy or a political struggle, and the sociologist's task is the more objective one of studying dispassionately the whole movement and concluding what he can. The educational sociologist is rapidly making us conscious that our former naïveté was unjustified. It has been assumed that education would solve our social problems; but we now know that education can be manipulated by special groups and will tend to produce a result which a particular group will approve but which other groups may regard as disastrous. The Bolsheviks in Russia and the Fascists in Italy furnish the most dramatic examples, but there are many less spectacular pictures of it nearer home. It would seem, therefore, that the claim that the curriculum can be decided by the methods of the sociologist must be made with certain reservations.

The curriculum having, by whatever methods, been decided upon, there remains the technical question of how the preparation for the activities can be obtained most economically and thoroughly. The work of Charters in vocational analysis, suggested doubtless by the Taylor movement in job analysis, is both familiar and relevant. The recent work that has appeared in the technique of teaching spelling or reading and the rest, along with the tests of proficiency of an objective sort, are for the most part at least superficially independent of sociology and its interests. Nevertheless there is a point here which often escapes attention

and deserves more serious study than it has received. The question concerns the social situation inside the schoolroom and the group relations that unite the pupils with each other and with the teacher. Instruction in groups is never individual instruction, and the study of group morale, esprit de corps, and *représentations collectives*, must receive more attention than they have been accorded before the problems in this field can be worked out. There lies a distinct fallacy—at least the sociologists would say so—in much that has been said about individualized instruction. The pupil in school may be an individual and he may be treated as an individual, but in addition to this he is a member of a group and may be treated as a member, and there is a difference between a member as member and an individual as individual. There is no doubt that sociology here has a real contribution to make to teachers. There is abundant evidence that unwise emphasis on competition does exist, and unnecessary feelings of inferiority are produced through sheer ignorance of the laws of group behavior on the part of well-meaning and earnest teachers.

But there remains still another aspect of education of the highest importance about which the sociologist has perhaps more to say than any other specialist. This is the field of moral training and character education, conceived, not in the restricted meaning which some “religious education” specialists give to it, but in the broader sense of participation in the moral and cultural attitudes of the society which has produced the children and which will in a few years be composed of them. To some of us sociologists the performances of most of our schools in this respect are very deficient and often utterly lamentable. High-school faculties and boards of education pass regulations about lipsticks and skirt lengths, cigarettes and fraternities. The results are known everywhere. A concrete instance: A high-school senior said to an investigator, “The ambition of many a boy in this school is to get his diploma in his hand and then walk up to the principal and tell him to go to hell.” We all know to what extent the moral and social ideals of the teachers in the high school (to go no further) are matters of contemptuous indifference to the students under their care.

To the sociologist this is serious, regrettable, and almost entirely unnecessary. It concerns a theoretical formulation of the nature of group activity, the forms of social control, and

different types of primary groups, the intrusion into the primary group of institutional controls that do not belong there, much of which has been already worked out, though many things need to be made the subject of further research. An examination of the best books on education reveals that there is much material on the methods of punishment but no hint that such groups might be better controlled without any punishment at all. The pathetic and sometimes stupid device of "student government," which is often a despairing gesture on the part of the responsible adults in the group who turn over to the immature members burdens too heavy to be borne and burdens which the older ones are paid to assume, is one of the many concrete illustrations of the failure to take advantage of what sociology can teach. It is worse than this, for they not only have not learned what is known, they are not aware that a problem exists.

The teachers should be the channels through which the highest ideals of a people are transmitted to the children of the nation, but, owing to many causes, the channel is blocked, the children are alienated, and out of this situation grows a phenomenon not peculiar to our day but very characteristic of it. The adolescent clique, the boys' gang, the high-school fraternity and sorority, sociologically speaking, are little clans of aliens shut off from adequate contact with the best traditions of their people.

Educational sociology has not found itself, and its conceptions are extremely varied. The confusion is natural but by no means final, and the widespread interest in the subject is symptomatic of the need for another approach in the solution of our problems. It is to be hoped that educators on the one hand and sociologists on the other will not only be aware of each other's problems, but will also come, if not to speak, at least to understand, each other's language.

XVIII

TWO EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS

This discussion deals with the relation of the teacher to the community and to the children under instruction. It is hoped to offer a view not too unorthodox concerning two problems on which light could be thrown by an adequate sociology. Teachers like to speak freely and often find their freedom restricted. They like to have their pupils follow the highest moral ideals and are often disappointed. Are there any known sociological principles that will throw light on the nature of these two problems or that will aid in their practical solution?

We wish our children to be taught those things that we want them to know. We resent being compelled to send our children to teachers who will influence them in ways distasteful to us. Our laws permit a Roman Catholic parent to reject a secular school and choose a religious one so that the instruction imparted may be in accordance with his convictions. In Fascist Italy, in Bolshevik Russia, and in Nazi Germany every teacher must be loyal to an approved philosophy of life and government. This seems very foreign to American ways of thinking, but the difference is very slight and only a matter of degree, due perhaps to the relatively peaceful conditions under which we yet live.

Education, at least in schools, is for the purpose of transmitting to our children our social heritage. The school is a channel, an aqueduct through which our culture is transmitted to those who are to inherit it. Therefore what is taught in the schools is of vital concern to those who have set them up and who pay for carrying them on. If the teachers teach what the community regards as unwholesome, the community cannot avoid protest and opposition.

The content of the teaching is in the hands of professional men and women who are skilled to impart and who are representatives of that level of culture which the community has attained. The teacher is no private individual, free to say or to do anything he

may choose according to his whim. He is a trusted public official, standing in some respect in loco parentis, trained at public expense, chosen for a public service, and maintained at great financial sacrifice. The mores set limits to what he may appropriately do or say in his capacity as a teacher.

It will probably not be questioned by any sociologist that the mores constitute an impersonal force, never clearly formulated, always appearing as true and right, not open to debate, and not to be consciously and purposefully set up or deliberately modified. The mores change, but slowly and almost unconsciously. To offend against the mores is to ensure opposition and conflict. To argue that the mores are untenable and that the people who hold to them are illogical is to confess ignorance of a fundamental sociological truth. A young teacher was interrupted in his remarks by a girl who objected that what he had said contradicted the Bible and who quoted the passage about woman being made from Adam's rib. He answered in a sneering manner: "Nobody believes that stuff any more." His biology was undoubtedly sound, but his knowledge of the sociology of the mores was defective. He was sent to Coventry for the rest of the year and not asked to teach any more.

The question of the freedom of the teacher and his obligation to the community is one aspect of the question of the relation of the individual to society. Even the university research professor is not an isolated individual responsible only to himself. He is a favored and fortunate appointee, subsidized financially so that he need do no economically productive labor, and permitted to subsist on the surplus of the work of other men. His very freedom is a gift of society, a society which trusts him and expects some return on the investment they have made in training and sustaining him.

For the individual apart from society is a meaningless abstraction. Human life is always essentially dramatic in the sense that we are assigned to roles which we are to play after the manner of characters on the stage. The role of a teacher is none the less a role because the lines are not written out in detail and formally agreed to, or the details of behavior minutely prescribed. As a member of the school system he has obligations and duties as well as rights of self-expression and freedom. He who keeps in mind that he is the product of an institution and the beneficiary

of society will be able to subordinate his private notions, however dear, to the public good and the public peace. However informal the expectation may be, the prestige of the office is a public trust.

Nor does this principle imply any danger to truth or any disloyalty which might be involved in its suppression. For truth, if it is fully known, can be proved. And if it is fully proved there is small danger that it will be rejected. Not truth, but unproved and unprovable opinion is the usual cause of conflict. And we must confess that in social science the body of demonstrated truth is much smaller than the total of untested opinions. Those who are most zealous in the cause of academic freedom could do the cause no greater service than to insist on the validity of the distinction.

The relation of the teacher to his community is, therefore, that of a representative whose function it is to induct the young into the social heritage which the community values. He need not be an average member, indeed, he may well be somewhat in advance of those who have chosen him. But, if he has wisdom, he will not scorn the mores. To do so is to invite trouble and to display at the same time an unfamiliarity with a sound sociological principle.

If now we turn to the relation of the teacher to the child, it would appear that the figure of the aqueduct is appropriate here also. For skill in figuring or reading does harm rather than good to the community unless the attitudes which the community approves are also imparted and strengthened. We cannot avoid the ethical results in the process of education. The teacher is neither a preacher nor a social worker, but unless the school is able to transmit approved attitudes the nation will not prosper. Struggles between the state and the church in Italy, in Germany, in France, and in other countries show the importance which is attached to the schools, especially the lower schools. In American experience the issues have never been formulated in opposition. Rather have the traditions that the school is to transmit remained unformulated, that is to say, "in the mores." But we desire our children to adopt the moral and social views that we regard as important and valuable, and the school is expected to do its part—and a very large part—in making clear and definite and appealing the basic attitudes which are the foundation of good citizenship.

That the task is partially accomplished, no one will deny; that it is done as well as it should be, no one will contend. Juvenile delinquency is not to be laid wholly at the door of the school any more than it is to be charged up to the church or the family. But the school has its share of responsibility and much improvement needs to be made. Has sociology any contribution to make to the analysis of the difficulty or the working out of a better method?

It would seem that the theory of the primary group should be of value. For it is in those groups and associations, where there is face-to-face association and cooperation, a sense of the whole, and a conscious feeling of "we" that we may discover the specifically human qualities actually taking their rise. It is as a member of a primary group that the virtues appear and become conscious, and it is from the members of the primary group that attitudes are taken over. Now it is an interesting fact that, while a child can hardly become a member of an adult group, the contrary is not true. An adult can become a bona fide member of a group of children. And attitudes are tender plants and will grow only in a favorable climate. They cannot be forced. Severity is fatal and aloofness futile. It is necessary to form a primary group and to keep some measure of this relation if the school is to succeed in this important function. Any procedure which alienates the teacher from the group or tends to limit the relation to one of authority and external power results in clogging the aqueduct and impeding the transfer of the culture.

In American kindergarten practice this relation is set up and maintained with the most fortunate results. Attitudes are recommended and accepted and the influence of the teacher is at a maximum. In the American high school there is a great contrast. Open hostility is not common; and rebellion, though not known, is not usual. The typical result is the externalizing of the teacher, followed by the formation of primary groups composed exclusively of adolescents, often with a tradition at variance with that of the community and a minimum of access to the experience and judgment of the mature members of society of which they stand in need, but which they cannot have.

The relative complacency of the public and the school authorities is due, perhaps, to the conviction of the inevitability of this break between old and young. The out-dated notions formu-

lated in the days when the recapitulation theory of human development was dominant still survive. The adolescent is thought to be passing through a period of storm and stress when it is natural and inevitable that he should rebel against authority. But some sociologists at least are convinced that the cordial, close, and even intimate relation with which the teacher starts in the primary grades could be kept unbroken and would be unaltered if the nature of the primary group were clearly grasped and the discipline of the schools altered to correspond with this knowledge.

But whether this is the key or not, there is surely a key to the difficulty. If it is not now known, then it should be discovered. There is hardly a more important problem in our American life. If we could have a single generation of children brought up to know our mores and to adopt them there would be a new nation, happier and better than we have known. Juvenile delinquency has many and varied causes, but one important source which contributes to the unwanted result is the spiritual isolation between young people and their elders. It is the contention here that the break is artificial and abnormal. It is not doubted that we are given the confidence and allegiance of the children to start with. It is uncontrovertible that we usually lose it to a large degree. It is arguable that the bond is never broken in the first instance by the child but rather by the erroneous procedure of the adults.

Whether we have found the solution is not so important. What is important is that the problem should be recognized as a problem. It is a problem for sociology and particularly for that branch of sociology known as social psychology. More investigation is needed before we can announce positive conclusions or issue definite programs. But surely the question of the effective and beneficent discipline of our children in our schools is a practical problem of the highest importance and one toward which the sociologist should be expected to make a contribution.

To fail to make the child know and accept the best ideals of his people is to deprive him of his rights. And just as the teacher who is limited in his freedom of expression feels that he has a right to protest, so the children who have been brought to withdraw from their elders or to rebel against them have a grievance none the less real because it was unconsciously inflicted and unconsciously suffered.

The children of preliterate people are more wisely reared than ours. The primary group attitude is always present and the channel of communication from old to young is ever open. The result is, at least in those most carefully studied on this point, that they can hardly be said to have a period of adolescence at all. Physical and sexual maturity is a matter of anatomy, but adolescence is a stage between childhood and maturity. Pre-literates are so well integrated that the transition is from childhood to the responsibilities and fellowship of the mature. The "young people" do not rebel against the elders because there are no "young people." A boy who has been initiated into the society of men is no longer a boy but fully a man. And since the discipline of childhood is so kindly and so wise, there is an absence of the break which seems characteristic of all civilized societies.

We have a much more difficult task than any primitive community. They tend to dislike change and succeed in discouraging it. Yet much could be learned from a careful comparative study of their discipline. But whether we get the cue from pre-literates or whether we work it out by studying and experimenting, it will, it is to be hoped, be recognized as a vitally important issue.

XIX

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MORES

One of my early childhood recollections is of a conversation between two prominent members of the church of which my father was pastor, whose remarks I was not expected to overhear. Said one Christian woman to the other, "You should be glad you did not go to church today, for if you had been there you would have been forced to shake hands with a Negro to whom we gave the right hand of fellowship." The Negro had given his heart to God, professed his faith in Jesus as the son of God, showed evidence of a change of heart and life, and had asked to be identified with the Christian church whose principles included the universal brotherhood of all mankind and repudiated all distinctions of "Jew or Greek, barbarian, Scythian, bond or free." The puzzled pastor had received this newly regenerated soul, but in the sequel, the treatment met made the relation unsatisfactory, and the black sheep left the fold. Today in the same community such an applicant for membership would be very rare, but if a case did occur, the pastor would know how to reject him in a Christian spirit and instruct him to postpone to the next world any program of associating intimately with his brothers in Christ.

Now there is nothing in the New Testament which commands or even justifies the current practice of race separation and race discrimination or race segregation. Nevertheless, a wise religious leader is forced to conform to current usages, and everyone, white or black, understands the necessity of it. The reason for this is perfectly clear to the sociologist. In present-day America race separation is in the mores.

We understand by the mores the ways of doing things that are current in a society, together with the faiths, codes, and standards of well-being which inhere in these ways. The mores come to be the expression of the specific character of a society or of a period. They are to be sharply distinguished from the institutions and laws, although they grow into institutions and laws

which, in turn, may greatly affect the mores. The chief distinction is that the mores are unwittingly created by the masses of the people as they meet the problems of their own lives. We do not even become conscious of our mores until we are led to consider the customs of another people or those of a different age. There are societies that have infanticide in the mores. The Ibibio of Nigeria always put twins to death immediately after their birth. In Greece, infanticide was in the mores and in the case of weak or deformed children was considered a sacred public duty. Our own attitude toward infanticide goes to the opposite extreme, and whole institutions are devoted to the tender care of helpless idiots whose prospects of development are admittedly desperate.

One important characteristic of the mores is their moral defensibility. The mores are always right, and any agitation to change them is always futile. The Greeks made eugenic arguments for their practice of infanticide, but such agitation in our age and among our people gets nowhere. We are unable to criticize our mores because they have become an integral part of our view of life and the world.

If the mores change, they change slowly, and the alteration is never due to individual initiative. Here there is no place for the theory of the great man. When the mores have been undermined by the indirect and impersonal forces, some leader may give the coup de grace, but he is only striking the last blow of a long series which others have delivered.

Among our own people, in the Middle Ages and somewhat later there was no opposition to brothels, and witchcraft was accepted as a reality by all. On the other hand, it was against the mores to take interest for money. We could not conceive of a Christian banker being called to account in our day for refusing to lend money on inadequate security, and yet for ages Christian people regarded it as a sin. It was John Calvin who gave the sanction to Protestants, but Calvin was only expressing a change in the mores which had been going on quietly for a long time.

The mores, then, present a perfect example of an impersonal and collective phenomenon which individual members of a society take in as they inhale the very atmosphere they breathe. For the people who accept uncritically the mores, and every people does and has always done so, are never the people who have

created them. The mores are always the result of the life of the past, and thus they appeal to us as being natural and normal, old and established, right and true.

A perfect analogy exists in the mother tongue which all of us have come to speak. We had no individual preference for the English language; we possessed no more inherited facility to speak it than French or Russian or Chinese, and yet we have come to express our thoughts in these words and carry on our communication in English phrases. We did not create the English tongue, nor did any man invent it. Moreover, the English language is changing and has always changed. There is hardly a single English word that is not wrong from the standpoint of the Anglo-Saxon speech from which it grew. Yet no one planned these changes, and few were aware of what was happening; so also with the mores.

A generation or so ago, in response to a crisis in our national life, America became a world power. In this way we differ from Switzerland, for example. Now, when the people of a nation have become a world power, they feel that they have the right to a voice in anything that happens anywhere in the world, whether it be in China, Samoa, or Central America. The result is that we have become more belligerent; we demand a navy second to none. We have a general staff preparing elaborate plans, euphemistically called defense plans, against Japan, England, or any possible enemy. The Daughters of the American Revolution or the convention of the American Legion find abundant support for this attitude. A Quaker president, whose religion has historically insisted on non-resistance, repeatedly announced the policy that we should make ourselves strong on sea and land.

Our mores are changing, and no one can find a man who is responsible, since there is no man who has brought about the change. It has grown up in the life of our people.

The study of the mores is important for leaders in education and in religion, for these forces in the mores are continually acting to modify the work of the church and of the school. Polygamy is not in our mores, and anyone who argues for polygamy among us may be said to waste his breath. Divorce is different. It is unquestionably in the mores. The church has stood against divorce, but the pressure of the mores to modify this attitude is

everywhere apparent, and the resulting change in the attitude of Christians can confidently be prophesied.

The mores of the Puritans forbade dancing, gambling, card playing and the theater. Slowly, but progressively, the attitudes and practices of the church on this question have been modified. Many a city protestant church has a dance in the building every Friday night and periodical bridge parties where the members indulge in this form of physical culture. Several departments in the Y. M. C. A. in Chicago are not only provided with billiard tables, which entered in several years ago, but permit card playing and smoking, and some provide dances, always, of course, properly chaperoned. The reasons for the change are interesting but not easy to obtain with certainty. The men who are responsible for the change will always have reasons, but they are apt to be rationalizations; that is, they are good reasons, though not the real reasons. From the standpoint of a larger theory of society, the phenomenon is an extension of the mores which are gradually adopted by those who opposed them.

We may, therefore, emphasize the three outstanding characteristics of the mores: their non-rationality, their irresistibility, and their continuously changing character.

The mores are not arrived at by reasoning. Since we acquire the habits which the mores prescribe, the result of participating in the life of our people, they come without reasoning and before reasoning. If challenged, we may be counted on to defend the mores, but another people will be just as logical or just as illogical in their defense of the opposite type of action. If we were asked to give a reason why a man owes his first duty to his wife as against his parents, we should at first be puzzled, but could soon find justification for our own beliefs and practices. Yet there are peoples where the very opposite view prevails, and it is held to be the only conceivable way in which the matter should be viewed, and the arguments which they make will be equally strong. But since the mores are non-rational in origin, the reasons advanced seem naïve and unconvincing to those who have inherited a different tradition. For neither we nor they have arrived at our custom by any scientific or rational process. The mores of a people are always a slow and unconscious growth and are able to make any custom seem right or to prevent the condemnation of anything.

Consider the attitude toward punishment which prevails among our people in our day. It seems to be a part of the moral order of the universe that a man who commits a felony should be sentenced to a lifetime of brutal treatment and deprived of all his rights as a human being. We know that it makes of him a wreck, a caricature of humanity. Moreover, the effect on the lives of those who guard and herd and punish him is always unfortunate. The time may come when Americans will regard this practice of ours with the same feelings which we have when we recall the treatment meted out a century ago to the insane, but neither the change we now see in the latter case nor the possible change that may come in penal administration could result from a sudden adoption of a rational plan, for punishment is now in the mores. Those who advocate the abolition of punishment altogether, and such advocates exist, receive but a negligible response from our people. This is not because they are wrong, for it is difficult to defend punishment from a rational point of view—that it does not deter and does not reform—but since we have nothing else to put in its place our people will not tolerate any suggestion to do away with it. Punishment is in the mores. The mores are non-rational, therefore, in the sense that the habits and sentiments are received by us all in a way and at a time when we are uncritically receptive.

The second characteristic to be emphasized is the irresistibility of the mores. They coerce individuals. This is not invariably true, but it is always true where the mores lack competition. Primitive men believe in magic, not because it works, but in spite of the fact that often it does not work. The mores make us impermeable to experience. The patriotism which our schools and churches inculcate into our children is responsible for the widespread sentiment that America never has done any wrong. When men are living in a community where the mores are dominant, they can neither resist nor criticize. It has been said that any one of us would have sentenced the Salem witches to death had we sat on the bench in the days when that custom was dominant. In such a situation there is no point of support for any opposing view. If the mores command us, we will obey without knowing we are commanded; we will trust the dictum in the mores in spite of the evidence of our own senses. When Joan of Arc reported her conversation with the angels, everyone

believed that she had seen them. But were angels from heaven to descend into this room at this moment, we should not believe; we should probably look for the cords and pulleys; failing to find them, most of us would remain unconvinced. Such beliefs are no longer in the mores, and so we cannot have them. When they were in the mores, our fathers could not resist them. Our only chance to be critical is given us when there is some choice between one formulation of the mores which contradicts another. If one wants to be an independent thinker, he should arrange to be born on a cultural frontier. In that case, if he does not become disorganized or cynically skeptical, he may approach a rational life.

In the third place, the mores are mutable. Living within them, we may not see the change, and we may not be conscious of their history; but they are never wholly fixed, and sometimes a great crisis will work a rapid transformation. Ideas on birth control have been gradually making headway among us, and economic forces of our time will probably bring it about that even in the Catholic church the change will be recognized and adopted. If this takes place, we may expect theologians to defend the new custom as skillfully as they now show its undesirability. The important consideration is the impersonality and the indirect nature of the forces which make the mores change. They change as our language changes, as the fashions change, and often we are not aware of the change until after it has occurred.

If now we inquire into the relation of the mores to religion and to religious education, we will find this relation more intimate than might at first be suspected. The historian of religion traces the changing conceptions of theology, the changing conceptions of God, of Christ and His work, and of the nature of the church and religion itself. These changes have been many and important. It was Carlyle who said that no man worships the God of his grandfather, meaning, of course, that the conception men have of God is undergoing continuous alteration.

But whence come these changes? Why is it that we reject a God who, before the foundation of the world, predestined a certain number of people to everlasting life and a certain unalterable and far greater number to everlasting punishment in a fiery hell? The historian tends to select some influential writer who has formulated the new conception. It would be truer to say

that the change was due to the mores, and when the moral ideals of a people have undergone a gradual change, the formulation of the church comes later to reflect this new view in its creeds. The atonement of Christ was once thought of as a commercial transaction in which Christ paid with his life the debt due from a bankrupt community. There was another time when men thought of the death of Christ as a ransom paid to the devil, who, in the war he had been waging against God, was almost victorious and who thus secured the release of the souls in prison. The explanation lies in the mores of the time. In a commercial age Jesus paid the debt, in a military era he was a ransom. It is not merely that the figures of speech and imagery were provided by the life of the time, it is far more than this. The very conception of right and wrong is different in different ages, and the mores of a people are crystallized in the convictions of the church.

Someone has called theology transcendentalized politics. It would be equally true to speak of theological beliefs as the idealized mores of an earlier time.

Sometimes it is charged that the adaptations, like those earlier referred to, in which the church or the Christian association makes a concession to the desires and customs of the young people, are objectionable because they represent a concession to evil and a surrender of conviction. This seems a superficial statement. Christian young people are allowed to dance or play bridge when the mores have changed so as to approve of these practices, or at the least to regard them as innocuous. The church has never successfully stood out against the mores of any age or any people.

If we were to leave the subject here, we should not only be greatly misunderstood, but we should be guilty of a serious error. The early sociologists who formulated the doctrine of the mores did stop here, and with grievous consequences to the clarity of their thought and the lasting value of their work. They knew that the mores were strong and that individuals had no power against them, and they made the natural mistake of assuming that we were helpless in our effort to guide our life and were condemned to wait for the tides and to drift without a rudder whither the currents should lead us.

This error, natural as it was, neglected the important aspect of the possibility of choice where the mores are complex. And in a great and populous country like America the mores are always

complex. It is untrue to say that the drinking of intoxicants is in the mores of the American people. It is very true that for large groups the mores permit and encourage the drinking of alcohol. It is equally true that for other areas and groups the drinking of alcohol is not in the mores. This has been true of whole populations, such as the Mohammedans. At a time when these two conceptions of life conflict and men are called upon to engage in strenuous campaigns for one side or the other of such a question, the whole irrationality and irresistibility may tend to disappear, and we may come to have the power to foresee the consequences and to make our decisions according to some alternative which we regard as offering the more desirable consequences. We may resist the mores at any point if we are presented with an alternative organization. Our habits are strong, but they can be reorganized.

The necessity of taking into account what the sociologist knows about the mores is nowhere more apparent than in the work of the foreign missionaries. The attitude of the typical missionary is one of a naïve acceptance of the mores of his own people and a confusion of the essentials of the Christian message with the non-essential customs with which he has all his life been familiar. The unconscious assumption that the native culture can be completely displaced by the culture of his own people has led to results which at some times have been mildly troublesome and in other cases have been rather thoroughly disorganizing. The work of the missionary will always result in a fusion or syncretism of culture elements. To uproot completely the native culture is impossible. The problem of what to conserve and what to discourage always presents itself, and a failure to state it in these terms may result in relative failure.

One group I knew well produced an unexpected commotion and almost a revolt because they insisted on the native Christians in Africa cutting their hair short. They had anticipated no objection but found the change to be accompanied by deep-seated emotional resistance. Not finding a convenient way to retreat, they finally won, but the result was not advantageous to the enterprise they were carrying on.

At another time the same group excommunicated a native Christian for allowing his relatives to give him a customary treatment of hot baths, on the ground that all native medical

measures must be rigorously opposed. On a third occasion a native chief was left to die without the attendance of the medical missionary because his people insisted on some supplementary native treatments. In this latter case the whole village was so shocked that the station was actually abandoned.

This failure to recognize and deal with the mores produces repeatedly an interesting cycle. The people who accept the new doctrines and customs find it interesting and satisfying, but the mores of a people are so strong in their hold on the affections and habits that there appears regularly a period of repercussion and reaction when those who passively tolerated the new doctrine become active in their opposition. The factors in the Protestant religious situation in South Africa are too complicated to be disposed of by a single formula, but I venture to express with confidence the opinion that the widespread revolt and consequent isolation of the native church from all white leadership, which in my opinion is almost a tragedy, could have been avoided had the missionaries taken into account from the beginning of their work the phenomenon of the mores and avoided the unnecessary conflicts. I do not presume to utter a prophecy with regard to what is happening in Central Africa, which is a later chapter in the missionary effort, but it is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that the methods now being employed there will eventually produce a native revolt quite according to the pattern of the South African church. This phenomenon of disregard of the mores, with the above-mentioned results, is not confined to Africa but can be made out in many other parts of the mission field.

Nor does the position here taken lack a certain interesting confirmation when compared with the methods of the Roman Catholic missionaries. Protestants tend to be contemptuous at times when speaking of these methods, referring to the product of their work as a certain compromise with heathenism. Undoubtedly this is true, but the stability of the native Catholic church is the reward that this compromise has received. Moreover, the logic of this discussion would insist that to a certain degree compromise is inevitable and should, therefore, be conscious and deliberate. This syncretism has always and everywhere taken place. The etymology of the word "Easter" is familiar to all scholars, and if the word "Easter" occurs in the New Testament

it is only because the heathen goddess of spring had been baptized into the Christian church long before the translation appeared. We are perfectly comfortable with the heathen evergreen tree ceremony at Christmas time, nor are we disturbed by Easter eggs or even Easter rabbits. Yet these are examples of the way in which the mores of our fathers were tolerated and revalued by those who brought Christianity to them.

The mores always seem right if they are old, but they are not always right, and when the mores are in conflict with other mores their rightness is no longer unquestioned. Religious leaders are not to be passive when confronted by undesirable mores, but a knowledge of how the impersonal customs of a people are changed would greatly add to the efficiency of any effort to transform society.

Religion is rational and individual in its critical points. In other areas, religion is social and emotional. Religious education seems to differ fundamentally from education in arithmetic. A knowledge of the mores will bring new appreciation of the place of ritual in the life of a people. Our children are given to us in a plastic and receptive condition. We cannot hope to carry on our culture in its essential aspects by an emphasis on problems or the assumption that little children should reason out carefully the ultimate values of life. Rather is it ours to choose the accepted formulations of our culture and, with modesty and humility, but with earnestness and devotion, strive to introduce into our common life the immature members as they come on. The mores do not lose their character as mores when they become Christian.

To understand these things should help us to acquire two very valuable virtues, sympathy for others when they follow mores which we do not accept, and modesty in our own attitude toward ourselves, our beliefs, and our practices. And since so much of our life is determined by the mores of our fathers and so much of our own history has been forgotten, we are far less responsible for what we believe and teach than we sometimes assume. Our originality is often the result of a defective memory.

XX

THE FUNDAMENTAL TENDENCIES OF CHILDREN

There was a time when no psychologist would have been interested in the question of the fundamental motives of children or their instinctive drives or tendencies. Within the memory of some very old men still living it was the accepted postulate of psychology that the child mind was like a blank sheet of clean paper on which could be written whatever fair words a wise teacher might choose to indite. It was the doctrine of evolution which chiefly destroyed this formulation and brought into prominence, some forty years ago, an entirely different conception. It became clear, and still is almost universally accepted, that action and emotional urges are anterior to thought and reason processes. No child ever passively receives the instruction of his teacher. On the contrary, he acts before he ever thinks and when he thinks it is normally because he wants to act. And this led to the doctrine of instincts.

Ten years ago the position was unchallenged that the picturesque repertoire of instincts easily described in the wasp, the ant, and the bee were present in even greater variety in the human animal, not at birth necessarily, for nestlings do not fly, but complete at the age of adolescence. This list of instincts was the foundation on which secular education and religious education were urged to build. But at present we are not so sure. The emphasis is again placed on plasticity and modifiability, and human instincts are impossible to describe in terms of anything which human beings do. All that is left of the maternal instinct, for example, even with those who argue strenuously for the retention of this adolescent tendency, is a feeling or "heart hunger" which never presents itself in any uniform expression. There has arisen the generalization that, if we arrange animals in a series, the instincts vary inversely as the educability. The bees are moved almost wholly by instinct but no successful efforts at training them are on record. Our children are of all the

animals the most amenable to training and their specific instinctive equipment is, to say the least, inferior to that of any other animal.

The food habits and preferences may help to make the matter concrete. The wild animals have "natural" foods. The zoologist can tell you what constitutes the food of the rabbit, the wolf, the eagle, and the whale. But the zoologist cannot tell you what constitutes the food of man. Apparently there is no natural food for man and if there ever was we have lost the clue. If one wants to know what a human being eats, he must appeal to the sociologist or the anthropologist. Human hunger is a physiological discomfort; human appetite is a cultural fact. The gusto with which the Eskimo sits down to his raw meat and bloody bones must be contrasted with the appetite for a vegetable diet of the Hindu, who turns away from refined sugar in disgust because it has been clarified by filtration through animal charcoal. John the Baptist never ate a ham sandwich, but most of us would say that he was welcome to his diet of grasshoppers. The western Indians regarded fish as poison, and the cannibal tribes of the world have been very numerous. In the matter of food, no dietitian presumes to ask what original tendencies or motives or drives of the infant are to be considered.

To come closer to our subject, let us consider the extraordinary diversity of religious allegiance, belief, and practice. Is it incredible to believe that if children are taken early enough it would be possible to bring up any normal group of them as Catholics, or as Lutherans, as Jews, Moslems, Buddhists, or atheists? John Stuart Mill and Bertrand Russell had atheistic parents whose wishes were followed out in producing the conviction of atheism in the minds of both of these gifted men. Is it unreasonable to assume that Saint Francis or Pope Pius under similar circumstances would have been atheists? For generations the Moslem conquerors in the Balkans demanded a toll from their Christian subjects, systematically taking their young boys and turning them into the fanatical Mohammedan Janizaries. Whatever their instinctive drives or motives or tendencies were, these children responded to the cultural formulation in which they found themselves. The human child is characterized by educability, and religiously he is capable of fitting into an infinite variety of cultural molds.

Now, if we inquire into the reason of all this, the first consideration is that culture precedes the individual. This statement may offer difficulties as thus phrased, but in the matter of religious education it offers no difficulty. What I mean is that the church is older than our children and the moral life which we admire and the principles of conduct which we hold dear have their structural formulation before the child has any interest in it. Moral and religious education, then, must be thought of as a process of transmitting a cultural heritage to the immature members of a society in order that they may carry it on, be true to it, and of course improve it.

For it must not be forgotten that we ourselves are the children of our age. The fact that we revise our conceptions must not disguise the more important truth that we worship the God of our fathers. No one would entertain seriously the suggestion that we should present the child with objectively scientific accounts of all the religions in the world so that he might make a free and voluntary choice. Who would be sufficient for these things? Protestantism, Catholicism, the Greek orthodox society, the seventy-two Mohammedan sects, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, these do not more than begin the list, and to make the suggestion that a child should have an impartial presentation of all these and the rest would be to run the risk of appearing facetious. In our effort not to impose on the personality of children we must not lose sight of the fact that we are the heirs of a religious heritage with the obligation to transmit it.

The central psychological aspect of religious education is not proof and demonstration but loyalty or allegiance. Children are growing and are eager to grow, and one way in which they love to grow is to become members of the company in which are found the older people whom they admire. The truth of Buddhism as over against Mohammedanism cannot be investigated according to the canons of laboratory science.

And here we must make mention of the current survival of intellectualism which emphasizes situations and involves an obsession concerning "problems." The resulting ideal is the familiar "discussion group." Now life has problems in plenty and our children have more than their share. Moreover, these problems are important, and in their intelligent consideration progress is made in the refined definition of values. But to center

excessive attention on problems is to lose sight of the vital importance of emotional loyalty, for analysis and criticism are appropriate only where the more important devotion and loyalty are in danger of breaking down. Religious education should have as the foundation of its method and should keep in the focus of its attention the achievements of our people and their efforts to live the good life.

The corrective of a vicious rationalism might be found in a renewed interest in ritual. It might be discovered that inadvertently more ritual is practiced than is realized. A careful observation of the annual conventions of social workers, or labor leaders, or even scientific societies would reveal an unexpected amount of warm emotional and inspirational ritual. But it is incidental and unwitting. The Roman Catholic church accomplishes its results to a large and perhaps unknown degree because of its beautiful buildings, its emotional pictures, and the recurrent and splendidly enacted drama in which the "Christian Epic" is presented afresh, week in and week out throughout the years. Not in discussion and analysis, not in rational proofs of theology, nor even in analysis of "problem situations" do they hold their members and fill their churches. Religion is social and collective, problems are individual and always unique. They leave these latter to the confessional and I believe they are right.

The current practice of some of the gifted leaders in religious education which seems to me to be so inadequately founded represents a reaction against a procedure which we would all agree in calling inadequate. Children have been herded together and told what they should do, how they should amuse themselves, and what they should think. This has often been done without any consideration of the children or inquiry into how they feel about it. The results of such an imposed program have been very disappointing, and the pendulum has swung to an extreme, owing to what seems to be a defective analysis of the difficulty. Children want to get certain things out of any association, and if these are present it seems hard to find limits to the type of group they will join or the extent of their devotion to it when they are in it.

If an attempt be made to set forth the conditions under which children will joyfully enlist themselves and continue their relation to a group, I venture to make the following points:

1. The group must have prestige. It must be a company to which he would like to connect himself. This prestige need not reside in the whole community; it may be a matter of family conviction. But if the group is one that does not seem attractive before he joins or does not appeal to him as being important after he is in it, there are difficulties which will be hard to overcome. A principle of the highest importance seems to be this: men do not join groups, nor do children, because they necessarily feel that they are like-minded with those in the group. It would be truer to say that we connect ourselves with groups because we are not like them but want to be like them. The church must have standing in the eyes of the child or he will never be sufficiently devoted to its life.

2. The next point is closely connected with the first. Children, like their elders, want to belong to a company which is larger than themselves and sink their individuality in the common devotion to a collective enterprise. It is not too much to say that everyone belongs to groups or wishes he could, and when the group is presented as an attractive goal with the prestige of society there is hardly any price that will not be willingly paid in order to belong to it. The first and greatest tendency, then, may be given as loyalty. He wants to belong and he wants to be true to something. But in his heart this exists as form without content. So far as we know, there is nothing in any child that would precondition him to be loyal to the Catholics rather than the Baptists.

3. Children, as well as adults, want friendship; they need closeness of companionship and personal intimacy. Many an Episcopal choir boy has sung till his voice changed, primarily because his friends were in the choir. How many of our interests have their origin in the interests of our friends cannot be said with accuracy, but no reader will fail to recall confirmatory experiences. The second general tendency, then, if we must mention it, is the tendency to seek friends and to value them. He who has no friends is lonely and unhappy, but as in the case of loyalty, this is really not a tendency at all but a vague and undefined craving, capable of being met in a thousand ways and leading to actions of a thousand kinds.

4. If you solicit children and hold them, you must in some way praise them. Approval is essential and if it be denied there is a

feeling of inferiority and failure. The extreme of this is despondency and despair. But here again, commendation and approval are only the form, and the content seems to be absolutely irrelevant. Children enjoy being approved for what they do, what they say, how they look, what they wear, or what they know. Fundamental as this hunger for praise is, there is no moral quality here residing. The gangsters in the city streets are inspired by exactly the same need for praise as are the leaders in moral crusades. The form is the same; the only difference is in the content.

Another condition might be mentioned, but it really belongs to the activities of the group itself rather than to the antecedent drives or tendencies. The group must have a program and the members of it must be doing interesting things. A group will be a failure if its activities are monotonous. The deadly sin is dullness. The psychological principle here is that purposes and goals of achievement must exist in the imagination of the children and when these are progressively realized there is always a lightening of the teacher's task. It is not difficult to hold the interest and enthusiasm of the children in the month of December if Christmas plans are skillfully used. Even the bad boys can often say that just before Christmas they are as good as they can be. Such devices may descend to a form hardly better than an unworthy bribe, but doubtless much of the failure of group instruction can be traced to the barrenness of the program and the lack of anything to look forward to. We do not object to a certain amount of routine and unconscious or habitual activity, but we do need interesting and stimulating objects toward which we can strive. And a group which solicits a child into its membership must find some such attractive images or lose the interest of its members.

What shall we say, then, of fundamental motives, or drives, or tendencies? Are we to return to the blank-paper conception of our fathers and think of the children as coming under our influence with no predispositions? Far from it. Very far from it. The children we have with us in religious education have many tendencies, desires, habits, and motives; but these are not inborn, they are socially inbred. The tendencies belong not to the nature of the infant but to the social experience of the girl and boy. The important thing is to know what crowd the lad has been running

with and what interests and ambitions he has picked up in his sojourn. The influence of motives, therefore, shifts from the individual child to the traditions and ideal of the groups to which he has belonged or with which he has been acquainted. The "fundamental motives" which the religious educator would need to consider on West Madison Street in Chicago would be very different from the "fundamental motives" which he would have to think of in a favored residential district. What the child has with him when he comes must be taken into account, but no analysis of general psychology is of any value here. It all seems to derive from the social experience. Whether a child is interested in baseball, adventure stories, swimming, or petty thieving is of importance, but surely one does not need to argue that the genesis of these is to be found in his prior associations.

Yet, even here some religious workers have been too timid. It is not wise to proceed in ignorance of the former ideals of a boy, but it is surely not necessary that closely allied motives shall be presented to him. For religious education, if it ever succeeds, must go into competition with the old motives and skillfully supplant them by better ones. It is not necessary in order to break up a boys' gang to organize another gang. It might be an appropriate action under some circumstances, but if the child comes at all he ought to come because he sees something better or more attractive in the new associations. There is nothing inappropriate in a week at a summer camp for the choir boys, but the same results might conceivably be obtained by periodical bean suppers with amateur dramatic performances under a skilled leader. Let the religious educator have faith in his power to change children. Civilization and culture operate on the raw material of human nature and succeed only after they skillfully organize these materials into a stable and worthy framework.

We conclude, then, that the fundamental tendencies of children, the original drives or motives are inaccessible, and the current effort to find them is wasted effort. The nature of normal children is such that they can fit into any skillfully presented cultural pattern. Children are at the mercy of their culture, but so also were their fathers. If the reader of these lines will pause a moment and inquire how he came to have the religious alignment which he now confesses and asks himself concerning the source of the principles of morals and religion which he holds

most dear, he will probably decide that very little of it is due to his own cleverness of originality. At best, we make a synthesis or a mosaic of competing formulations which have influenced us, and these are but a tiny fraction of that infinite variety of systems extant in our world today.

The important aspect, then, of motives in religious education is that they all have a history and that they can be created. Motives arise out of actions, and actions can be controlled if we can have command of the conditions. Essential as it is to note the motives that already exist, our chief effort should be to create the motives that we desire. We must not regard these motives as biological. Rather do they arise in social participation. Drives and tendencies are created in social experience, and the older and undesired ones can be replaced by later and more valuable urges. The energies of parents and teachers should be devoted to the task of so controlling conditions that new and powerful motives may lead to high endeavor in the interest of social welfare. He who deals with children will do well to ponder the profound saying of Dewey that it is the institutions which create our instincts.

XXI

DISCIPLINE IN THE MODERN FAMILY

In another connection we have tried to show the social origin and the social nature of individual tendencies and motives. Culture and customs around the world and through the ages present such variety that it is hardly too much to say that every evil has at some time been treasured and every good condemned. "The mores can make anything right and prevent condemnation of anything," wrote Sumner, and the facts he cited are convincing in their volume. From infanticide and the killing of the old to voluntary mutilation of the body, from ceremonial suicide and and the sacrifice of widows to the ceremonial slaughter of the king—all through the list of "atrocious" practices we see evidence of the plastic nature of the human material and the sensitiveness of culture to changing conditions.

And the moral of that is that the very children who grew up approving and practicing any of the customs so cited could have been reared to condemn them if transplanted at a sufficiently early stage.

Children have two sets of ancestors, and every man is as much the child of his time as he is the child of his biological forebears. Indeed, if we consider the evidence of the children of immigrants like Chinese or Negroes, it is the cultural that looms large. But whatever the decision concerning the unimportant question of the relative proportion of the two, it is very clear that human children are sufficiently plastic to speak any human language that is spoken around them, to accept any moral code that is approved in their community, and to engage in any practice with unquestioning approval, in the absence of conflicting and opposing complexity.

Whether the cultural tradition is right or wrong, good or bad, is not a matter for psychology. It is a matter of the highest importance, but it is not a matter for psychology. It is clear that Catholicism and Christian Science cannot both be true, since

they are fundamentally contradictory in essential points; but it is also true that a given child might be brought up a devout Catholic or a devoted member of the Mother Church of Boston without any hindrance from the family tree or the religion of his ancestors.

The psychology of family discipline must, then, refuse to consider the question of values and devote itself to the problem of how any given tradition may be wisely and adequately transmitted. For transmitted it can be if we know the methods that are to be used.

It is entirely proper to inquire concerning the right of the adults in any community to decide in advance what the child is to be taught and in what doctrines he is to be indoctrinated. There has been vigorous argument that it is presumptuous and unfair to prejudice the case and that each child should be left free to make his own system and to work out his own code and his own creed. Whether this position be sound or whether it be fallacious has, again, nothing whatever to do with our problem. If it be wrong to influence a child and if he should be allowed to work out his own salvation, there is little of the problem left, and the main injunction should be to keep hands off. But we are inquiring here as to the method it is best to adopt when, in the opinion of his elders, there is a tradition that the child does need to have. We wish to know the way in which it is transmitted and made strong.

It is in the primary groups that the soul of a child is fashioned. The intimacies of such a relation combine to give the first conception of himself and to define accurately the vagueness of his impulses. But what is essential in the nature of the primary group? It is in the face-to-face association and cooperation; it is in the free-flowing informality of the personal relations. The primary group has a quality of its own and is characterized on the negative side by its freedom from laws and formal official regulations and on the positive side by the intimacy of its contacts.

And here we meet an apparent paradox. The family in modern society can be, and sometimes is, a primary group only in the chronological sense. When paternal tyranny issues decrees, enforces commands and threats, and inflicts punishments, it is a primary group in name only; its character has little to identify it with that essential quality which will enable influence to be

transmitted and ideals to be taught. The first principle of family discipline is that the primary group should be kept "primary," for the primary group has bonds of its own, and the bonds cannot be broken if the group is not to lose its character.

If a precept might be indulged in, one would say: The child should be treated as nearly like an equal as possible—not exactly as an equal but as nearly like an equal as possible. For the primary group is one where mutuality of relations is the essential characteristic.

In the practical application of this principle, it is necessary to distinguish the prelinguistic stage, approximately three years, from the later period in which articulate speech gives the power to reason easily and makes a consciousness of self possible. This earlier period is important as a foundation for the latter life, for then the foundations of later habits are laid down. It is not too much to say that the question of discipline need never arise, though it often becomes a serious problem. But an infant should not be directed to do things. Instead of being asked to take a bath, he is bathed. He is not told to go to bed; he is put to bed. Although the early conditions play a large part, yet the difficulties are, for the most part, artificial and are traceable to certain misconceptions. We may mention two of them.

First, there is an underestimation of the strength of infantile impulses and a corresponding overestimation of the strength of the powers of inhibition. A candle flame will draw a child's hands into it dozens of times before the power to draw back is acquired. To expect "don'ts" and raps on the knuckles to inhibit later impulses is to invite disappointment. Every sensory experience is a motor impulse of more or less power, and it should be recognized that precept should await the years of linguistic competence.

In the second place, there is a defective theory of habit. Very young children can and do acquire habits, but obedience is hardly a habit; it is more properly called an attitude, since it does not stand for any specific act but rather represents a general tendency toward a mode of acting toward a given person. Inculcation of habits is perhaps wisely limited, so far as program is concerned, to routine acts and physical objects. It is more important that the relation toward parents and other adults be more generally conceived.

And so, in the early years, it seems hardly desirable to use negative methods. The little animal can be carefully transported and removed, adjusted and deposited, with no expressed or implied displeasure over the fact that he should have been elsewhere or done otherwise. Lovingly to overpower an infant, if necessary, is always possible, and it will be sometimes helpful to consider him as a precious little animal with neither gratitude nor principles, with little power to resist undesirable impulses, and incapable of deliberately doing anything that is serious enough to be the occasion for rebuke. A thoroughgoing mechanistic attitude toward an infant has much to recommend it and is a great aid to patience, for some adjustments have to be made not seven times, but seventy times seven.

The whole situation alters when a child has learned to talk and when, in his talking with himself, he acquires a conception of his own and other personalities. Not that this happens with suddenness, but it does happen, and the attitude of respect and mutuality which belongs to the "primary relation" comes into its own when the dignity and respect with which a child is constantly treated result in a feeling of dignity and self-respect on his own part.

This also has its negative side. Unless the design is that the child should become servile and lacking in initiative, it is necessary to avoid the orders and commands which are appropriate only to inferiors. That the child is inferior can easily be argued, but that he should consider himself inferior and that he should learn to take his purposes from another is not only not obvious but it would perhaps be denied in present-day discussion. But the fatal beginning of commands and authoritative directions means inevitably a further excursion into threats and penalties, and this sometimes leads to the development of a spineless type whose parasitic life bodes ill for subsequent efficiency. It sometimes leads to this result, but not always. At other times it produces rebellion and the negative "bohemian" type whose variations from accepted standards are of no value either to himself or to anyone else.

It is surprisingly easy to forego the autocratic regime and at the same time produce a disciplined character. This does not mean that the child is to be indulged and allowed to "do as he pleases." Much of the confusion encountered in making this

point clear arises from the notion that there is no middle ground between imposing the will of the elder and the stronger and allowing the weaker and the less experienced to make decisions unaided. The cultural influences are so influential and so overwhelming in their prestige that it is always possible to recommend them within the desired limits and to insist on them, if necessary, without breaking the bond or destroying the intimacy that belongs to a primary group.

To be quite specific, it is necessary to conduct the life of a primary group with none of the methods of a formal institutional organization if the character and value of the primary group be maintained. This means the absence of personal authority, commands, obedience, threats, penalties, punishment, and submission, for to resort to these is to institutionalize the family and to clog the feed-pipe by which the ideals of the group are to reach the heart of the child. And there is a more excellent way.

The vagueness and indefiniteness of the hereditary tendencies of children make them relatively easy to modify. There are no fixed instincts which have to be modified. There is, rather, the powerful urge to deserve approval and seek companionship. And the price a child will pay for these rewards is conformity with any cultural formulation. Personality is an organization of the social attitudes and the social attitudes are defined, always, by the others who stimulate and who respond. No child will feel critical toward the ritual or the dogmas of his ancestral religion in the absence of a competing and conflicting influence. We have already raised the question of the right of a parent to decide for a child. This is not in question. If the parent is in doubt about the truth or value of the formulation, it will be possible to leave the question open and to allow the child to decide for himself later according to the way in which he can work out his formulations for himself. What we are discussing is the method by which the accepted and important principles can successfully be made an integral and powerful part of the personality of the child. And even admitting that there are subjects which are in transition and on which the parent may not wish to be dogmatic or wherein he feels that the child should be allowed his own liberty, yet there surely remains a body of teaching concerning which it would be wasteful to allow the child to feel his way by trial and error. There are the code of courtesy, the beauty of fine manners,

the initial and subsequent attitudes about sex, and many more subjects. Concerning these it is a duty to teach as well as one knows how.

The secret of control is to be found in the attractiveness of the group to which the child belongs, the intensity of the group consciousness, the *esprit de corps*, and the strength of the morale. The first of these is given. The child is always attracted to his family group unless by unwise negative treatment he be alienated. His family may not really be the best family, but it is his and he yearns to be loyal to it. Group consciousness arises, to some extent, in the normal family experience, but it is well to attempt to increase this consciously, by reciting family history, transmitting family traditions, teaching about worthy ancestors, celebrating family festivals, and employing acceptable and attractive family rituals.

Morale is a feeling of confident assurance in the success of the endeavors of a group, and this is not difficult to cultivate. The best of us have our moments of self-doubting, and children more than they confess. If, in addition to the individual encouragement, there is the conviction of the worthiness and ultimate success of the family group, a source of strength and support is gained which is beyond price.

The pride of a son in his father is the result, in no small part, of the standing which the father is believed to have in the eyes of the community. Family discipline in the modern world is easier if the elders have prestige. But the relation is such that many of us can stand rather well with our children for a number of years before they discover how ordinary and commonplace we are. And by the time they have found us out we can have started them well along on their way!

It is the conviction of the writer that the crying need in the modern family is discipline. The earlier meaning of the word has been largely negative. The new methods must be positive. We must lead our children to be self-respecting American children, scorning a mean act, afraid only of dishonor, and loyal to the best traditions we know. In order to achieve this result we must avoid as the plague those repressive and punitive measures which produce either shadowy echoes on the one side or destructive nonconformity on the other. We need creative souls. Our children should make an advance upon our own achievements.

But before this is possible, they need to come up to the point we have reached.

Culturally, the family is a medium for transmitting the best in the life of the past to the citizens of the future. Our methods for doing this have been traditionally very unsound. The results are seen in the access of juvenile delinquency but infinitely more in the unhappiness of those whose sorrow no one knows. If we can learn the secret of it we shall have done something to bring in a happier and a wiser world.

XXII

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORISM FOR CHARACTER EDUCATION¹

By behaviorism is meant a particular "school" in vigorous and militant opposition to other schools and in frank opposition to psychology. The term "behaviorism" is sometimes applied to any psychological interest in the movements and actions of men, but the behaviorists themselves object very strongly to this extension of the word, and in the interests of clear thinking the distinction should be preserved and kept in mind.

To begin with, "behaviorism" does not denote the point of view of all students of behavior. "Behavior" is by no means a new word, and men learned to behave and talked and wrote about behavior long before the "ism" was added to denote a particular group holding a specific point of view. It is interesting, though not particularly important, to recall that the word "behavior" was originally an evaluative term, having to do with approved conduct. Children are still exhorted to behave, by which is meant that they should behave properly, should conform to standards. We cannot, therefore, discuss the implications of behaviorism by noting the uses of the word "behavior."

In the second place, while behaviorists are concerned with acts and movements, there is no monopoly of attention to this aspect of life which these writers can claim. Indeed, psychology has always been interested in what men do and how they behave, and particularly in the last forty years an increasing emphasis has been laid upon the overt and observable actions. If psychologists directed attention to what goes on "in the mind," this was only for the purpose of explaining more adequately what happened in the actions. Mental life has long been held to be the effect of past behavior and the condition of future behavior, and behavior-

¹ The word "behaviorism" is used with various meanings. The conception here discussed is the definition which Professor John B. Watson himself has repeatedly insisted upon.

ism did not arise until this interest had become a fixed tradition among psychologists.

Though behaviorism is professedly concerned with an objective method of investigating conduct, this concern does not differentiate it from psychology. The behaviorists advocate watching and listening to what the individual does and drawing scientific conclusions from the results. This method is, however, much older than behaviorism. A list of achieved results which psychologists have produced in this way would be very long. Before behaviorism was invented there appeared the now conventional mental tests in which children are presented with certain little puzzles, and their success or failure in solving the puzzles, together with a record of their birthdays, led to far-reaching investigations and important deductions. The memory experiments using nonsense syllables, the photographing of eye movements in studying the psychology of reading, are but random instances of scores of completed researches which were planned and carried out in complete independence of behaviorism.

Behaviorism is to be contrasted with psychology, but the distinction does not lie in its interest in behavior nor in the advocacy or use of observational methods of investigation. As elaborated by its gifted founder, its distinguishing characteristic seems to be not a method but a philosophy. It is a philosophy of mechanism and materialism, involving a complete ignoring of mental life and even a denial of it. No behaviorist admits that he has a mind or that he is conscious or that his feelings are involved. The reason assigned is that conscious behavior, mental life, and feelings are not accessible to observation. If behaviorists cared to insist that they were investigating only a fraction of human life, and that other methods were necessary to get at the rest of it, there would be no controversy at all between behaviorists and psychologists. As it is, behaviorism vigorously excludes mental life and consciousness as being not only unimportant but as non-existent. Everything is to be stated in terms of physiology, which reduces ultimately to physics and chemistry.

Behaviorism, therefore, appears as a sort of enterprise resulting from a self-denying ordinance. The attempt is to see what can be learned about human life by neglecting the mental aspect. Behaviorism thus appears as a sort of stunt. It is like a man who tries to swim a river with his hands tied behind him. It is

as if a person should drive a car through the streets, blindfolded. Both of these exploits are possible and have been done. It would, however, be inadmissible to conclude that hands and eyes are not helpful. It would be even more difficult to deny their existence. The behaviorist attempts to study human life by observing movements, but the psychologist is interested also in the feelings, attitudes, and aspirations. Those interested in character education are concerned with faith, hope, and love. They are interested in investigating honesty, sincerity, and conscience. Now these are all related to behavior, but they are also aspects of life and they involve experiences which external observation never hopes to find.

It ought not to be difficult to state the issue. The most important word is, perhaps, "experience." Now, experience includes movement and actions, but it seems to include more. Every psychologist regards the movements of men as highly important. Indeed, what a man does, if doing be defined with sufficient inclusiveness, will determine what the man is. A doctor, a lawyer, a preacher, a thief, a bootlegger, a murderer—none of these can be defined or known apart from certain characteristic actions.

But here arises the crucial question. The actions which men do are sometimes very slow in being done, and before the actions are performed there are many things which may happen to a man which no one can see. Moreover, when the act is over there are feelings of satisfaction and joy or of disappointment and disillusionment which are not always wholly registered in a man's face, nor are they always registered in his speech. Character education can never neglect the experiences of men. Not that all experience is wholly inner or subjective, for it is really never wholly subjective, but experience does not wholly yield itself to external scientific record. The history of all religions is eloquent of the assertion of the importance of the inner fraction of our lives.

Another way to bring out the contrast between behaviorism and psychology would involve the notion of habit. Now, habits are important, and since they tend to be mechanical, are naturally the object of attention from the behaviorist. Education should concern itself with good habits and, indeed, has always done so, but it seems doubtful whether habits are all we need to strive

for unless we extend the meaning of the word "habit" to include mental and emotional habits, which behaviorism would at once forbid. The effort to reduce all life to habit might succeed in a society so fixed that change would never occur and difficulties and problems would never arise. In that case each one could live and die in the place in which it had pleased God to call him. But the world we live in is not so simple. We have many habits, some of which help and some hinder, but we have problems and difficulties for which no habits are available and which require us to think, to strive, to plan; and when we think and contrive, psychology has found it necessary to investigate the imagination which seems always to be involved.

In this type of problem the point can be made clearer by illustration. Misled by the fact that language can be analyzed into words and that each word has to be learned, behaviorists have insisted that language and speech are habits. There is just enough truth in this contention to conceal the error. A man who is suddenly called upon to rise and address a dinner party may be at a loss to reply effectively, and if he does manage to get through with a few remarks, it is very unlikely that his speech would receive or deserve the name of habit. At this moment this chapter is being written. If the writer were in the habit of producing pages on behaviorism and character education, the paragraphs would run off much more smoothly. There are some definite notions which are being formulated, and there is a vivid feeling that it might be better done. Clearly the word "habit" is quite unsatisfactory to designate what is being done in phrasing the words of this discussion. There seems to be thinking and striving going on and a certain attempt to discover some method of making explicit and convincing the thoughts which the writer is endeavoring to express. There is much more in experience than habit.

In the emphasis on habit behaviorism has a double motive. To insist that habit is all, is to deny that imagination is anything. It ought to be clear that character education is concerned with imagination. It is concerned with the formation of objects in the minds of children and their elders. Behaviorism naïvely asserts that a word is a conditioned reflex, so that we react to the word as we do to the thing. But psychology insists that the conception of the object is the important middle phase of action.

In religious education children are taught to have right ideas about God, the church, the nation, and the home. These ideas involve what we may speak of as attitudes. They are not exactly habits, although they might be called habits of mind or habits of thought or habits of feeling. But they are not observable habits. A child with an attitude of devotion to his father will confine his actions to a certain area of performance, but the emergency or the situation will determine what is done, even when there is no habit at all. A loving attitude toward one's mother may mean an offer to help with the work, a plan to provide a pleasant surprise, or an acceptance of some request or command. It is in this insistent emphasis on habit and the unwarranted assertion that habit and learning are the whole of life that the contrast of behaviorism with psychology is most conspicuously felt.

Another consequence of the behavioristic assumption of mechanism is an unwarranted position concerning stimulus and response. This has had a great influence on the preparation of tests and certain types of investigation, but the influence has not been altogether wholesome. Misled by the fact that much of our life can be formulated in terms of stimulus and response, behaviorism asserts that all human actions can be so comprised. Now this position has been thoroughly criticized, and upwards of thirty years ago John Dewey published a critique which has been followed by many similar discussions, notably those of Bode, Mead, and Znaniecki. One looks in vain, however, for any awareness of this criticism in the controversial literature produced by the behaviorists. To some of us the objection seems positively unanswerable.

This point is so important that an attempt must be made to set it forth. First, we must observe that stimulus and response do occur whenever a habit is suddenly evoked by its appropriate "cue." There is every warrant for speaking of the movement as a response to a stimulus. A sleepy baby will respond in this way to a nursing bottle, for there is an existing mechanism. A man working at his desk will answer the telephone automatically with a minimum of effort, for here again is a mechanism. Some of our mechanisms are inherited but most are acquired. All, however, are to be thought of as in the structure of the body and are the result of organization.

But not all movements are responses to stimuli. In a changing and contingent world it is impossible to foresee every situation or to provide by means of drill and training for every emergency. We are confronted with new problems for which we have no adequate response, and where there is no response there can be no certain stimulus. Stimulus and response involve relation, an organization. If the unknown is pressing and insistent and sufficiently strange, there may be utter confusion and total disorganization. There is neither habit, mechanism, object, stimulus, nor response. Internally there is disorganization and search for response; externally there is vagueness and search for stimulus. If and when the problem is solved, and not until then, stimulus and response emerge. Organization succeeds disorganization. In Dewey's classic phrase, response in such cases is not to the stimulus but into the stimulus.

The response, then, may be said to *constitute* the stimulus, for a stimulus is such *because* we respond to it. An article is food because we eat it, and we make it into a food by eating it. A woman is precious because she is loved; friends are *made*, and so are enemies. If this point of view be accepted there is involved a complete restatement of the familiar and over-simplified behavioristic doctrine, for in human experience are involved imagination, tentative ways of conceiving, various attempted definitions of object, and the final selection of some conception that will harmonize and organize this particular moment.

In the field of religion and character education such experiences are well known and are all important. When a scornful non-believer is converted after an emotional crisis, there is involved a redefinition of old objects, a different cluster of images around the familiar concepts. To such a person the Bible is a different book. The important aspect is his conception of God, man, the church, and himself. These must all have been reorganized, and this is to say that he has secured new responses and thereby created or organized new stimulations.

But stimuli and responses are the *result* of his striving and contriving. He has not acted in response to a stimulus but has so organized his chaotic life that he now has new stimuli and new responses. Response and stimulus are not effect and causes but occur simultaneously. They are, strictly speaking, correlative. Our objects, therefore, exist in our imagination. Cooley has

shown in a brilliant statement that even our friends exist for us as images of possible movements. My friend is one whom I think of as a person who will speak pleasantly to me, clasp my hand warmly, or lend me money. He is not to be described in terms of muscles and bones and glands, but rather of the imagined responses which I think of. If the friendship is destroyed, the muscles and glands are still there but the imagined activity has disappeared and my friend is gone.

There is, therefore, a whole realm of character education and religious experience which behaviorism is professedly incompetent to investigate, or even to characterize. It is more important, says James, to know your lodger's philosophy of life than to know his bank account. Psychology finds this point of view in much of the ancient wisdom. Psychology would approve the ancient maxim, to keep the heart with all diligence since from it are the issues of life. Behaviorism, however, would throw this away. It seems that thoughts, conceptions, principles, and ideals, while not independent of behavior, are essential aspects which need to be studied and without which the external movements cannot be understood.

This discussion has turned out to be controversial and polemic. When it was begun there was no such intention, but the treatment seems inevitable, and the reason is that the contribution of behaviorism is not in its methods but in its philosophy. Even if we set down to the credit of behaviorism a certain stimulation of attention to objective methods this is, as earlier remarked, neither original nor new and would certainly have gone on had behaviorism never appeared. We may accurately characterize behaviorism as an attempt to state the essentials of human life by denying the mental or conscious aspect of it. At present the controversy is at its height. If one might risk a prophecy, it would take the form of a conjecture that within ten years the extreme position of behaviorism will have been greatly modified. In the opinion of the writer the sooner, the better.

The effect of behaviorism and its influence have, however, been great. One interesting result has been the increased activity of many gifted workers who deal with tests and statistics. Of course, neither tests nor statistics can be credited to behaviorism since they began much earlier, but there is a certain inhibition which one discovers in the writings of contemporary investigators

who fear to use the words "feeling" or "thought" or "imagination" because they are out of favor with behaviorists.

There seems to be no cause for concern. It ought to develop rather promptly that while statistical methods reveal aspects of life, and even of personality, which can be discovered in no other way, the statistical treatment of observed actions will serve only to lead up to the important problem of the inner aspect of life and mind. What we think and feel, what we imagine and strive for, what we remember and hope—these are as important as ever, and even from the behaviorists, who deny that these exist, there may come some useful observations on the other half of life which can be seen and measured. It is idle to talk about which is important, the outer and more observable, or the inner and hidden. Neither exists without the other. Both must be taken into account in any adequate statement concerning human nature and the possibility of education.

PART IV
SOCIOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY

XXIII

PRELITERATE PEOPLES: PROPOSING A NEW TERM

Conservatism in terminology is always desirable. An indiscriminate coinage of new words is not to be undertaken lightly, for this involves a waste of time and effort, impairing the continuity of scientific writing. Science has been called funded knowledge, and if each one gives free rein to his desire to use new words, it is difficult to add to the edifice of our predecessors, or to ensure that those who follow us will profit by what we have done. In the matter of a term for designating those peoples who are the subject matter for ethnological research, there is, however, an apparent need for a better term than those now current.

For some time the writer has been using in lectures and class discussions the term "preliterate" to designate the peoples of the *sociétés inférieures*, as Lévy-Bruhl calls them. These pages are written to suggest the term to scholars at work in the fields of ethnology, sociology, and psychology as a more objective word than any of those now current. The term is obviously suggested by Lévy-Bruhl's word "pre-logical," and it seems even more defensible than that very questionable word. Upon a very cursory consideration of the writings in this field, the need for a new terminology becomes apparent. Goldenweiser has recently broken away from any attempt to make a distinction, and entitles his book *Early Civilizations*, treating as civilized the Eskimos, Australians, Central Africans, and Iroquois. This use of the word "civilization" has been criticized as an unwarrantable extension, robbing the word "civilized" of any content, for indeed if all peoples are civilized, we shall need a new word to indicate the great difference in culture that separates us of the modern tradition from the societies found in Melanesia, Central Africa, and Greenland.

The history of terminology in this field is long but need not be recounted in detail. It would include, among others, the words "pagan," "heathen," "barbarian," "savage," "primitive," "lower races," "nature peoples," and several others. The

etymology of these words reveals them to have been objective in origin, though they have acquired a content which ethnocentrism has turned into depreciation. We know that the pagan was originally merely a villager, that the heathen was at first merely a plainsman, and that the savage was originally only a forest-dweller. These words have, however, all acquired a meaning which has led to their gradual abandonment as scientific terms. How recent this development is, will appear from recalling the title of one of Dewey's epoch-making papers which he called the "Interpretation of the Savage Mind."

The word now most widely used is "primitive," by which men from Herbert Spencer to Boaz, in works including some of our most valuable literature, designate those peoples and cultures which I propose to speak of as "preliterate." The most recent book in this field, that of Lévy-Bruhl, which appeared in English in 1923, is called *Primitive Mentality*.

The objections to the term "primitive" are several. It is ambiguous. There was a primitive man, and concerning him much has been written. The myths all describe him, and Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and many more have set down in detail the picture of him as they conceived him. The primitive man of Hobbes was the hypothetical, primordial being who was presupposed in a political theory. Rousseau described another one, quite opposite in character, but imaginary. Herbert Spencer in accordance with the preconception, which we no longer entertain, identified contemporaneous peoples of preliterate cultures with primitive man, and since Spencer the word has been widely used to denote the Bantus, the Polynesians, the Negritos, and all those peoples outside the cultural influences of Europe and Asia.

It needs no argument to show that primitive man, so designated, is not really primitive. Their culture is very old, their languages are complex and highly developed, and their inheritance goes back very far. They are often referred to now as "so-called primitive peoples."

"Preliterate" seems a far better word. It is neutral, connoting no reflection of inferiority, and is, therefore, objective and descriptive. Moreover, it may well be that the introduction of a written symbolic language is the chief differentiation between the culture of city-dwellers and those who belong to the "lower societies." But whether this be true or not, it is evident that

none of the peoples we include in the terms "savage" and "primitive" possesses a developed, written language. This is not because such peoples cannot learn to read and write. Missionaries and teachers have proved that letters are not impossible to them. They have simply not had the opportunity to learn. They are not literate, nor illiterate. They are preliterate.

Preliterate man is, then, one in whose culture there is no written literature. And it is obvious that such a person is in a very different situation, culturally, from an *illiterate* person, by whom we mean a man who cannot read what other members of his society have written and can read.

It would be interesting to attempt to set forth the changes in a culture which the introduction of writing brings about. For writing means record, and the records of a vanished generation make possible a continuity of culture otherwise impossible. Literate people have a history; preliterate peoples have only oral tradition. And the difference is analogous to the possession by a person of memory. To lose one's memory is to lose one's personality. And something analogous to the acquisition of memory takes place when the records of the past give us an attitude toward our ancestors otherwise impossible. Moreover, written instruments transcend not only time but space and make possible the integration of societies into larger units, thus adding a new dimension to life. It is no accident that civilization is derived from the word "city," for preliterates do not really have cities. At the most they have large villages.

Literature begins with Egypt, and in spite of many differences between the civilizations of China, India, Greece, Rome, Babylon, and medieval Europe, one is constantly being impressed with the fact that all of these civilizations have many points in common which differentiate them clearly from that large outer group whom we speak of as preliterate.

Modern man may be differentiated by several cultural elements, but science, in the sense of controlling nature, is perhaps the most outstanding one. For this we go back very far to get the germs, but the full expression is a matter of only a few generations. Mathematics, objective science, and humanism differentiate us from the ancients. A written language differentiates both us and the ancients from those who have not yet learned to write—the preliterates.

XXIV

ETHNOLOGICAL LIGHT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

It is at once fortunate and unfortunate when the important practical problems are also the problems of greatest interest to the theorist. It is fortunate, for it gives a sense of reality and vitality to the work of the theorist, which is a distinct advantage: it is unfortunate in so far as it tends to becloud the issue with prejudices and interests which even the scientist may often vainly strive to escape. These prejudices and interests not only confuse the mind of the investigator, hindering his method and warping his conclusions, but they condition the reception of his work by his critic and his public, with lasting detriment to the cause of truth.

There are many questions, of concern to the social psychologist, which fall within this category and which clearly show the effect of preconception and bias. I have in mind such questions as the relation of nature to nurture, the relation of original nature to the modifications effected by social experience, including the origin of the differences between the several racial and national groups. Of most emotional interest is the problem of the capacity and possibilities of the colored races, and the effects of miscegenation. Less important, but still within the list, would come such questions as the nature of religion and of superstition, the differences between the sexes, the problem of the nature and number of the human instincts or whether there should be any such instincts assumed, the relation of the individual to the group, and such like.

The greater part of these questions are rightly regarded as psychological, and the sociologist usually assumes that their solution must come from individual psychology and that groups cannot be understood without the possession of these solutions from the laboratory. Now, the ethnologist has a similar problem, and he has decided that he does not need to wait for the results of

psychology. At least Lowie has so argued in his *Ethnology and Culture*. Of course the ethnologist is chiefly interested in setting forth the objective cultures and, as his material is objective, his ideal is to form hypotheses without assumptions concerning the mental processes of the people whom he studies.

It is the object of this paper to call attention to the attitude toward social origins which the sociologist can take and which has been so much neglected. If we assume that personality is a group resultant, that human nature is inconceivable apart from language, then it is clear, since there is no such thing as a language in general, that personality will develop in a concrete local situation. If we assume that human nature cannot be conceived apart from wishes, and if we agree that ideals and life-organizations can only exist in a society, then the study of social origins ought to throw much light upon human nature. Each group develops its own type of leadership, and its own brand of human nature, and the study and comparison of widely separated groups is, therefore, one method of studying psychology.

The psychological methods are familiar, being matters of common knowledge. Introspection has never been wholly discredited, but its limitations have been increasingly recognized of late, for introspection is always memory, and memories, alas, are influenced by our wishes and greatly modified by them. Moreover, the wishes of the individual are always related to the wishes of the group, the purposes of the individual to the purposes of the group, so that introspection reveals human nature as modified and fashioned in social life.

Experiments in laboratories have clarified many difficult questions, but the results have, on the whole, been of most value when the problems have been most simple. Experiments on sensations have yielded the largest results, and in these cases it is not always easy to distinguish psychology from physiology.

A distinctly newer method is that of abnormal psychology. The recent and well-known attempts of Freud and others to apply the concepts used in their work with neurotic patients to normal psychology are not so helpful as was at first hoped. And when the writers go farther afield and explain social origins by psychological principles, it is no longer acceptable. The explanation of totem and taboo by Freud which enables him to explain the culture of African natives on the basis of the dreams of neurotic

Austrian women is as simple and naïve as it is unsound. A recent explanation of this method recites the story of a Fuegian who related that the first man climbed down out of heaven on to earth by a grapevine. The psychiatric ethnologist writes that this is frankly a sex myth, the inverted bowl of the sky being the uterus, and the grape-vine being the umbilical cord!

Still another type of genetic explanation has arisen from a study of the war neuroses of soldiers. Now, soldiers who break down with so-called shell shock are for the most part suffering from fear. The abnormalities of sex observed among them are most apt to take the form of homosexual practices. And it was to be expected that the writers on these cases should attempt to apply the conclusion to social origins and the mind of primitive man. The influence of this can be seen in *Psycho-therapy* by Kempf.

All that needs to be pointed out in this connection is that psychiatric theories of primitive man assume a sort of recapitulation and vestigial reversion which does not stand the test of objective field investigation. Primitive man is not to be understood nor most clearly viewed from the consulting room of the neurologist in one of our great cities.

Quite another method of studying human nature is that of animal psychology. Unfortunately, this is chiefly anecdotal in character and uncritical in the highest degree. It can hardly be called a method of explaining instinct. It is rather a custom. Most of the discussion of curiosity, constructiveness, fear, anger, and such like has leaned chiefly on the dog, the wolf, the ant, and the bee. An Englishman recently wrote a book on human instincts, the greater part of which is taken up with the opinion of former writers of books, but when one comes toward the middle of the volume upon the first discussion of an instinct, it is concerned with the wild ox of Demaraland.¹

None of these methods should be minimized. In their own field they stand independently and even outside it they sometimes suggest analogies and insights that are of great value, but they do not get to the real data of their problem. If we are to understand human nature, we must study human nature; and if we study human nature, we must not study some unreal and

¹ Of course this does not refer to experimental animal psychology, which is not a study of human nature at all but exists quite independently.

deceptive abstraction of it. Individual or differential psychology is a very fruitful field, but its data are partly social.

In one sense it is true that the views of human nature which we now hold to be erroneous have a common error. They all tend to identify the natural with the familiar. They failed to take account of the larger human group. Savages they did not have access to, and babies were not considered of sufficient importance. The philosopher who believed in God thought of his belief as natural. He who believed in a king held that the rule was by divine right and in accordance with the very nature of the universe. Those who opposed a doctrine did so from the belief that their own introspections were a revelation of nature itself. Descartes taught that ideas were inborn, but the inborn ideas of Descartes were those current in the Europe of his day. Locke taught that the mind was a blank and the slate wiped clean, but he made no study of children, nor did he have any real method of assembling facts.

The confusion of nature with the customary still exists as a heritage from the Greeks themselves. They, indeed, made a distinction between nature and convention, but the nature which they described seems to us to be merely an older convention. Aristotle taught that it was natural for a Negro, but not a Greek, to be a slave. In the Stoic's worship of nature, the wrongs and ills to which men were accustomed were inflicted on the sufferer by nature. Said Marcus Aurelius, "When you kiss your child, say to him, 'Perhaps you will be dead tomorrow.'" Mr. Strachey records of Doctor Arnold that when he lay in pain upon a couch he asked his son to go thank God for this pain which had been sent to him. Many who read this passage feel that somehow the poor are the naturally unfit. McDougall in his book *Is American Safe for Democracy?* records that the Negro race is very strong in the instinct of submission.

The point of all this is that men have generalized broadly upon a fractional experience, in realizing the extent to which plastic human nature can be made to assume definite forms. Instincts asserted of human beings have been created by psychologists and sociologists alike to "explain" any given phenomena, whether war, pioneering, or vagabondage. Biologists may doubt the Darwinian formula of survival and natural selection as applied to individuals, but psychologists have kept the faith when con-

sidering instincts. We have plenty of trouble now, but in the Golden Age nature was always right and every instinct was brought in on account of its survival value. The implications of the current doctrine are three in number:

1. Instincts are the same in man and animals.
2. Instincts exist because they were first useful.

3. Instincts can be observed in their activity by anyone who will make himself familiar with human conduct.

A corollary of these beliefs is that individual psychology formulated according to this method is a prerequisite to the question of group life.

It seems necessary to question all these assumptions. There is probably a real difference between man and the animals. A study of cultural groups does not wait for the psychology of the individual. On the contrary, the individual can be known fully only by means of the methods of social investigation. The group will help illuminate the nature of this process.

And here comes in the task of the sociologist, for it is he who is chiefly interested in the processes of human nature which are involved in culture and which the ethnologist notices only incidentally. If the problem of instincts cannot be solved by a study of primitive peoples, at least the problem could be greatly illuminated. One writer asserts that hunting and fighting alone interested primitive man. Therefore, all work is drudgery and no one ever really likes it. The student of primitive life might investigate further instances of the building of houses, clearing of land, child-caring, and other forms of group life which bear no relation to hunting or fighting, and which are intensely interesting. The findings on this subject would throw much light on the theoretical question involved. Graham Wallas insists that the human race inherits an instinct for irregularity in work, and since primitive man did no regular work, modern man finds it irksome. The response of primitive people to regular work, like their response to regular meals, could be noted, and the facts ought to throw some light on the problem.

The burden which primitive man has to bear is very heavy at the present time, particularly the moral burden. Primitive man is blamed for juvenile delinquency, marital infidelity, family desertion, dislike of work, and for crime and war. The thin veneer of civilization is a metaphor from the furniture

factories at Grand Rapids, but it implies an unjustifiably uncharitable view toward the poor savage. Anyone who has carefully studied the literature of primitive peoples and has given due weight to the absence of punishment of their children, and who has considered the relative completeness of the social control which they have developed, will look for another explanation of our adolescent rebellion. It is entirely possible that we ourselves have invented many original sins and that there are new and modern ways of acting the fool. Certainly, the question of a native tendency to storm and stress on the part of the adolescent can be illuminated by a study of primitive peoples. On this, as on many psychological problems, it is possible to shed much light from ethnology.

Many other questions, such as that of the culture epochs on which hang the question of recapitulation, the question of sex differences, and the relation of the individual to the group, are all capable of illumination by methods which include the comparison of cultures.

For example, the theory of culture epochs is passing in ethnology. Polyandry was supposed to be a phase of culture having a definite relation to a specific form of economic organization. When, however, it is found that polyandry exists in Tibet where there is agriculture, among the Todas who are pastoral, and among certain Eskimo tribes who are still hunters, the conclusion which the social psychologist is led to make is fairly obvious.

Another instance of the value of this method is in the names of relationship which the ethnologists are now studying with great zeal and promise of interesting results. When we find that among many peoples there is no word for father or mother, but only a word denoting parent; when in other societies there appears no distinction between child and grandchild, or between mother and aunt—when these and a score of other similar facts are noted, the conclusion is inevitable that the psychological basis of the family is a more variable phenomenon than is usually assumed. On this psychological problem there remains yet much light to be shed from the study of primitives.

The study of words is in itself very instructive, and the structure of the grammar of primitive peoples which is as yet so imperfectly known, will in future lend much real aid to the study of human nature.

The sex differences are still highly important to us and form a problem as yet quite unsolved. Schurz in a classic utterance has explained the outstanding fact of primitive life to be the well-known psychological fact that women are not gregarious. Mrs. Talbert, however, in her work among the Ibibios describes a most elaborate system of secret societies, thus discrediting the explanation by objective citation of new facts.

The question of diffusion, as against independent origin, which is now a storm center of ethnological debate, must be settled by the ethnologists and the anthropologists among themselves. The argument is often so heated that epithets and names fly very freely. The sociologist should and will wait for the experts to agree, but the point here is that when they shall have agreed we shall be able to know much more than we now do about the relations of the individual to the group.

The social psychologist must no longer assume that he cannot attack the problem of collective behavior or understand cultural groups without a working theory of individual psychology. Social psychology was at one time proposed as the science of the individual as modified by the social processes of the group. We must take seriously the statement that no such pre-existing individual is discoverable.

Primitive man has very frequently been invoked as an explanation of some social phenomenon of modern life. He has oftener been coerced into justifying a political interest or buttressing an established practice. He has at times helped a devoted reformer in his effort to uproot established institutions that have cumbered the ground. He has done much service in furnishing the human element in mythologies and cosmologies. Sociologists have used him to furnish concrete confirmation of their deductive conclusions. Herbert Spencer used him to show that evolution demanded a halfway stage between animal and man. Sumner brought him in to prove that man is an irrational and helpless creature, too plastic and too helpless to boast. Westermarck employs him to illustrate his own doctrine of instincts and the emotional doctrine of morality. McDougall makes use of him, as do most psychologists, to illustrate and confirm the doctrines of the instincts.

Few of us have, however, studied him. Here lies a vast treasure of psychological knowledge for the most part untouched.

Primitive man who is really primitive is gone and gone forever. None of us ever saw him alive. Contemporary uncivilized peoples exist, and the careful, objective, scientific study of their manners, customs, ritual, speech, and other behavior is destined richly to reward those who are able to study them. We may, indeed, hope to solve some of our theoretical problems here.

The social psychologist must no longer assume that collective behavior can be studied only after we have in hand a complete statement of the nature of the individual. Social psychology is not merely a study of the modification of the individual that occurs in social situations. It is time to realize that these facts are ready at hand and that the individual whom psychology was supposed to study does not exist and never did. And, since he does not exist, he cannot be modified in a social group. On the contrary, he is created in a social group. He can be found only by looking there.

THE MENTAL CAPACITY OF PRELITERATES

The conception of the mind of "primitive man" held by Herbert Spencer¹ had the advantage of aesthetic symmetry and proportion. If animals can be arranged in serried ranks, and if the highest of these is infinitely below the civilized man, there ought surely to be, not only a missing link, but also grades or ranks of men varying in their capacities and possibilities. If this assumption be made, and if the isolated sentences quoted from travelers and residents among savages be duly cited, it is possible to make out a good case, as the classical statement of Spencer shows. The criticism of this point of view by J. R. Angell,² F. Boas,³ John Dewey,⁴ W. I. Thomas,⁵ and others has grown in volume in recent years. It is possible now to declare one thing confidently, namely, that should it finally be demonstrated that the savage is inferior to civilized man it will have to be proved on other grounds than those formerly held sufficient. The old arguments are discredited and the old facts questioned. The inquiry may be prosecuted now with methods of scientific precision impossible to an earlier generation, and the next chapter of the investigation should be written with the help of our recently acquired technique of modern experimental psychology.

It is our purpose here to offer some observations on the subject based on a residence of several years among the tribes of the Upper Congo River, with particular reference to the people living around the mouth of the Bosiri River, almost exactly on the equator. These tribes were so recently subjugated that it was possible to find many villages not previously visited by a white man. The people are Bantus, clothed in raffia, with native iron-working arts, no written language whatever, and still practicing,

¹ SPENCER, H., *Principles of Sociology*.

² ANGELL, J. R., *Chapters in Modern Psychology*.

³ BOAS, F., *The Mind of Primitive Man*.

⁴ DEWEY, JOHN, *Psychological Review*, IX.

⁵ THOMAS, W. I., *Sex and Society*.

at rare intervals, ceremonial cannibalism. The tribes are isolated and small, no one with any gifts of political leadership or military genius having appeared to found large units. They are the sort of people to whom the older and familiar generalizations were meant to apply. They were supposed to have keen sense-organs beyond the power of civilized man to approach. The eye was assumed to have the power of field glasses. There was supposed to be a native sense of direction better than a compass for finding the way home. Emotionally the native was believed to be very unstable, impulsive, incapable of anything like persevering labor, improvident, intolerant of restraint, and unmoral. Intellectually he was said to be a superficial observer, quick, especially in childhood, maturing early and soon coming to the limit of development, and with little or no power to think in abstract terms, lacking in discrimination, and without ability to concentrate on a problem. The literature of the "imitation school" of social psychology abounds in references to the "primitive traits" which are supposed to come to the surface in religious revivals, mob activities, and whenever the restraints of ordered life are removed.

Before going into the statement of the actual facts as they were found, there are half a dozen sources of error which are sufficiently noteworthy to be set down here as explaining in part how such a mistaken view could have been formed, assuming that it is a mistaken view. Let us consider these:

1. The most obvious force operating to tip the scales of sober judgment is race prejudice, the assumption that other people are inferior to us in so far as they are different. We are coming to realize that the Hindu, the Chinese, and the Japanese are not convinced of their inferiority, but rather are certain of our inferiority to them; but it comes as a surprise when first we learn that the Eskimo has the same conviction. The same is true eminently of the Congo native. In a good-natured debate one day I was giving arguments for the superiority of the white man over the black, and instanced the fact that in a territory containing twenty million natives the absolute authority was exercised by the Belgians, who numbered less than a thousand. The reply was immediate.

"Give us breech-loading guns and ammunition, and within a month there will not be one of the thousand left alive here."

"But," says the white man, "that is the point. The white men invented and made their guns and ammunition."

"Sir, do you know how to make a gun and ammunition?"

"Well, no, not yet, but I could learn to make them in a factory."

"Certainly you could, if they would teach you, but so could we."

Many of those who observed and recorded their experiences and whose record became the source of the older views were men whose perceptions were colored by the conviction of a measureless superiority—and judicial fairness in such circumstances is not always easy.

2. Unwarranted generalization is the commonest danger in scientific research, a danger against which the carefully trained scientist is likely to be sufficiently on his guard. But most of the observers whose words are quoted in the books were not careful scientists, and their unwarranted but explicable leaps of inference are set down as unprejudiced and dependable fact. For example, a native finds his way back home unaided when the white man in the party is hopelessly lost, whereupon it is set down in imperishable record, to be copied with an uncritical credulity, that primitive people have a mysterious instinct of direction and carry compasses in their heads. Or one of them is very stupid in handling a new tool and makes a laughable blunder in trying to use a saw, and forthwith it is demonstrated that his whole race has no power of logical thought!

It is fair to say that some of the most careful of writers have at times been guilty of using isolated anecdotes from travelers and have thus fallen into this type of error. It is like the foreign traveler who saw a street fight from the window of a Pullman car and, having inquired the name of the state, wrote in his notes, "The inhabitants of Illinois are a very warlike race." Primitive man has been treated that way many times.

3. Another source of error might, by a slight stretch of terms, be called the psychologist's fallacy. It is the assumption that we are viewing the matter exactly as the person under observation does, which assumption is uniformly untrue. Consider, for example, the reports on native religions, even by those who have lived for years among the people. Most of such reports are, or at least were, inaccurate to a surprising extent. We have assumed that any human being could observe the facts of social life. No

one would accept the observations of an uneducated sailor to determine the facts of botany or geology, and ability to report on social facts is equally dependent on training.

The Western observer thinks of religion in terms of doctrines and theologies and is able to report the beliefs and doctrines of the native in a way that is very complete and systematic and misleading. In fact, a safe rule would be to trust implicitly the account of an actual happening reported by a reputable traveler or explorer or missionary but to be very slow to accept his explanation of the event.

For example, the natives are supposed to have a belief in spirits which extends to everything they see in their world. The trees have a spirit, there is a spirit of the river, a spirit in the stones, and in every object in their world.

Now the very great difficulty that I found in getting a satisfactory word that would answer to the concept of "spirit" leads me to question this statement. And I can imagine a psychologically inclined Eskimo coming among us and reporting in a paper before the Polaris Scientific Institute that white people believe every chair to be inhabited by a spirit, proving his point by declaring that he has seen many a white man curse a chair after it had maliciously got in his way and caused him to stumble over it.¹ White people believe that spirits inhabit golf balls and billiard balls and are frequently seen to offer short prayers to them in order to induce them to roll where they are wanted. They also imprecate them if they do not obey. They believe that so small an object as a collar button has an evil spirit, and often swear violently when this little object rolls under the furniture—thinking that the action is caused by the mischievous spirit of the button. The interpreter of the savage mind must beware of the psychologist's fallacy.

4. A fourth source of error may be called the mythopoetic error, the tendency of a native to invent an explanation rather than confess ignorance. Most of their customs are due to unthinking adherence to the ways of the former generations, and they are not conscious of why they do them. If asked a reason, they will often invent one, but this is not necessarily the true reason. Few

¹ Missionaries in inland China report that the natives consider that the missionaries worship chairs, on the ground that they often bow down to them at family worship.

of us could give offhand the explanation of why we remove our hats in saluting a lady acquaintance. In fact, it does seem almost unreasonable "to make the meeting of a female friend the occasion for taking off part of your clothes to wave in the air." Any explanation that the man in the street might give of the custom would be a guess, and this is doubly true of the uncultured peoples in their attempt to explain—and yet the traveler can tease out an explanation if he tries.

Mr. Stefansson¹ writes that he has found out why the Eskimo do not punish their children. This may be true and it may not, but it is true that he has found out the reason they give, and that is perhaps a different matter.

5. Two more sources of error remain to be noticed, the first of which is due to ignorance of language. It is very easy to fall into the error of supposing that because a word has not been found, none exists. The character of the language of one people is so different from that of another that it is next to impossible to make any valid argument on the absence of a word.

6. Finally a sixth sort of writer may be said to be the error due to *knowledge* of language. An illustration may be found in the argument of a recent writer made from the manner of designating relationships by blood. There is in many primitive languages a lack of any word to distinguish brother from cousin, and this failure to distinguish brother from cousin, and son from grandson, means that the primitive man has such a vague idea of personality that he has not been able to make the fine distinctions. We, on the other hand, distinguish brother from cousin, and stepson from blood kin, etc., therefore we have a much more highly developed sense of personality.

In order to appreciate the native point of view it is necessary to call in our primitive psychologist once more. I recall a time in the Congo when I had occasion to refer to the tail of a chicken, and used the word that was in my notes as meaning "tail." I had pointed out the caudal appendage of a dog, and had been told that it was called *bongongo*. This word proved quite intelligible when I applied it to designate the tail of a sheep or a buffalo, but when I said something about the *bongongo* of a chicken, the whole company burst out into loud laughter. A chicken is not a dog, of course not, and did I not see that a chicken had just

¹ STEFANSSON, V. *My Life among the Eskimo*.

feathers sticking out behind and it was not a *bongongo* at all? They called that *mpete*, of course. Was it really true that white people called the feathers of a chicken by the same name that they called the real tail of a dog? Later on I found that the word for tail of a fish is a very different word from either of the other two.

Now the Eskimo psychologist might, on the basis of these facts, write that English-speaking people have such vague, undefined notions of tailhood and of spinality that they cannot distinguish the difference between the feathers of a chicken and the tail of the dog and call both of these by the same name as the steering gear of a fish. It is true that Western people distinguish the snout of the pig from the lip of a man, and these two from the beak of a bird, and all three from the muzzle of a horse, and are therefore in a state of evolution which will probably lead them to a stage where they can develop a notion of distinction in tails in the process of time. I submit that the analogy is fair.

The sources of error being so many, what methods are to be relied upon for dependable results? The answer is that careful, painstaking, scientific experiment and inquiry alone will give dependable findings. Most of those we now have are not to be depended upon. But I wish to direct attention to the subject of language.

The language of the people is a very instructive phenomenon—giving much information as to the manner of the working of the logical processes of those in whose mouths it developed. It does not follow, perhaps, that a highly developed language indicates a highly developed capacity, for language is inherited and passed on, the slave speaking the tongue of the master; but the presence of a complete and “scientifically” constructed language would make impossible the opposite argument.

Now, the people of the equatorial Congo speak a language of a pronounced agglutinative type, quite typical of the Bantu tongues, being complete and developed to a degree surprising to those whose conception has been derived from writings of the Spencerian variety. A brief account of some of the outstanding features of the language will make the matter clear.

The alliterative concord, which makes this family of languages unique among human tongues, consists in a device which indicates the agreement of the words dependent upon the governing

noun by means of a prefix attached to verb, adjective, numeral, and possessive pronoun, relative, and demonstrative. There is no sex gender in the language, but some eight "classes," or grammatical genders, with an inflection for the plural. Each of the sixteen different noun prefixes must be applied to the dependent words in the sentence. For example, should I wish to ask the question: "Where are those two spoons of mine which you gave me?" every word except the verb in the dependent clause would have to begin with the plural prefix of *totoko* ("spoons"), thus:

"Totoko tonko tokam tofe toki wonkaka tolenko?"

"Spoons those mine two which you-gave-me where-are-they?"

Should the question be regarding the whereabouts of an equal number of bananas, similarly acquired, the words would be:

"Banko banko bakam bafe baki wonkaka balenko?"

"Bananas those mine two which you-gave-me where-are-they?"

Suppose there is only one banana involved in the inquiry, then I should have to ask:

"Jinko jinko jikam jiki wonkaka jidenko?"

"Banana that mine which you-gave-me where-is-it?"

I should ask for two goats given by you and lost by me in the following language:

"Nta inko ikam ife iki wonkaka ilenko?"

"Goats," etc.

Should I inquire about canoes, every dependent word must begin with *bi-*, the prefix for *biato*; if for sticks, it would be *be-*, the prefix of *betamba*, etc.

There is a diminutive prefix which can be further diminished so that by the form of the noun the degree of littleness can be indicated. Likewise there is an augmentative inflection which can be still further augmented. Thus the five words, *imbwambwa*, *imbwa*, *mbwa*, *embwa*, *embwambwa*, mean respectively: "little tiny dog," "little dog," "dog," "big dog," and "enormous big dog." It is a sort of comparison of nouns.

The verb is very highly developed and very complex. It contains the subject of the verb in the form of a pronominal prefix, as in Latin. It also has a pronominal syllable to indicate the pronominal object, as in Hebrew. But in this family of languages there is the indirect object, which is similarly indicated. *Akenda*, "he-is-going"; *tokenda*, "we-are-going"; *wonkunda*, "you-are-

striking-me"; *akokunda*, "he-is-striking-you"; *lonjelza*, "you-bring-him-to-me"; *baolonjeleza*, "they-have-brought-him-to-me."

By suffixes the shades of meaning of the verb can be changed after the analogy of the Hebrew verb form. Thus *tunga* means "to tie or bind"; *tungama*, "to be bound"; *tungya*, "to cause to bind"; *tungela*, "to bind for" someone; *tungola*, "to unbind"; *tungana*, "to bind each other"; *yatunga*, "to bind oneself"; and so on to the number of eight. But there are numbers of permutations and combinations of these, as, for example, the causative and the dative can be combined in the form *tungeza*, "to-cause-(or help-) to-tie-for" someone; *tungoza*, "to-help-unbind-for" someone; *tungameza*, "to-help-to-place-in-a-bound-state-or-condition for-the-sake-of" someone, and so on to the number of ten or twelve.

Now each of these separate forms is capable of tense and modal inflection to the number of at least fourteen tense forms, differing in toto from the models of Indo-European tense inflection. There are an indefinite present, an immediate future, a distant future, an immediate past, a remote past, a continuative past, a past with the consequences no longer obtaining, *e.g.*, *nsombaki*, "I-bought-it (but sold it again)," a "not yet" tense, and various ways to introduce negative ideas.

Examples of the variety of pronoun, tense, and mode in a single word would be: *ifokokaya*, "he-will-surely-give-you"; *aoyatunga*, "he-has-bound-himself"; *aoyatungama*, "he-has-placed-himself-in-a-bound-condition"; *aoyolokotungamezamaka*, "he-has-caused-himself-to-be-placed-in-a-bound-condition-for-your-sake."

The extraordinary development of the verb and the noun is compensated for by a corresponding lack in adjective and prepositions. If we reckon all the agglutinated forms of a transitive root like *tung-*, "bind," including the possible pronominal combinations, there would be more than five thousand different words from this root alone.

There is perhaps only one real preposition, though there are nouns for "top," "bottom," etc., which can be used to translate "above," "below," etc. The preposition, therefore, is merely a connecting particle.

Adjectives are very slightly developed, the grammatical form for "strong" being that of a noun. The word for "hot" is the

word for "fire," but there is a word for "cold." They do not know ice save in the rare occurrence of hailstones.

Onomatopoeitic particles of an undifferentiated character, which may be thought of as intermediate between our adverbs, adjectives, and interjections, are very numerous. Thus we say to a child, "He shot him, bang." Most verbs of action admit of such a completing word in the Bantu tongues.

This word or particle, is in animated discourse, supplied by the listener, who fills out a pause with an appropriate inflection on the part of the narrator. In the case of an orator making a speech, the whole audience responds. The delivery of an oration is therefore a very lively performance, in which the native orators take great professional delight. In an address I heard once, the speaker, describing a hunt, went on to say:

"I was passing through the forest when suddenly I saw a large bird on a tree just above the water of a stream. I took aim with my flintlock"—"T-e-e-e," said everyone in the audience as the speaker went through the motion of aiming—"and then"—he snapped the fingers of his right hand—"Kow!" shouted the two hundred listeners—"and into the water"—he stopped and made a downward gesture with the hand—"Chubu!"—"("Splash!")"—sang out the whole company. This peculiarity of conversational response may be partly responsible for the successful technique of the orators. At any rate they are very enthusiastic public speakers, take great delight in it and, when skillful, handle their audiences with great art.

Their number system runs as far as a million. I do not know what use they have for that word now, but I think it was needed when there was a commerce in beads, now no longer existing.

Many native proverbs have been recorded by various investigators, and these are often curiously parallel to those in other languages, though there are many not like ours. "No meat without bone" (No rose without a thorn), "Don't carry fish to the riverside" (Carrying coals to Newcastle), "One day won't spoil an elephant" (Rome wasn't built in a day).

These linguistic considerations are presented for the purpose of illustrating the statement that the language is at least sufficiently developed to make impossible any conclusive argument of a lack of mental power or ability on account of the lack of linguistic development. Particularly noteworthy is the prefer-

ence for abstract nouns, as, "man of strength." It was formerly thought that they could not think abstract thoughts.

If we consider, as Spencer does, the sensory life, we find the usual statements to be that the keen eyes of the savage and his extraordinary powers of hearing mark him off from his degenerate civilized brother, even if they do place him nearer the lower animals in this respect. My own observations among them would not bear this out. In a hippopotamus hunt one day the natives insisted that there was a herd at the end of an island a mile away and paddled through a broiling sun, getting under cover of the island and approaching the spot carefully, only to find that the supposed ears and nose of the "hippos" were the roots and snags of trees. Later on I secured a good pair of field glasses and was able to make them out wrong on many occasions.

The sense of direction that is so often referred to by travelers, who assert that they "have a compass in their heads," is attributable, in the opinion of several of us who have had experience with them, to a mere familiarity with the locality, much as we are able to make our way about in a room in utter darkness if it is sufficiently familiar. On more than one occasion I have witnessed very spirited debates between different natives themselves, indicating that the compasses in their heads were at least not all working together. In Mr. Stefansson's latest book there is an account of a difference of opinion between the white man and the native in a country strange to both. The later events vindicated the opinion of the white man.

The emotional life of the uncivilized peoples has been written about with a great deal of assurance by many anthropologists. The older view was that primitive men, being midway between man and brute, were characterized by a sort of activity more nearly like primitive reflex action. They were less highly evolved and therefore less able to have emotions connected with the more remote possibilities. They were supposed to be impetuous, like children, noisy, excitable. And yet we are able, on the Congo, to write contracts for a year at a time and keep large numbers of servants and workmen constantly employed with as little trouble among the laborers as we would expect to encounter here at home. They were said to be characterized by improvidence and a lack of the feeling of ownership, but the Congo natives eat *cassava* as the principal article of breadstuff, and this requires

fully nine months in which to mature—quite as long as wheat and longer than any other of our ordinary foodstuffs.

The inhibition of impulses is supposed to be one of the best indexes of mentality. Feeble-minded children are unable to choose between two offered objects because they cannot apparently suppress the impulse to seize the nearest. The savage has been said to be under the same limitation. And yet it is altogether probable that he would be the first to accuse the white men whom he knows of just this fault. The white man comes into the tropics with exaggerated ideas of the importance of getting things done on schedule. When people do not move as fast as he wishes, he often loses control of himself and raves and fumes quite like a spoiled child. The African would be able to insist that it is the white man who has no control of himself.

The taboos of savage life are many and complex. They are habitually well observed. And when it is remembered that the taboos are prohibitions on practices that are attractive and which the agent wishes to engage in, it will be seen that mastery of the impulses is required to be able to resist.

As to imitativeness, it is not at all apparent that the savage is more imitative than others. We adopt the ways of the people in the group which we admire and which we are trying to attain to, but with the ways and methods of another group we do not concern ourselves. The savage will adopt a new garment of civilization when he has commenced to admire the group of civilized men with whom he has been associated, but there are many irreconcilables in every group of primitive people who flatly refuse to touch any of the accursed foreigner's things. It may be said that we imitate other people when we wear neckties or stiff collars or other by-products of fashion, but it would be perhaps a better statement to say that we respond to a demand for this sort of thing.

Now, most of the examples of imitation in the savages of my acquaintance could appropriately be classed in this category. When they wear foreign clothes, it is because they admire the group that wears them and seek to secure some measure of identification and incorporation with that group. They secure guns, not from a desire to imitate, but from a desire to hunt and fight successfully. They build better huts or even construct real houses, because they see a certain advantage in this procedure,

and not on account of mere imitation. It is, at most, rational imitation.

The most positive statements of the psychology of the savage have been made with reference to his reasoning power. It seems a very natural and defensible conclusion that, since exact science as we know it does not exist among them, they have an inferior ability in reasoning. At least they lack a sufficiently developed reasoning faculty to meet the needs of their life.

It will, of course, be apparent that the modern experimental method which originated with Galileo and his generation did not originate independently among the present-day savages. But the power of forming hypotheses to account for difficulties is as readily observed among them as among us.

The quantitative conceptions have entered but slightly into their life. Cloth is measured by fathoms, the outstretched arms of the seller sufficing for a measure, but there is no measure of weight. The volume of oil that is sold is measured by the potful, but there is no rigid standard of size.

There is no formal drill in numbers, as there is no formal drill in anything, but I tried a lad once with the idea of discovering whether he could tell nine times nine. "If nine pieces of cassava cost nine brass rods each, how much would they all cost?" After the inevitable argument that they did not cost nine rods each, but could be bought anywhere at five rods each, he finally yielded the point and agreed for argument's sake, and then set out to try to find the solution. He took nine sticks and placed them on the ground, breaking the last one into nine pieces. He then placed one of these pieces on each of the other sticks, and found that he had eight whole sticks and one piece left over, so he announced that the result was—*eighty-one*.

The importance that should be given to the social forces in the psychology of a race can be well illustrated by considering the emotional character of Negro religion. Davenport¹ classes the wild extravagances which may still be observed in certain groups of whites as "primitive," and matches them with similar accounts of the activities of present-day Negroes.

The facts are, of course, not in dispute. The American Negro is emotional in religion—and the accounts that have been handed

¹ DAVENPORT, F. M., *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*.

down in the literature are substantially accurate. In a typical Negro revival meeting there is, as a rule, a minimum of thought in the sermon. The exhortation consists often of a chant with a violent appeal to the emotions of the hearers and lurid imagery. If the appeal is successful, some of the audience are affected by it. They begin to respond in rhythmic movements or in crooning chants or loud shoutings. There is often an epidemic, and large numbers are affected simultaneously. Sometimes the whole congregation gets religion, and multitudes are "slain before the Lord."

The assumption that is made to explain these facts is that such manifestations are native to the savage mind and are explicable as manifestations of the Negro's lack of resistance to stimuli and to his general imitateness.

It seems that the facts can be explained better without appealing to the native African endowment. The social situation in which the American Negro found himself has, in all probability, furnished the pattern by means of which he was guided in his religious life. Extravagant as the reactions are, they can all be matched by others just as remarkable in the white race that was the teacher of the black. In Cane Ridge, Kentucky, in 1803, 20,000 white people were gathered together for the great revival services, where they stayed till the provisions in the district were exhausted, and they were then compelled to disperse. There were the most exciting manifestations of religious conversion. Some had the "jerks" and could not control their muscles. Others would take hold of the young trees and twist the bark off in their excitement.

Until the last twenty-five years the customary way of carrying on religious activities in the rural South was to have more or less perfunctory services during the fall, winter, and spring, with many interruptions in the winter on account of the weather, but to concentrate attention on the summer revival or "camp-meeting." At most of these it was the custom to appoint "holding committees," not financial organizations, but more apathetic individuals who would undertake to hold the shouters and prevent damage during their exercises. As late as twenty years ago, one could be pretty sure of seeing someone "shout" at the revivals of the white people, but the custom has practically died out at present.

The practice among the whites having disappeared so completely, it would be significant to inquire whether the Negro churches are correspondingly affected. And this turns out to be the case. A friend of mine visiting the South took the first opportunity (and this was fifteen years ago) of visiting a Negro church for the purpose of hearing some of the plaintive Negro music that the "jubilee singers" had popularized. He came away disgusted with what he had heard, for the choir had given as the main rendition on the program a selection from an oratorio, "The Heavens Are Telling." The theory of my friend was that this last was a servile and unworthy imitation, and that they had been quite original in their former emotional Christianity.

But even these facts are not, perhaps, conclusive, for it may be thought that the psychology of the American Negro is gradually undergoing a change in his new environment, due to physical changes of an anatomical nature, the result, in turn, of the different physical conditions under which the race is now situated. In this connection the form taken by the Christianity of present-day converts to missionary activity ought to be instructive.

Within a radius of ten miles in one district on the Upper Congo there have been three distinct types of Christianity observable. The original church at Equatorville was founded by men of a rather liberal turn, who allowed the largest liberty to the native converts in working out the problems of polygamy and slavery and the use of tobacco. This was succeeded by a very strictly legalistic type of teaching, in which the number of forbidden practices rivaled the native taboos and were, in fact, regarded substantially as substituted taboos—very much as has been described by Mr. Stefansson in Alaska, where the people put away their nets on Sunday because it was the Sabbath day, and proceeded to fish with hook and line.

The third type of religion in the Congo was very different from either of the others, being the result of the preaching and instruction of a company of Trappist monks whose emphasis was put on relics and ceremonial observations. The type of religion observable in the village resembles quite closely, at least in its superficial aspect, what one sees in rural Portugal or Belgium.

The most significant thing in this connection is that the religion of the three churches above referred to was in no case emotional to any marked degree. I have yet to observe anything resem-

bling excitement in the whole phenomenon of the conversion of a people to Christianity in Africa. The mission was and is a decided success. There are now more than five thousand converts, and the seriousness with which they take their religion is evidenced by the statement that this company is at present employing nearly three hundred adult evangelists, paying them a living support, and keeping them going all the time. But their reaction to Christianity has taken a form decidedly theological, and they can argue and debate like any one of our modern polemic sects.

A reasonable explanation would assume that the pattern from which their conceptions of the new religion were taken was the determining factor in the reaction. The American Negro is emotional in religion on account of the type of religion which his teachers possessed when he adopted the faith. He is rapidly changing this, owing to the corresponding change that has taken place in the superior social group. The Congo African would become as emotional as the slaves were before the war if the Holy Rollers were to go among them and establish congregations.

The hypothesis that has been forming, therefore, in recent years concerning the mind of so-called primitive man, meaning the uncivilized races of the present day, is that in native endowment the savage child is, on the average, about the same in capacity as the child of civilized races. Instead of the concept of different stages or degrees of mentality, we find it easier to think of the human mind as being, in its capacity, about the same everywhere, the difference in culture to be explained in terms of the physical geography, or the stimuli from other groups, or the unaccountable occurrence of great men. But this is only a hypothesis. It has not been proved. It may well be that differences in anatomical structure can be correlated with differences in mental capacity. One would suppose that the size or weight of the brain could be so correlated. The difficulty is in finding a crucial test. To measure the achievements of the tribes in their own habitat is inconclusive, and to import youths into our schools is to fail to isolate the years of childhood which recent psychology considers the most potent in their influence on the after life.

Much light could be thrown on the problem by going to the villages and making detailed mental and physical tests. The

expedition to Torres Straits by the Cambridge University Expedition, and later to the Todas in India, was a good beginning. A little was done with the natives who were at the St. Louis Exposition in 1904. The evidence was in the direction of the conclusion suggested by this chapter, but the tests were admittedly inconclusive.

In the first place, the natives at the World's Fair were too few in number and selected on the wrong principle to be representative. Secondly, the tests were merely for sense-organ acuity, vision, color-blindness, and auditory ability. Since 1904 a great deal of progress has been made in establishing the norm of mental ability in many other direction. A third reason for the inconclusive character of the tests lies in the fact that the investigators in the cases mentioned were all instances ignorant of the language and had to rely on interpreters or the use of "pidgin English."

If an expedition could be made to the equatorial Congo in charge of one who could speak the language readily and who was also trained in psychology technique, and if records could be obtained of the mental and physical ability of, say, one thousand or fifteen hundred properly distributed individuals, it would be possible to be far more positive on the general question than we are at the present time.

XXVI

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY AMONG THE FOREST BANTU

The standpoint of this discussion can, perhaps, be made clear if the assumptions are first announced. It is assumed that culture and personality are correlative terms; that to know the culture of a people is to know the types of personalities to be found within it; and that to know the personalities is to understand the culture. These two products of human life are twin-born. Culture is the collective side of personality; personality, the subjective aspect of culture. Society with its usages and personalities with their variations are but two ways of looking at human life.

It is further assumed that these two concepts are not to be thought of as arranged in a causal sequence. Personalities do not cause culture, nor does culture produce personality. Interaction, interstimulation, interlearning are continuous, and personalities are always affecting culture, and culture is always modifying personality. It would appear that society does not mold the individual, for molding is too passive a term. Individuals do not produce a culture, for collective life has its own laws and its own procedure. Society and the individual, culture and personality: both are useful and necessary abstractions made sometimes at will, forced sometimes upon the student as he tries to understand the phenomena before him.

And yet a sequence is assumed, if not causal, at least temporal. All culture can be assumed to arise out of a former culture or some blend or combination of more than one. Similarly, all personal ties are organized from the contact with other personalities and cultural forms. But in any particular instance, in the consideration of any one individual personality, it is here assumed that personality arises subsequently to a specific cultural system. The priority of culture seems to be not only a demonstrable fact; it is a heuristic principle of great utility. The personality is not

formed on the basis of innate tendencies; it is organized on the basis of the cultural milieu, appearing to him as coercive, timeless, and omnipotent. Ethnological studies have no more important lesson to teach the sociologist than the lesson of the almost limitless adaptability of the human animal. Given an uncontradicted cultural medium and we can see that the powerful drives of hunger, sex, and even the will to live are as nothing if they run counter to the mores. Confirmation of this is familiar to us all. Voluntary fasting, voluntary celibacy, voluntary mutilation and torture, voluntary suicide—examples abound to show the irresistibility of the cultural model. One can no more organize his personality independently than he can be born without a mother.

The Congo Bantu of the Equatorial Rain Forest have a culture which has come down to them from a past as distant as our own. At present they are also in contact with a high type of modern capitalistic industry. Two streams of influence converge upon them. The village life with its simple economy, its richness of ritual, and its ordered grades of prestige and influence is one stream. The other is the modern city, objective, impersonal, individualistic, with monetary forces and aims, not to speak of the forms of law and the coercive power of an omnipotent, even if benevolent, despotism. Such a sharp contrast has few parallels in all the world. So sudden an exposure would be difficult to find on a comparable scale in any period. It is hardly too much to say that nowhere in the history of the world has there occurred so great a change over so large an area in so short a time. A numerical detail will aid in bringing the point clearly before you. In 1914 the foreign commerce of the colony, imports and exports, amounted to some 229 millions of francs. Seven years later, in 1921, this amount had more than doubled, 490 millions. In 1929 the figure was 3,480, an increase of 1,400 per cent within a period of fifteen years.

Neither the native nor the traveler sees the graphs and curves of the statistician, but he does see the capital city of the colony transformed from a military post with a few compounds, near a village of 800 natives, into a modern city of 40,000 population with all the metropolitan institutions: banks and hotels, cinemas and taxicabs, factories and department stores, and two daily papers. Nearly a thousand miles up the river, just on the equa-

tor, another city of 20,000 with more banks, department stores, a cathedral, street lights, theater, hospitals, and schools. A thousand miles farther on still another city even larger and more important, while in the southeast Elizabethville rivals the capital in importance, including its daily press. All of this in a little more than a decade of years. Smaller establishments and centers exist, all connected by telegraph, by rail and river, by airplane and motor roads. No native village in the million square miles is unaffected by the influence. All have been profoundly modified.

He who would understand the relation of personality and culture among these forest Bantu must, then, take into account the violently contrasting streams of influence. When West meets East we must draw a parallelogram of forces.

There is, of course, a gradient. Within the city are seen city types and striking modifications. Near the city the influences are strong. In the remote villages they are naturally weakest. But the foreign influence is ubiquitous.

If the original village culture be pictured it presents elements not unfamiliar to students. Small kinship groups, sessile, agricultural, hunting, fishing, with chickens, goats, and dogs. There are weaving, pottery, iron mining, smelting and forging, besides woodworking done by clever carvers.

Isolation, though essentially a negative term, suggests the key to much of the collective life of these Bantu. The dense growth of the Great Forest permits only tortuous and difficult foot trails, and this difficulty of communication effectually prevented any predatory or rapacious group from conquest. The political units are, therefore, small. They are hardly political units at all in the modern sense, for the elders of what we may term their gerontochracy seem to have no official authority, though possessed of high prestige and great influence. The classic notion, still prevalent in popular writers like H. G. Wells and revived by McDougall and by the psychoanalysts, who seem to cast their nets in all waters, assumes a strong ruler in the small groups who clubs his way into authority. There is nothing in this save the inaccuracy of the suggestion. An old woman will have more power in her querulous voice than the strongest warrior fully armed. Not strength but age and wisdom are deferred to, and the deference of the younger to the older is everywhere

important, even extending to the young in their relations with each other.

The details of their life, the exact methods of cultivating the soil, of working their iron, their pottery, the elaborate "drum" language, the ceremonies, both serious and playful, and the rest of their culture offer material for him who seeks to reconstruct their history. They are of little importance for the present inquiry into the relation of the personality and the culture. What seems to be most relevant can be stated in more general terms, terms which also apply to hundreds of small tribes in many parts of the world. Such descriptive terms turn out to be comparisons, and the most useful comparisons, at least here, are negations. So we may point out certain aspects of these cultures in a series of words compounded with the prefix "pre-," meaning "before," or "not yet." Therefore we can say that they are preliterate, prescientific, pre-industrial, and pre-individualistic.

The Phoenician alphabet traveled west and north but did not penetrate these isolated regions. They are preliterate, not because they cannot learn to read and to write but because they had no opportunity. Now, when scribes make and preserve books, a profound change comes upon a society and the whole character of their culture undergoes momentous alterations. Preliterate peoples have not added that increment. And until they do have it there are certain important ways in which they differ from those who have letters.

The first of these concerns the realm of time and space. A people without a history is like a man without a memory, and no people has a history unless it is written. The time span possible to consciousness hardly transcends the memory of the oldest elder. No writing, no calendar, and no meaning in an arithmetical statement of years, for there are no years. Our fathers a few generations ago could look back in historical retrospect for only 6,000 years, while we now have the modern span of billions. Our most recent acquisition is our distant past. But even 6,000 years is something definite. Preliterates have no years at all. Without writing, the normal myopia is unassisted and the horizon of time is narrowed as in a mist.

It is true also of space. There is the forest, and there is the river, and back in the forest and up and down the river are other

peoples, but there is little knowledge and less curiosity. There is neither a word for *world* nor any felt need of one. How much we are indebted to maps and globes and geographical writings would be hard to overstate.

This lack of ordered schemes of things extends beyond the material world of geography into the spiritual world that has to do with a moral order. In this sphere, also, there is no cosmos. There is no fixed system, no definite theology or cosmology. Religious observations and ceremonies there are, as spontaneous as Christmas in America, and myths that explain are told. But it is ethnocentrism to identify these myths with theologies.

Therefore, there are no religious heretics. The rebel in religion is unknown; he is even impossible. How can one fight against the prevailing theological system when there is no real system to which one can object? New myths brought from stranger tribes or introduced by foreign wives are as welcome as a well-written foreign novel would be to a civilized people. Who would care to reject an interesting and attractive novelty? And, although their current beliefs and practices seem good, they do not always succeed, so the new is worth trying.

This hospitality is all very well when it receives the products of other preliterate societies. But when the book religions enter the arena, the old culture encounters a tragic fate. Whether it be Mohammedan, Catholic, or Protestant, it is a religion of a book. It is a system, dogmatic, absolute, infallible, with all the answers to all the questions which the native culture has asked but could not answer. This explains the quick success of the missionary propaganda and the early death of the native religious culture. For when could uncertainty contend with assurance? He who is quite in doubt as to where his soul may go after death has nothing to say when the book tells so plainly of the eternal fire.

Being preliterate, their culture, is, of course, prescientific; which chiefly means that there is in it much magic. Events cannot be thought to occur according to the law of nature if there be no conception of nature. For nature as a concept appears only after reflection, accumulated and funded in the recorded thoughts of men. Lévy-Bruhl's recent book on the natural and the supernatural among primitive people misses

just this point, for the preliterates have no conception of the supernatural.

To say that the culture is magical does not mean that all things are held to be animate or endowed with mystic power. There are, indeed, omens and portents, signs and wonders, ordeals, charms, amulets, talismans—as well as magical ceremonies to ensure food, avoid sickness, gain success in war. In the inimical and the helpful, the bizarre and surprising, the magical attitude is seen, but most of their life goes on with the aid of common-sense technique. In most acts they manifest keen, logical, analytic reasoning. It would appear that there was almost as widespread a belief in magic at the court of Louis XIV as today in the Great Forest. There was probably quite as much magic in the Rome of Augustus Caesar as now on the Congo. Magic has no relation or correlation either with intelligence or high civilization. Scientific cultures are non-magical; prescientific cultures are magical. Magic appears to be a group of culture complexes, universal among men until the introduction of dependable methods of scientific control. Man and the forces around him cannot find a neutral relation: either they control him, or he controls them.

And since magic and science are incompatible, they are not to be identified. Magic differs in being uncritical, lacking a method, being devoid of certainty and incapable of proof. It rests on faith, on tradition, on prestige. It is, therefore, essentially social or collective, whereas science is preeminently individual. So while science gives confidence and certainty, magic dwells alongside of fear. Missionaries who think to overcome magic by religion have little reason to hope for success. Religion as introduced may substitute new taboos for old, provide new spirits to be addressed, but it affects little the older attitudes toward the unseen. It is science that cuts the very root of magic, and when applied science offers control of nature, magic withers and dies.

Pre-industrial the Bantu surely were, though the flood of capitalistic invasion is bringing them suddenly into contact with factories, wheels, and machines. The contrast is obvious, and there is a possibility that the transition may be accomplished with some less degree of demoralization.

It is more significant for personality to understand that the Forest Bantu are pre-individualistic. Unwritten mores in a constant and homogeneous stream of influence define the situa-

tions and their conduct. No one is forced to take a stand against popular opinion or to stand alone for the right. No one lives alone, and there are no books to give variant notions. Conflicts and differences occur, but friends, or the assembled elders, are at hand to arbitrate, and loneliness as modern men know it has not yet come to them. Civilization is just around the corner from them, but at present this aspect is one of the most striking differences. I am inclined to look here for the most probable explanation of a rather remarkable discovery, to be discussed in detail presently: the absence of our well-known forms of insanity.

Generalizations about so-called primitive people occur very widely in the literature of sociology and anthropology. It is temptingly easy to make generalizations: it is very difficult to prove them. In this field it is hardly too much to say that no one has had any scientific warrant for any of the many general statements. But, in spite of this, they exist and continue to be defended.

One thinks of Herbert Spencer, of Lévy-Bruhl, of Sigmund Freud, not one of whom has had any real acquaintance with a single one of the thousands of tribes. Spencer's conclusions have been fatally criticized by scholars, but his views are accepted to this day in some degree by missionary, trader, government official, and the man in the street. It is the view that mental inferiority of the personalities is the true explanation of the cultural inferiority of the collective group. They can perceive, he says, but they cannot reason. They have emotional power but no effective stability or power of inhibition. And, most important of all, they lack the power of abstract thought, from which all invention and progress must derive.

Lévy-Bruhl argues at length against the whole English school, from Spencer to Frazer, and insists that we have not a question of degree but of kind—not inferior reasoning power or arguments from poor premises, but prelogical minds that do not argue at all. "The concepts of primitive minds are not at all like our own. They have a different mentality." It is because they depend on memory and have pre-logical mentality that there is no progress.

Freud's statements about primitive life are even more familiar. As among us, it is the custom among them for the children to be born of female mothers and to suck their milk from that mammalian source. This biological necessity is said to cause an

inevitable personality conflict. No escape exists from the incestuous longing, and jealousy of one's father and hatred against his tyrannical presence is made more serious when subjected to censorious repression. Personal experience, therefore, explains both totem and taboo and the play is the tragedy "Man."

But though generalizations are hard to prove, disproof is easier. Spencer's arguments have been often refuted and many of his facts questioned. Perhaps it will be fitting only to add regarding abstract thought that stories and proverbs do abound telling of the nature and effects of love, jealousy, envy, pity, generosity, ingratitude, and injustice, for all of which abstractions and many more there exist words and synonyms. On hearing that a man had been fined unjustly by his employer, one said:

"You may take a necklace from a baby
But not the palm-seed he is playing with."

Lévy-Bruhl has also been opposed by those who have written of these matters. Most of the discussion has to do with analogous behavior among modern peoples, among whom it can be shown that fixed ideas exist and collective representations abound. On the field, the statements seem to be without validity. Houses are built, hunts organized, and battles are planned with every attention to logical sequence and due regard to cause and effect. Magical beliefs and practices do not cover the whole of life. To accumulate enough property to provide a bride-price for an advantageous marriage for one's son involves as much careful reasoning and weighing of consequences as the launching of a joint stock company. Hunger, love, and danger are very real, but they have no routine. To meet emergencies requires wit and cleverness, and these are abundantly in evidence. Field notes abound in facts which all tend to show that where the routine is prescribed by tradition the individual person falls back on collective representations, just as the Romans did when they examined the liver of the sacrifice to see if it were auspicious to go to war, or the Russian peasant who did not plant his field till the land was blessed and the weeds cursed by the priest. In 1898 the Spanish ships were sprinkled with holy water to make them safe. But when individual problems arise among the Forest People, there is a premium on ingenuity and cleverness

and reasoning power. *Wanya*, or keen intelligence, is highly praised.

As to the Freudian's easy solutions, the evidence is all against them. The father is not a tyrant and never punishes his children. The maternal uncle has a special status and function, but it is difficult to find the concept of authority applicable. The uncle is indulgent to the point of being imposed upon. If *Bona wa Nkana*, child of my sister, wants my bicycle I shall probably find that he has taken it without asking. If he needs money, he does not steal it from me but asks for it and always gets it. In a polygamous society the monopolization of the sexual favors of one's mother by the father can hardly have the same effect as under monogamy. Moreover, divorce and remarriage are very frequent and would add another modifying factor. Whatever the causes, mental abnormality is practically non-existent.

It would seem that the errors of these three writers can all be brought under a common erroneous assumption as to the relation of culture and personality. Spencer and Lévy-Bruhl assume that cultural forms are the result of intellectual capacity or mental quality. Freud likewise would account for cultural forms and social disorder by a theory of individual infantile experience. This is a persistent error. The vanishing instinct psychology of McDougall is grounded on the same assumption. Indeed, it would be difficult to account for the low degree of cultural advance if high civilization be due to superior minds. The syllogism is indeed correct: All people with minds equal to ours or like them will produce a high civilization; these people have not produced such a civilization; therefore, they are inferior or different. But if we deny the first promise, the argument falls. Instincts do not produce the institutions. Culture precedes the individual. A low degree of culture may contain many gifted men of the highest endowments.

Another error common to the assumptions of the first two of our authors appears to be in the theory of change or progress. They take change to be a datum and progressive improvement to be a law of human society. The whole argument rests on this: Normally intelligent people are constantly moving toward progress and improvement; these people do not progress; therefore they are not normally intelligent. There is a serious question as to the truth of the first of these statements, for it would seem there is nothing in culture that necessarily leads to change.

Wherever there is change there is the problem for sociologists. The essential inertia in culture is neglected or unrecognized by many students of society but seems to be borne out by our data. Crises bring change, but without crises culture reproduces itself true to type. The maelstrom of our modern civilization so abounds in crises that it is not easy to see how other peoples can lack them. Yet, relatively, they do lack them.

A way might be found to bring the argument to a test. If the children and youth of these tribesmen should be subjected to the type of education and experience which is brought to moderns, it would soon appear whether the cultural differences are due to personality deficiencies. And fortunately for the argument, at least, this is actually going on in the Great Forest. With what results? One can see young men from these villages who are postal clerks, telegraph operators, typists, automobile mechanics, steamer engineers and captains, engineers of electric light installations, operators of calculating machines, and graduates of theological seminaries with courses in philosophy and mastery of the Latin tongue. The new culture has produced new personalities.

Two results of the expedition seem almost to deserve to be called discoveries. The first concerns the sociology of race exclusion. Scattered among the Bantus are symbiotic villages of Pygmies who live apart, have commercial relations, and assist their Bantu neighbors in their fights with hostile villages, but they have no social intercourse with them. There is no language barrier, the Pygmy language being adopted from their neighbors. For some reason, there is not very much difference in stature, owing, it may be, to a better food supply. But the social barrier is absolute. No Bantu will visit a Pygmy in his house; eating with a Pygmy is unthinkable; and intermarriage is abominable. So far there is nothing new, and similar conditions could be found in Mississippi or California. But one important difference appeared.

On visiting the Pygmy villages I became impressed with their keenness of intellect, native shrewdness, and essentially high mentality. I was inclined to rate them quite as high as their Bantu neighbors. On venturing to suggest to groups of Bantus this opinion, I was met with unquestioning assent. The common opinion of the Bantus was: The Pygmies are strong and agile physically, rather superior to us mentally, and decidedly

more moral. It was a surprise to find rigid exclusion with no rationalization or depreciation. Non-intercourse without race prejudice is surely so rare that it raises a fascinating problem. Perhaps, if one were to guess, the explanation may lie in the absence of any form of competition, but whatever the explanation the fact seemed very striking.

The other discovery was the relative absence of insanity, already mentioned. Four large hospitals were visited, and inquiries were made as to the extent of schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychoses. These hospitals are in or near the cities and draw from large areas. They have been established several years. No records of any such cases existed, nor was there any memory on the part of those of the staff of any such cases. In the villages attempts were made to describe the symptoms to the natives, but no comprehension of such disorders was found. There were, indeed, certain stereotyped forms of hysteria among women. Also there were manias due to infectious diseases, but no insanity was revealed. To say that there is no case of our two chief forms of insanity in this region is not possible. But it is true that a careful and persistent inquiry failed to reveal a single case or any record or memory of one. Therefore, it can be asserted that such disorders are very rare and possibly do not occur.

It would be tempting to venture an explanation. Much more work is needed before this would be warranted, but the suggestion that the social life offers the key to the riddle is very attractive. They are pre-individualistic. Sharp competition, feelings of inferiority, the mechanisms of projection and reference, and the delusions of persecution belong to a society like ours where the swordfish alone can swim in security. The Bantu always has his friends. It is impossible for them to conceive of a man on the street asking food of strangers. Perhaps the solution of the problem may take some such form as this.

The results of the information obtained on the trip to the field thus bear out the assumptions and hypotheses concerning the relation of culture and personality. It was to be expected. This is what usually happens. To keep one's mind open is so difficult that few of us succeed. Whether what was found was previsited can be determined only by others less interested. Of the scientist no less than the Christian is it true that we have our treasure in earthen vessels.

XXVII

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

When Rasmussen returned to Etah after a journey to the north of Greenland, he heard from the Eskimos the news of the World War. "And the fighting still goes on," they told him, "and the white men are all killing each other. It may be that ships will come no more to the *Land of Men*." The Eskimos regard themselves as distinctly superior to the men of any other race. So, also, do the Bantus, the Maoris, the Melanesians, the Todas, the Chinese, Germans, Americans, and Nordics. If we, then, being civilized know what it is to be ethnocentric, how much more shall we be on our guard when we try to maintain a scientific attitude toward the question of the course of human development which has lasted just to this present time and which seems to have converged upon us as a goal.

Social evolution is a difficult subject to discuss without bias, for it is often used as a synonym for social progress to which it is indeed closely related. Like immortality and democracy, progress is believed in because it is desired. While it refers primarily to the past, it cannot be unmindful of the future; it is at once a record and a prophecy, or at least a hope.

Social evolution cannot be discussed without a discussion of primitive man, and primitive man was dead and gone long before anyone ever seriously discussed anything. And since primitive man could not be found when the discussion started, he had to be invented. In the mythologies of all races he may be found, but the fantastic records have chiefly a literary value. Of course, mythology furnishes certain indirect evidence concerning the mental and emotional life of a people, but we treat the material as illustrating the wishes, nothing more. However, not only in the myths did this invented primitive man have an imagined existence, for in the seventeenth century he became a scientific hypothesis, being described as gentle and innocent in the books of Rousseau, cruel and selfish in the books of Hobbes, quite

unformed in the books of Locke, while he is quite worthless to us in the books of them all.

Scientific study of primitive man got a bad start, for it took a false lead. In the nineteenth century primitive man was supposed to exist in the static and congealed cultures of uncivilized peoples such as the natives of Australia, Central Africa, and Melanesia. It took a long time and involved a great waste of effort before it finally became clear to all that none of these peoples are primitive, for their culture is a real culture and is very old, their languages are rich and complex, their blood is everywhere mixed, and real primitive man must be sought elsewhere than among peoples now existing.

And then they dug for him. What little we do know about him is the result of the work of the archeologist, whose patient effort has built up a structure giving us a picture of what took place in northwestern Europe but leaves all the rest of the planet in darkness. Many facts force the hypothesis of Asia as the original home of the race, but few remains of the early handiwork have been found there.

A conservative estimate of the oldest remains of our own species is 25,000 years, though some authorities would double and others would treble this estimate. But other species of the genus *homo* have left a few bones which go back very much farther yet. *Paleolithic* (Old Stone Age) men lived in France, Spain, and other parts of western Europe and the gradual advance in their technique of working the rough stones has been represented in the accepted divisions into periods, of which the following six have been quite generally recognized, with various subdivisions not so generally agreed upon. The Chellean, Acheulean, Mousterian, Solutrean, Aurignacian, and Magdalenian, are named from the places in France where the deposits were found, sometimes in the gravel beds or "drift" and at other times in caves. It is possible to assert a definite advance or evolution from the first of these through the series, but some of the changes may be due to the sudden incursion of a stranger folk. Indeed, the Mousterian and the two preceding deposits are generally assumed to be the work of another species than ours. The Magdalenian flints, however, were left by the Cro-Magnon people, whose bones have been recovered in sufficient numbers to warrant the statement that they were perhaps physically superior to any

existing race of men, being taller in stature and having a larger brain capacity than any modern race. Their mural paintings executed two hundred and fifty centuries ago may still be seen and are the wonder and admiration of all who know them. But whence these people came into France and Spain and why and how they disappeared—guess who will, for there are no facts.

Following the men of the Old Stone Age came the *Neolithic* (New Stone Age) people, who polished and ground the edges of their axes, knew of fields and grain, and erected houses and built huge stone structures which still remain to puzzle us and pique our curiosity. But it is not clear, indeed it seems a bit unlikely, that the Neolithic men were the same tribes as the men of the Old Stone Age, and the setting forth of the separate stages of progress from rough to polished stone may be, after all, merely the record of the different migrations into western Europe; it no more proves or even describes evolution and progress than the description of the culture of newly arrived immigrants into America proves that we are rapidly becoming illiterate.

It is possible to describe, after the Neolithic, a *Cypolithic* stage or age, when copper was worked like stone, just as today the Andaman Islanders work iron, cold, as they do their shells. And then the bronze age is reached, where the addition of tin hardened the metal till it was a good tool, so good that it was in use down to the Homeric age, so difficult that it was not used or arrived at by most of the peoples in the west or in the islands. With bronze the curtain of civilization is rung up, but the story of the origin of these improvements is yet to be told, if ever it can be told.

Whether the flint workers of France ever went back to Egypt or had any connection with their original home, we know not, but we do know that by the time a city arose in the Nile valley the human glacier had been covering North and South America for six thousand years, the Mongoloid and Negroid races had not only covered the other continents and islands, had not only been separated long enough to be differentiated, but had also mingled their blood till the problem of the complete classification of the races of the earth is one of the most difficult in modern science. There is no generally accepted classification which includes all the families of men.

The theory of a gradual and continuous evolution assumes progress upward, due to inherent forces in a people living alone. Another and competing theory insists that isolated homogeneous peoples tend to become stagnant and fixed in their organization and that the key to change is to be sought in social contacts due to whatever cause, especially such as migration, invasion, or other forms of interaction.

At the present time the conception is a controversial one, and the difficulties met in the effort to make the formulation appealing are very real and very stubborn. Those who oppose the orthodox view of progress or evolution are engaged in trying to substitute objectivity for evaluation. It is interesting to recall, in this connection, that the idea of progress is a modern one. It has been so widely held in our time that it comes to many as a surprise when they learn how recently it came into its formulation. Let us glance at a history of the idea.

Preliterate peoples, having a social organization handed down traditionally by oral transmission, were not concerned with the relation of the present to the past. Indeed, in the sense in which we formulate the picture of our past in order to account for the facts discovered, they did not have a past at all. Preliterate peoples have no history. Mythology is lightly held, is largely art, is thought of in a way quite different from that in which we regard historical accounts. As for the future, they concern themselves with it almost not at all.

When ancient civilizations wrote their chronicles of whatever nature, a momentous change occurred; for literature means contacts bridging time, preserving exactly the words of the dead, and overcoming space. And so we meet early in the history of independent reflection the attempt to answer the question of the sort of path which had been traversed by the race of men.

The first of these that shall concern us here is that of the *Greeks* who formulated the conception of human life as passing through a series of recurrent cycles conceived of in terms of millenniums. What was had been before and would be again. Life was thought of as a vast pattern with a repetend. The first age was the Golden Age, then came the Silver, then other baser and still baser elements till the final degeneration should come when the whole process should start over again. The complete cycle was fixed in terms of 72,000 years, at the end of which period it would

all begin anew. This is, therefore, a sort of anti-progress, a philosophy of degeneration, the whole political, moral, and physical world gradually running down like a clock. Readers of Plato will recall his stages of political degeneration, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism. To the Greeks progress was unthinkable and change, undesirable.

Quite different was the conception of the course of history when the regal monotheism of *Christianity*, with its doctrine of providence and what Santayana calls the "Christian epic," came into being. To them life was a sort of drama the scenes all written out and the final outcome known from the beginning. The time-span was shortened to a few centuries; the world had been created by a fiat and was to endure to the Day of Wrath, and after that the curtain would descend and the action be transferred to other stages. And in the meantime, there were no accidents in the providence of God, but there was no progress or evolution in the modern sense.

When the doctrine of evolution began to win its way against the conception of medieval theology, the emotional values which had been furnished by confidence in the essentially beneficent power were abundantly supplied in the attitude of confidence in the moral character of the process itself. Henry Drummond and Tennyson gave utterance to the new-found faith that, although the evils of the world are many, they are overcome by manifold forces of good and in the distance there is,

One far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.

Science has no quarrel with this formulation, for it is not a scientific question. Evolution as a philosophy has all the values that any philosophy has and no more. As a detailed statement of the origin of anatomical structure, evolution is a scientific hypothesis, and this has been successfully applied to problems in botany, zoology, geology and astronomy. When applied to social and ethical problems, it has never been possible to find a method of demonstration, and the facile generalizations of Herbert Spencer have one by one broken down under the increased strain of accumulated facts. Evolution as a philosophy is clearly a child of the wishes, but a child which can be born only to a society whose comfort and prosperity are obvious and undeniable.

The stages through which society has everywhere passed, formulated again and again and correlated with economic organization, familial schemes, moral concepts, religious views and practices, all these have been regretfully abandoned under the strain of accumulated facts which have revealed exceptions, anomalies, and lacunae too serious for the theory to incorporate.

But progress is still a good word. Every man knows what it is in reference to his own life and his own purposes. Every society knows what it is to form plans, to work toward them, and to witness their satisfying realization. But progress as the specific achievement of a definite aim is one thing, while progress as a steady and progressive realization of the common good or happiness is quite another. And in the last thousand years conflict and struggle, warfare and victory, have been so continuously the experience of human society that it is not difficult to see that progress must always be stated in terms of the victor in the contest. It is, therefore, a subjective category. Optimism is the faith of the successful who believes he will continue to succeed and that the victories he has won over his enemies are but the assurances that future enemies will also be destroyed. It is not too much, therefore, to say that the older doctrine of progress is losing its attraction for those who think in terms of the human race. There is another conception of progress which the scientific age is formulating which brings the process within the human will, the human reason, and the human muscles, namely, *the doctrine of the conscious progress of plans which men may make, of dreams which the dreamers may dream, and which by careful and progressively clever methods may be realized*. From this point of view progress is no longer the cosmic process realizing itself, as the Hegelians conceived it, but rather collective purposes, collectively planned, collectively striven for and, therefore, believed in. It is a retail and particular process and not a wholesale and general one. It is the process by means of which we control our own destinies and analyze our own problems, making our own plans and bringing them to pass where we can, in spite of the niggardliness of a stepmotherly nature.

As a doctrine of progress it began in the seventeenth century; as the doctrine of social evolution it is of the nineteenth century and is the analogue of the anatomical evolution of the biologists,

applied here not to individual organisms, but to the growth of societies.

The orthodox theory of social evolution is a corollary of the theory of psychological evolution. As the body can be traced from the very simple forms to a climax in the relatively large brain of man, so mental capacity was assumed to consist of separate stages, the lower ones being those occupied by primitive man. Aided by the concept of vestiges, men like Herbert Spencer were able to construct a symmetrical picture with the lower races at one end of the scale, intermediate forms following after, the climax occurring in the geniuses who are the glory of our race.

Primitive man, said the representatives of the older view, not only existed in the Old Stone Age, but he also exists today in Australia, in Patagonia, in Greenland, and similar regions of low culture. Culture being the product of the adaptation of the individual to his environment, it was thought high or low as this adaptation was made by a higher or lower order of mind. In the development, several stages were clearly distinguished, some formulations of which have become classic and are, indeed, the intellectual heritage of our literary tradition. A familiar series is the division of cultures into hunting, pastoral, agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing. As the facts began to accumulate, subdivisions of these were made and transition stages admitted, but the general framework was not questioned.

An even more familiar designation still current is that which gives the series as savagery, barbarism, and civilization. These, again, are divided by some writers into upper and lower savagery, upper and lower barbarism, and early and later civilization. Again, some found it necessary to further subdivide the material, making three divisions of each: lower, middle, and upper savagery, and so forth.

The common assumption of schemes of this type is that culture and social organization result from an interaction between the mind of man, which is assumed to be uniform and constant for a given situation, and the environment, which varies with the climate and physical situation but which is a definite fixed entity to be "adapted to." The attempt to assign the different peoples to their appropriate places in the scale was repeatedly made with a certain measure of success, the differentia being in each case the possession of a certain specific element of material cul-

ture; for example, a bow and arrow or pottery combined with the economic organization or the degree of social integration. It was assumed that the human being who must drink will need a vessel to drink from and that when his mind has developed sufficiently he will know how to adapt himself to an environment which will make him bring into proper relation the three elements of clay, water, and fuel. Brought together in proper spatial and temporal relations, clay, water, and fuel will produce a pot. The lowest races had no pots because their minds were inferior. When, through the gradual evolving power of the intellect, they rose high enough in the mental scale, the pottery adaptation took place and they advanced to the higher stage of social evolution.

Analogous assumptions were made concerning the bow and arrow. The bow and arrow is almost unique among human inventions. It has been called the most difficult and most important single material invention. It very greatly extended the zone of danger and efficiency of the hunter, gave him a greatly enlarged food supply, and contributed enormously to his feeling of self-confidence and power. But this is not the chief reason for the high place which the invention holds in the minds of the ethnologists. The remarkable aspect is that it is difficult to see through what stages the invention has passed. With a spear it is different. A poor spear is still a spear. A poor pot has some value as a pot. But a poor bow and arrow is practically worthless. Now, the origin of the bow and arrow is unknown, being prehistoric, but many tribes exist who are ignorant of it. The older theory assumed that elastic wood or similar material, straight shafts and twisted cord were put into their proper relation when the mind of man had advanced far enough in self-direction and mechanical skill to make this possible.

And so on through the series. Domestication of animals is higher than pure hunting and was assumed to have arisen when the scarcity of game and sufficient mental power occurred together. And so with agriculture.

The technical name for this theory is *Independent Origin*. Through the American continent the bow and arrow was used. It is also present everywhere throughout Africa. It was not assumed that the Africans learned to make the bow from the Americans or vice versa; but rather that peoples in both cultures developed the instrument at their proper stage.

Such a theory has all the attractiveness of symmetry and simplicity. It held the field for a long time and has by no means been wholly abandoned. Questions, however, began to arise when careful studies revealed certain spatial relationships that suggested difficulties. If a map of North America be drawn with reference solely to the manufacture of pottery, the areas where the art is known are practically continuous. A line drawn from the northern part of Arizona roughly in a northeasterly direction will separate the area of pottery south and east of this line from the area of no pottery on the north and west. It might be assumed that the people of the North and the West were inferior to the others, but the question was raised very early whether the art of pottery had not been introduced and taught to the remote tribes by some who had learned it or discovered it. The situation is quite similar regarding the bow and arrow. There is a large section of Oceania where this invention is unknown. That part of Oceania where bows and arrows are used is contiguous on the map with Malaysia and the continental areas which have possessed this instrument from prehistoric times. Here, again, the assumption is entirely tenable that the lower races are those who have not yet advanced to the stage of culture where the invention could occur, and it is entirely thinkable that this division of mankind into lower and higher might occur were the given peoples not entirely contiguous in the areas they occupied. In the case of the bow and arrow, however, complications affecting the theory of progress early appeared.

The Andaman Islanders are admittedly among the most primitive of people, having no agriculture nor any pastoral life, living off native pigs, fish, and turtles, and with the very simplest form of social organization. They have, however, excellent bows and arrows with which they are very skillful. Certain Polynesians, on the other hand, whose social organization is complex and who have chiefs and kings, are ignorant of the bow and arrow. Moreover, the weapon is used in the northern tip of Australia and the Australians have long been considered among the most primitive of peoples.

One more instance may be cited, the discovery of iron. There is still current a scheme of social evolution which gives as the stages stone, copper, bronze, and iron, and there is no question of the validity of this division of cultural elements in the case of

the inhabitants of western Europe in prehistoric times. But when we consider that throughout the continent of Africa iron was mined, smelted, and forged and that in North America, where there are the richest deposits of iron in the world, no use whatever was made of it, it is impossible to avoid serious questioning concerning the implications of the orthodox theory. The Iroquois Indians or the Pueblos, the Aztecs or the Cherokees, when carefully studied, appear to have no lack of mental ability. Dr. Eastman, a native Sioux Indian, began to learn to read in his adolescent days and fourteen years later was awarded the degree of Doctor of Medicine from Harvard Medical School. It is seriously to be doubted whether the absence of ironworking in America is to be ascribed to a low degree of mental power, and when we look at the map of iron culture it is again a continuous area which appears.

The accumulation of facts of this nature has led to the theory known as *Diffusion*, which would account for the spread of inventions in terms of contact with other peoples. That it is possible to trace the march of an invention in all its meanderings and in the absence of written records no one would assert. But given the appearance of an efficient weapon like the bow, and assuming contacts and migrations so that one group might learn from its neighbors, it would easily be possible to find the bow and arrow introduced to a people of low mentality but entirely absent from those of superior ability because they had not had the good fortune to be reached by its influence. This whole subject is still a matter of controversy among specialists, but a sufficient number of indubitable connections have been made out to impair seriously the older formulation of the evolution of material culture.

The older conception of the life of primitive peoples has been modified in two important respects. First, there has been apparently a continuous mobility, continued to our own times, which gives a picture very different from that presented to a scholar who wrote fifty years ago. We know of voyages of more than a thousand miles of the South Sea Islanders in their ocean-going canoes. Anthropologists now regard the American Indians as kindred of the Mongolians and assume that the Fuegians on the southern tip of South America are there because of a slow migration from Alaska throughout the whole length of the two con-

tinents. Similar itineraries have been made out of the two wings of the Bantu race, who started somewhere in northeast Africa, divided to the east coast and the west coast, and met again in the region of the Cape. Far more recent have been the migrations of the Maoris, the date of whose arrival in New Zealand has been provisionally fixed at the thirteenth century, A.D. We think of the modern era as characterized by free movements of peoples, and this is true, but it is merely a question of degree and rate of movement. The prehistoric world is now everywhere pictured to us as characterized by migrating, advancing, intermingling peoples. So thorough has been this process that many anthropologists assert that there are no pure races left on the earth, not even the Africans.

A second change in our conception is the realization that an element of culture can travel from one tribe to another without the presence of those originating it. The researches of Boas have shown that tales and myths are relayed from language to language and can be traced through thousands of miles, those finally telling them having no familiarity with the language in which the stories first originated. When Stanley came down the Congo River he found food plants that had been domesticated in South America growing thousands of miles inland, hundreds of miles beyond where white men had ever penetrated, having been relayed within the last two hundred years. Another instance of this process is to be found in the journey round the earth of the practice of smoking tobacco, which was brought to Europe in the seventeenth century, spreading soon to Asia, extending to the whole of Africa, finally reaching, by way of Siberia, the Indians in Alaska, who had been ignorant of it. The practice made its spiral circuit of the globe in one century, and this before the advent of steam power.

All this has much to do with the theory of cultural evolution, making it easy to see how many or even most of the elements of the culture of a people may have been borrowed. It is now easy to see why the Pygmies are expert archers while some of the Polynesians are still spear throwers, or why Soudanese ex-slaves can read Arabic though Marquesans remained preliterate.

There is another cardinal feature of the classic theory of social evolution that has been fatally criticized in recent years. It is the assumption that with a given economic organization or stage

there would always be found a corresponding political, moral, and religious stage of ideas and institutions. Much has been made, for instance, of the position of women with reference to the degree of advancement in culture. The most primitive women were assumed to be lowest in status, and each advance in cultural development was assumed to be reflected in a higher stage with reference to this particular culture element. But when the facts began to accumulate, this simplicity did not appear. Some primitive tribes do, indeed, treat their women with scant consideration, beat them, imprison them, and make them into beasts of burden. But these are not always the lowest tribes. Indeed, they are never the lowest tribes. The simpler peoples are the kindlier. It is among the more advanced that harshness becomes striking. The writer has seen the wife of an African chief sitting on the ground wearing on her neck a punishment fork made from a heavy log whose continued weight could be nothing short of torture. But these people were agricultural with half a dozen breeds of domesticated animals and a high degree of skill in metal working, weaving, and wood carving, while among the Iroquois Indians, who were in the Polished Stone Age, the matrons of the tribe had great freedom, much dignity, and a high degree of political and administrative responsibility and power. It is unnecessary to multiply instances of this sort, for the statement is unquestioned that the economic, the social, and the religious development do not run *pari passu*.

What shall we say then? Has there been no evolution or development of social life and organization? Is it not possible to see any progress in the march of the human race? It does not follow because the older explanation of evolution is unsatisfactory that no continuity or improvement can be made out. The psychology of invention is not easy to write. In fact, it is perhaps forever impossible to formulate it, for invention is something new and to hit upon something new and original always has the quality of the accidental, by which we mean the not understood. No one knows who invented the art of working iron. It is certain that it was not a white man and it is not impossible that two or more men could have done it independently and in far-separated regions. Whoever it was, he passed it on to others until now it has become the foundation of our modern civilization. The invention of iron, however, does not seem to

be any measure either of mental capacity or of high culture. The Eskimo, who had neither metals nor stone, who understood neither weaving nor pottery, stands conspicuous among primitive peoples as an industrious, efficient, and highly moral person. For many millenniums—the guesses at their number are very wild, for the only measure is the very small-scale map of geology—primitive man over all the earth lived on a level of culture which, with all its variations, can hardly be separated with any degree of scientific confidence into higher and lower.

We return, then, to the assumption which underlay the formulation of our fathers in the age of faith, namely, that the human race is approximately uniform in mental endowment and that progress and change are not to be correlated with or explained by any assumptions of increasing mental capacity. This was the assumption made by those who formulated the course of history in terms of divine providence. As we have already seen, throughout medieval thought and surviving still in evangelical circles it was assumed that the whole course of human life, creation, fall, redemption, the last day, and the millennium, were all conceived in the mind of God, who had made of one blood all the nations of the earth. The modern doctrine of progress is but a translation of these terms into the scientific language of the nineteenth century. The span of the years was enormously lengthened, and the details of the scheme were loosened noticeably, but the steady growth and irresistible improvement of social and moral ideas were steadfastly believed in and still have many able and earnest advocates. They no longer speak of a millennium to be inaugurated by the visible, literal, bodily *Parousia*. It is, nevertheless, confidently believed by many that a goal of change exists.

The emotional value of such a conception is unquestionable. Moreover, it accorded so well with the doctrine of biological evolution that scientific warrant for this emotional faith was easy to procure. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest, when applied to social phenomena, is very full of comfort for it is always preached by those who have survived, and who thus assert their fitness by a scientific indirection. Ethnocentrism, the tendency to make one's own culture the measure of all others, seems to be everywhere present, but to those who are enabled to contemplate all peoples from the standpoint of the whole the relativity of

these measures soon appears. For progress is relative to the ideals and wishes of a nation or a race, and in a world as bloody as ours progress has meant death and destruction of many from whose point of view there has been, of course, no progress. To a Bulgarian Christian the history of the Balkans in the last two centuries shows more progress than appears to his Turkish neighbor. The Cherokee chiefs fighting a rear-guard action against encroachment and injustice can believe in progress only by taking the point of view of their enemies. The dog who is running for his dinner and who is gaining on the rabbit running for his life is indeed making progress, but the rabbit, soon to be a victim, could he think might not so define it.

Considerations such as these have done much to discredit the earlier generalizations. Particular progress in specific activities is obvious, but whether in general and on the whole this could be asserted must depend on the point of view. Those of European culture, including Americans, whose ships dominate the seven seas and whose flags float even over the barren wastes of the poles are hardly justified in identifying their own achieved ambitions with the fate of the race as a whole. Moreover, warning voices in no small number have been raised, calling attention to the new types of degradation in our slums, new forms of slavery in factory and brothel, new types of discontent, and what is more serious if true, the physical degeneration of the race in a land where the most miserable fraction produces more than half of the children. It is necessary to reexamine older formulations if we are to escape the fallacy of our own prejudices.

Leaving out of account the new terms of value, what descriptive changes can be described? One of the most significant is held to be the *invention of alphabetical writing*. Diverse as they are, preliterate peoples are much more nearly alike and have far more in common with each other than with those who, possessing written literature, we call civilized. Now, literacy is an institution arising out of certain inventions, originating in very circumscribed spots, and spreading over the earth. The missionaries of our own generation have abundantly proved that all peoples can learn letters. An unclothed Bantu can be seen sitting in the shade of the forest reading a book which six months before had seemed to him like unintelligible magic. Literacy is not the result of capacity, but a tradition handed on from one race to

another and from fathers to sons, which can be traced back to the dawn of history. Whatever social changes literacy represents, it has this much of the fortuitous. That literacy does make profound and fundamental changes is increasingly evident, for the written word remains. In the records of the past the fathers speak, and the writings, or scriptures, are venerated among all peoples. Such facts mean that a continuity of tradition, an enlargement of consciousness, is possible to such a degree that it amounts to a difference in kind. A race without letters has no history, merely tales and traditions. A people without history is like a man without memory, who lives from moment to moment. It is possible, therefore, to make one grand division in the evolution of man at the period where writing begins. For the preliterate, different as they are from each other, may all be characterized by certain common traits. They live in small groups; they are relatively isolated; they are uncritical of their own culture; and their lives are lived in a social atmosphere where magic and superstition have reached the saturating point.

When writing appears, several things happen. The past lives on in the inscribed leaf. Isolation both in time and space begins to give way. Contacts multiply and cities begin, and with the growth of cities and the complexity which necessarily results a new dimension is added to human life. W. J. Perry and Eliott Smith have brought forward many facts in support of the notion that city life with its cooperation and consequent accumulation of savings, or capital, furnishes the culture medium in which were evolved both slavery and war. This theory is too recent for a final judgment to be passed upon it, but the complexity of large aggregations with their division into classes, and the stratification which finds its ultimate expression in Europe in feudalism, and in Asia in the caste system, seems quite undeniable. Now, one aspect of social evolution which we can attribute to writing is the systematizing and fixing of the moral, spiritual, and social ideas and customs. Pre-literate societies are erroneously assumed to be fixed and immovable. Properly understood, the opposite statement is more nearly true. All tribes have food taboos, religious and ceremonial practices, but none are so fixed or have endured so long as those of peoples who have written them down, for writing fixes the old and the old always tends to become sacred. Everyone who is familiar with prelit-

erate culture recognizes the helplessness of its traditions in competition with an organized and systematized competing system, whether the missionary be Christian, Mohammedan, or Buddhist. The preliterate villager has no effective defense against a missionary's confident assertion of a fixed and hoary tradition.

It is not meant to assert that writing necessarily represents a higher stage of culture. Indeed, the point has been repeatedly made that writing introduced too early may be a great bar to progress. The elaborate and meticulous ritual of the toilet would probably have been abandoned long ago in India, had it not been written down in the sacred books. The irrational dietary laws of the Hebrews which forbade ham, but permitted grasshoppers, survives to our own day only because of the literacy of their fathers.

If one term must be chosen to characterize the effect of writing, it would be the tendency to *absolutism*. Preliterate peoples live in a world of magic and environing spiritual beings, but these are evanescent and shifting in their existence. The introduction of writing mitigates in no sense the tyranny of superstition, but it does erect it into a system giving stability and permanence and the prestige of former generations. In the enthusiasm for classic culture, it was for a long time customary to deny superstition and magic to the Greece of Pericles, but careful researches forced the admission that this praise is undeserved. The life of medieval Europe is so well known that it is impossible to minimize the place of magic and superstition in their culture. Indeed, it is easier to list the likenesses between the civilization of Egypt, Greece, Rome, and Medieval Europe than it is the differences. Differences there are in plenty, but through all the variety there appear the common characteristics, expanding political units, stratified society, sacred books wherein the superstitions of their fathers are glorified, and a uniform and pathetic dependence upon unknown supernatural beings and influences: gods, devils, gnomes, fairies under the control of witches, necromancers, shamans, and priests. If the word were not already pre-empted by historians for another meaning, it would be convenient to designate all that period of human history from the earliest civilization in Egypt to the seventeenth Christian century as the *Medieval Period*, for middle period it certainly is, intermediate between the unorganized and half-conscious life of the prelit-

erates, and the modern age, the keynote of which is control.

John Dewey somewhere remarks that the idea which appeared in western Europe in the period following the Renaissance was the most important invention of the human mind save perhaps the "invention" of language itself. This idea he says was the conception that *the forces of nature can be used and controlled to satisfy and increase the wants of man*. Our third period of social evolution is, then, the *age of science, age of control, or the modern period*. It is unnecessary to admit that anticipations of this may be found as far back as paleolithic man, and that the art products of Egypt and of Europe would have been impossible without a measure of this spirit. But despite these facts, it remains true that the whole center of gravity of our lives has shifted in the last three or four centuries from dependence and submission to conscious invention and control. Wissler characterizes European culture by three terms: universal suffrage, education, and invention, and these are all different manifestations of the modern spirit which is homocentric, self-reliant, and when true to itself devoid of superstition. The history of this transition has been but recently written, nay, it is still in the writing. One of the most important documents of this history is White's *History of the Warfare Between Science and Theology in Christendom*, a history which he could not completely write, since he is dead and the warfare not yet finished. The different chapters in this book are accounts of the several battles in that war and may all be brought under our formula. Astronomy began as an effort to reduce to a mechanical statement the movements of those terrible points of light whose influence on our fathers is still reflected in the names of our weekdays. The comets were transformed from portents of wrath to harmless streams of luminous gas, and insane people who formerly were the helpless hosts of disembodied demons, have by the touch of science been transformed into hospital patients.

It is difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of this change. The control of astronomy, the control of navigation, the control of agriculture—these are all such commonplace assumptions of our culture that we need at times to be reminded of the prescientific methods which secured the safety of ships by prayers and offerings, and the fertility of the soil by magical and erotic ceremonies.

The dawning conception that human nature itself is the result of social interaction and that psychology and sociology can become natural sciences opens up the hope that by taking thought human nature itself can be controlled. War, poverty, and crime, which were formerly defended, apologized for, and even conceived as a part of the divine plan, appear to our modern eyes as problems to be solved, as challenges to the technique of control which scientific men persistently seek.

That this is another and higher stage of social evolution can admit of no doubt. The modern scientific world is a different world from the medieval universe, where all the evils were a part of some higher plan of extra-human powers. The medieval has this in common with the preliterate world, that the emphasis of importance is always on some other life—superhuman or infrahuman, but never human. The preliterate world is social, mythological, magical; the medieval mind added theology and metaphysics; the modern conception is positive and scientific.

The conception of social evolution is, then, that of a dependence upon new inventions and discoveries, but these are not necessarily or chiefly material. Human brotherhood is as much an invention as is a steam engine; and democracy, as real a discovery as electricity. The history of these concepts bears a direct relation to the growth of social organization, and Shailer Mathews, who speaks of theology as transcendentalized politics, has shown in the clearest way the relation of our concepts of the universe to our social life. The preliterate world is still in many parts a godless world, for gods cannot exist where there are no kings. When civilization appeared, the pantheon of each culture reflected the political structure of its people. In this our modern age the revolution has been so recent and so fundamental that concepts and imagery for the religious symbols of a democratic people have not appeared in any satisfying form. The transmitted scriptures of our fathers give us a fossil vocabulary of a medieval world, a vocabulary which fits but poorly the needs of our day. The new wine of democratic ideals is endangered in the old skins of medieval vocabularies.

And yet nothing would be more erroneous than the assertion that social evolution has outstripped religion or that science is taking the place of religion. The dreams of our dreamers are as

splendid as any Syrian prophet's inspiration. The faith of a modern advocate of peace on earth or a modern prophet of social reform is of the same quality as that which has made the record of the Hebrew prophets perennial fountains of courage and hope. There is this difference, however: the preliterate faith was a dumbly despairing trust in capricious and precarious spirits; the medieval faith was a humble and contrite surrender to an arbitrary and powerful external deity; the modern faith is a trust, equally sublime and of the same quality, but having for its instrument a scientific technique to be expected and sought for. The love of a man for the life of his child is of the same quality in all three cases. But in sickness the Melanesian for relief leaned on pure magic; the early Christian, on fervent prayer; the modern man, on preventive medicine and its attendant sciences.

And so we conclude that there has been evolution and progress after all, but the formula is *the more or less rapid spread from single centers of diffusion of particular inventions and discoveries in the material and spiritual worlds*. Some of these inventions have been evil, and some of the change has been regressive. The great discoveries have always presented new problems, some of which have not yet found solutions. The doctrine of progress here presented would view our present evils and future perils in the nature of a challenge to our inventive genius and associated creative intelligence. With the conviction that this is not a stage play which is already rehearsed with the final consummation already certain, but a real fight with the issue in doubt, and a real struggle into which the high-hearted can throw themselves with all the devotion of the ancient heroes, we work earnestly to find a technique which will enable us to achieve the object of our faith, the bringing in of a better world.

We come finally to the problem of the evolution of culture narrowly defined, which is the distinct subject matter of sociology. The key to the understanding of this question lies in a study of custom and the stages through which it passes. Now, the customs of a group are its habits, analogous to the habits of a man, and arising out of the normal tendency to repeat an act in the same way, time after time. Custom has all the advantages of individual habits. Attention is economized and efficiency results, for energy is more effective if a channel already exists.

Custom likewise has the disadvantage of habits, for habits are hard to break and not all habits are good.

The stages of custom are now generally agreed upon. They begin as folkways, the unwitting uniformities of behavior which arise in every society. The folkways are in the beginning never formulated and are only partially attended to; for not only is it the tendency of habit to become unconscious through long repetition, but also the beginning of habit may be entirely unnoticed.

The second stage of development of the folkways is known among sociologists as the *mores*, which, while still unformulated, are more conscious and always in some degree emotional, for the violation or threatened violation causes concern or resentment. The folkways, which are mere usages, exist in all societies alongside the *mores*, which are all but universal but not quite so. It is possible to find isolated societies on small islands, like the Andamans, where hardly any of the folkways have risen to the conscious and emotional level of *mores*. This means that resentment at the violation of the folkways has not occurred because the violation has not sufficiently often taken place. There is no penalty for murder among the Andamans, that is, no set penalty. If the murderer be a man of influence he may withdraw himself for a time from the camp, followed by some of his friends, and stay until the matter has blown over, after which the whole thing is forgotten. The *mores* seem to require a certain degree of interpenetration of groups to bring the folkways to the conscious level of morals.

The third stage of development is double, for it takes two directions, one individual and one social. On the individual side group morality passes into individual morality; custom becomes conscience. And here, again, our formula seems adequate. Conscience among completely isolated peoples is so rare as to be negligible, for conscience is an appeal which the individual makes from the group to his own ideas, setting himself in opposition to others or feeling guilty because of his refusal to obey the voice of his people. The literature of isolated preliterate peoples seems to warrant the assertion that a homogeneous group hardly ever has the problem of dealing with one who criticizes the customs of his people or refuses to fall in with their wishes. Modern civilized life, with its company of martyrs, heroes, rebels, and independent thinkers, has obscured the obvious principle that individuality

presupposes a sort of dual membership or, at least, a dual influence. Conscience is not merely the voice of the group in the soul of a man; it consists in the warring voices of two groups or of multiple social influences, contending in a single breast for allegiance and supremacy. In modern life this is not difficult to see, particularly if we take into account the influence of literature, for the reading of books is, as already remarked, a kind of conversation with the past or, at least, with the absent.

The social aspect of the third stage of development is the passage from the unformulated mores to the organized institutions. Now, an institution as Sumner points out involves a concept and a structure; the concept being the abstract symbol, the product of reflective thinking, and the structure being an organization into a formulated and systematized arrangement of personnel and *materiel*. This process may be illustrated in religion, which begins in the unconsciously formed folkways, arising out of the quest for food, the defense against enemies, and the crises in life and in nature, such as birth, death, winter, and storms. The folkways thus gradually crystallized are called mores when they come into consciousness and are rationalized. Likewise, the phenomenon of conscientiousness in religion is most easily observed when two religions simultaneously solicit the allegiance of one man or when a strange custom or a lawless impulse invites him to disregard or criticize the religious practices of his fathers. And finally, while among preliterate there are no religious institutions, yet among moderns there are no religions without institutions, our conception of religion being bound up with our ideas concerning the church, the mosque, the synagogue, or the temple.

There is one important modification of the statement that these phases are stages of evolution. It is not the whole truth to say that isolated peoples are governed by folkways, conflicting preliterate groups by mores, and modern peoples by institutions. The folkways are as much a part of modern life as of the most backward people, and the mores exist even where institutions are most numerous. The mores do not replace folkways but are superadded to them, and institutions do not replace the mores but exist alongside both the earlier forms of control.

Consider a book of etiquette describing the social usages of the most refined society. Such a book might be defined as a set

of written directions enabling members of a lower stratum to behave consciously as the members of a higher group behave unthinkingly. The manners of the superior social group are folkways and are absorbed without effort by the children, being enforced by no severer penalties than lifted eyebrows of pained surprise or gently smiling approval. For every society develops its unintentional customs, which, if they continue long enough, may pass over into the stage when they are expected so confidently that they are enforced by severe penalties, although the penalties may not become exact and formal. And when the customs reach another development they may pass into legal enactments, thus reaching the institutional stage. The prohibition law may be thought of as the efforts of part of the nation to impose their mores upon the whole. In many cities it is now illegal to alter the direction of a motor car without extending the hand horizontally. The custom having proved desirable, it became a law and passed quickly into an institutional phase.

These three stages may indeed be thought of as being preceded by another, a sort of instinctive morality whereby, as in a figure, nature punishes violations, even though society is organized in favor of them. The polyandry of the Todas, the infanticide of the Solomon Islanders, and the birth control of the Bobangi are rapidly causing their extinction. But neglecting this phase, the four stages of evolution may be set down as folkways, mores, conscience, institutions, followed by the disorganization and breaking up of these later and the reorganization into new systems.

But all this is obviously concerned with the form only and not at all with the content, and it is the content of morality which is important. If we inquire whether there is a development or evolution of mores on the side of content, the matter becomes very difficult. No practice which we deprecate or abhor has been without moral approval among some people, somewhere, at some time. The Greeks thought it highly moral to kill sickly children; the Fuegians kill their aged parents as a sacred duty; and the Australian offers his wife to his guest, lest he be considered inhospitable. To this day head-hunters in many communities feel ashamed until they have raided a sleeping village and decapitated a helpless victim. The content of the mores depends upon the fortuitous constellation of forces, economic, political, and

social. A sudden change in circumstances will make a good practice immoral. The exploitation of the children in our factories is but one of many examples. Alexander Hamilton is quoted as praising the new machine age because it brought the opportunity for gainful employment to all the people, especially those of tender years.

Moreover, folkways and mores are as much the object of import and export as are material goods. Witness our Australian ballot, our German Christmas tree, our Chinese game of mah-jongg. The development of the content of customs is never a simple evolution but includes the sudden acquisition by one folk of what has been slowly built up by another. If the tribes of earth had each remained quite separated from all the rest it might be possible to have described their cultural evolution with more confidence, but the mobility of races and cultures is the outstanding phenomenon. Whenever for any cause the mobility is decreased, customs tend to harden and become stable. This not only characterizes China and India but to some extent Medieval Europe, and perhaps the most salient feature of the cultural life of our time is the rapidly increasing tempo of alteration.

The development of the folkways may be into mores and thence into institutions, but the change does not necessarily take this direction, for the manners of people may change or disappear or undergo substitution while still remaining on the level of mere usages. Likewise, the mores undergo constant modification, decay, intensification, or substitution, without necessarily ever becoming institutionalized. And as for institutions, they are always being altered, and some of the changes are very slow. Moreover, some institutions pass back into the life of a people as mere customs, remaining sometimes as vestiges, surviving in a few instances in the games of our children before disappearing entirely from human life.

And when there are sudden and dramatic changes in institutions, these are never the result of immediate causes alone but may be thought of as a sudden eruption due to long-continued and increasing pressure, as a tree long decaying may be overturned by a sudden gust of wind. They can be comprehended only if we consider that the slow process of undermining has been going on for years. Revolutions have occurred in all ages of history, from Egypt to Russia, and the formula seems everywhere

to apply. The revolution may mean moral advance or it may not. The judgment in each case depends upon the judge. But the revolution is the breaking up of an old organization, and the tendency of human society is to reorganize itself as best it may and as soon as it can.

Every institution, like every organization, involves the expression of some attitudes and the suppression of others. The equilibrium obtained is never permanent, for the temperamental equipment of the rising generation is never identical with the adults who are in command, and the temperament of new leaders introduces at times a disturbing factor. Moreover, widespread communication gives increasing opportunity for new and disturbing changes, and these always make for disorganization.

Modern life is perhaps most truly characterized as involving an increasing rate of change whose tempo is speeding up in a geometrical ratio. More changes have taken place in the last generation than in the previous century, and greater changes, perhaps, in the last hundred years than in the preceding thousand. Whether this be good or evil depends upon the outcome, and concerning the outcome no one may dogmatize, for possibilities of growth involve possibilities of decay, and men who may continue to advance beyond middle life are also subject to the perils of disorganization in a far greater degree than their ancestors.

Twenty-five years ago it would have been easy to secure general agreement to the proposition that the increased communication of our day has led us to an era of democracy, and it is clearly true that our units are larger and the area of our sympathies includes more people than ever before. "Men have always believed that it was right to love your neighbor as yourself—the difficulty has been to agree on who your neighbor is." There is dawning an age of humanity. Our circle of brotherhood sometimes includes the planet, and there is some warrant for saying that there has been a continuous expansion of the family sympathy. Nations were once everywhere considered to be above all moral law, but now we plan a Parliament of Man. It may be that institutions will culminate in a Master Institution, with justice and liberty, equality and democracy, as cosmic ideals.

And yet it would be very easy to fall into an error, even here. In 1917 the hearts of men were lifted up because they saw visions of universal democracy following the last of all the wars. Today

we are a sadder race. The tragic discords of Versailles and the bitter hatreds that have arisen out of our intense reactionary nationalism have already produced a flood of articles, pamphlets, and books glorifying isolation, defending the exploitation of the weak, and repudiating democracy. The future even of democracy cannot be foretold out of hand. If and when we work out an adequate social science, we shall be able to predict, and to control because we shall know the processes and the mechanisms. Until then the issue is veiled. The outcome depends on the visions of our seers and the skill of our leaders, as well as upon the inscrutable movements of the cosmic processes whose outcome, being inaccessible to our knowledge, remains the goal of our faith.

PART V
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RACIAL CONFLICT

XXVIII

RACIAL ATTITUDES AND SENTIMENTS

If the reader will permit a paradox,—race prejudice is a phenomenon that is not essentially connected with race. This paradox has its justification when the results of any attempt to secure a classification of mankind into races has been seriously made. The only sense in which race prejudice deals with race is in the naïve and untechnical fashion in which the United States government lists races for the purposes of the immigration law. In the list of races given one may read of the Irish race, the Welsh race, the Bohemian race, the African race, the Spanish-American race, the Canadian race, the Italian race, to a total of some thirty-nine.

Another way to say the same thing would be to assert that as races are dealt with and as races are disliked, there is little or no connection with the scientific concept of race. Not that this is without justification, for, in this crude world in which we live, it is of importance to determine not what races are, but what men call races when they manifest racial antipathy. And it is an extremely easy task to show in this connection that race prejudice is contingent upon a certain type of group consciousness which may have no defense in a scientific classification, but which does determine in large measure what men live by and what they do when they live.

Now, concerning group consciousness we do know something, and one thing we know is that group consciousness has a beginning in each particular case. It has been repeatedly shown by competent and careful men that group consciousness, like self-consciousness, arises in a condition of inhibition or contrast which may be acute enough to be called conflict but is always capable of being studied genetically.

If the foregoing statements are convincing, we have as a starting point of our discussion a complete repudiation of the mythological school of sociologists, who derive race prejudice from

organic attitudes. The chief reliance of such writers seems to be the olfactory apparatus, with some attention to the gustatory function. There is also the unproved inaccurate assertion that the strange or unfamiliar is a native stimulus to fear. Such writers in moments of absent-mindedness present the reader with equally untenable statements about curiosity which would contradict what they have written about fear, but let us not digress. So far as the present writer's facts show, there is no race prejudice prior to group consciousness, and new and unfamiliar people are more apt to be interesting and intriguing than to excite either fear or disgust. In short, without going into detail here, the assumption is made that the consciousness of one's own group and the consciousness of another group, which require specific and definable conditions for their creation, are held to be necessary for the existence of race prejudice. The group to which I belong is the in-group, but I can belong to an in-group only if there is also present the conception of one or more out-groups. The reaction in race prejudice is never to an individual but always to some person or persons as representing, belonging to, included in, an out-group over against which my own in-group is contrasted.

But group consciousness does not always mean group prejudice. An athletic contest between two rival colleges may be conducted in an atmosphere of more or less chivalrous strife, with the rules of the game carefully defined and scrupulously kept, the defeated team accepting gamely the result, and while group consciousness in such cases is sometimes intense, the mark of antipathy and the peculiar feeling tone which we associate with prejudice may be entirely absent. But group prejudice does arise, and often, and it seems to possess all the criteria of race prejudice even when race is not the object. There is class prejudice seen in the attitude of the proletariat toward the capitalist bourgeoisie. There is sectional prejudice which has been bitter enough to cause bloody wars. There is political prejudice, not to be lightly spoken of and involving on occasion intense antipathy. The writer as a child listened one day to a Southern Democrat discussing a certain Republican. With great feeling he insisted that he would not dream of allowing a Republican to enter his house and didn't see how any self-respecting Southerner could feel any different. It would be impossible in this case to

appeal to race, but the group prejudice involved all the characteristics of very intense race prejudice.

Race prejudice, when it exists, has apparently no distinguishing qualities, but it does perhaps admit of somewhat different defenses or rationalizations. The writer has attempted to show elsewhere that men are held to be human when they act in a comprehensible manner. If the group against which we feel strongly is strange in its customs or habitually given to disapproved actions, it is difficult to regard them as wholly like us. If, therefore, the term race can be brought in, it gives a sort of pseudo-biological defense to the emotional attitude. In one instance of group antipathy toward a recently arrived group of Bohemian farmers in Texas it was asserted that the people were really not human beings; they worked their women in the fields, they went without shoes, and it was commonly believed that they lived in their houses like animals, devoid of the normal human comforts. If you feel that way about a people, you are much more comfortable if you call upon biology to classify them as belonging to a different race from your own. This call has often gone forth but has never been answered. Biological science has no word to say. Biologists classify men as one species. Anthropology alone has given marks of race and they class Berbers and certain children of Mother India as of the Caucasian race—to which the popular response is a law keeping them out, as of another and lower race.

If the theory of organic attitudes as a basis of race prejudice were true, then we could not account for the fact that the first Chinese were welcomed and approved. The earliest Japanese were interesting and charming. The Mexicans in the artists' colony are the subject of exceptionally favorable attention.

A phenomenon in point on the campus at Chicago is the popularity of the Hindu students with the romantic-minded girls. They are new, unfamiliar, and strange, therefore they are rather attractive than otherwise. Prejudice against them is improbable because they are too few in number for group consciousness to arise. Nor are we left to guess what happens when they are more numerous. We know something of the history of the subject in California, in Texas, in South Africa.

We may conclude, then, in the first place that race prejudice is a social phenomenon with nothing in the organic or innate

constitution of man that offers any explanation. It is rather due to a complex situation in which two or more contrasting or conflicting groups come into contact in such a way that one is set over against the other, with certain emotional aspects to the conflict such as hostility, antipathy, and the like, to the consideration of which we may now turn.

One of the most difficult theoretical aspects of this problem of race prejudice lies in the difficulty of accurately defining its limits. Robert E. Park has taught us to distinguish between prejudice and the condition where accommodation exists. This insight seems profoundly valuable and gives warrant for saying that a caste system may exist without the phenomenon of group prejudice. The essential difference here seems to be the stability of the organization and the absence of tension. Each group is ranked, allocated, and relatively stable and content with its position. Analogous conditions can exist in class distinctions where no race questions are involved. The lower class in England thirty years ago looked upon the aristocracy without envy or antipathy. The latter had always been rich and powerful, and the poor had always been restricted in their lives. It seemed part of the order of nature. The prayer books seemed to assert that it was, indeed, the will of God. There were many distinctions, but they were accepted. Class prejudice was absent. Even in England it is not so now, and in Russia the conditions are strikingly different. If the situations where race prejudice is clearly recognized be brought together for comparison, there appears to be a common element in them all. There is everywhere some degree of tension, some struggle real or impending, some uncertainty of the outcome, some competition or conflict, either for economic opportunity or for social status, or for some other desired goods, and along with this tension there can be made out differing degrees of hostility and antipathy, the extreme limit of which is extreme hatred.

The problem, then, is to define accurately the situations which produce this emotional stress and to point out clearly the different types of emotional stress which are produced. For it is clear that race prejudice exists in an infinite number of graded intensities, shading all the way from slight tendencies for withdrawal to the violent extremes illustrated by the activities of the Scotch shepherds in Auracania who organized shooting parties and by paying

bounties for tongues of dead Indians soon exterminated all the natives.

Race prejudice, therefore, is a particular class of social attitude, a particular subclass of a group attitude, involving a feeling of negative affective tone varying through a wide series. Prejudice seems, therefore, to be always emotional. It is a sentiment. The object of the sentiment is never a perceptual experience, but always a concept, a subjective image, of a class of persons toward whom the attitude is directed.

Being emotional, race prejudice is not rational. It is, perhaps, this fact which has misled the authorities above referred to into the error of assuming that it was organic or native. Sentiments arise in the emotional conflicts, but emotional conflicts are always the result of an attempt to reorganize life and to overcome new difficulties. Any collectivity has in it the potentialities of new and unheard of bifurcations and divisions. Everyone understands what is meant by violent sex prejudice, men prejudiced against women and vice versa. We have witnessed recently the rise of youth movements and interesting talk about what youth is doing or thinking and about their success or failure in inventing original sins that they might commit. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in some of these "youth movements" we have men prejudiced against their own children—and, *pari passu*, a group prejudiced against their own parents. The inevitably transitory nature of this phenomenon requires no elaboration.

Race prejudice, being a collective phenomenon, is always localized in space, for groups are situated on the land. Race prejudice is thus attached to the soil. It should be studied with the assistance of the map. It would be highly profitable to have a world map of race prejudice which would show the different groups in different areas where the phenomenon is present and would reveal the interesting facts as to the unilateral or bilateral character of the attitude. Sometimes the prejudice is mutual, at other times it is one-sided. Moreover, such a map could be drawn so as to show the varying degrees of prejudice in so far as these are capable of objective statement and record. But such a map, even if completely and accurately made out, would not exhaust the possibilities of cartography in research on prejudice. It would be profitable to have historical maps showing areas

where prejudice formerly existed and has now disappeared. It is easy to show that many such areas can be delimited. The historical map would also reveal previous periods when existing prejudice was not present. In short, the ecological study of race prejudice seems to offer a fruitful field for investigation and one which appears to have been overlooked hitherto. In July, 1928, a delegation of Presbyterian ministers appeared formally before the Home Secretary of Britain, requesting a quota arrangement against the invasion of the Irish into Scotland. They represented that the Irish are far too numerous in Glasgow and are increasing at an alarming rate. Constituting 25 per cent of the population of the city, the Irish receive 70 per cent of the poor relief. In the past twenty years the Irish increased 39 per cent and the Scottish only 6 per cent. Here are all the essential elements of race prejudice. Moreover, the Scoti from Ireland invaded Scotland, so that they are identical in race. No sociologist could say of the invading race in this case that the trouble with the Irish is that they have the wrong color.

It has elsewhere been pointed out that prejudice is a bivalent attitude. The rejection of one race is coeval with the acceptance and allegiance to another. When prejudice against a group is found, it seems always possible to discover the correlative prejudice for another group. Moreover, both the favorable and the unfavorable attitudes vary in a continuous series with a middle or zero point of neutrality or indifference. Sometimes in defending the prejudice against a group the main emphasis is placed on devotion to the conflicting group. The literature produced in India in defense of what we may now call caste prejudice is devoted chiefly to idealistic phrases claiming a divine origin for the upper caste and defending the system as a benevolent institution which enables the privileged group best to serve the people as a whole. The current writings of the Ku Klux Klan abound in highly idealistic phrases in which loyalty and devotion to the precious heritage of the white race are set forth as the chief motive of their activity and the main defense of their program. In this sense it may be said that race prejudice takes the form of altruistic devotion to the threatened group. The hostility may easily masquerade as love, and the wolf of antipathy wears not infrequently the sheep's clothing of affection and solicitude for the beloved group.

But here emerges a very interesting and important problem. The whole of a series from absolute devotion on one side to complete rejection on the other would thus seem to be characterized as prejudice, and yet prejudice is held to be an undesirable attitude and is so described in the law books and so treated in the administration of justice. Freedom from prejudice is held to be the mark of a cultivated member of society. No refinement of dialectic seems sufficient to take away a certain moral stigma which has always been attached to the term. To be prejudiced is to be biased, bigoted, unfair, one-sided. A man may admit that he is prejudiced and may even boast of it, but one can also admit being blind or can glory in the possession of a goiter. This will lead us to suspect that some attitudes of rejection could exist which do not deserve the name of prejudice and corresponding attitudes of approval and loyalty may be described which are not even prejudice in favor of their object.

Just how the nice distinction here involved can be investigated is an interesting problem for social psychology. The research could involve specific inquiry into the exact nature of the feelings, their attitudes, their genesis, and above all, their immutability. Not to be deflected by any threatened logomachy, we can assert that some attitudes which we may call *X* vary from extreme admiration to extreme rejection, and other attitudes, of the series *Y*, vary likewise between the two extremes. And these differ in some essential respects. The former appear to belong to the category of *représentations collectives* which have been fully set forth by Lévy-Bruhl. He who holds an attitude of extreme prejudice or reacts to an object which has extreme prestige is, in the phrase of the French author, "impermeable to experience." The attitude is fixed. He is "wedded to the notion," he believes in spite of the facts. Arguments against his view only make him worse. If forced to admit the untenable nature of rationalizations, he does not give up his prejudice but merely seeks out other rationalizations.

Against this the series *Y* is more objective. It is called judicial, since we expect judges to feel and act that way. Sometimes we refer to a scientific attitude or an open-minded attitude. The theory of gravitation had high prestige for several generations but was abandoned in a short time and without any mental discomfort when a few facts were brought against it. Scientific

theories seem to belong to class Y, though when the partisans of rival schools repeat their formulation the latter sometimes approach the character of *représentations collectives*, and are hardly to be distinguished from the slogans of politicians and other conflict groups. The conditions under which these divergent classes of attitudes are created is a fruitful field for research and one which seems to have been relatively uncultivated. The term "rationalization" is so useful a word and has so definite a meaning that it will never do to apply it to every reason one gives to justify his conduct or to defend a conviction.

There is a sharp difference between emotionally toned non-rational attitudes and those other attitudes whose real defense is identical with the expressed reasons. There is knowledge, certainty, and conviction; there is opinion and belief, and also prejudice. Our knowledge of the exact distinction between them awaits the result of the future investigation of some skilled psychologists.

We have referred to race prejudice as a collective phenomenon. The object has been shown to be a concept. Racial prejudice against a man is always against him as belonging to a conceived group. Now, this group can be studied by the sociologist for he is always at home in studying groups. And if there are found two groups in conflict in connection with which prejudice exists, it seems always possible to describe them as different. These differences can be described in many forms. Physical appearance is one, including color of the skin, but religion is another and very important difference. Language is so important a difference that to say "sibboleth" instead of "shibboleth" on one occasion cost many thousand people their lives. But prejudice is kept alive, or even at times created, in a situation which calls attention chiefly to some other aspect of the collective life. A difference in food habits is important. Striking differences in dress may be the center of attention. Difference in moral codes or variations from the folkways serve at times to mark off an out-group and to prevent us from including them when we say "we."

The particular situation determines the *gestalt*. For purposes of political action we may temporarily unite with our religious opponents, and such activities tend to mitigate and diminish the intensity of race prejudice.

It is important to observe that where several of these differences combine in a single group the prejudice is strengthened in intensity and prolonged in time. The perennial nature of anti-Semitism is by no means a solved problem, but it seems relevant to note that in many cases there is an accumulation of these symbolic differences. There is a so-called race of slightly different appearance, a different religion, a different dietary, and sometimes even a different costume. It would be interesting to know whether, if religion, language, food, and dress were identical, the race prejudice against the Jew would survive. There is reason to think that it would not.

This last remark gives occasion to emphasize an important aspect of race prejudice. In the experience of him who manifests it, the conceptual image of the out-group tends to persist as long as any considerable number of the members retain the differences, even though most of the out-group have become assimilated to other ways of living. It is the poor Yiddish-speaking, kosher-eating Jew who is in a large and undetermined measure responsible for the attitudes felt toward the completely assimilated members of his group. It is the illiterate, unwashed, and dissolute Negro who keeps alive the conceptual image which is responsible for much of the unjust treatment which wholly assimilated members of his race receive.

In the above suggestions there seem to be also fertile areas of investigation. The varying differences, the extent to which they are focal in consciousness, and the ease and speed with which they are modified could be carefully studied with great profit, and the results ought to make significant contributions to what we would like to know about race prejudice.

Another aspect of prejudice which should be studied concerns the degree of exclusion or distance. Some work has been done in this field already, but much more light is needed. Complete assimilation, inclusion of the other race in the we-group, is one limit, the other extreme being the desire to annihilate the out-group or the less sanguinary expedient of sending them all across the sea or of keeping them there if they already are there. Between these extremes the out-group may be permitted to buy and sell, but in specified times and places only. They may be allowed to use the roads where horses walk, but not the paths reserved for foot passengers. A less degree would allow the

privileges just mentioned, admitting the out-group into the public meetings and vehicles, but in a segregated area. To continue the series, they might be allowed to attend meetings but would be excluded from hotels and restaurants where the in-group go, and near the end of the series they would be allowed to attend meetings and mingle freely but would not be eligible to legal marriage.

This series is merely suggestive and not at all complete. With sufficient patience and industry an exhaustive exhibit could be made which would not only give the picture of a situation but would include the changes in time. Concerning the conditions under which these various items in the mores arose and persisted, or did change and modify, the facts seem to be accessible and ought to throw much light. The Hindus in Natal are not more unwelcome than they are in Vancouver, yet the form of their treatment differs widely, and the study of the difference and the account of how and why it arose ought to be very valuable information.

In the next place, we need a careful study of the decline and disappearance of race prejudice. The difference between the Norman and the Saxon in England was physically very striking, and the student of history knows that the prejudice was very strong. The process is called assimilation, and about assimilation we know much but need to know more. For race prejudice seems to go in a cycle. It has a sort of life history. We can record in many cases the conditions in a period when it would not exist. We can describe the very beginnings and set forth the peak. In some cases the cycle has been completed and the very conceptual image of the out-group has disappeared from human experience. And if a sufficient number of these were set forth with completeness and accuracy, the documents would be very precious and the insight would have no small value.

Concerning the relation of race prejudice to argument and discussion it would probably be agreed now, in the light of what we have come to know of human experience, that the reasons assigned, the rationalizations, the *dérivations* are the result not of the attitude itself, nor of the object, nor of the situation which produced race prejudice. The arguments, reasons, rationalizations are the result of controversy. They bear the same relation to race prejudice that theology bears to religion. Reasons are

not essentially the products of the attitude, but rather are they separate acts. Arguments are the blows struck in wordy warfare. They are efforts to make ourselves appear rational to others or consistent to ourselves. The serious wastes of time which well-equipped men have suffered from when they tried to discover the attitudes by getting written or oral answers to questions is perhaps not too great a price to pay for our progress, but surely it is a blunder which need not be repeated.

When the attitude changes, it must disappear in the melting heat of an emotional experience, and the new attitude is molded in exactly the same kind of matrix as that which gave form to the earlier one which it displaces. And since emotional experiences involving race result in attitudes toward a conceptual and not a perceptual object, it is possible for this to be vicarious with almost an equal effect as if it were personally experienced. Indeed, many of our prejudices are formed as a result of artistic experience. The Turks are detested by millions of people who have never seen a Turk. Instead of seeing the Turk they have lived through a dramatic and highly emotional experience where the Turk has been blamed for atrocious acts and prejudice against him has been strongly formed.

The cure is similar to the cause. What art gives art can take away. *Uncle Tom's Cabin* produced emotional attitudes and occasioned epoch-making changes in the objects which men held in mind over a large section of the nation. The *Clansman* and the *Birth of a Nation* had identical tendencies in the opposite direction. Poetry, painting, the novel, and the drama, to which may be added that form of literature which we call history, are perhaps responsible for more of our prejudices and for more of the changes which take place in time than are actual first-hand experiences.

But actual experiences do modify us. An emotional situation can never leave us unchanged. Every interesting and sympathetic contact with an approved member of a despised group is a drop of water slowly wearing away the granite of a collective attitude.

Race prejudice may, then, be called a natural phenomenon, in the sense that a drought, an earthquake, or an epidemic is a natural phenomenon. It is defended by many as desirable; it is deprecated by others as an evil. But whether it be good

or bad and its effects desirable or undesirable, there is everything to be gained by considering it objectively and by studying the conditions under which it appears, the causes of its origin, the forms and conditions under which it has increased or decreased in intensity, and the questions whether it disappears and why. We have much literature on the subject, but most of it might be listed as propaganda. If objective social science were to proceed to an industrious and indefatigable investigation of this perennial aspect of collective life, the results would have much theoretical value and would offer as well useful instruments of control.

XXIX

RACIAL SUPERIORITY¹

When Mark Twain went to London to report the celebration of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, he wrote of the colossal pomp and display. He described the bonfires on the headlands, the drilling of the army, and the mobilized fleet, up to that time the mightiest armada that had ever assembled. He concluded his account with these words: "And I perceive that the English are mentioned in the Bible: 'Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth.'"

The irony of this comment was not shared by Kipling, who, moved by this same spectacle, wrote his now classic "Recessional," taking occasion to refer to the Americans in these lines:

If, drunk with sight of power, we loose
Wild tongues that have not Thee in awe—
Such boastings as the Gentiles use
Or lesser breeds without the Law—
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget, lest we forget!

The "lesser breeds without the Law" are the Americans, concerning whom the opinion of Kipling was never conspicuously altitudinous. But he was humbled when he thought of "dune and headland" on which the fire had sunk and of the navy that had "melted away" "far-called," and kept praying that they do not forget. What was it he did not wish to forget? I think it was the lessons of history. The English are a proud and boastful people, but there may still be read a letter in the original Latin addressed by Cicero to Atticus—a personal letter in which occurs a reference to the purpose of Atticus to buy some more slaves. "Whatever you do," Cicero wrote to his friend, "do not buy English slaves, for the English people are so dull and stupid that they are not fit to be slaves in the household of Atticus."

In those days Rome was mistress of the world. But even then, and much more so a few centuries earlier, the Romans were looked down upon with disdain by the Greeks, who called them "barbarians," good enough to kill and fight, but devoid of culture and having base souls.

And there is in Herodotus an account of an old Egyptian priest who, turning to a small company of Grecians, said: "You Greeks are but children, you have no history, no past, no adequate civilization."

That is enough in that direction. Let us turn the other way. A famous anthropologist who has done much work in the Southwest recently asked me if I know the people in the Texas Panhandle and the exact sociological explanation of the curious types of people who made up that eddy in the stream of progress. Two weeks later one of my summer students who teaches in a college in the same Texas Panhandle sent me with great pride a paper written by one of his students. The theme of the paper is the superiority of the Texas Panhandlers over all other inhabitants, though his argument is entirely devoted to showing that this superiority is not due to anything innate but is wholly due to the fortunate physical environment and resulting social conditions. As I recall it, the prairies are quite wide, and they had managed to swell out the souls of men to correspond.

Well, we know the "meekness" of the Californian and the "humility" of the inhabitants of Wisconsin, and we are familiar with the same phenomenon of assumed superiority not excluding even Boston, "that land of the bean and the cod," where the Lowells and the Cabots have such a restricted opportunity for conversation. The superiority which we assume in our own life as compared to that of others is obviously a widespread phenomenon. It came as a surprise, however, when scholars discovered that this same phenomenon applied also to the savage and primitive peoples of all the earth. The attitude of the Greenlanders when they gave Rasmussen the news of the World War, shows that the Eskimo sincerely thinks himself superior to every other race.

It would be easy to multiply examples sufficient to warrant the generalization that every people, when they contrast themselves with others, regard themselves as superior in essentials in so far as they are different. I have read many books about

superior and inferior peoples and races but have yet to see a book written by a member of an inferior race. The apparent exception but tests the rule. A subject people may come to accept the estimate of themselves which their masters have, but in this case they are not independent, and they actually include in their notion of themselves the larger group. They are but the inferior part of a larger whole. Where they are separate and distinct, they think of themselves as superior, whether they be Mexicans, Winnebagos, or Melanesians.

Ethnocentrism, then, being universal, is of small value if one wishes to know the facts about comparative ability and excellence. If men of every race and people regard themselves as superior to those of every other, it is probable that most of them are wrong. Mere boasting and group egotism is hardly a proof of either excellence or ability. In fact, in personal relations we usually regard the boaster and egotist as a person who, in the latest scientific slang, is said to suffer from an "inferiority complex." He is said to "compensate" for his feeling of inferiority by asserting that he is superior. The high-minded man, said Aristotle, thought himself to be worthy of high things and was worthy of them, but he never walked fast, because there was nothing important enough to make him hurry, and he never spoke of his enemies unless occasionally he wished to insult them. We regard the superior person as one who has the calm of dignity and assurance, and the heated and labored arguments which are so often printed in these days, in which the writer masses words together to show that his folk are better, are hardly the type of behavior that a really superior person is assumed to exhibit. The psychologists have a familiar concept, that of rationalization. It consists, as Robinson says, of "many good reasons instead of the real reasons." It is the process of finding a verbal defense with a show of logic to defend an emotional attitude or prejudice which is denied or even unconsciously held. The Jews who call themselves superior to all the rest of us rationalize by assuming that God was the unwise parent of a spoiled child. They were the chosen people just as Joseph was the favorite son. Modern rationalizers have usually taken another form. They make amateur excursions into anthropology and biology. They are often quite modest in their knowledge of either, but one of the penalties of universal literacy is the dilettantism and patter

"which enables men who know a little to talk as if they understood much."

And so it comes to pass that modern writers whose ethnocentrism is so conspicuous have tended to maintain their position by appeals to the biological fact of race. But "race" is a difficult word. It is not a fact; it is a concept. If we inquire as to the number of races, we learn that some anthropologists make three races, others five, and so on through a varying number up to nineteen; and the point is that, however many or few there may prove to be, they are all made, that is, constructed. The members of the human species vary through a continuous series, and the division into races has always something in it of the arbitrary. It is easy to distinguish the Chinese, the Swedes, and the Bantus from one another, but if we try to divide the whole of mankind into races, there remain unsolved problems and peoples that are not fitted into any division. This does not mean that there are no races, but it does mean that men who talk glibly about race often do not realize the difficulty of their subject.

When it comes to estimating the ability of races, the problem is infinitely more difficult. Kroeber has pointed out the amusing results of an attempt to arrange the apes, Negroes, Mongolians, and Caucasians in a series that will show more or less of animal characteristics. If one considers the facial angle made by two lines drawn from the base of the nose to the orifice of the ear and to the front of the skull, respectively, the angle increases on the average in the foregoing order: ANMC. But there are other characteristics, and some of these are very useful in specifying race. For example, hair form is very constant and very useful in classifying peoples. The ape's hair is very straight and so is the Mongolian's, while the Negro has very crisp or kinky hair, the Caucasian falling in between. In taking hair form, therefore, the order would be AMCN, the negro being farthest removed from the animal. Considering the amount of hair on the body, the ape is obviously the most hairy, the Caucasian next, while the Mongolian and the Negro are least covered with body hair. The order here would be ACMN. The white people are nearest the animal in this respect.

When it comes to the weight of the brain, the facts here are not easy to get, because most people use their brains up to the last minute and it is not convenient to weigh them separately.

But so far as the facts have been gathered, the Negroes' brains are the lightest, while the Mongolians' are the heaviest. The order would in this case be ANCM. If the facts about brain weight are confirmed by further researches, it will prove to our modern writers that brain weight has no relation to ability! Race is therefore not only a difficult category to handle accurately, but is obviously a factor in civilization that is not necessarily of prime importance. The modern movement for testing intelligence and ability has demonstrated that if we take at random a large enough sample of the people in any race, there are some who are very low in ability and others who are high. The distribution of ability and excellence lies, therefore, within the race, and the only way that one race could be compared with another in ability would be to compare the average. If the average Eskimo is lower in intelligence than the average Caucasian, it has not been proved; and there is at present no way of proving, or indeed of disproving it.

The statement of this fact would give us very little understanding of any particular Eskimo compared with any particular American. The average wealth of Americans is far higher than the average wealth of Mexicans, but there are some American college professors who could afford to retire if they could have as capital the annual income of some of the Mexican millionaires.

The technical question involved here is essentially that of heredity. It is an old problem and very much alive at the present time. New light is appearing, as gifted men work in their laboratories with disinterested devotion. The biologists are conscious of problems, no end of them, which the popularizer has never dreamed existed. In a recent book by Jennings are given the results of some experiments. A fish with bilateral eyes was put into another medium than the salt water where it normally lived. When the eggs of this fish were hatched, the progeny developed a cyclopean eye; that is, just one in the middle of the head. This characteristic or mutation was inherited from generation to generation. When, however, the eggs of this one-eyed fish were transferred to the original medium, the progeny developed bilateral eyes as their ancestors had done. Professor Childs, describing experiments on the *Planarium*, a little worm, says that when cut in two the animal does not die; instead there are two

worms where one grew before. The tail develops a head on the wounded end, the head end develops a tail. If a *Planarium* is cut into three pieces, two new heads will develop and two new tails, the heads developing on the end that was nearest the head and the tails developing on the ends nearest the original tails. If, however, an electric current be sent in the reverse direction through the middle section of the *Planarium*, a head will develop on the tail end and a tail on the head end. So far as these two experiments generate a hypothesis, it is this, that the biological characteristics depend in part on heredity and in part upon the medium in which the development takes place and the treatment to which the inherited substance is subjected.

There are analogous facts in the realm of human nature. Consider the Janizaries. For centuries the Turks had the practice of demanding small boys from the Christian population. Such Christian boys were brought up as Mohammedans. They were fanatical Mohammedans and, to make the irony complete, were used as guards and troops against the Christians. This extreme case could be matched by many others of a similar character throughout the pages of history. The third generation of immigrants in America, in the cases where they have gone through the public schools and mingled freely with the people of other races, are on the whole indistinguishable from the people of the earlier immigration.

Some years ago Israel Zangwell wrote a play which he called *The Melting Pot*. It tried to establish the thesis that in America a new race is forming to which the different peoples each make a contribution. In a more recent book by Mr. Fairchild the whole doctrine of the melting pot is vigorously attacked. Mr. Fairchild insists that characters are national and cannot be blended or melted or molded. They can only be mixed, he says, and the mixture is disastrous.

But one should consider carefully what it is to be an American. We can speak with a certain poetical license of a soul of America. The "soul of America" means to me a convenient and poetical way to designate the mores, traditions, legends, expressions, and ideals which form a consistent and historical tradition which Americans may quite accurately be said to share together. I know a man who was born in Europe and educated in a foreign language, and whose traditions and religious ideas were utterly

alien to those prevailing here. In early life he came to America, lived with his uncle, took up his education in America in the Middle West, and now I should call him an American. He speaks English without any accent; he knows and reveres our history, our poetry, and our traditions. He shares our political and social ideals, has married a native American girl, and is the father of a native American child. His baby is being brought up in every respect as millions of American children are being brought up, and there is absolutely no occasion for denying the fact of complete assimilation in the case I am describing.

The argument of Mr. Fairchild and those writers who believe as he does depends on the answer given to the crucial question, Is assimilation a possibility? It seems possible to convince any serious student that the personality of a man is the result of his experience, and that if children are born and brought up in the midst of a given civilization, they will take it on; and in America, where the public schools are literally serving as the melting pot of the masses, this process can be observed by anyone who will take the trouble to go and look at it.

Those who make arguments upon inherited race characteristics are not conversant with the known facts, for human nature is not a racial characteristic—it is a cultural or civilizational phenomenon. The same stock in a different situation produces an entirely different set of characteristics, and a casual reading of history will convince anyone that cultural traits change, not only with the longitude, but also with the calendar. There was a time when men wrote convincingly of the sheeplike docility of the Russians. That was prior to 1905 for the most part, but certainly not subsequent to 1917. The racial characteristics of the Russians are modified by their revolutionary experiences, and so with all races.

The question of superiority and inferiority when applied to races is clearly beyond the possibility of cold scientific treatment. The difficulty is that we cannot find disinterested judges. But we are accustomed to think of superior people as those who are at least free from boasting and obtrusive assertion of their superior excellence. We are accustomed to discount the claims of individuals for superiority if they insist on asserting it overmuch. And it does seem that we might safely assert that a freedom from narrowness and prejudice, from sectarian or partisan or religious

or sectional bias, should be expected of those whom we call superior.

The soul of America has been influenced and molded in no small degree by the teachings of the Greek and Roman philosophers, but even more by the ethical teachings of the Christian church. The ideals of our people have always included generosity, sympathy, kindness, and good will. We have tried to be the haven of the oppressed and the champion of the weak.

The program suggested by some, and even boldly outlined by others, that we should protect our precious racial germ plasm by being hard on the inferior races, amounts, it seems, to this tragic paradox: "This is the best civilization because our racial germ plasm is superior. The superiority of our germ plasm consists in its being the carrier of a civilization. But since the germ plasm is in danger of extermination, we should protect the civilization which the germ plasm bears by being narrow, hardhearted, and cruel. We are to put up the inner and the outer dikes against the rising tide of color. If the inferior races attempt to come, we must keep them away. We should intimidate them and, if necessary, kill them." In other words, it is proposed to defend civilization by uncivilized methods.

It would seem that, if they are correct who so advise, we are lost either way. If we remain civilized and cultured, the lower races will displace us. If we defend ourselves, we no longer can do it without being barbarous and cruel. We shall then become as the lower races whom we are now striving to keep down.

In order to be superior, we must act inferior. We Nordics are in a dilemma.

In order to understand the question of civilization, we must consider not only the factor of race but also the factor of culture. The culture of a people, as the phrase is used by sociologists and anthropologists, includes their language, social customs, traditions, and ways in which the problems of associated life are met. Now it is easy to show that the culture of a people is not necessarily limited to any one racial stock. The culture of the French is shared by three races of the Caucasoid group, and the religion of the Western world can be introduced, and has been introduced, successfully among peoples which differ very widely in racial characteristics. The technical mastery of nature which modern science has made possible is a phenomenon of industrial Japan,

even more conspicuously than of some of the Caucasian races in southeastern Europe. So far as any facts will warrant our making conclusions, there seems to be no limit to the ability of one race in taking over the technical achievements of another. The Central African Bantus can learn to use pen or pencil and write their language in Latin characters in a shorter time than is required to teach English or American children, owing to the fact that their language is spelled phonetically. The history of the ability of the Mexican Indians in taking over the railway system, not only as conductors and guards but as engineers and telegraph operators, is another of the hundreds of examples of this fact. Civilization is, therefore, a matter of tradition; it is a culture heritage; it is transmitted by means of contacts, sometimes formally in schools, at times informally by means of apprenticeships or family contacts. But transmitted it is; it is not inherited and seems to be quite independent of the biological differences that divide races.

It would be unfortunate should the reader consider that the matter in question is settled in a way that admits of dogmatic and final statements. On the contrary, the sociologist and the social worker alike realize that here is a vast and fruitful field for investigation. The conclusion is therefore negative. We have much to learn about races and cultures. Most of the knowledge that our children will use is yet to be discovered. Nay, the very methods for obtaining that knowledge are, for the most part, yet to be worked out. What we should protest against with all our force is the confident dogmatism of anyone. Let pseudo-scientists lay down decalogues to presidents of republics. What we should seek for is a method of research that would give us more of wisdom. To such as speak so confidently we feel constrained to reply, in a recently revived word of Cromwell:

"Brethren, I beseech ye, by the bowels of Christ, bethink ye lest perhaps ye may be mistaken."

XXX

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE

The national Conference of Jews and Christians is a sort of permanent religious disarmament conference with a history of several years of energetic activity. Under Protestant auspices it has brought together representatives of the three faiths to discuss points of tension and to promote understanding by means of round-table seminars. Eventually they came to feel the need of facts, and the volume by Silcox and Fisher¹ is the result of an attempt to meet this need.

In January, 1933, the Institute of Social and Religious Research approved a study requested by the Conference of Jews and Christians which was to be a series of "community case studies" for the purpose of discovering the actual contacts and relationships, locating the difficulties as well as the forces making for understanding and cooperation. The two authors spent six months gathering material but abandoned the original plan and wrote the report on the basis of "cursory studies" in thirteen cities in the United States and three in Canada, besides "incidental studies" in New York, Philadelphia, and Newark—nineteen cities in all. Limited by lack of funds, they present the material topically, treating the subjects of discrimination and social distance, relations in social work, education, intermarriage, proselyting, and cooperation.

The motive which prompted the preparation of the book was undoubtedly irenic, and the authors present their findings and opinions with a manifest desire to be objective, but the report will not please all who read it. Many Catholics and Jews will object strenuously to certain passages, and Protestant readers will differ widely in their reaction.

¹ SILCOX, CLARIS EDWIN and FISHER, GALEN, *Catholics, Jews and Protestants: A Study of Relationships in the United States and Canada*. New York and London: Harper & Brothers (published for the Institute of Social and Religious Research), 1934. Pp. xvi+369.

Just how far it is possible to mitigate strife by getting at the underlying facts may depend largely on the type of conflict. Arbitration and mediation have often worked well in civil disputes and in international relations. Whether racial strife and religious conflict are equally subject to the same sort of objective arbitration may be questioned. It may well be that political conflict differs essentially from the struggles between races and religions.

Conflict between nations, leading to war, is, of all forms of strife, the most intense and the least enduring. It is also very formal, with a ceremonial beginning or declaration and a ceremonial ending or treaty. That the treaty often ends the conflict completely is witnessed by many alliances between former belligerents.

Religious conflict and racial conflict differ from it in both these respects. There is no formal beginning and there is no formal or ceremonial ending. There is no declaration of war, nor can there be any treaty of peace. In the case of nations there are formal representatives duly accredited, ministers and plenipotentiaries who can speak authoritatively. In race conflict this is impossible. The race has no representative. There can be no formal contacts or communications with the race as a whole. In the very nature of the relations there cannot be any accredited representative.

Religious conflict might conceivably have somewhat more of a formal beginning and ending, for it is possible to have organization, and in the case of the Catholic church there are duly accredited representatives clothed not with delegated power but with omnipotent or, at least infallible, authority, and even though the Protestants are not so well organized, yet there are federations that might be thought to make it possible for some analogy to the relation between nations to obtain. Yet this is not and cannot be the case.

For there is another important difference between national conflict and religious strife. The differences between nations are open to discussion and negotiation. The quarrel is over public acts or utterances that are apparent to all and that can be defended or disallowed. If it is possible for the diplomats to compromise the differences, the war may be prevented, and many times the whole matter can be left to an impartial arbi-

trator to decide according to his conception of justice. The two parties are in theory and in dignity equal. They come together to discuss the differences and the issues which threaten their peace and to decide them after discussion. But religious conflict differs essentially from strife between nations, and the difference is so profound that it modifies completely the possibility of a formal ending of the strife and conflict. With unimportant exceptions, which are really not exceptions at all, the issues between religious groups who are in conflict are not debatable and are not subject to discussion. Round-table conferences which include Catholics, Jews, and Protestants have been held and will be held again, but those who have held them will recognize the exact truth of this statement just made. Round-table conferences are at best futile, though they do help the minority party. For religious groups are not free to compromise, and the essentials of the faith are so sacred that they are not subject to discussion and debate. The essential articles of the creed are not of human but divine origin, and each one of the conflicting parties feels that he has no power to compromise with what heaven has commanded. Moreover, the Catholic church and the Protestant church are pre-eminently imperialistic. The map of Africa, and indeed the map of every religious field, is divided off into territories which each missionary organization claims. These fields are to be cultivated by the different societies, and the map divides the whole territory. But there is not one map but two, and every Protestant society has its field of territory which it claims for its own, and these Protestant fields overlap completely those claimed by the Catholics. The conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism is, therefore, a conflict between two groups, both of whom claim universality, hope to convert the entire world, and have central objects of belief that are sacred and not open to discussion. This makes a different type of strife from that which obtains between nations.

Race conflict is quite different from national and from religious conflict. It is even more informal. It does have a beginning in every case, but the beginning is hard to locate in time; and there does sometimes come an end, but the end is so gradual that no one knows when it has arrived. But the phenomena of racial strife have other fundamental differences. While nations fight other nations for something that is done, or threatened to be

done, and while religions strive with other religions for what they believe and say, there is, in the case of the religions and of the nations, the possibility of change. But racial conflict is founded not on what people do or think or believe, but on what they are, and what they are cannot be changed. The basis of the classification is assumed to be biological and, therefore, immutable.

It is quite proper to urge that some races are so called without any warrant in anthropology or biology for the designation. While this may be exactly true, it makes no difference whatever in the nature of racial conflict. From the standpoint of sociology a race is not one which is anthropologically different or biologically demonstrated. A race with which people are in conflict is a group of people who are *considered* as a race, and these thoughts or considerations are determinative in conduct and in attitude. Racial conflict is, therefore, the most enduring of all. The outcome may be the submission of one or a state of accommodation or the amalgamation by intermarriage until there is a blending of the two races.

The conflict between Jews everywhere and those among whom they live is a racial conflict. That the Jews belong to a separate biological race is doubtful and perhaps not true. Nevertheless, the conflict is sociologically racial, for they are regarded as a separate race, are treated as a separate race, and hold themselves together as if they were a separate race. Racial conflict may exist by itself, when the religion of the two races is the same, as among the Negroes and the whites in America, or religious conflict may exist without racial differentiation; but when the two come together, and two groups differ both in race and in religion, the intensity of the conflict is increased. The Jews are therefore the object of attention on two counts—race and religion—and growing out of these two there is a third difference, that of culture. And when a group highly conscious of itself is conspicuous, easily identified, and numerous to the number of several million, differing in religion, culture, and race, it would seem easy to assume that conflict would arise. Add to these factors the competition for status and for economic opportunity of the alien minority and their own determination to be separate and unmixed, preserving a foreign culture of their own, and the essential conditions of anti-Semitic conflict may be assumed to be present.

Whether the Jews live in the city or the country or preponderantly in one or the other seems to have little relevance. Whether they engage in manufacture or business or banking, or whether they enter professions or become owners of moving pictures or writers of books seems to make little difference. What is important is that they compete with the majority, either for status or for monetary advantage; and prejudice against them is the result of the social order in its efforts to resist unwelcome change. The fact that Jews have historically been moneylenders or merchants is seen to be of minor importance considering the fact that there is widespread discrimination against Jews in academic life, even extending to the exclusion of Jewish students from medical and other schools.

For it must not be forgotten that social attitudes, particularly collective social attitudes, are not limited to the occasions which call them forth. Once the attitude has been established in a given society, it may persist long after the actual occasion which gave rise to it. The attitude of hostility toward the Jewish race is against a group which is not really a race at all, and it arose in historic times long ago. Nevertheless, the attitude persists and seems to be perennial. The self-conscious group is opposed. The opposition increases the self-consciousness, and the increased self-consciousness in turn makes greater the opposition. And so the vicious cycle proceeds.

Race prejudice and race conflict sometimes end, but they take a long time to end. Conflicts between nations may end quickly when one party will agree to do something which the other one demands. Even religious conflict would end if one would give up and accept the faith of the other. But racial conflict cannot end in the same way because the Jew cannot cease to be a Jew. He does not want to cease to be a Jew, but if he did want to, he could not. The attitude is therefore directed against what is assumed to be inevitable and unalterable. The only way a Jew could cease to be a Jew would be to have one or both parents not Jews, but marriages are not made by policy-makers; they occur when two people decide to mate. This in the nature of the case is a slow process; and when the whole culture and educational training and racial pride of a people unite to prevent this from happening and to discourage it in every way, it eventually and inevitable prolongs the conflict.

Not that the Jew is to be blamed, because, as we have said, in a sociological study no one is to be blamed, but certainly the Jew is least of all to be blamed.

The Jew should not change, because he cannot. No one ought to do what he cannot do. His values are as sacred as his neighbor's. His desire for status is surely as intense as that of those around him. His love for his children is as great and his ambition for their success is as high. Moreover, his effort to gather his children into schools to revive the ancient, sacred language, and to indoctrinate the young into the traditions of the race so that they may develop their own life and get an enhanced sense of the value of their own culture—all these things they must do lest they be swallowed up, lest Israel die and disappear. But he feels that Israel must not die or disappear. The cause of Israel is sacred; it is holy. The question is not debatable; it is a compulsion, and so the Jews go on as they have gone on for ages, and so they will go on as they must.

Intermarriage is rightly regarded as dangerous to the sacred cause. In orthodox Jewry it is the occasion for the saying of prayers for the dead. It must be discouraged and is discouraged. Such mixed marriages are not infrequent and seem to be increasing, but they are relatively few, and the melting-pot is held by Jews and neighbors alike to be an inaccurate and undesirable metaphor. They do not want to melt. They refuse to be assimilated. They prefer to be undigested.

But if we are to understand the desire of the Jew to remain separate, we must take into account, as well, that the reaction of those with whom he competes is also due to an attitude which cannot be controlled. War against the nation is directed against an alien abroad. Conflict in religion is directed against an erring brother who ought to come back to the fold. But conflict in racial relations is directed to an alien in the midst who belongs to a different kind and yet who insists on trying to obtain all the values which the society offers to its own. There seems to be no alternative to prejudice, resentment, discrimination, and at times persecution, human nature being what it is. The history of the Jews from Nebuchadnezzar to Hitler has shown what this type of conflict turns out to be. The pride of the Jewish race is its continuity. Its opponent regards this as the chief reproach against the race. But to the Jew this is indeed the highets

social value, so precious that he has been willing to pay for it with thousands of years of suffering. It is still so treasured that he has been willing to pay whatever price is necessary in order to retain it. There may be some who think it can be retained without paying a price, but the sociologist sees no warrant for this assumption. Assimilation would indeed be loss and death, but on the other hand it would be union and peace. There seems to be not the slightest reason to expect assimilation to take place, but there is even less reason to expect the disappearance of discrimination and prejudice if the separation continues. Men may legally and freely worship God according to their own conscience, but they cannot be guaranteed acceptance into the voluntary associations whose members wish to discriminate.

The conflict between Catholics and Protestants is all the more difficult because it is a kind of family quarrel. The Catholic holds to most of the essentials of the faith which the Protestant regards as sacred. He differs only in a few respects, and these differences could easily be settled if he would consent to change, and he would not have to change very much. But the little that he would have to change is important—so important that it is again sacred, undebatable, not to be discussed or arbitrated. Nations fight against nations for specific acts. Races contend against races on account of unalterable facts. But religious conflict is concerned with what people believe, and it is assumed that they can change their belief if they would be willing to accept the truth. And some of them, of course, do accept it. There are Catholics who are converted to Protestantism, and Protestants who are converted to Catholicism. If all Catholics would embrace Protestantism, the conflict would cease. If all Protestants would embrace Catholicism, there would be no more difficulty. Each party hopes eventually to conquer all the rest, but in the meantime the bitterness of the family quarrel remains. There is no more irreconcilable enemy of the Catholic church than a converted priest. There is no more enthusiastic Catholic than one who has come to that church from Protestantism. The refusal of one to accept the teachings of the other may indeed be laid down to ignorance, but even ignorance has some culpability, for there is always someone ready to enlighten, and when a man is not only ignorant but stubbornly refuses to accept the truth, he becomes a very easy mark for persecution and discrimination.

The pope may speak on the radio to the whole wide world, but the best word he can have for the Protestants is an admonition to the heretics who should accept the faith to return to the one true, universal church. He cannot do otherwise, for he has a sacred trust. But the Protestant has his own access to the sacred writing on which he considers the church to be founded. He believes that Christ demands his allegiance to another way of life. He cannot do otherwise; God help him. His values are equally sacred, undebatable, not to be discussed or compromised.

Facts like these furnish, perhaps, the best explanation of why the word "intolerance" belongs peculiarly to religious conflict. He who knows so much of the truth and has accepted so large a part of the sacred body of doctrine and yet refuses to accept the rest of it seems destined to be regarded as a man with a stubborn will. To permit him to go his way would be to show indifference to sacred truth. Moreover, his evil example may lead others to perdition. Therefore, one should be intolerant toward him and if necessary persecute him for the good of his soul and the souls of others whom he might lead astray.

But we must be on our guard against the assumption that what characterizes the Christian religion is necessarily true of all religions everywhere. Without going into the matter fully, for lack of time and space, the assertion is ventured that intolerance is particularly at home among those religions which have come down from the Semitic tradition. It has always characterized Christianity, and it is certainly indigenous to Mohammedanism. Moreover, there is abundant evidence in the sacred writings that intolerance was no stranger to Judaism when its people had the power of numbers. In Egypt, Greece, and Rome religions were certainly less intolerant and more humane. In the modern world the primitive people, all of whom have religion, are remarkably tolerant and hospitable to any new message which a religious teacher will bring among them. The most outstanding example of religious tolerance is perhaps to be found in China, where it is hardly too much to say that three religions live side by side in complete harmony. There are millions of Chinese who worship devoutly in the temples of three separate religions existing side by side. They go to the Confucian temple to honor the sage, and on set occasions and high holidays they also go to the Buddhist and to the Taoist temples. The Semitic traditions

from which Christianity and Mohammedanism both sprang are the most intolerant of all. Perhaps it is due to two aspects of these religions: first, the claim to universality and absolute dominion; second, the divine character of their revelation, giving them an unalterable system from which they are not at liberty to diverge.

But there is another aspect of the conflict between Catholics and Protestants which is worth noting. It is indeed true that the issues are framed in terms of theological differences and written creeds which must be assented to, but these are not so unalterable as other elements. The conflict between fundamentalists and modernists in Protestantism becomes at times very bitter and would seem absolutely irreconcilable, and yet the sociologist can confidently predict an end to this religious warfare. It will come about through discussion and the gradual modification of the points of view of one or both or because the issues will some day seem to be outgrown. But in the case of the Catholic and Protestant controversy there is in addition to creed and article of faith another important difference, namely, that of culture.

Catholicism is more than a religion and a creed. It is professedly a culture, and the sociologist is in complete agreement with this claim. Now, cultural differences, while more vague and undefined than creedal ones, are much more stubborn and more difficult to alter. The mores of a people are never the result of deliberate formulations. They are collective phenomena which grow up without planning, and, having grown up, they are non-logical in their origins and in their character. Attachment to them is deep-rooted in the emotional life of the people. Moreover, the mores are forever true and right from the standpoint of those who accept them, and they are likewise sacred and not open to debate. But being ways of acting, in addition to ways of talking and believing, they are much less easily altered and much more resistant to change. The conflict is between two peoples who feel in some degree alien to each other. It tends further to intensify the fratricidal war, which is the type of conflict in most religious controversies.

It is not the intention to present a pessimistic statement. No statement is pessimistic if true. If it be not true, it matters little whether it be pessimistic or optimistic. Jews might con-

ceivably give up their separatism, gladly becoming at one with the culture of the people where they live; Catholics might convert all the Protestants; Protestants might convert all the Catholics; some union might arise which would be a blending of both of these, but these events are too remote for serious consideration.

And if the conflict is to endure for a long time, it is well to know that and be prepared for it. A passionate lover of peace is not inconsistent in advocating a navy, if war seems inevitable. We cannot be accused of desiring arson if we organize a fire department. We have a duty to face the facts if we can discover them.

And if it be that the conflict is inevitable we may expect the three groups in question to press the conflict. Victory being remote, either surrender or renewed combat would seem the alternatives. One war is named from its duration of thirty years; and another is known as the Hundred Years' War. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants has gone on for more than four hundred years, and between Jews and their neighbors in every land for more than two thousand years. And since neither side is ready to give in, let them continue to fight it out. And if they fight, let them fight hard. Fighting is to be avoided if feasible, but to strike softly is not merciful; it is foolish. If you must hit, hit hard.

But hard fighting does not mean unfair fighting. Even carnal warfare has its mitigations, its Red Cross. The religious wars of the future may be expected to be conducted with less ferocity than in the past. Indeed, much mitigation has already been achieved. We do not now employ the thumbscrew and the rack for the glory of the Lord. Men are not now burned at the stake for heresy. The intolerance, bigotry, and persecution of our day is more negative, more in the nature of exclusion from privileges because of nonconformity than of efforts to force agreement.

Those who feel distress at the strife, the waste, the needless suffering, and the unholy bitterness can do much to call attention to the injury that comes from fighting with the wrong weapons. They can remind the minorities of the effects of their procedure that are irritating; they can admonish the majority; and they can help to create a public to which both parties to a

conflict must ultimately look. For the public wants justice and admires fair play, even in a fight.

Prejudice is narrowing. It is a form of emotional and intellectual indolence. It is a refusal to make distinctions while reacting to a stereotype. Prejudice toward a racial or a religious group is a collective phenomenon with roots in the distant past. Not being individual, it cannot be changed by any number of individuals, however well meaning. But something can be done; and every generous act and every noble utterance on the subject has its effect, however small. And it is possible to have strong convictions and unyielding loyalty without wasteful hatred or harmful intolerance, meanwhile fighting valiantly for a cause.

Cooperation is the most important means of reducing prejudice. Perhaps it is the only effective way. The volume we are considering has a chapter on this subject, and there could be no more important one. For what sociologists call the primary-group attitude seems essential for the overcoming of unfriendliness. To find or to create a situation in which the feeling of "we" arises is to form bonds that unite. Whoever brings Catholic and Protestant together where they speak of each other as cooperating members of a group, where they develop a feeling of "we" and learn to say "our" and "us," whoever brings a Jew and another into such a unity, has done something to make the ravages of prejudice less severe.

The effects of such contact and cooperation must not be exaggerated. Sometimes they are very transitory. To expect too much is to risk disappointment and to invite reaction. He who tries to mitigate prejudice must be like a man who plants an orchard in his old age, knowing that he himself will never eat of the fruit of the trees.

There is, finally, another possibility that might conceivably end the conflict of Catholic and Jew and Protestant, not so remote as to be unthinkable, and that is the triumph, or even the threatened triumph, of irreligion. Militant atheism and violent opposition to all religion is seen in more than one nation today. Should this thing grow, there might be a great change in the attitudes and practices of the servants of the God of love toward one another. Followers of the meek and lowly Jesus, who taught universal love, even of one's enemies, might cease

their persecution of each other and turn their attention to the godless.

But the triumph of atheism is not even a present threat and the harmony of all those who profess to follow Jesus Christ is, therefore, remote. Still more distant is the unity of all those who worship the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

XXXI

IF I WERE A JEW

A gifted Christian leader whose words carry weight wherever they are read, published an article under the title, "If I Were a Jew," in *The Christian* of July 29, 1933. It may be that a contrasting view of the Jewish question will be welcomed by those who read *The Christian*.

If I were a Jew, I should arrange to be born in America. And I should not be ashamed of being either a Jew or an American. I could and should take pride in being a Jew, knowing that every human being can and most human beings do take pride in being what they are. For from China to Peru it is possible to find heroes of the past who shed glory on the strugglers of the present.

But I should not make any extravagant or unique claims for my heritage. The Jews did not invent religion. They did not first advocate monotheism. Professor Breasted has proved that Egyptian teachers believed in a single God centuries before the Hebrews learned of the idea. Nor did the Jews invent righteousness, fair play, sympathy, kindness, or any of the virtues. One finds all of these written on the tablets of the hearts of the heathen. Men have always and everywhere taught that one should love his neighbor as himself: the great question is as to who that neighbor is. The Jewish teaching of the present on moral questions is high, but no higher than the teachings of many other faiths. So, if I were a Jew, I should not claim that I was holier than other men or that my people were holier than other people.

If I were a Jew, I should regard the "survival" of my people as a reproach to be lived down and not as a virtue to be boasted about and gloried in. For every race has, in some true sense, survived. The Goths, the Nordic French, the Aryans of India, have all survived, but they have mingled their blood and their virtues with the people where they live and have made their contribution in the best way, by becoming one with their neigh-

bors. The "survival" of the Jew as a separate cultural group means only that the Jew is unassimilable, an indigestible mass, refusing to be incorporated into the common life. I should not say that "the mission of the Jew is to suffer," thereby receiving false comfort by blaming that suffering on the evils of others, from Nebuchadnezzar to Hitler. I should do what I could in one earnest lifetime to overcome that isolation which has caused rivers of blood to flow and which is still destined to bring much needless woe to innocents unborn.

But I should realize, if I were a Jew, that the hatred of my people had understandable causes and could be overcome with time and patience and intelligence. I should try to make my life a recommendation to the Gentile world, who would revise their opinion of my people a little because of what they could see in me. So I should not keep myself apart from those who were ready to accept me. For this reason I should disregard all the useless and cumbersome and superstitious practices that are so divisive and so out of harmony with modern life. I should not refuse to eat good boiled ham, or oysters, or catfish. I should insist on sanitary methods of slaughtering animals, but I should not refuse to eat chicken unless its killing was a religious and ritualistic act, nor regard good steak as something sinful to eat. A Jew in Chicago brought suit against a merchant who sold him ice cream by mistake instead of sherbet, for the guests ate the ice cream after they had partaken of meat and became very angry. I should not do such things.

Nor should I be impatient with my brethren and friends who still do them. I should not blame them. Nor should I blame their neighbors for discriminating against them. I should not waste time in blaming anyone but should use my influence in removing the causes and trying to overcome the evils of tribalism and separation. It was Israel Zangwill who once wrote this:

How odd
Of God
To choose
The Jews.

Like Zangwill, I should believe in the melting pot and be an assimilationist. I should regard Washington and Lincoln as my national heroes, and all the saints and heroes of all ages as my

heritage. I should prize the seamless robe of American citizenship as a birthright. I should be an internationalist in sympathy just as so many Christians are, but not as a Jew. And for this reason I should deprecate Zionism as an impracticable and unsuccessful effort to solve a problem by running away from it. For no one can be a *citizen* of the new state in Palestine and at the same time a *citizen* of America. If the persecuted in Europe can be moved to a better land to their advantage, I should help if I could, but the Jews have no right to Palestine other than the right of conquest, and they were defeated so long ago that to restore them now would be as unjust as to give New York City to the Indians.

Zionism rests for foundation on the fine rhetoric of writers who lived ages before anyone had dreamed of the possibility of the existence of England, France, or America. To make those fervid utterances the basis of a political program for this century is to disregard intelligent realities for a dangerous and disturbing romanticism. The Jews had the misfortune to be taught the Phoenician art of writing far too early. The savage fighter who massacred the men, women, and children of the Amelekites, reserving the king to be butchered by a fanatical prophet, belonged to a tribe which refused pork as a religious duty but ate grasshoppers, as did the other natives of the region. And since the early books are always sacred books, those superstitious practices have descended to an age when they are no longer harmless but perennially divisive.

If I were a Jew, I should marry for love but I should try to marry a non-Jewish girl. There are excellent eugenic arguments for crossings of this sort and, if fate should work out this way, the gesture and example would count for much. For I should not want to separate. I should be unable to find the precious values in Judaism which it is their "duty" to give the world. What is it in the Jewish tradition that is worth so much? Is it the making of money? Or the lending of it? Or sharp bargaining? Or offensive aggressiveness? No, these are the taunts of the enemies of the Jews who thus justify their persecution and injustice. But what are they? Monotheism? We do not need a separate people to teach that. Honor, virtue, brotherhood? Is that a Jewish monopoly? The music of Mendelssohn? That is very German and hardly came from the rams' horns of the temple. The philosophy of Spinoza? That was written by a

Jew, but he was trained in the language and tradition and thought of a far later time than that of Amos or Micah, and the outcome was very different. The science of Einstein? His work is no more Jewish than is the use of internal combustion engines.

But even if there were unique contributions in Jewish life, the best way to give them to the world would be not to try to hold them back but to join, as all other races in America have joined, in gladly contributing to a common way of living, just as my Scotch ancestors did when they decided that this land was a good land to live in.

If I were a Jew, I should realize that the prejudice, discrimination, injustice, and persecution of my people could not be quickly overcome. It will endure for a long time. It will outlive anyone now living. It has endured so long partly on account of the evil doings of Gentiles and partly on account of the mistaken actions of Jews. But I should regard it as a condition which might and should disappear. I should, therefore, expect to suffer injustice, but I should do all I could to change the conditions and to alter the attitudes of my people. It is not necessary in America to abandon one's religion to escape injustice. It is necessary to abandon divisive tribalism, and I should devote myself in a quiet way to the effort.

If I were a Jew, I should do these things. How do I know I would? Because I know many Jews who are doing and saying just these things. In the universities of America there are students in the courses and professors on the faculties who are living examples of the feelings, the attitudes, and the practices I have set forth. Sometimes a stranger meets one of my Jewish friends without knowing that he is a Jew, and is surprised, saying that he cannot be a Jew since he is so likable. And I say to him that my friend is, by his life, giving a new definition to an old word.

I am not a Jew and have no warrant either to censure these people or to instruct them. It is task enough to understand them. But the Jews who are our neighbors need us and are needed by us. This would be a happier land if the barriers that keep us apart were taken away. I write these words with diffidence and send them on with hesitation, lest I be misunderstood. Only the appearance of a vigorous article urging what seemed to me to be a disastrous course of action would have prompted me to write on the subject at all.

XXXII

THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE

In reading the title "*The Natural History of Race Prejudice*," the reader is asked to regard the occurrence of race prejudice as a natural phenomenon, just as truly as a drought, an earthquake, or an epidemic of small pox. Race prejudice is defended by some as desirable; it is deprecated by others as an evil. Men have their opinions and attitudes on the subject, but it is not the purpose here to discuss this phase of it. However good or bad the prejudice may be, it is assumed to be possible, and believed to be advantageous, to view the matter with detachment and to look to the conditions under which this phenomenon appears, the cause or causes of its origin, the forms it assumes, the conditions under which it has increased or diminished in intensity, and whether it disappears, and why. This chapter is too brief to do more than suggest a treatment of the topic.

The advantage of this mode of procedure is apparent. The history of science seems to show that this method is more fruitful. Knowledge is power; science gives control; to see is to foresee. We can effectively change and control only those events that we can formulate.

Race prejudice is a special form of class prejudice and does not differ in attitude. The only difference is in the object. There may be in a community a prejudice against preachers or soldiers or Republicans. The prejudice against radicals is like the prejudice against Negroes, except for its mutability. Religion or politics are voluntary and can be changed, while race is relatively independent of the will.

But class and race prejudice in turn are special forms of a larger category of human experience, namely, prejudice in general. Men speak of prejudice against the Anti-saloon League, too short skirts, the yellow press, cigarettes, and small towns.

Prejudice is not easy to define, for it is bound up with emotion and contains usually an element of reproach. The dictionary

may tell that prejudice is "an opinion or leaning adverse to anything without just grounds or sufficient knowledge," but it is not easy to agree as to what grounds are just or what knowledge is sufficient. And race prejudice, like all prejudices after they endure over a period of time, tends to be supported by arguments. The grounds may not be rational to a critic, but they may seem rational to those who hold the views. It often happens that prejudice is denied by one in whom others confidently assert it.

Nevertheless, for practical purposes, this difficulty is not great. Race prejudice is recognized as a feeling of antipathy or a tendency to withdraw or limit one's contacts toward the members of a certain racial group.

It is important to observe that race prejudice is typically a collective thing. It characterizes a group. It is not private; it is public. Of course, the manifestations are individual, but the point is that race prejudice is of no importance unless the same or similar attitudes and feelings occur in many people at once. Race prejudice, then, belongs in the field of public opinion or public sentiment.

It is of importance also to point out that race prejudice is attached to the soil. It characterizes a given area and a study of race prejudice can never be adequately made without a map. The significance of this fact arises when we discover that individuals migrating into an area where a certain prejudice exists tend to acquire it, although it was absent from their original region. One cannot discuss the subject concretely without a reference to certain areas. The student thinks of the prejudice against Jews in Rumania, against Negroes in Mississippi, against Japanese in California.

In attempting to understand the nature of race prejudice it is important to observe its wide extent. The Japanese have been referred to as the object of prejudice in California, but in Japan the Eta people, who number well over a million, are the objects of an extreme form of prejudice. An Eta is not supposed to enter the temple for worship. In one recorded instance an Eta insisted on being allowed to worship and said to those who deterred him, "I also am a human being. Why cannot I worship the gods?" The crowd set upon him and he was killed. When his friends complained to the magistrate, they were told, "One

human being is equal to seven Etas. A man cannot be punished for killing one-seventh of a man. Come back to me when six more of you have been killed." There is prejudice against the Eurasians in China, against the natives, the Mulattoes and the Hindus in South Africa, against the Mexicans in southern Texas, against the Jews in most parts of the world, and so on around the map.

If now we inquire into the conditions under which the phenomenon appears, we are able to say that there is a quantitative requirement or precondition which seems necessary. If only a few members of an alien group appear, they do not usually call out any such attitudes. The first Japanese were received in the United States with every evidence of welcome. Forty years ago a Japanese gentleman married an American girl in Chicago. The wedding was the occasion of widespread interest, and one newspaper devoted a whole page of its Sunday edition to pictures and description of the event. The prejudice against the Japanese did not arise until they had appeared in far larger numbers. The same remark applies to the Armenians in the West. In Natal, South Africa, the British residents invited and imported men from India to work. This was in 1865. The workers were welcomed and it is agreed that their labor saved the colony from financial disaster. Thirty years later there were more than a hundred thousand of the immigrants and the prejudice against them was intense. There were Jim Crow laws for the railroads, but Hindus were forbidden on the streetcars altogether. Moreover, they were forbidden to walk on the sidewalk and restrictions and social ostracism took an extreme form.

These and similar facts have led to the statement, very widely accepted, that race prejudice is caused by economic competition. Undoubtedly economic competition does occasion such sentiments, but this appears not to be everywhere the case. There was recently a widespread and very strong feeling in China against two racial groups, the Japanese and the English. Not only has there been an economic boycott, merchants refusing to handle the goods from these nations, but the coolies have refused to work for any Englishman or Japanese, and prominent Chinese have dropped their membership in clubs because of their feelings. This movement is so recent that we can state the facts with confidence. Hostility to the Japanese was occasioned by the

fear of aggression, brought to a dramatic climax by the twenty-one demands, while the hostility to the English grew out of their refusal in the Washington Conference to allow the Chinese to regulate their own tariff provisions. In both cases the feeling was stirred up by the Chinese students, who were hardly in any noticeable condition of competition, at least economic. The students petitioned the government, interviewed the merchants, and harangued the coolies. The effect was quite typical, but the cause is not apparently the one ordinarily assigned.

Race prejudice has often been asserted by popular writers to be instinctive or hereditary. While this appears to be a complete misstatement, it is a very excusable one. The error arises from the normal tendency of unsophisticated people to confuse the customary with the natural. When children grow up in a community, they take on the customs and attitudes prevailing, some of which are very old while others are quite recent in origin. But the children can make no distinction between the new and the old, and when the attitudes have become second nature, they are often thought of as innate or natural. It is said to be "in the blood." That this is not true can be shown by a comparison in space and time of the same racial stock in respect of this prejudice. The English in South Africa manifest it to an intense degree, as they do also in China against the natives, in sections of Canada against the French, and in parts of India and particularly in Australia. Yet these same English in New Zealand do not have much prejudice against the Maoris, who differ from them far more in complexion and civilization than do the Canadian French. Moreover, the prejudice against Jews in England has been greatly mitigated. No doubt some exists, but it is undeniable that there has been an important modification in the direction of assimilation.

Nor is it possible to assert that wherever two races meet each other there will be prejudice. A list of the areas where it does occur would be too long, but we may repeat that in South Africa the English have prejudice against at least four groups; and in Turkey the phenomenon was intense. The Poles and the Lithuanians furnish an extreme example; the prejudice between the French and the English in Canada has been mentioned; the Negroes in the United States are the objects of it; while in Haiti it is possible to describe a prejudice of the blacks against the

whites. The French have their anti-Semitism, which is perhaps most severe in Rumania. The list if complete would be very long, but I mention that in Chicago there has developed a racial prejudice between the Polish residents and the Mexicans, due in part to economic competition and to certain tragic events that accentuated the feeling.

On the other hand, race prejudice is relatively absent from Switzerland, the English have lost much of their feeling against the Jews, three races live without race prejudice in Brazil, there is no prejudice against the Indians as Indians in Mexico, two races live without prejudice in New Zealand, several racial groups live together without prejudice in Hawaii, and the phenomenon has never occurred in Greenland, in the southern portions of which the common racial type is a mixture of Nordic and Eskimo blood.

If now we inquire more specifically into the conditions of race prejudice, it appears that in all cases there is some form of conflict. It may be, and often is, a struggle for money, work, bread, but in many cases it is a struggle for position, status, social prominence, and when it occurs there seems to be a necessity for a definite group consciousness; an *esprit de corps* arises in one group in contrast to their conception of the other. It is interesting to notice that prejudice is thus double-edged. The prejudice against one group arises with the prejudice for another; prejudice is the other end of one type of loyalty. It is this fact that has made it so easy for those who defend race prejudice and exclusion to present plausible arguments and rationalizations.

The extreme form of race prejudice, or better, perhaps, one extreme limit of its development results in a condition of stability in which it is sometimes difficult to recognize the main features of prejudice. I refer to the accommodation or acceptance of the situation on both sides, in which case the inferior group ceases to struggle against the controlling one. (This characterizes much of the relation between the Southern masters and their slaves before the war.) It is seen in its extreme form in the caste system of India. Now, it would be a profitless argument to insist that caste is not prejudice, but for the fact that the acceptance does alter the whole psychology. At the present time, when caste in India is beginning to disintegrate, prejudice is more easy to find.

The caste lines are, or were, extremely rigid. The members of a caste had the same occupation and what we call the social ladder, which is used by the social climbers, did not and could not exist. A poor man's children could never expect to rise in the world by getting into another group. Moreover, a person could not marry save in his own caste. He could not eat with another not in his own caste, his meals must not be cooked except by one of his own caste, neither could the cooked food be handled by anyone of another group. The interesting thing to the psychologist here is the form which the defense of such a situation normally takes. Anyone familiar with the literature of educated Indians on this subject will recall how often the condition has been defended as being desirable because of the benefits to civilization and humanity which flow from loyalty to one's own group. Exactly the same arguments occur in the writings of Americans in general and Southerners in particular on the question of race mixture in the South. The utterances of the Ku Klux Klan abound in highly idealistic phrases of loyalty and devotion to the precious heritage of the superior group.

This leads us to the question of the motives which govern race prejudice, and the social psychologists have discovered an important principle which applies. It is now known that in the case of an ancient custom the motives are certain to vary. This is partly due to the fact that the custom is more difficult to change than is its motive. Children carry on the custom without any motive, and if the old motive must be given up, a new one spontaneously arises and men try to phrase their motives so that others will not condemn them. It is hard to imagine the published defense of race exclusion assigned to the motive of hatred or of fear. It is not conscious hypocrisy; it is the normal thing in human nature to attempt to make our actions appear as defensible as possible.

There are, thus, survivals in the plays and games of children, in the customs of weddings, funerals, and baptisms which go back to rather humble origins but which continue from approved modern motives. Likewise with race prejudice. Sometimes the despised race is represented as inferior, but a recent writer in California defended the severity toward the Japanese and concluded with the statement, "If the Japanese are superior people, so much the worse." One can read rationalizations which take the form of a pseudo-scientific assertion, that while both

racess may be good, the mixture is bad. There is nothing in this except the ingenuity of an author who rather pathetically grasps at a poor reason when he has had to abandon the others.

Race prejudice, thus, can be shown to be founded not on reason but on sentiments lying deeper and to be relatively impervious to rational arguments. Defenders of the Negro can marshal many interesting and important facts. In 1870 the Negro in the United States owned 12,000 homes, 20,000 farms, and property to the value of \$20,000,000. At a later time they owned 700,000 homes, 1,000,000 farms, and were worth \$1,800,000,000. They own 22,000,000 acres of land, which is equal to the area of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. These facts are very interesting and very important, but when they are quoted to a person who is defending race prejudice in America their effect is sometimes absolutely nothing.

In the concrete social phenomena, particularly those of a collective nature, we may distinguish two parts or elements. One of these is relatively changeable and arises from the need men feel to be logical and the desire they have to appear reasonable to their fellows. The other element is relatively invariable and is based upon, or is the expression of, the interests and the emotions which lie deep in the personality. These are the social attitudes, and race prejudice is one of them. It is not the result of calm reasoning but arises from an emotional condition in a specific social setting. This attitude is defended by arguments but is not necessarily altered by counterarguments.

If the reasons assigned for the prejudice are shown to be bad, the usual effect will be the abandonment of the reasons and the assertion of new reasons for the same old attitude. Race prejudice, as will be later shown, can be lost and does on occasion disappear, but it is perhaps futile to expect the attitude to yield to mere arguments, though, of course, there is no reason why men who wish to argue may not do so.

We may attempt to summarize the views here expressed under the following heads:

1. Race prejudice is very widespread. It is almost universal. Indeed, sociologists would agree that it might appear anywhere on the planet and has actually been manifested by every racial group. Those who are the victims of exclusion in some areas are themselves exclusive in other places. The Chinese may be dis-

criminated against in America, but the Chinese in China have exhibited the same antagonism against other racial groups. The Japanese are discriminated against, but at times they themselves are discriminating and so with the peoples of India, whether Hindus or Mohammedans, not to mention the various color lines which exist among American Negroes. We shall therefore be most accurate in our formulation of race prejudice if we regard it as a natural phenomenon and normal in the sense in which Durkheim speaks of crime as normal or poverty or suicide, by which he means that, under given conditions, the statistical facts force the prediction that the phenomenon will continue to occur.

2. Race prejudice is not one culture pattern but many. It takes many forms and exhibits many degrees. There is always involved a collective attitude of exclusiveness, the object of prejudice being kept at a greater distance than the members of one's own race. But this social distance varies, and a rough measure or scale could be made, and has indeed been attempted. The members of the out-group are in some places completely excluded from every form of contact, as, for example, in India where the very shadow of an untouchable is a contamination, or again, the out-group may mingle freely in public thoroughfares but may not sit as neighbors in a public assembly. Sometimes the line is drawn at eating together, where it forbids or permits public assemblies of a religious nature, and so on through separate scales to complete "social equality" and the approved courtship and marriage between the young people of the two groups. The exact conditions under which the line is drawn in each case might be historically accounted for, but there is little or no logic in it and it can easily be shown to be absurd. As before remarked, however, one may admit the absurdity and retain the attitude.

3. When race prejudice arises, it appears to follow a pattern which has been set locally in the mores, if such pattern be present. Thus the extreme form of exclusiveness toward the Indians in South Africa can be explained only by the previously acquired attitudes toward the native Negroes. Feeling against the Indians was no higher in Natal than that against the Japanese in California, but the form of exclusion is different, and this pattern was followed in each case. A recent court decision in Mississippi excludes Chinese from the public schools. This is understandable if we recall the pattern existing with reference

to the Negroes in the south. It may be called a certain consistency in exclusiveness and follows a certain law of habit.

If prejudice arises where there is no pattern or tradition, it may take original forms. Thus, the children of the slave women in the South who were not acknowledged by their fathers and who lived with their mothers brought about the classification of Mulattoes and full-bloods as members of the same excluded group. In the Portuguese colonies, where such children were recognized and publicly acknowledged by the father, the Mulatto came to be classed with the white group. In Cape Colony the Mulatto received certain concessions, as for example, the right to vote, which tended to make them into a third caste—quite different from the situation in the two other cases.

4. Race prejudice having arisen, it may be intensified or mitigated by social experiences. It is aggravated by any conflict between the groups. If conflict ceases entirely, a condition of equilibrium known as accommodation ensues and the feeling is reduced to a minimum. If, however, the conflict or hostility arises in a form where the in-group and out-group unite against a common antagonist or enemy, the result is always to mitigate the prejudice and to act in the direction of its removal.

During the World War there was a period when the Negro soldiers and the Negro man-power were regarded as valuable assets to the nation. Men who had never done so before used the words "we" and "us" to include the Negro and white groups taken together. Had the conflict lasted longer, and had it at the same time threatened to go against us, this common feeling would have been more enduring. What happened is a matter of common knowledge. The unexpected armistice released the tension and in some places a very strong reaction took place. Nevertheless, the period is part of the experience of the nation, and the ultimate result in social evolution will be affected by what happened in 1917-1918.

5. Race prejudice is increased both in intensity and in duration when to the difference in heredity is added the factor of religious or other social barrier. Anti-Semitism seems almost perennial, and part of the explanation may be looked for in the multiplicity of barriers to freedom of social intercourse. Each new wave of immigration supplies a group who differ even in dress. The dietary differences are by no means negligible, though these tend

to disappear, but the religious separation continues to accentuate and emphasize the objects of exclusion when the original motives and occasions have disappeared. Still, it is possible to over-state this point. The definition of the we-group and the out-group depends upon the arousal of group consciousness, and this may take place in disregard of any single type of separation, whether religious, racial, or any other. The massacre at Amritsar united for the time being men in south India with the inhabitants of the Punjab in an intense feeling of brotherhood, in spite of many differences and in spite of ancient historical antipathy. It is a common practice of Hindu students in American universities to wear a turban or some distinctive mark, so that they will not be classed as Negroes. Yet it sometimes happens that a series of unpleasant experiences will entirely change this attitude and the Hindu will class himself as a colored man, aligning himself with the American Negro. This phenomenon follows the normal law of group consciousness which, perhaps, needs no further illustration.

6. Race prejudice cannot only be mitigated, it can disappear. In many cases it has entirely disappeared and in other situations it is obviously decreasing. The Norman Conquest of England was followed by a period of racial hostility and prejudice, but at the present time there is hardly a vestige of the feeling remaining. There was an unmistakable race prejudice against German immigrants in this country and the successive groups of Germans, Irish, and French felt the effects of this same phenomenon. At the present time the race prejudice against these three groups is hardly more than vestigial. The hostility which the Germans and the Irish encountered is now turned against Italians, Poles, Mexicans, and others, but there seems no discoverable difference between the treatment of these last and the way in which the former groups were originally received.

7. If we inquire more particularly into the stages of integration, it seems that there can be distinguished certain generalized aspects. There is first of all the gradual taking over of the customs of the dominant group. This is observed first in the costumes, particularly the costumes of the men who go freely among the natives, and of the children and young people who are sensitive to the criticism of those among whom they move. Costume is more conservative in the case of the older women,

chiefly because of the domestic isolation. Next follows the matter of language. Those of the first generation learn to talk English if possible, but they are sometimes too busy. The second generation has usually two languages, but the members of the third generation often discard the heritage of their fathers for the custom of the country.

The sociologist sees in the public schools of America the real melting pot. The immigrant children are confronted with the new culture in a way that forces them to adopt it. The methods are sometimes brutal, the ridicule of the natives being the most cruel weapon, and because the children are young and defenseless they capitulate rather promptly and are absorbed into the cultural life of their schoolmates. We can generalize all these processes under the head of common experiences which, as before mentioned, are the sources of group consciousness and group loyalty. The bi-racial committees in the South have often been little more than informal conferences by leading members of both races to talk over a situation, to see what can be done. These committees help to create a temporary we-group and add ever so little to the stock of traditions which forms the stream of social evolution.

An important means or method for the mitigation of race prejudice lies in the realm of art. To join with an Irish girl in order to help her persuade her father to let her marry a Jewish boy is not given to many Americans. But in the theater we may do this for two interesting and amusing hours. Art is an experience, a sort of vicarious experience, and yet, however vicarious it may be, it is an emotional experience and always modifies our emotional attitudes. The exhibition of primitive African sculpture may have little effect, but it may have some. The reading of a powerful novel in which the human qualities of another race are made appealing acts like a powerful social cement to bind together the hitherto unconnected fragments of a social body.

Of course, art can work both ways. The Negroes objected to the *Birth of the Nation* and the *Clansman*. No one who strongly desired the disappearance of race prejudice between whites and Negroes would care to see this drama continue in its popularity. Indeed, it may be thought of as a direct reaction to *Uncle Tom's Cabin*.

8. Race prejudice, being at the same time a collective and an emotional condition, is modified slowly. It is not an individual phenomenon, though every serious individual modification may be theoretically assumed to have some effect on the whole. The important point is that the subjective emotions are only half, the other half being the external conditions and organized regulations. It is only partly true to say that religious emotions or principles can remove this prejudice. This would be to neglect the necessity of a change in the external conditions. There is, therefore, a double problem; the one side psychological, the other, institutional. Any attempt to study it or change it without recognizing this is apparently doomed to disappointment. This is the sense in which race prejudice is appropriately called a natural phenomenon. It changes slowly but it does change. A too-sudden modification, either of attitude or institution, is not only impermanent in character but tends to be followed by a reaction which temporarily leaves the last state worse than the first.

9. But to call race prejudice a natural phenomenon is not to assume that it should be endured or accepted. If we may call race prejudice natural, we must also admit suicide, murder, and automobile accidents into this same class. These disturb us and we try to mitigate them, but perhaps we shall never wholly succeed. Nevertheless, the unwelcome effects are undeniable and should be clearly kept in mind.

Race prejudice is narrowing. It may intensify loyalty to one's own group; it certainly produces blindness when members of the out-group are considered. We regard as human those whom we can sympathize with, whose motives we understand, and whose feelings we recognize to be like our own. The barriers men erect in prejudice make it sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible to regard the member of an excluded group as being wholly human. If we fight the Germans, we tend to regard them as Huns, as man-like beasts, as cruel savages. If we exclude Negroes, we call them inferior or patronize them as being emotionally gifted but intellectually deficient. Reactionaries of today speak of the south Europeans as coming from unassimilable stocks. Sometimes a man who feels this way writes a book to prove it and calls it science. But let us not be deceived; there is always an emotional element which is difficult to alter and even

hard to make explicit. It is a sentiment of race prejudice, and it narrows the individual life and always weakens the society where it exists.

The effect of race prejudice on individuals who hold it is to limit their power of discrimination. It blinds a man to differences where these would otherwise be easily seen. Persons are treated according to a stereotype and not as separate and distinct individualities. This is a sort of mental laziness, due to the emotional attitude which, being directed toward a class, is manifested toward the varying members of the class as if they did not vary.

The object of this chapter has been to show that the desire to change a prejudice is more likely to succeed if we first understand fully the nature of prejudice. Those who are interested in removing a social attitude are more apt to succeed if they first are successful in understanding why people who have the attitude do have it.

INDEX

A

Absolutism, 304
 Accommodation, 358
 Act, 146, 147
 Alliterative concord, 267
 Allport, F. H., 39, 58, 127, 160, 197
 Amana Community, 49, 51
 Ames, E. S., 64, 165
 Andamans, 107, 297
 Angell, J. R., 63, 64, 144, 155, 262
 Art, as mitigating prejudice, 364
 Associationism, 178
 Atkins, W. E., 133, 142
 Attitudes, 57, 186, 187
 definition of, 136
 racial, 317
 resolution of crises, 140
 social, 127-154
 Aurelius, Marcus, 257

B

Bain, Read, 145
 Baldwin, J. M., 157
 Bankundo, 68
 Bantu, Congo, 267, 278-288
 Bartlett, F. C., 15
 Bectereu, W., 160
 Behavior, 144
 Behaviorism, 39, 156, 160, 178, 180,
 182, 241
 Bentham, J., 160
 Bernard, L. L., 156, 160, 169
 Bivalence, 322
 Boaz, Franz, 252, 262
 Bogardus, E. S., 127
 Burgess, E. W., 127
 Bushman tribes, 107

C

Campbell, Alexander, 49
 Cane Ridge revival, 274
 Carroll, Lewis, 79
 Catholicism, 344, 346
 Character education, 208, 241-248
 Children, discipline of, 234-240
 fundamental tendencies of, 226-
 233
 punishment of, 88, 89
 Collective psychology, 168
 Communication, 189
 Community studies, 103
 Competition, 356
 Conflict, 2, 51, 52, 339, 358
 race, 340
 religious, 339
 Conscience, 308
 Consciousness of kind, 50
 Control, 305
 Cooley, C. H., 7, 9, 17, 36, 37, 40,
 43, 64, 157, 162
 Cooperation, 348
 Crowds, 74, 76
 Culture, 21, 35, 228, 278, 299
 pattern, 361
 priority of, 3, 30
 Custom, 307
 Cyproolithic age, 291

D

Davenport, F. M., 273
 Derivations, 199, 326
 Descartes, 160, 257
 Desires, 151, 184, 185
 Deterrence theory, 111
 Dewey, John, 98, 127, 129, 133, 135,
 136, 144, 152, 159, 165, 233, 252,
 262, 305

Diffusion of culture, 25, 260, 298
 Discipline, 234
 Downey, June E., 72
 Drever, James, 62, 69
 Dunkers, 54
 Dunlap, Knight, 132
 Durkheim, Emile, 134, 157, 197

E

Ecological areas, 34, 103
 Education, 205-209, 210-215, 241-248
 Edwards, Thomas, 50, 51, 52, 59
 Elements in psychology, 173-189
 Elite, 200
 Ellwood, C. A., 64
 Environment, 295
 Eskimo children, 107
 Eta people, 355, 356
 Ethnocentrism, 13, 14, 282, 301, 331, 332
 linguistic, 14
 "scientific," 13
 Ethnology, 254-261
 Expiation, theory of, 110

F

Faculties, mental, 187
 Fairchild, H. P., 334, 335
Faits sociaux, 23
 Family discipline, 234-240
 Fisher, Galen, 338
 Folkways, 23, 308, 311
 Frazer, J. G., 134, 284
 Freud, S., 64, 161, 255, 284
 Friendship, 230

G

Generalization, 264
 Gestalt psychology, 146, 156, 162, 183
 Giddings, F. H., 50
 Group consciousness, 318
 Groups, 99-101, 230
 priority of, 98

H

Habit, 136, 236
 Hayes, E. C., 64
 Hegel, G. W. F., 110, 174
 Henley, W. E., 20
 Herbart, J. F., 110
 Hereditary tendencies, 238
 Heredity, 333, 357
 Hobhouse, L. T., 90
 Hollingsworth, H. L., 146
 Holmes, O. W., 40
 Human nature, 7-20, 188
 mutability of, 18
 Hunter, W. S., 61, 64

I

Ibibio tribe, 67
 Ideas, 175, 187
 innate, 175
 Imageless thought, 180
 Imagination, 3
 Imitation, 73-83
 immediate, 77
 intentional, 81
 slow, unwitting, 80
 Imitativeness, 272
 Impulses, 236
 Independent origin, 296
 Individual, 211, 228
 Inhibition, 272
 Insanity, 288
 Instincts, 15, 61-72, 158, 187, 196, 226, 258
 controversy about, 169
 Institutions, 309, 311, 312
 Integration, 363
 Intellectualism, 228
 Interview method, 102
 Introspection, 181, 255
 Isolation, 280

J

James, William, 22, 61, 65, 155, 175, 179, 247
 Jews, 338, 342, 343, 348, 350-353
 Jung, C. S., 64

K

Kant, E., 28
 Kempf, E. J., 256
 Kingsley, Charles, 78
 Kipling, R., 329
 Koffka, K., 127
 Kropotkin, P., 64

L

Lang, Andrew, 67, 85
 Language, 97, 266
 "drum," 281
 Lasswell, H. D., 133, 143
 Leadership, 31, 33
 LeBon, G., 64
 Lee, Ann, 48
 Lévy-Bruhl, L., 28, 134, 251, 282,
 284, 323
 Life history, 102
 Locke, John, 257
 Loyalty, 230

M

McDougall, William, 13-16, 61,
 62, 64, 67, 71, 73, 82, 85, 155,
 156, 158, 159, 170, 196, 197,
 257, 280
 Magic, 283
 Marett, R. R., 134
 Marginal man, 33, 34
 Mead, George H., 7, 79, 144, 165
 Merriam, C. E., 143
 Methods of investigation, 102-104
 Mill, J. S., 160
 Missionaries, 223
 Moody, William Vaughan, 42
 Moore, Addison W., 165
 Morale, 239
 Mores, 216-225, 308, 311
 irresistability of, 220
 mutability of, 221
 non-rationality of, 219
 Mormonism, 47
 Mormons, 54
 Munsterberg, H., 62, 64
 Mythapoeic error, 265

N

Negro, American, 276
 Neolithic age, 291
 Neuroses, 256
 Nordic race, 72

O

Opinion, 141
 Oppenheimer, Franz, 110

P

Paleolithic age, 290
 Pareto, V., 1, 57, 58, 152, 190-201
 Park, R. E., 33, 57, 127, 320
 Parker Carleton, 64
 Patrick, G. T. W., 66
 Penn, William, 31
 Perry, W. J., 303
 Personality, 53, 130, 169, 189, 278
 Phrenology, 176
 Pillsbury, W. B., 62, 64
 Political science, 172
 Polyandry, 259
 Polynesians, 297
 Prejudice, 321-322, 325, 348, 354-
 356
 Preliterate peoples, 215, 251-254,
 282, 292
 Primary group, 36-45, 213, 215, 235,
 238
 Primitive man, 260
 Progress, 294, 302
 Protestants, 344
 Psychiatry, 171
 Psychoanalysis, 161, 183, 184, 280
 Psychological elements, 173-189
 Psychologist's fallacy, 264
 Psychology, animal, 160, 256
 associationist, 176
 faculty, 176
 genetic, 70
 introspective, 12
 physiological, 21
 social, 155-172

Pueblo tribe, 107
 Punishment, 84-95, 96-123, 220
 of children, 88, 89
 theories of, 110, 111

R

Race, 287
 Race prejudice, 263, 317, 354-366
 a natural phenomenon, 354, 365
 Rasmussen, K., 107, 289
 Ratcliffe-Brown, A., 107
 Rationalism, 229
 Rationalization, 326
 Ratzenhofer, G., 134
 Raup, R. B., 145
 Reflex, 65
 conditioned, 161
 Reformation, theory of, 111
 Religion, 225
 Religious experience, 247
Representations collectives, 17, 28,
 157, 208
 Residues, 198
 Response, 245
 Role taking, 9
 Ross, E. A., 74, 155, 157
 Royce, Josiah, 131

S

Sect and sectarian, 46-60
 Sensation, 177
 Sentiments, 317
 Silcox, C. E., 338
 Small, A. W., 134
 Smith, Elliott, 303
 Snedden, D. S., 206
 Social evolution, 289-313
 Social heritage, 210
 Spencer, Herbert, 13, 23, 84, 174,
 252, 260, 262, 271, 284
 Stefansson, V., 88, 89, 106, 266, 271,
 275
 Stimulus, 245, 246
 correlative with response, 147, 246
 Sumner, W. G., 23, 134, 191

Symonds, P. M., 145
 Sympathy, 12

T

Taboos, 272
 Tarde, G., 75, 157
 Temperament, 56
 Thomas, W. I., 57, 71, 127, 128, 133,
 135, 138, 142, 143, 262
 Thorndike, E. L., 61, 62
 Thought, imageless, 160, 180
 Thurstone, L. L., 58, 152, 171
 Titchener, E. B., 155
 Toleration, 51-52
 Trotter, W., 64
 Tufts, J. H., 165
 Twain, Mark, 78, 329

U

Unconscious, the, 184

V

Values, 4

W

Wallas, Graham, 64, 135
 Warren, H. C., 64, 158
 Watson, J. B., 62-65, 160
 Wheeler, W. M., 9
 White, Andrew D., 305
 Williams, J. M., 127, 133, 142, 152
 Wilson, Woodrow, 188
 Wishes, 184, 185
 as elements, 130
 Wissler, C., 23
 Woodworth, R. S., 146
 Writing, 303
 alphabetical, 302
 sign of civilization, 253
 Wundt, W., 62, 134, 157, 168

Z

Zangwell, Israel, 334
 Zionism, 352
 Znaniecki, F., 57, 71, 133, 135, 142

